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Focusing on the Peronist period from 1943 to 1955 as the high point
of a transitional process between two patterns of dependency on foreign 
capital, the study explores the dynamics underlying the pendular cycle 
so characteristic of Latin American political life— the dialectical 
movement between some variant of populist rule and that based on military 
power as a means of repressing popular aspirations. Peronism emerged 
in the context of contradictions within a developmental pattern based 
on an alliance of the export producing, landowning oligarchy with foreign, 
primarily British, commercial and financial groups. The developmental 
model promoted by the Peron government^in turn, was geared principally to
urban labor and local capitalists producing for the domestic market.
The coalition Peronism was based on could only be held together 
under conditions allowing for increased wages along with higher profits 
for national capitalists. In the absence of such advantageous conditons, 
a populist-nationalist regime is driven by its commitment to pursue
development within the framework of capitalist social relations to cut 
back on the consumption levels of its popular base. Such policies 
result in increased working class militance which undermines capitalist 
accumulation-. This brings the military to power.
The military rulers then use the coercive power of the armed 
forces to back up an economic project serving the interests of the 
oligarchy and multinational industrial and financial capital. Whereas 
populist-nationalism used material incentives to gain stable labor rela­
tions, the military enforces labor peace through intimidation, torture 
and murder. This forceful restructuring of the foundation of the nation's 
economic life not only harms the working class and popular sectors, but 
also erodes the position of bourgeois sectors based on the production and 
distribution of wage goods. The stage is set for the reemergence of some 
variant of populist-nationalism as a formula for exercising state power.
Finally, military repression will return once the new regime is 
unable is unable to provide material benefits for its popular base while 
also meeting the increased demand from foreign capital for whatever surplus 
the Argentine economy is able to generate.
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CHAPTER I
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND FINDINGS
Theories of Modernization and Development
This study evolved as an effort to understand the significance 
of changes which took place during the Peronist years between 1943 and 
1955. It soon became apparent that their implications went beyond 
the study of Argentine politics. Argentina represents an early exam­
ple of what many Third World nations have attempted to achieve. With 
the First Five Year Plan of 1947-51, the Peron government announced 
a concerted and systematic, nationalist and non-socialist program of 
industrialization designed to lead to self-sustaining and autonomous 
growth for the Argentine economy. Argentina of the Peronist period 
had the desire and seemed to possess the conditions necessary for 
rapid and self-sustaining growth. Yet, in spite of manifesting the 
conditions and relationships held in the development/modernization 
literature to be essential for achieving economic development and 
political modernization, the Argentine case did not show these results.
It is interesting to note that the early formulators of the 
development/modernization literature did not view Latin America as 
their major research area. As Alfred Stepan pointed out in his arti­
cle on the subject*, this neglect was "due, in part, to the underlying
*Alfred Stepan, "Political Development Theory: The Latin
American Experience," Journal of International Affairs 20 (1966):223-
34.
assumptions of much of the work on development. The literature reveals 
a strong bias toward an almost unilinear, mechanistic view of history—  
society moves from traditional, to transitional, to modern stages."^- 
In extrapolating an idealized version of liberal-democratic components 
from the Western experience and presenting it either as a goal toward 
which "developing" societies automatically tended or one they must 
strive for because it embodied humanity's highest political achieve­
ment, the literature proceeded ahistorically and served an ideological 
function. It proceeded ahistorically because in reifying selective 
components of the Western tradition, they loose all connections to 
the social and economic processes from which they emerged. An in-depth 
analysis of these processes would have negated the literature's ideal­
ized, one-sided characterization. It would have led to a dialectical 
treatment of, for example, the relationships between political democ­
racy and the exploitative mechanisms of the emerging capitalist sys­
tem. Such a dialectical treatment would have contradicted the litera­
ture's ideological function.
Rather than contributing to the explanation of cases like the 
Argentine, the conventional theories of modernization and development 
have essentially served to justify the relations between the centers 
of international capitalism and its peripheral areas. In avoiding an 
analysis of the oppressive and exploitative mechanisms on which the
power and privilege of those who benefit from the ongoing social relations 
rests, mhe literature served to justify their position. The ideological 
function performed by the mainstream literature can be seen by the 
way its various conceptual frameworks and methodologies
^Stepan, p. 293.
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deny, minimize, or obscure the negative features of social reality: 
the posture of value-neutrality with its implicit espousal of exist­
ing arrangements in the distribution of power as legitimate; behavior- 
alism with its focus on observed behavioral regularities abstracted 
from the socio-economic context within which they took shape; func­
tionalism with its concern for existing relationships as the "natural" 
means for performing the function in question; the fetishism of sta­
tistics which treats its units of analysis as separate and distinct, 
having no connections other than their numerical relationships; the 
consideration of the political dimension as an independent variable 
in and of itself, not as the outcome of particular social processes; 
not to mention such concepts as "social mobility," "openness of 
elites," "transitional societies," and so on, which remove the onus 
for those benefitting from conditions of economic exploitation and 
political dominations and counsel the victims to bear their burden 
because of the transience of their situation.*-
The critique of the modernization/development literature is 
well known. The earlier examples are still among the better ones: 
Barrington Moore, Jr., Political Power and Social Theory (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1958) and C. Wright Mills, The Sociological 
Imagination (New York: Grove Press, 1961). The best single article 
is probably Mark Kesselman's "Order or Movement? The Literature of 
Political Development as Ideology," World Politics 26 (October 1973): 
139-54. For numerous citations of the literature showing its orienta­
tion aimed at aiding those in power retain it, see pp. 144-5. Kessel- 
man remarks: "My objection is not to describing how authorities 
attempt to maintain dominance, but rather to the implicit espousal 
of their cause: the literature of political development might be
assigned reading in Silone's school for dictators." (p. 144)
Another excellent work on this subject is the book edited by Robin 
Blackburn, Ideology in Social Science (New York: Vintage Books, 1973) 
which reprints articles from the New Left Review.
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In assessing the utility of the modernization/development 
literature for analyzing the Argentine case, I found it particularly 
deficient in two major areas of inquiry. On the one hand, in mini­
mizing or avoiding any analysis of dependency altogether, the litera­
ture neglected an integral component in the functioning of the inter­
national order. On the other hand, its treatment of economic factors 
was also deficient. The economic dimension is either absent from the 
analysis or it tends to be "inverted." That is, instead of analyzing 
material elements as-a principal aspect in the determination of 
social reality, they are seen as dependent variables determined by, 
rather than determining cultural patterns, norms and values.
Only an analysis that is squarely based on both the economic 
and dependency dimensions can unravel the complexities and paradoxes 
that have characterized Argentine development. To summarize the 
basic theoretical premise pursued in this study: from the very
beginning to the present, the patterns underlying Argentine economic, 
social, and political life have been determined by the particular 
structural links between the national groups controlling the pre­
dominant forms of productive activity and the major foreign groups 
most closely tied to these productive processes.
Dependency Theory
In analyzing the Argentine case I adopt the dependency 
theory framework because it most adequately addresses the shortcomings 
in the development/modernization theories. Dependency theory focuses 
on the external conditioning of local history, but at the same time 
lends itself to a dialectical approach that emphasizes the inter-
5
relationships between the external and the internal. Thus it also 
addresses one of the weaknesses in Marxist theories of imperialism.
Too frequently there has been a tendency to analyze Third 
World development as simply a kind of reflex action caused by imperial­
ism. To be sure, international capitalism shaped local class struc­
tures, but the course of the international system, in turn, has been 
affected by the specific ways in which these societies developed in 
the areas to which capitalism spread.
In this study I apply the Cardoso and Faletto version of 
the dependency theory framework because it best encompasses the 
needed dialectical approach. Their formulation is specifically 
geared to avoid the twin interpretive fallacies that arise from "the 
belief in the mechanical conditioning of the national politico- 
social situation by external domination amd the opposite idea that all 
situations are historically unique."*- Cardoso and Faletto's theoreti­
cal framework also links the economic, social and political components 
of development. In analyzing the relationships among groups comprising 
the social structure, the key, according to Cardoso and Faletto, lies 
in the control of production and consumption. Cardoso and Faletto*s 
version thus avoids one of the major errors Marxist critics have 
faulted dependency theory for. Earlier formulations, particularly 
Andre Gunder Frank's, traced the causes for underdevelopment to the 
systematic siphoning off of economic surplus from the satellite areas 
to the metropolis through the mechanisms of international trade. Such
■^Fernando Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, Dependencia y desarollo en 
America Latina (Buenos Aires: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 1972) p. 162.
My translation.
an approach, confined to the sphere of circulation, results in an 
analysis whose units are exploited and exploiting nations. Moreover, 
as the critics correctly pointed out, a dependency theory confined to 
the sphere of circulation necessarily avoids analyzing social rela­
tions of production and hence class structures.^
Unfortunately, there was a tendency, particularly on the part 
of the more sectarian Marxist critics, to proceed from this justifiable 
criticism to the "straw man technique" in order to dismiss dependency
theory as a whole. Equating the whole of dependency theory with the
2Frank type of formulation allows John Weeks and Elizabeth Dore, for 
example, to overlook dependency theory formulations, like Cardoso and 
Faletto*s, which proceed from the sound Marxist premise of commodity 
production. As Karl Marx demonstrated in Capital, the development 
of capitalism— i.e., the process whereby commodity production takes 
over the provision of the goods and services necessary to sustain 
social life— cannot be properly understood without analyzing the 
various interrelationships between production and circulation that 
it gives rise to. Indeed, Volume II of Capital largely concerns itself 
with the implications of the factthat, though surplus value arises in 
the sphere of production, it must be realized in the sphere of circula­
tion. Just as an analysis confined to circulation fails by avoiding 
class structure, so too an analysis restricted to the realm of
^Emeste Laclau(h) in "Modos de production y sistemas 
economicos y poblacion excedente: aproximacion historica a los casos 
argentine y chileno," Revista Latinoamericana de Sociologxa 5 (July 
1962): 276-317, is the earliest and one of the most cogent exponents 
of this critique, 
oJohn Weeks and Elizabeth Dore, "International Exchange and the 
Causes of Backwardness," Latin American Perspectives 6 (Spring: 1979) 62- 
87.
production fails equally because it neglects the importance of 
commercial and trade relations. It is inconceivable to analyze the 
functioning of the world economic system without taking this dimension 
into account. A sound analysis is one that proceeds from a more com­
plex but also more accurate perspective of the nature of contemporary 
global capitalism. "The capitalist world economy is an articulated 
system of capitalist, semi-capitalist and pre-capitalist relations of 
production, linked to each other by capitalist relations of exchange 
and dominated by the world capitalist market."^
An even more unfortunate use of the "straw man technique" is
the reasoning of those Marxist sectarians who dismiss dependency
2theory out of hand as a bourgeois construct. It is of course quite
true that the impetus for the originators of the dependency theory 
/framework, Raul Prebisch and those grouped around him in the United
3Nations' Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA), was nationalist 
and sometimes anti-imperialist, but certainly non-Marxist. Yet the
Ernest Mandel, Late Capitalism (London: Verso, 1978), pp. 48-9. 
See also Geoffrey Kay, Development and Underdevelopment: A Marxist 
Analysis (London: n.p., 1974) which emphasizes the specific weight and 
role of merchant capital in colonies and semi-colonies for any explana­
tion of backwardness.
Mandel presents a very useful formulation of Marx's method 
which corresponds with the procedure that evolved In the present 
study. See especially pp. 16-7 of Mandel's book.
^For example, Raul A. Fernandez and Jose^F. Ocampo, "The Latin 
American Revolution: A Theory of Imperialism, Not Dependence," Latin 
American Perspectives 1 (Spring 1974): 4-29.
3The concepts of "center" and "periphery" were already 
clearly formulated in ECLA's Estudio economico de America Latina 
(New York: United Nations, 1949).
fundamental premise on which ECLA based its analysis incorporated 
the Marxist "law of unequal development under capitalism." ECLA 
saw the international system as one entity composed of industrial 
centers and primary producing peripheries, with the former dominating 
the latter. Prebisch had already applied the concept of unequal ex­
change to the Argentine situation in a 1934 article for the Revista 
de econom^a argentina (Ano 17, nos. 193 and 194, July and August). He 
noted that in that year Argentina had to sell 73 percent more than 
before the Depression in order to obtain the same quantity of manufac­
tured goods and "in the previous year the nation had to pay double the 
amount in terms of gold on its fixed foreign debt obligations as it 
did in 1928."* Thus in dismissing dependency theory as a bourgeois 
construct, the sectarian Marxist critics fail to take into account the 
Marxist underpinnings even in the bourgeois version.
Stressing the ways in which Latin American productive 
structures were shaped in accordance to their insertion into the 
international division of labor emerging in the nineteenth century, 
the ECLA analysis provided a powerful explanation for the region's 
contemporary problems: persisting dependence on agro-mineral experts, 
weak and underdeveloped industrial sectors, and as a corollary, the 
lack of self-sufficient, autonomous national economies. On the other 
hand, the ECLA analysis' almost exclusive focus on trade relations 
(leaving productive relations outside its purview) and its neglect of 
the internal social structures of peripheral areas and their points
*Joseph L. Love, "Raul Prebisch and the Origins of the Doc­
trine of Unequal Exchange," Latin American Research Review 15 (1980): 
50. Pages 52-60 present a good summary of Prebisch1s analysis of the 
functioning of the international system.
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of connection with the advanced industrial areas, also accounted for 
the shortcomings in the earlier dependency theory formulations.
Because the early formulators neglected the sphere of pro­
duction and therefore failed to develop an adequate class analysis, 
does not mean that this deficiency is intrinsic to dependency theory 
itself. Cardoso and Faletto's version for example, which begins with 
analyzing the predominant forms of economic activity and the social 
groups who control the "productive processes" and the "structures of 
distribution" involved, incorporates the Marxist synthesis between the 
two spheres. Thus when left sectarians equate Cardoso and Faletto's 
construction with the bourgeois version, they conveniently ignore 
the Marxist content in Cardoso and Faletto's work. An example is 
John Myer's critique of Cardoso. He faults Cardoso's formulation 
of dependency theory for the very point that constitutes one of its 
strengths. He objects that Cardoso's focus is on process, on the 
dynamic interrelationship which obtains between politics and economics, 
and not on class, and that it thereby deviates from Marxist analysis. 
Cardoso's unit of analysis, Myer argues, is by its very definition 
dynamic and "cannot be given a complete definition in strictly econ­
omic t e r m s . M y e r  ignores two basic points. First, Cardoso's 
analysis focuses on the developmental process involving shifting rela­
tionships between social groups within a theoretical framework that 
begins with system of production and its relations of production.
Second, the strength of Marxist analysis lies precisely in its ability
*John Myer, "A Crown of Thorns: Cardoso and Counter-Revolution," 
Latin American Perspectives 2 (Spring 1975): 41.
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to relate the economic to the political. Taking Marx's theory as a 
whole, there is no such thing as "a complete definition in strictly 
economic terms."
Rather than constituting an antithesis to Marxist theories of 
imperialism, when properly constructed, dependency theory represents a 
a necessary supplement. As Barbara Stallings put it, "dependency 
theory can be seen as an attempt to look at imperialism from the 
bottom up rather than from the top down."* Being concerned with the 
functioning of the international system as a whole, theories of 
imperialism tend to concentrate on the advanced capitalist areas as 
the centers of gravity. Dependency theorists, on the other hand, tend 
to turn their attention to effects of imperialism, to the specific 
ways in which international capitalism has had an impact on an area 
over time. A specific instance of dependency cannot be properly 
understood in isolation from the world system in which it developed 
and in which it functions. At the same time, each particular set of 
relationships between advanced capitalist centers and a dependent area 
has its own history and its own peculiar manifestations. It is in 
analyzing concrete instances that dependency theory has a contribution 
to make
Cardoso and Faletto's Contribution
I extrapolated the theoretical model applied to the Argentine 
case from Cardoso and Faletto's version of dependency theory, 
elaborating on their basic framework and the relationships they
^Barbara Stallings, Economic Dependency in Africa and Latin 
America (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1972) p. 5.
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single out as significant and determinative. Four aspects of Cardoso 
and Faletto*s formulation make theirs' a superior version of dependency 
theory for unravelling the complexities of the dependent world:
1. Their theoretical framework links economic, social and political 
factors and it provides a handle for getting to the key of the 
endeavor, the analysis of class structures
2. They provide for a dialectical conception of the external/internal 
nexus
3. Their analysis focuses on historical process and on the dynamic 
which accounts for movement and change, the contradictions under­
lying the relationships of the groups comprising the class 
structure
4. Their analysis incorporates the very important consideration of 
the transitional period between one pattern or modality and 
another
It must be pointed out that in singling out these four aspects and 
in their elaboration which follows, I have been selective and 
extrapolated from Cardoso and Faletto*s formulations, and I have re­
formulated and sharpened those components from their analysis which I 
feel provide the most useful approach. However, while it reorders 
and shifts the emphasis somewhat, this interpretation does not violate 
the implicit thrust of their arguments.
Cardoso and Faletto*s theoretical framework views society as com­
posed of groups having diverse and conflicting interests. At each 
point in time there are unstable compromises which resolve some 
conflicts while generating new ones. Thus, in a fundamental sense, 
the process of competition and struggle between groups with diverging
12
interests constitutes the dynamic element within any given social 
system. These interests, and the values and norms that express them, 
do not exist in a vacuum; they arise from the manner in which social 
groups are related to the structures involved in the production and 
distribution of material necessities and rewards. Power, according 
to this perspective, involves the use of the state and its institutions 
by some groups, and not others, to control the structures of production 
and distribution. Hence social change is the process which brings 
about redistributions in the power relationships of groups whose 
interests are at stake. And such "changes in the social system of 
domination always imply a redefinition in the forms of the control 
and organization of production and consumption."*
The second aspect of Cardoso and Faletto's formulation that
makes it so appealing is the stress they lay in their framework on
the global context within which national class structures develop and
to which its constituent groups are linked. Consequently the analysis
must incorporate such relationships as those which determine the
economics of the world market and the international balance of power.
In this endeavor they argue against a focus that separates factors
labelled external from those categorized as internal. "What is being
proposed is to find the characteristics that the national social system
2assumes and within them, their relationship to the external."
*Cardoso and Faletto, "Dependencia y desarollo en America 
Latina" in La dominacion de America Latina (Lima: Francisco Monchoa 
Editores, 1968), p. 191. My translation.
2Ibid., p. 196.
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The third aspect of the Cardoso and Faletto approach that I 
found valuable is its "dynamic" content. Cardoso and Faletto empha­
size that the analysis must be historical. In my view, the focus 
must be on the process whereby the contradictions underlying the 
relationships between groups comprising a particular class structure 
develop. Thus, if in the course of analyzing a particular develop­
mental pattern— in specifying its underlying structures and the links 
within and between national and foreign groups exhibited in these 
structures— one must employ a procedure which provides a kind of snap­
shot (frozen in time) of the constellation of socio-economic forces 
operative at that particular historical moment, then this procedure 
must be a means, a heuristic device and not an end. Its purpose is 
to underscore theoretical points and it must transcend a mere ideal- 
typical formulation of a given reality. This procedure should serve 
as an analytical tool with which to delineate possible outcomes 
within the dependent pattern being analyzed.
The analysis must be such that in specifying the develop­
mental pattern characteristic of the given historical stage, it 
states relationships exhibited in the "snapshot" of social forces in 
a manner that rules out some links between social groups and points 
to others likely to emerge as dominant within the modality charac­
teristic of the next stage. Thus, though this procedure used to 
analyze the relationships underlying a given historical moment may 
not predict specific contents of the developmental pattern operative 
at the next historical moment, it should aim to at least narrow down 
options and provide clues for the types of social constellations most 
likely to prevail.
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In making these points I have elaborated on Cardoso and 
Faletto's formulations where they emphasize historical process and 
stress dynamic tensions between groups as the analytic tool. In their 
view, analyzing a given historical moment requires specifying the 
social groups that make up the dominant set, since the particular ways 
in which they promote their interests defines the developmental process 
operative at the time. In this sense these relationships among and 
between national and foreign groups are presented as momentarily 
frozen. But, at the same time, they must be characterized within a 
dynamic context, as part of the process of change. In other words, 
the analysis of a given historical content must be able to take into 
account its fluidity. The analysis should not present a finality of 
results, but instead a process of becoming.
It is within this context that Cardoso and Faletto stress 
their point about dynamic tensions between groups.* With it they 
underline two facts. First, that a particular ruling coalition con­
tains within it groups with varying degrees of actual or potentially 
conflicting interests. The cohesion and stability of a dominant set 
of groups depends on the types and intensity of such conflicting 
interests and on the manner in which they are resolved. On the other 
hand, the dominant configuration must also contend with the interests 
of the national and foreign groups excluded from representation within 
it. Thus, the degree and form whereby excluded groups express their 
opposition, constitutes a second limiting factor on a ruling coalition's 
staying power.
*For reasons that will be explained shortly, I prefer the 
concept of "contradiction."
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Calling attention to the importance of transitional periods 
represents Cardoso and Faletto's fourth major contribution to dependency 
theory. They note that these dynamic tensions between groups become 
most acute and are therefore manifested most visibly during the 
transitional period between one pattern of dependency and another. In 
their writings a transitional period emerges as a result of an inter­
national crisis that disrupts the ongoing pattern of relationships 
between internal and external groups. Much of what they say about 
transitional periods is treated implicitly in the two cases they cite. 
The first is "the rupture of the colonial pact" which resulted in 
various types of the "externally oriented growth model." Externally 
oriented growth— economic growth based on the production of agricul­
tural or mineral primary goods for export— defined and determined the 
development of most Latin American societies from the colonial period 
until the Great Depression of the 1930's.* The second transitional 
period, which is the important one for our purposes, resulted from the 
1929 crash. Cardoso and Faletto term it "the crisis in the externally 
oriented growth model." It was marked by policies aimed at the 
consolidation of "internally oriented growth"— the expansion of 
nationally-owned manufacturing for domestic consumption. Eventually, 
it led to variations of "dependent industrialization" or the control 
of the local industrial sector by multinational capital.
The international economic collapse of 1929 exacerbated, and 
brought to a head, shifts in the relationships among and between the
*Mexico, which experienced the first social revolution of 
the twentieth century, is an important exception.
national and foreign groups comprising the dominant set, and shifts in 
their relationships to excluded and opposing groups. These shifts pro­
vided the content of "the crisis in the externally oriented growth 
model" of the thirties. These shifts came about as a result of factors 
which undermined the position of groups linked to the export of mineral 
and agricultural primary goods and the factors which made industrial 
activity increasingly important. The process set in motion resulted 
from the interplay of these external and internal factors and it was 
the manner in which they were linked that determined its results. Con­
sequently, as Cardoso and Faletto point out, in tracing the origin of 
the stimuli and mechanisms that may result in an industrialization that 
restructures the economic and social system, the analysis must incor­
porate, on the one hand, the transformations or conditions on the 
international scene and, on the other hand, the elements favorable 
to this type of development within the interplay of the politico- 
social forces in the dependent nation. These internal forces, linked 
to particular configurations of interests in the metropolitan centers, 
produce the policies that take advantage of these new conditions and 
opportunities for economic growth, and thereby define the direction 
and reach of the social and political changes being generated.
This formulation represents a useful contribution because, 
as Cardoso and Faletto note, though the transitional period of the 
thirties responded to essentially the same external stimuli, it 
resulted in diverse social arrangements taking shape in the various 
Latin American countries. In some cases the traditional ruling 
groups resisted any displacement of their control over the power 
structures. For example, in Argentina until the advent of Peronism,
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the crisis resulted in strengthening the domination of the agro­
exporting oligarchy through military-authoritarian forms, thereby 
repressing social turmoil and postponing the demands of excluded 
groups. In other cases however, the power of ruling groups diminished 
as the process of industrialization developed beyond their control.
In ascertaining possible outcomes of the transitional process, Cardoso 
and Faletto stress the importance of analyzing the degree to which, and 
the manner in which, prior conflicts within the ruling coalitions and 
with opposing groups have been resolved in the preceding stage.
In calling attention to the importance that the analysis of 
transitional periods deserves, Cardoso and Faletto offer an extremely 
useful addition to dependency theory. Understanding the dialectical 
process that occurs during a transitional period provides a unique 
opportunity for clarifying complex interrelationships that take shape 
into the trends determining the pattern of dependent relationships 
that emerge as dominant in the next stage.
A transitional period involves a dialectical process because, 
on the one hand, it implies more autonomy and less dependence for 
national groups. At a time when prior links with external groups are 
weakening, they have more room for maneuver and more options in re­
structuring their internal and external alliances. It is at such 
times that progressive changes are most likely. However, developments 
of this type depend on the presence of internal groups ready and 
willing to take advantage of the favorable international context.
There must either be a new coalition, representing a wider popular 
base, strong enough to offset the traditional groups, or the elite 
groups must be willing to widen their power base. On the other hand,
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a transitional period is also one in which the options of national 
groups become successively narrowed. The process which transpires is 
one in which the new arrangements are gradually solidified and con­
solidated; as each link between groups becomes established, it elimi­
nates the possibility for others and the room for maneuver grows 
increasingly smaller.
Theoretical Model Applied in This Study 
The model sketched above served me as a guide with which to 
organize and attach significance to the manifold events comprising 
Peronism, my aim being to see if I could "make sense" out of the 
totality. The particular formulation of dependency theory I chose 
stresses the connections among and between internal and foreign 
groups as a determining factor in the process of economic development.
The analysis must specify the ways in which foreign and national groups 
interconnect through their relationships to the predominant forms of econo­
mic activity. The interests of both of these groups arise from their 
connections to the structures of production and distribution involved.
Their interests, in turn, are the source for both the alliances and coali­
tions forged among and between these groupings as well as the source for 
the contradictions among them.
It follows then, that the analysis must delineate the com­
ponents operative in a given pattern of dependency: the groups, their
interests, the orientations that flow from them, and the relationships 
formed between these groups. In practice, this raises many problems 
and involves innumerable complexities particularly as concerns the key 
problem, that of relating groups to interests. In spite of these dif­
ficulties, I nevertheless propose to make general statements based on 
empirical data. The type of economic activity which predominates at
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the given time, provides the clue for the first step in this endeavor.
To find the predominant forms of economic activity I will use such 
indicators as percentages contributed by sectors to the Gross Domestic 
Product, the proportion of the total economically active population in 
each sector, and the relative volumes in the types of goods exported 
and imported. The next step is to locate the significant actors by 
singling out the groups "tied" to those processes found to encompass the 
largest shares of the totals. It is the structural ties of these 
groups to the predominant forms of economic activity— ownership of 
means of production, part played in the labor process creating value 
and in the distribution thereof; in other words, the social relations 
of production— that determine their interests and thus condition the 
relationships they forge among and between them.
Next comes an even more difficult step in the proposed pro­
cedure— one that, in the end, can only be justified by the results 
the analysis yields. Though necessary, it is clearly insufficient 
to merely enumerate the relationships between internal and external 
groups comprising a matrix of dependency. The procedure outlined so 
far does not get beyond a static picture; it lacks the vital element 
that accounts for change. If a particular modality or pattern of 
dependency is conceived as a stage, then the analysis must specify 
those elements that make for movement within it. Each stage contains 
within it the next stage. Consequently, rather than seeing it stat­
ically, as an outcome of processes, the analysis must deal with the 
dynamic elements inside these processes themselves. The key to 
this task lies in uncovering the conflictual tensions or contradic­
tions implicit in the particular ways that connections among and
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between the significant actors are structured. Each stage is in a 
constant state of flux— whereby relationships are solidified, altered, 
and undone— with continual readjustments that result from the contra­
dictions within it. Thus in analyzing the process whereby a particu­
lar set of relationships between groups takes shape, the focus must 
be on what holds these relationships together and what drives them 
apart. What holds them together is the common purpose the members 
of the coalition controlling the mechanisms of power have in using 
that power to pursue their interests. Likewise, opposing sets of 
groups have a common purpose in seeing their interests promoted. In 
what drives them apart, we get to the concept of contradiction.
There are, on the one hand, contradictions between the interests of 
the ruling and opposing groups. Simultaneously, each of these 
groupings also contain varying degrees of contradictory interests 
within them.
I use "contradiction" in contradistinction to "opposition," 
"contrary," or "conflicting"— all of which are meanings encompassed 
by the concept*-— because "contradiction" calls attention to 1) the 
systemic nature of the opposition involved, and 2) its dynamic 
nature as a source for movement and change. As to the first point, 
groups with contrary interests are not atomized units which can 
choose to avoid the conflict between them. What drives them apart 
is at the same time what holds them together. In other words, they 
are integrally related and connected by virtue of their common ele-
*Tt does not however, include the meaning of "untruth" or 
"false" prevalent in the everyday usage of "contradiction."
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merits within the same system. For example, proletariat and bour­
geoisie in a capitalist system are ultimately tied together and 
driven apart by their relationship to the process of commodity pro­
duction. The second point has already been mentioned: a contradiction 
involves more than just opposition arising from differing interests. 
The opposing interests are connected in a way that makes tension and, 
ultimately, conflict unavoidable. A contradiction involves opposing 
interests which become active and the resulting conflict is the source 
of change. A contradiction cannot remain a contradiction indefinitely. 
It must eventually lead to change and thus be reformulated on a new 
basis. Finally, it is important to note that the conflicting demands 
posed in a contradiction can be resolved in either direction. If 
there is a causal model in this dialectical mode of analysis, it is 
not the unilinear one of "a" causes "b." The contradiction between 
"a" and "b" can be reformulated in either direction. The causality 
is one of a narrowing down the range of possible outcomes while, 
simultaneously, the scope is also widened as the new combinations in 
turn, create the possibility of yet unforeseen reformulations.
I noted that there are contradictions between the interests 
of the ruling and the opposing groups, and that, simultaneously, each 
of these groupings also contain contradictory interests within them. 
Applying this step of the proposed analytic procedure requires imagi­
nation and creativity, intuition and common sense associations, and 
just plain knowledge of the subject matter. In this endeavor the 
theoretical framework offers no fast and firm, mechanical rules to 
be applied. All it offers is the awareness that each pattern of 
dependency should be conceived as a stage in a dynamic and dialectical
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sense, with each set of relationships between groups in a constant 
state of flux containing contradictory interests which set the limits 
for the next pattern of arrangements (which, in turn, contain their 
own contradictions). Moreover, the logic is not a deterministic one. 
Rather, each set of arrangements contains a number of possible 
patterns, with each one implying a different field of options for 
succeeding patterns.
Having delineated a dependent pattern in terms of the signif­
icant groups tied to the predominant forms of economic activity, the 
methodology which proved useful in ascertaining the determinative 
contradictions among and between these groups was to analyze the con­
tinuities and divergences with the developmental policies of the 
adjoining time periods. Each stage is the product of the previous 
stage and contains within it the next stage. Hence a thorough analysis 
of one stage, particularly focusing on the basic continuities of its 
developmental policies with those of the preceeding stage and on the 
ways in which they diverged, brought out the contradictions within 
that stage whose reformulation, in turn, determine the contents of 
the following stage. Specifying and clarifying the contradictions 
within one stage in this way provided an understanding of the manner 
in which these contradictions might be reformulated in the next stage. 
Developmental policies were chosen as the focus for comparison 
because they provide a useful handle for analyzing the interrelation­
ship between the economic and the political. A developmental policy 
is the medium through which the state as the institutional expression 
of the configuration of dominant groups mobilizes resources that 
reinforce some relationships among these groups and undermine others,
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as well as developing links to previously excluded groups, by pro­
moting some modes of economic activity and some features of the class 
structure while attacking others.
The most important stage to analyze is the transitional 
period. It is during transitional periods that shifts in the patterns 
of dominance become most discemable, and it is during such periods 
that the process of combinations of groups vying with each other to 
impose their aims assumes particular intensity. It is also in the 
transitional period that one of these begins to consolidate its posi­
tion vis-a-vis the others. Consequently, in focusing on relative 
shifts in the influence and power of local and foreign groups during 
the period of transition, the analysis provides a means for ascer­
taining its likely outcomes and thus also a means for narrowing down 
the variety of developmental patterns that could result.
A
How can one distinguish between a transitional period and a 
stage? It was stated that the lines are blurred, that change occurs 
constantly. Yet one must be able to specify at what times this 
process assumes particular intensity and, thus, becomes more visible. 
What then, sets a transitional process apart? Implicit in the fore­
going discussion there are at least four conditions which must be 
operative for a transitional process to take place. These general 
criteria are offered in a preliminary, and not in a definitive sense. 
They were found useful in this endeavor and, it is hoped, they can 
be refined and sharpened in order to aid in the analyses of other 
transitional periods.
The following are these four conditions. First, there must 
be a crisis on the international scene severe enough to disrupt the
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ongoing developmental process. In particular, the internal reper­
cussions of this crisis must be profound enough to throw into temporary 
disarray the alliance of domestic and foreign groups controlling the 
productive and marketing structures. This creates the vacuum which 
the competing sets of groups try to fill. Second, the basic elements 
that provide the infrastructure for the new pattern must be at hand. 
That is, even if in a subordinated capacity, the new pattern must 
have been developing within the prior stage. In our case, the transi­
tion between externally oriented growth and a dependent industrial 
economy, the industrial plant necessary for the production of con­
sumer goods must already exist. Such an infrastructure is a pre­
requisite for the physical and technological requirements of the new 
pattern. In addition, the groups tied to this infrastructure are 
the actors pushing for the expansion of the "new" pattern. Third, 
the alliance of groups on which the alternative developmental pattern 
is based, must possess and mobilize a coercive power strong enough to 
offset the political power of the groups comprising the traditional 
alliances. That is, for the goals of the new developmental program 
to be implemented, the mobilization must produce a political force 
strong enough to determine the use of available resources. Fourth, 
the realization of an alternative developmental program depends on 
adequate material conditions; that is, the necessary resources must 
be available before they can be utilized. In the case examined here, 
the transition from externally oriented growth to dependent indus­
trialization depends on the export of primary goods in order to
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obtain capital goods. This means that the demand for the nation’s 
major products must secure sufficient revenues to cover the costs 
of industrialization.
Summary of Analysis
Applying the theoretical framework and methodology out­
lined here yielded an analysis that brings out the significant fac­
tors and determinative interrelationships necessary for a deeper under­
standing of Argentine economic and political development.
This analysis enabled me to identify the key actors and time 
periods in the course of Argentine development. It will be recalled 
that each stage is conceived of as a pattern of dependency defined by 
the relationships forged among and between the national and foreign 
groups tied to the predominant forms of economic activity. I noted 
each stage must be analyzed not in a static, but rather in a dynamic 
sense as a process whose components are constantly evolving. The 
dynamic element in this process is the constant reformulation of 
contradictions arising out of the nation’s structures of production 
and distribution and their insertion into the global capitalist economy. 
Such an approach focues on the shifts within a pattern of dependency that 
become determinative in leading to modifications or alterations in the 
predominant forms of economic activity.
Which are the key actors and the significant stages in the 
course of Argentine economic and political development? This study 
analyzes the roles of British, continental European and North American 
capital (the external pole) and their shifting relationship with
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the landowning oligarchy and diverse sectors of the bourgeoisie, as 
well as the part played by the industrial working class and the popu­
lar sectors in these shifts (internal pole). The analysis traces the 
roles of these groups and their shifting relationships through the 
externally oriented growth pattern up to 1930, its modified version 
from 1930 to 1943, the period of Peronism's achievements from 1943 to 
1950, that of its limitations from 1950 to 1955, the period of the 
dependent industrial economy from 1955 to 1973, the second Peronist 
period of 1973 to 1976, and the attempt to reinstitute a new modified 
basis for externally oriented growth thereafter. As a means of 
highlighting the contradictions which underlay shifts in the relation­
ships among and between national and foreign groups dominant within 
each stage, I applied the methodology of analyzing continuities and 
divergences in the developmental patterns defining adjoining stages.
The resulting analysis revealed a process wherein, more often than 
not, these determinative shifts turned out to be a case of quantita­
tive change leading to qualitative change. This analysis developed 
in the remaining chapters can be presented schematically here.
Until 1930, Argentina exhibited the classical features of an 
externally oriented growth model. The economy developed on the 
foundation of agro-pastoral goods for export: first mutton, then beef, 
and later cereals and wheat, were raised and grown primarily for over­
seas markets. This predominant form of economic activity developed 
to the extent that Argentina practically became industrialized 
Europe's breadbasket. Between 1911 and 1934, 95 percent of Argentina's 
total exports were agro-pastoral goods and Argentina supplied more
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than half of the world’s total beef exports. In 1925, Argentina 
occupied first place in the world's exports of corn, oats and flax­
seed, and second or third in those of wheat and flour.* As a by­
product of this pattern, manufacturing remained relatively underdeveloped 
and subordinated to the requests of agricultural production. Local 
industry was constrained so as not to compete with the importation 
of industrial commodities from Argentina's major market, Great 
Britain. In turn, agro-pastoral exports became all the more essential 
since they provided the foreign exchange needed to purchase products 
not produced locally, both necessities and luxury goods.
Along with the centrality of agro-exports for the developing 
Argentine economy, a ruling class based on the ownership of the vast 
tracts of land used in raising or cultivating these commodities arose 
and solidified its hold over the evolving social and political struct­
ures. An increasingly sophisticated state apparatus with the capa­
bility for effective administration and regulation also developed in 
the context of this growing export trade. From the beginning, the 
landowning ruling class, or oligarqu^a. as it is popularly known in 
Argentina, used its economic power to control the state and, at the 
same time, the state played a key part in consolidating the oligarchy's 
economic and social position. Indeed, the state was instrumental in 
conferring ownership over thousands of acres of land to the handful of 
families comprising the oligarchy.
^Vernon Lovell Phelps, The International Economic Position of 
Argentina (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1938), 
pp. 134-6, 141.
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The state was also Instrumental In cementing the relationships 
between the locally dominant groups and the representatives of foreign
capital which provided the foundation for the externally oriented 
growth pattern. The strategic structures channeling the circuits in 
the accumulation of capital were established with regulations that 
guaranteed monopoly conditions for foreign, mostly British, investors 
over export and finance: thus the British owned railroads, meat packing 
plants, port facilities, and their preponderant influence in banking.
In Argentina externally oriented growth took a form best described as 
the "Anglo-oligarchic connection." It was based on the exchange of 
commodities: foodstuffs for manufactures. The oligarchy viewed manu­
factures which competed with British imports as a threat to the 
trade arrangements guaranteeing them wealth. On the other hand,
British investors concentrated on the export of finished consumer 
goods from England and on controlling the financing and transportation 
of rural commodities from the Argentine countryside. The ideology of 
free trade and laissez faire expressed the mutual self-interest of 
these two elites in the continued dependence of the Argentine economy 
on exporting agro-pastoral goods.
Along with the crisis and reordering of the global economic 
order that began with World War I, the dominant relationships among 
and between national and foreign groups shifted in conjunction with 
the prevalent modes of economic activity. Externally a triangular 
pattern was taking shape within the traditional two-way flow of 
exchanging rural commodities for industrial imports that linked 
Argentina through her ruling class to the United Kingdom's finance 
and industrial capital. Gradually, the United States began to dis-
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place Great Britain as the major source for imports. Argentina had to 
realize a favorable balance in her exports to Europe to cover the 
deficits in the trade with North America. Internally, North American 
groups took advantage of the corollary of externally oriented growth: 
an underdeveloped local manufacturing sector. It was in the industrial 
area that North American investors began to make their presence felt 
in Argentina. In so doing, U.S. groups enjoyed a competitive edge over 
their English counterparts. Their greater proximity to the domestic 
market allowed them greater flexibility in responding to and creating 
local demand, they had the capacity to use cheaper labor power, and 
their operations were not disrupted by an economy placed on a war 
footing.
These shifts did not proceed far enough to undermine the 
externally oriented growth pattern. With the end of the disruptions of 
the First World War, they were arrested and in many instances even 
reversed in the decade of the twenties. However, the trends of the 
World War I period reemerged much more strongly with the world crisis 
of 1929. This time their impact was powerful enough to modify ex­
ternally oriented growth which, in turn, eventually led to a new 
developmental pattern. The contraction of production in the advanced 
industrial nations and Argentina's inability to sell agro-pastoral 
goods meant a drastically reduced volume of imported manufactures.
The oligarchy responded to this crisis threatening to undermine 
externally oriented growth by using the state to promote an import 
substituting industrialization to fill the gap left by the lack of 
imported manufactured goods. The policies of the thirties 
succeeded in revitalizing the Anglo-oligarchic connection, but on a
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modified basis. These modifications gave rise to contradictions that 
provided the conditions that made Peronism viable.
The basic contradiction in the oligarchy’s modified model was 
that it depended on a certain degree of internal industrial develop­
ment in order to salvage the basic structures of externally oriented 
growth based on agricultural production. Though import substituting 
industrialization was clearly restricted and subordinated to main­
taining the primacy of rural production as the axis of the nation’s 
economic life, the policies of the 1930-43 period nevertheless ex­
panded industrial activity considerably. The result was a submerged 
industrial sector threatening to break out of the confines of its 
functional subordination, which generated a host of postponed demands 
and unfulfilled expectations on the part of industrialists and workers. 
These were the sectors that Peron built his winning coalition on. He 
held out the promise of expanded production to the capitalists and he 
built a mass movement by meeting the demands of labor which had been 
suppressed, at times brutally, by the oligarchic regime of the 
thirties. Peronism resolved the contradictions arising from the 
limited import substituting industrialization of the thirties 
through a full-scale import substituting model of internally oriented 
growth in the forties.
Analyzing the basic continuity of Peronist policies and the 
way they diverged from those of their oligarchic predecessors reveals 
the contradictions within Peronist development. The continuity 
results from the fact that Peronist policies promoted a basically 
import substituting industrialization with a capitalist frame­
work, centered principally on industry with a lower organic
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composition of capital (i.e., more labor intensive). The degree 
of industrialization promoted represents the basic departure of 
Peronist policies from those of the thirties. The impact of Peronist 
policies was such as to transform existing contradictions through a 
process of quantitative leading to qualitative change, and in this 
process creating the contradictions that led to the disintegration of 
the Peronist developmental model. The Peronist developmental pattern 
diverged qualitatively from that of the thirties in these respects:
1. Peronism used agriculturally generated surplus to promote indus­
trialization thereby reversing the traditional subordination of 
industrial development to agriculture as the foundation of the 
economy
2. Breaking sharply with the policies of the previous period, Peronism 
dismantled the British presence within the Argentine economy
3. From the supplying of external markets with agro-pastoral goods, 
industrial production for the. domestic market became the predomi­
nant form of activity
These achievements were possible because Peronism benefited 
from an extremely favorable confluence of external and internal con­
ditions in the World War II and immediate post-war period. The 
regime spurred on the most rapid development of the industrial sector 
in Argentine history, elevating manufacturing for the domestic market 
to the primary form of economic activity. At the same time, it 
instituted the most equitable distribution of wealth Argentines had 
ever experienced. Workers made their largest wage gains; for the 
first time millions of Argentines were covered by extensive social 
security, unemployment, retirement, health and other benefits; the
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cost of food was kept down; rents were frozen; thousands of housing 
units were erected for workers; and the universities were opened 
to their children.
The externally and internally favorable conjuncture made these 
impressive achievements possible, but it also obscured the contra­
dictions within Peronism. Externally, the wartime conditions in­
creased the demand for Argentina's traditional exportables, thus 
making for an accumulation of foreign exchange reserves, while the 
lack of competition from foreign producers allowed Argentine manufac­
turers to increase production. Internally, the traditionally power­
ful socio-economic groups were in disarray which made the political 
pressure generated from Peronism's mass mobilization more effective, 
thereby making the regime's social and sectoral redistributive 
policies possible.
Populist-nationalism was the doctrine Peronism used in its 
mass mobilizing efforts. It was especially suited for this task 
in that it perceived the root cause of Argentina's problems to 
lie in the alliance of the rural oligarchy with the foreign (mostly 
British) imperialists. By calling on all sectors of the population 
to rally against the tiny minority of those who had sold out the 
nation's interests, and by calling on capitalists and workers alike 
to cooperate in the task of national reconstruction, populist- 
nationalism simultaneously provided a sense of dignity and purpose 
for the proletariat which had always been held in disdain by the 
nation's rulers, and a crusade within which the bourgeoisie could 
legitimately pursue its corporate interests. The inclusiveness 
of Peronism's populist and nationalist orientation was the positive
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side that allowed the regime to undertake a broad-ranging mass 
mobilization which proved an effective tool with which to counter 
the power of the traditionally dominant interests. At the same time 
however, this glossing over of class distinctions was the negative 
side that prevented Peronism from confronting its contradictions at a 
time when the conditions were most advantageous for such a reckoning.
Consistent with its populist-nationalist doctrine which viewed 
industrial development as in and of itself leading in a spontaneous 
manner to economic liberation, the Peronist program aimed at and suc­
ceeded in strengthening the manufacturing sector under the control of 
national capitalists. Peronism remained a bourgeois doctrine in that 
it saw no need for, and indeed strongly opposed, altering capitalist 
relations of production. A major preoccupation behind Peronist redis­
tributive measures was to prevent class struggle over the distribution 
of wealth from undermining the authority of the groups controlling 
production. A major concern of Peronist policies in other words, was 
to confine the class struggle to the sphere of circulation and pre­
vent it from spilling over into that of production. Peron often 
justified social welfare measures undertaken by his regime as a means 
of giving the workers a stake in the new system.
The period of Peronism’s greatest achievements coincided 
roughly with the First Five Year Plan (1947-51), which was officially 
formulated as the government's instrument for achieving the liberation 
of the economy from imperialist domination. Essentially,the First 
Five Year Plan (FFYP) aimed at creating consumer demand through higher 
wages and a more equitable distribution of wealth. This demand was 
to be satisfied by domestic production, thereby releasing foreign
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exchange for the purchase of commodities essential for economic 
development. Peronism1 s developmental program thus rested on simul­
taneously providing benefits to social sectors with fundamentally 
opposed interests in the distribution of value created through the 
productive process. This contradiction within the Peronist develop­
mental model was obscured by the exceptionally favorable external and 
internal circumstances for the Argentine economy prevailing at the 
time.
A crucial feature of the FFYP's strategy for industrialization 
was the reversal of the traditional subordination of manufacturing 
activity to agricultural production. With the creation of the Insti- 
tuto Argentino para la Promoci^n del Intercambio (I.A.P.I.), Peron 
channeled the surplus generated by the rural sector into industrial 
production. Because it had moved to monopolize the export structures 
for rural commodities, the Peronist state reaped the benefits of the 
favorable conjuncture for the Argentine economy, in contrast to the 
past when the oligarchy would have further enhanced its position. How­
ever, though it resorted to indirect political control, the Peronist 
state stopped short of a direct assault on the oligarchy’s material 
base, thus leaving the foundation of its major internal opposition 
intact. The failure to expropriate large landed property flowed from 
Peronism's populist-nationalist doctrine. While some of the oli­
garchy's wealth was redistributed, its class position and the social 
relations on which its power rested were not attacked.
In accordance with populist-nationalist doctrine, Peronist 
policies promoted economic development within the framework of the 
private ownership of the means of production. The state reserved the
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right to interfere in those properties that "served a social function," 
but this potentially far-reaching formula was never applied system­
atically, serving more as an admonition to political enemies than any­
thing else. Capital was supposed to "humanize itself," to see its own 
self-interest, with some prodding from a popular government; but only 
Evita Peron seemed determined to force it in that direction. Economic 
privileges were decried rhetorically, but the class struggle was not 
advocated as a means to rectify injustices. In fact, it is here that 
Peronism drew its clearest line of demarcation from Marxism: it advo- 
cated "social justice," not class struggle. One of Peron*s frequently 
cited statements from his May Day speech in 1944, makes this point:
"We seek to suppress the struggles between classes, and to supplant 
them by a just agreement between workers and employers— that is to 
say, the people— under the sheltering justice that emanates from the 
state." The mobilization of labor as a pressure group was actively 
pursued, but leadership of the developmental process by the working 
class was out of the question.
In accordance with the study's theoretical model, the analysis 
of Peronism as a transitional period focused on shifts in the combination 
of foreign and national interests promoted in the Peronist developmental 
pattern as decisive in shaping the outcome of the process. One of the 
shifts taking place during the Peronist period was highly visible while 
another was obscured by the degree of independence, both from national 
and foreign economic groups, enjoyed by the Peronist state as a result of 
the favorable wartime conditions. Peronism*'s nationalist and anti­
imperialist policies clearly dismantled the structures of British 
influence; less clear was the movement resulting in their replacement
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by North American interests.
Peronist industrializing policies initially promoted the 
interests of national capitalists who were principally manufacturers 
of consumer goods. The foreign groups benefiting from the substitu­
tion of imported manufactured consumer goods with local production were 
primarily U.S. companies, particularly in the area of capital goods 
and technology, at the expense of British economic interests.* The 
net result of the Peronist program was the replacement of an oli- 
garchic-British based pattern of externally oriented growth resting on 
rural production by an internally oriented growth pattern resting on 
manufacturing and dependent on imported capital goods, primarily from 
U.S. sources. Due to an insufficiently developed capital goods sector 
and the lack of a concerted program for its development, Peronist 
industrialization fostered an indirect form of dependency.
To accumulate revenues needed to cover the vastly increased 
demand for machinery and parts, Argentina depended on the export of 
rural commodities. This dependence made for continuity in the 
Peronist developmental pattern with the prior pattern. However, 
benefits derived from Argentina's external links were now used to
*The largest deficit in U.S.-Argentine trade for the period 
between 1946 and 1952 coincided with the year in which the output of 
the industrial sector was the highest. Argentina's imports from the 
United States in 1948 amounted to 2,286 million pesos, while her 
exports to the United States for the year amounted to 537 million 
pesos. Roughly half of the total imports for 1948 were in the 
category of machinery and vehicles. Ministerio de Asuntos Tecnicos,
El intercambio con los Estados Unidos (Buenos Aires, 1951) and Sin- 
tesis estadfstica mensual de la Republica Argentina (Buenos Aires,
July 1953).
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promote the interests of groups whose economic activity was essentially 
contradictory to externally oriented growth. For this reason the 
Peronist pattern is conceptualized as indirect dependency: the 
interests promoted by the state, although dependent on surplus derived 
from economic activities oriented to external markets, were nonetheless 
tied to productive activity oriented to the internal market.
The analysis shows indirect dependency to have been a 
transitional form which resulted in the more direct form conceptualized 
as dependent industrialization. The deterioration of the favorable 
conjuncture for the Argentine economy in the initial Peronist years 
produced a crisis in the regime's import substituting policies. The 
second half of the Peronist period, from 1950 on, was characterized by 
a gradual penetration of the capital intensive branches of the indus­
trial sector by North American and Western European multinationals.
During its period of upsurge, as long as the favorable con­
fluence of factors for the Argentine economy held until about 1950, 
the regime’s policies seemed forceful and clear. However, once the 
favorable context deteriorated, the contradictions within Peronism’s 
class harmonizing formulas, which remained submerged in the prior 
period, now presented increasing difficulties for the regime. As the 
postwar recovery of Europe and the increasing vigor of the U.S. 
economy, now entering its phase of global preeminence, began to be 
felt, the Peronist government was increasingly forced to opt for one 
or another of the various socio-economic groups encompassed in its 
populist-nationalist coalition. Attempting to postpone a final 
reckoning, which would have involved a heavy political price, the 
regime vacillated and seemed hesitant.
38
Nevertheless, though incrementally and with much Wavering 
the Second Five Year Plan (SFYP) instituted in 1952 but never allowed 
to run its full course, did reveal the programmatic direction of the 
regime's intended socio-economic readjustments to the crisis. Essen­
tially, the proposed program for economic recovery was formulated 
within a capitalist framework and, as such, it consolidated the trend
toward a dependent industrial economy wherein the weight of foreign
interests assumed a central position within the manufacturing sector.
After 1950, Peronist policies increasingly favored private interests 
controlling large industrial companies, and the gains made by the 
workers and popular sectors in the earlier period began to erode.
Using the methodology outlined above,^ the significant shifts 
within Peronist policies of the 1945-55 decade that show how important 
this period was in determining the subsequent developmental pattern, 
were ascertained by compaing the regime's two Five Year Plans. Analysis 
of the FFYP showed it to be a programmatic expression of the attempt to
forge an alliance between the industrial proletariat and bourgeoisie at
the expense of the agro-exporting sector. With the favorable conjuncture 
gone, this attempt no longer proved tenable and the Second Five Year Plan 
(SFYP) expressed the regime's intended readjustments. The SFYP began to 
formulate a new relationship toward the landowning oligarchy and the bour­
geois sectors involved in the production of durable and capital goods at 
the expense of the workers.
The policies of the fifties showed four determinative shifts 
which revealed the direction of the outcome of the transitional process 
under scrutiny:
^See pp. 17-25 above, especially p. 22.
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1. The cost of development shifted from the surplus generated by the 
rural sector to that created by urban labor
2. In addressing the dual contradictory development of industry, the 
nascent heavy and capital goods branches were favored over the 
light non-durable goods producing sector
3. Agricultural output was now promoted by providing material incen­
tives to the oligarchy
4. There was movement away from the pursuit of economic independence 
and toward a greater role for foreign capital
In the industrial area the SFYP shifted priorities in economic 
policies away from promoting and catering to consumer aspirations to 
those emphasizing capital accumulation. The attempt was to develop 
productive forces within capitalist relations of production. Since 
the profit motive was recognized as the economic propellant, the gains 
of private owners were not held back while those made by the workers in 
the previous period of prosperity were reversed. By cutting back the 
acquisitive power of the workers, the domestic market for non-durable 
consumer goods contracted; and this spelled disaster for hundreds of 
marginally operating national enterprises fostered by Peronism in its 
ascendancy.
In its orientation toward foreign economic interests the SFYP 
prepared the ground for the entry of capital that was to lead to a 
dependent industrial economy a decade later. While it announced its 
continuity with the FFYP in its commitment to the liberation of the 
economy from the domination of external interests, the SFYP also called 
for an increased role for foreign capital, especially in the area of 
technology.
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It Is the permanent objective of the nation to favor the 
international exchange of technical knowledge and to stimulate 
the entry of productive capital that desires to cooperate in 
the economic development of the country.1
By the mid-sixties, industrial activity was almost completely
cominated by multinational corporations. This process had begun
with the penetration and virtual take-over of the more technologically
advanced and capital intensive branches of these firms. Moreover,
it was the bourgeoise in this sector which provided the backbone
for the "internationalized national bourgeoisie," the social
foundation of the dependent industrial economy.
This analysis of the Peronist decade shows that populist-
nationalism provided for the opening to foreign capital which sub­
sequently reversed Peronism's efforts to free Argentina from dependence
on external economic interests. The FFYP promoted the growth of 
industries under control of national capitalists. Economic policies 
never deviated from their commitment to development within the frame­
work of capitalist social relations. The FFYP also promoted increased 
consumer demand by raising the acquisitive power of workers through 
redistributive measures. This increased demand was to be supplied 
by the expanding production of national capitalists. With an undeveloped 
capital goods sector, the immediate result was a tremendous rise in the 
volume of imported machinery and other inputs (mostly from the U.S.) 
needed for the production of consumer goods. The contradictions within 
the indirect dependency fostered by the FFYP could be contained so long 
as the favorable international context allowed the Peronist state's
^Camara de Senadores de la Nacion, Diario de Sesiones, die. 20, 
1952, 41a Reunion (continuacion de la Primera Sesion Extraordinaria), 
p. 833.
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I.A.P.I. to realize surpluses in the export of agro-pastoral commodities. 
But when the propitious conditions no longer held, it was not possible 
to both expand consumer demand as well as increase the volume of im­
ported capital goods. The regime could no longer benefit both wings of 
the coalition it was attempting to forge. Being fundamentally committed 
to maintaining capitalist relations of production, the regime was com­
pelled to opt for the bourgeois pole in its populist-nationalist formula. 
Though it sought to postpone a final reckoning, the thrust of the SFYP's 
policies amounted to restricting consumer demand and enlisting foreign 
capital in developing the capital and durable goods branches. The ulti­
mate result was disastrous for national capitalists based in light con­
sumer goods production; meanwhile multinational corporations came to 
dominate the capital intensive branches producing commodities for the 
upper income market and inputs for industrial production.
Peronist policies of the fifties showed an increasing affinity 
towards the interests of big capital and a willingness to sacrifice the 
interests of labor. Gains made by the working class in the first half 
of the Peronist decade began to erode. The cyclical downward trend in 
real wages and the upward trend in the cost of living can be traced to 
the second half of the Peronist decade. Nevertheless, it is important 
to note that though leaning in the direction of capitalist interests, 
Peron did his best to postpone a fundamental reckoning on the nature of 
his regime's social base. Indeed, the regime's indecisiveness preci­
pitated its overthrow by the anti-lahor components of the coalition 
Peronism was attempting to forge and hold together. The fact that the 
material gains made by the working class component of the Peronist 
coalition began to dissipate accounts for the growing disenchantment of
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the proletarian sector and its unwillingness to rally to the regime’s 
defense at its critical hour of need. Just ten days before his over­
throw Peron turned down an offer made by trade union leaders to 
convert the national labor organization— the. Confederacion General 
del Trabajo (CGT)— into a civilian militia. Accepting this offer would 
have led the government in the direction of basing its power on the
armed working class. Peron’s rejection and his increasing warmth to
2the imperialist interests he had branded as enemies of the movement 
for economic independence and social justice were important factors in . 
the workers' lack of enthusiasm in supporting "their" government. There 
is little doubt that a massive display of popular support as the coup 
against him began to falter, would have maintained Peron in office.
At the same time, the ambiguity and indecisiveness in Peron's 
stand towards labor and the fact that Peronism had to be overthrown 
to remove the remaining populist-nationalist encumbrances from policy­
making, enabled Peron to retain his mystique as labor's champion. 
Policies attacking the workers' living standards and . reversing 
their rising importance as a power factor within the institutions 
of the Argentine body politic, were not pursued unambiguously 
until after Peron's overthrow. It is important however, to note that
*To have opted for a workers' militia would most likely have 
precipitated the final coup ten days early. Perhaps Peron would have 
been ousted from power at that point. However, the fact is that he was 
overthrown anyway. Given the initial faltering when the final coup did 
come, there is at least th^ possibility that decisive action at this 
point might have saved Peron^ See pp. 324-8 , above for more detailed 
discussion.
2As evidenced by the. contract negotiated with 
Standard Oil of California.in 1955. Previously, the state-owned Y.P.F. 
had enjoyed a monopoly on the extraction of oil from Argentine soil.
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these.trends were already discernible in the last years of Peronist 
rule. In this study’s terms, it was a case of moving from quantitative 
to qualitative change.
Similarly, though the SFYP announced a more favorable orienta­
tion towards foreign capital, its massive penetration of the industrial 
sector was not fu-lly consummated until the next period after the populist 
and nationalist vestiges had been forcefully removed. This too was a 
case of intensifying a policy direction to the extent that it redefined 
the relationships among and between local and foreign interests deter­
mining the subsequent developmental course. The close interconnection 
between the movement away from centering policy on labor's interests 
and towards one designed to attract foreign capital thus became clearer 
in the decade after Peron’s overthrow. Paradoxically therefore, though 
the process commenced during the Peronist period, the fundamental link 
in Peronist doctrine between economic independence and social justice 
was fully confirmed by the experience of the workers in the following 
stage when the process of denationalization of the manufacturing sector 
assumed full force and the pattern of relationships providing the base 
for dependent industrialization was consolidated. The events following 
Peron s overthrow provided fertile ground for the nourishing of the 
Peronist mystique. Alternating bourgeois-military regimes were deter­
mined to keep the working class movement in line and systematically re­
pressed any expression of its interests, whether political or economic. 
Strikes, which at times were frequent and intense, were put down by the 
army. Peronist candidates were not allowed to run for office, or when 
allowed to do so and elected, had the results of their election nulli­
fied. People remembered' the "good old days" when their man was in the
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Casa Rosada looking out for their interests, when one could easily find 
employment and make a decent wage.'
The violent suppression of the interests of the working class 
also undermined one of the essential conditions for dependent indus­
trialization, namely a certain degree of industrial peace and political 
stability, thereby leading to a fundamental contradiction within this 
stage. The militant tradition of the working class and the fact its 
former bourgeois allies joined in the ruling post-Peronist coalition, 
led the Justicialist (as the Peronist movement came to be known) move­
ment in an increasingly revolutionary direction. Stripped of its 
bourgeois and military components, the Peronist movement turned into a 
workers movement. Left to their own resources, being the only signi­
ficant opposition to the process of denationalization, and having to 
face the bourgeoisie economically and politically, the workers turned 
away from those aspects of populist-nationalism stressing the coopera­
tion of all classes against the foreign-oligarchic enemy and towards an 
increasingly Marxist direction. Revolutionary Marxism began to make 
significant inroads into the Peronist movement. The concerted attack 
on the movement and the repression it was subjected to only strengthened 
it further as the only alternative to Argentina's profound crisis.
This is one of the key paradoxes this study seeks to elucidate: 
how the Peronist regime which in the fifties promoted a program in con­
tradiction to its overwhelmingly working class social base, in the 
sixties turned into a vehicle for mobilizing the working class' opposi­
tion during the next developmental stage. Thus, even though the Peronist 
state acted as a kind of surrogate or substitute for a weak and non- self- 
conscious national bourgeoisie, it did so in contradictory ways as a
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result of conflicting tendencies.inherent in the regime's populist- 
nationalist doctrine.
Analysis undertaken in this study finds that Peronism’s 
contradictory tendencies deriving from the class harmonizing thrust 
in its populist-nationalist doctrine^ constituted the regime' s major 
flaw. In assessing the shortcomings in the Peronist developmental 
model, these were not found to lie in the steps the regime took to con­
front the external pole in Argentina's dependency. Given the limited 
control it had over this area, the Peronist government moved about as 
effectively as it could. Indeed, the creation of I.A.P.I., liquidating 
the foreign debt and minimizing financial dependency, eliminating foreign 
control over the internal transportation network with the nationalization 
of the railroads and port facilities, the building of a strong Argentine 
merchant marine, all represented major achievements in the quest for 
economic independence. Argentina had never had greater control over 
its export structures. Peronism's basic weakness lay in its neglecting 
to alter the internal relations over which it could- have wielded greater 
control.
This failure to decisively address the internal pole of Argen­
tine dependency constituted the central contradiction in the Peronist 
developmental pattern. What began as a reformist attempt to set Argen­
tina on the road to economic liberation, social justice, and political 
sovereignty, ended up with an Argentina even more closely integrated 
with the external economic interests it was supposed to free itself 
from. Though Peronism never lacked for revolutionary rhetoric, this 
analysis shows that its program, especially the readjustments signalled 
in the SFYP, proved inadequate in bringing about the internal trans­
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formations which would have given the regime a better chance to with­
stand the outside pressures the Argentine economy was subjected to.
The final segment of the study applies the insights derived 
from the analysis of the Peronist period of the forties and fifties. 
According to the theoretical model from which I derived the analysis, 
unravelling the contradictions within Peronist development should pro­
vide an understanding of the particularities of the post-Peronist de­
velopmental pattern. Indeed, looking at the Peronist period as a transi­
tional stage and analyzing the significant shifts among and between 
national and foreign groups encouraged by Peronist developmental 
policies reveals a process wherein the takeover of the industrial sec­
tor by foreign capital in the sixties is a logical outgrowth of the 
changes instituted in the earlier period. This study thus presents a 
picture which contrasts sharply with the commonly held view that consi­
ders the 1955 coup ousting General Peron as a watershed event in Argen­
tine economic and political history.
The Peronist period contained within it both the material and 
social foundations for the next developmental pattern, the dependent 
industrial economy. A dependent industrial economy is defined as one 
in which 1) manufacturing is the predominant form of economic 
activity and 2) the industrial sector gravitates around the presence of 
monopolistic multinational firms. Implicitly, the function of a depend­
ent industrial economy requires several conditions. Among the most 
important are:
1. Development of the industrial sector
2. Consolidation of a viable domestic market for consumer goods
3. Development within the framework of the private ownership of the
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means of production and the social relations underlying it ̂
4. The general prevalence of industrial peace and a certain degree of 
political stability
The Peronist policies of the 1943^-55 period succeeded admirably in 
achieving these results.
More specifically, comparing the interests promoted in the 
FFYP with those supported in the SFYP, the analysis found four deter­
minative shifts in deciding the outcome of the transitional process
2toward dependent industrialization. The study proceeds to show how 
these trends were consolidated in the decade following Peron*s over­
throw. The extent to which the directions already implicit in Peronism* s 
policies of the fifties and the intensity with which these aims were 
pursued in the late fifties and sixties, represents another instance of
quantitative change leading to qualitative change. The end result was
a developmental pattern qualitatively different from that which pre­
vailed in the Peronist years. The Argentine economy now gravitated 
around the activities of multinational corporations occupying the pivotal 
positions within the industrial sector.
Four factors were found to be critical during the transitional 
process in laying the foundations for the denationalization of the 
industrial sector. First, the capital goods sector assumed a central 
role in the industrial economy. Second, the extensive concentration of 
capital required to operate heavy industries made it difficult for
^There may be, indeed more often than not there is, as the
Argentine Case illustrates, a significant state sector; but it is
subordinated to the requirements of the private sector.
2See p. 39 above.
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national groups to control the basic sector. Third, and most important, 
was the advanced technology required for producing sophisticated mach­
inery and equipment.
Increasingly, since 1950 Argentine industry has become tech­
nologically dependent on U.S. corporations. It was through the more 
modern industrial sector that U.S.-based multinational interests began 
their extensive penetration of the Argentine economy, and it was the 
bourgeoisie in this sector who provided the backbone for the "inter­
nationalized national bourgeoisie." In this respect the Argentine 
case foreshadowed the experience of other Third World nations. Tech­
nological inadequacy has presented a formidable barrier less developed 
nations have had to confront in their efforts to break out of dependent 
relationships. As in the Argentine case, it has led to a restructuring 
of dependency rather than a radical change toward a developmental pat­
tern based on the interests of the poorest sectors of the population.
These three factors should be conceived as necessary but not 
sufficient in leading to the denationalization of the industrial sector. 
This analysis found a fourth factor, the social relations promoted 
by Peronist policies, to have played the key role in undermining the 
Peronist program for the liberation of the economy from foreign interests.
The cases of the Soviet Union, China, Cuba, and others have 
shown the tremendous difficulties encountered in promoting a progressive 
growth model from an undeveloped or underdeveloped technological base.
In this effort, in order to achieve the maximum degree of maneuverability 
and the greatest possible resistance to external influences, it was 
necessary to radically alter the social relations in the process of pro­
duction. In the case of Peronist Argentina, by stressing the coopera­
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tion of social sectors with diverging interests in the distribution 
of surplus value, the regime left the economic base of its enemies 
intact and it severely circumscribed its options by hesitating to 
mobilize its popular and working class base for the decisive confronta­
tions which an alternative developmental strategy would have required.
The analysis of the process whereby the multinationals in 
alliance with domestic monopoly capitalists in the industrial area 
established themselves as the dominant presence within Argentina's economy 
shows that it was not without its own contradictions. The process was 
accompanied by a massive reallocation of income away from the lower 
income groups undertaken by the state. The workers reacted by clinging 
to Peronist doctrine as their link with the past when the government pro­
moted their interests in its policies. The severe repression directed 
against Peronism backfired; it served to cement the workers' adherence 
to Justicialismo and to increase their combativeness.
On the other hand, the state's policies, particularly during the 
Ongania regime in the mid-sixties, succeeded in eventually driving sec­
tors of the bourgeoisie back into the Peronist fold, thereby setting the 
stage for the brief return of populist-nationalism to state power in the 
seventies. Initially, in the 1955 coup the military had acted as an 
instrument of a bourgeois-oligarchic alliance against the working class 
side of Peronism's populist-nationalism. Though united in opposition 
to the industrial proletariat, the agrarian and industrial, and the 
national and internationalized sectors of the bourgeoisie also had 
diverging interests. Once the.working class' interests were removed 
from official policy, their alliance fell apart on these internal con­
tradictions in the course of the sixties. Particularly significant were
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the policies favoring foreign capital which also hurt national entre­
preneurs, finally driving them back into coalition with the workers 
in demanding the return of Peronism.
The contradictions in the process of dependent industrial 
development had left Argentina in a state of turmoil by the late 
sixties. Discontent was rampant and strikes, factory occupations, and 
urban riots were everyday occurences. The intensity of the economic 
and political struggles undermined the continuation of dependent indus­
trialization. The industrial peace and political stability needed for 
this developmental pattern to function were being systematically eroded. 
Even the military was unable to achieve "normalcy.” The social unrest 
the nation was experiencing seemed to everyone to be leading Argentina 
in a revolutionary direction. The need of the ruling groups to displace 
or reformulate the contradictions they could no longer contain was so 
great that they were willing to take a chance on Peron. "Peron is the 
only one who can quiet things down," was the statement heard frequently 
in business circles before 1973. In the end, after eighteen years of 
exile, Peron was called back as the only figure possessing sufficient 
legitimacy to reestablish order out of chaos.
The hopes that Peronism would bring labor acquiescence and 
political tranquility were short lived. The Peronist movement mirrored 
the contradictions in Argentine society and they were much too great 
even for Peron*s consummate skills at incorporating conflicting sectors 
under the mantle of his mystique. The left of the movement had pro­
gressed increasingly in a Marxist direction and called upon Peron to 
lead the transition towards the patria socialists. The right, repre­
senting the movement’s petty bourgeois sectors and comprising careerists
51
and political opportunists, seized upon the more class conciliationist 
elements in Justicialist doctrine--the "Third Position," the "Social 
Pact," and so on. The right, under the slogan of patria peronista. 
claimed it could achieve the transcendence of class differences, and 
of course class struggle, by providing all Argentines the opportunity 
to become "social entrepreneurs."
The second Peronist period, which lasted less than three years, 
was doomed from the very beginning. The events transpiring during the 
first hours Peron was back in Argentine territory indicated the extent 
to which the contradictions within Peronism had developed beyond the 
ability of its aging leader to control them. A jubilant crowd of 
400,000 Peronists of all stripes had gathered at Ezeiza airport in June 
of 1973 to celebrate the return of the conductor. It was the largest 
mass gathering in Argentine history. The occasion which was supposed to 
mark Peron*s triumphant return instead provided the background for a 
bloody armed confrontation between Justicialism’s left and right wings. 
The encounter produced more casualties than all those killed by the 
repression between 1955 and 1973. Peron who was to arrive at the 
gigantic rally to a hero's welcome, instead had to have his landing 
diverted to a military airport.
Analyzing the second Peronist period with the same approach 
applied to analyzing the first period confirmed the validity of the 
study's methodology. The second period is analyzed as a modified ver­
sion of the populist-nationalist formula promulgated in the forties and 
fifties. The attempt was to.recreate a coalition of class interests 
around the regime similar to that which Peron had built! some thirty 
years before. But while the configuration of external and internal
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factors allowed Peron to balance-off contradictory interests for a 
decade the first time around, the different context of the seventies 
made the second attempt a more short-lived one, lasting from 1973 to 1976.
The analysis found two key factors which made the context which 
populist-nationalism had to address in the seventies very different from 
that which it confronted in the forties and fifties. On the one hand, 
the fact that the multinational corporate sector had become the dominant 
presence within the Argentine economy meant that the impact of external 
economic interests had been internalized much more directly and hence 
was more immediate and decisive. On the other hand, with a twenty-year 
experience of rank and file militancy and a developing political con­
sciousness that recognized the primacy of the contradiction between capi­
tal and labor, the working class was a much more independent force and 
no longer as easily subject to centralized control and direction by the 
union bureaucracy. Peron was dealing with a qualitatively different 
working class from that of the forties when he tried to recreate in the 
seventies the fundamental alliance on which populist-nationalism rests 
or falls. Just as in the first period, it was the basic aversion to 
fundamental changes in the class structure that was responsible for 
the regime's demise.
At first the Justicialist government sought to promote the 
interests of the national bourgeoisie with its Three Year Plan (TYP).
But whereas the national bourgeoisie could be considered an embryonic 
sector in the forties, by the seventies it was practically subordinated 
to the multinational sector and rendered virtually impotent. Thus while 
the interests of national entrepreneurs gained the upper hand in the 
policies of the regime for about the first half of the Peronist decade,
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their ascendancy in the seventies was compressed into one year. The 
same dynamic observed during the first period was repeated the second 
time around. As the contradictions in its populist-nationalist formula 
intensified, the regime rapidly shifted its policies towards the 
capitalist pole of its worker-national bourgeoisie "Social Pact." The 
greater weakness of the latter and the stronger and more central posi­
tion of foreign capital within the industrial economy meant a correspond­
ingly faster acceleration in the abanddnment of the measures protective 
of national capital and hence a more rapid policy reorientation towards 
the interests of the monopoly-multinational sector.
The comparative analysis concluded that the fundamental differ­
ences between the two periods involved the role of the working class 
both before the regime came to power and once it was in power. In the 
first period, Peron built and cultivated his ties to labor by using the 
resources at his disposal as Minister of Labor and Social Welfare. The 
workers played the key role in keeping Peron in power, as the events of 
October 17, 1945 dramatically illustrated; but they were not a factor 
in his original ascent to power. In the second period, the workers' 
struggle was the main force behind Peron's return to power; and their 
militance also provided the chief source for the undoing of the 
Peronist regime.
As the regime moved to promote the interests of the monopoly­
multinational sector, working class living standards declined.
The workers responded with increased strikes and job actions. Though it 
had depended on the workers' militance to get back into power, maintain­
ing its ties to the bourgeois sectors now meant that the Peronist gov­
ernment had to suppress, the left and the more revolutionary-inclined in
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its own movement. In the three.years it held power, the Peronist regime 
was responsible for killing more than twice as many leftist militants 
that were killed in the eighteen'years of Peron’s exile. However, .• 
rather than diminishing, the influence of the Marxist and Peronist left 
among rank and file workers reached new heights. Instead of minimizing 
class struggle though conciliation and harmony, as it had done during 
the first period, the regime instituted a vicious campaign of repression 
which, though it failed to stop the left, succeeded in isolating the 
regime from its strongest base of support.
Unable to stem the wave of strikes and job actions, or to 
erode the growing Marxist orientation among workers, the Peronist 
regime became superfluous and the military intervened to block the left 
from making further inroads into the working class. It was therefore 
Peronism's inability to control the actions of its working class sectors—  
which had taken the initiative in pushing Peronism1s ambiguities in a 
socialist direction— that led to the decisive removal of populist- 
nationalism from the Argentine scene. While they had been passive par­
ticipants in the regime's vacillating responses to the economic crisis 
of the fifties, it was the attempt of Peronism's proletarian militants 
to push the regime in a revolutionary direction that prompted the 
military to seize direct control on March 24, 1976.
The study concludes with a brief evaluation of the policies 
pursued by the military junta after 1976. Using the same conceptual 
and analytic categories applied throughout, this evaluation establishes 
the context within which Argentina's current democratic experiment is 
being conducted. Without pretending to offer predictions, the analysis 
aims to identify the key factors and significant issues in the present 
situation.
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Immediately after the take-over, the junta announced a program 
which represented a clear rejection of the policy orientation intro­
duced by Peronism which had predominated since 1943. Representing 
the traditional agro-based oligarchy, Economic Minister Martinez de Hoz 
sought to return Argentina to the role it played in the international 
system prior to the crisis of the thirties. In what amounted to the 
reintroduction of a modified externally oriented growth pattern, the 
principal axis of the nation's economic life was to be agricultural 
production for export and the chief beneficiaries were to be large land­
owners and, secondarily, foreign and domestic monopoly interests 
in the industrial sector. Indeed, for the first time since the forties, 
agriculture again represented the largest proportion of the Gross Domes­
tic Product.
Naturally, such a major economic reorganization could not be 
carried out without drastic socio-political consequences. The junta's 
policies had a devastating impact on the popular sectors. In a half a 
decade the cost of living went from one end of the spectrum to the 
other, from being one of the cheapest in Latin America in the Peronist 
years, to being one of the most expensive. The social costs of its 
economic policies made the military dictatorship's campaign of annihila­
tion against the left and its efforts to subjugate labor all the more 
necessary and ferocious.
Intending to bury all vestiges and encumbrances from previous 
developmental models in order to make a clean break and unambiguously 
institute the economic project .of the landed oligarchy, the pursuit of 
whose interests was deemed to hold the key to viable economic growth, 
the military underwent the same experience it had gone through almost
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exactly a decade earlier. Then it was the project of the multinational 
sector under the Ongania regime, but the contradictions set in motion 
had essentially the same result: the socio-political costs were so high 
that the regime soon found itself completely isolated without any base 
of support other than the harrow social layers whose interests were 
being doggedly enforced by the sword.
It was this extreme isolation, and the desperation it led to, 
that drove the Military into the ill-fated Malvinas episode. Sovereignty 
over the Malvinas is an issue close to every Argentine's heart since 
childhood. The generals reckoned that if they could succeed at what 
they thought they were best at, they could win the support for the 
regime that they were unable to gain any other way. When their crass 
attempt to manipulate patriotic symbols ended in ignominious defeat, not 
only had they lost their last desperate gamble, but they also squandered 
what little they had achieved economically by mortgaging the nation's 
resources to pay for the weapons of modern warfare.
Though the Malvinas were the final straw, it was the junta's 
economic policies which produced the social equation that eventually 
forced it to relinquish control to a civilian government. The dynamic 
paralleled that of the previous decade which had led to Peron's return 
to power. Though the bourgeoisie as a whole acquiesced in the severe 
repression of the working class, except for a narrow stratum, it soon 
found that its interests were being hurt by the developmental pattern 
set in motion with the junta's policies. Thus, once again all the 
significant social sectors stood on the outside available for mobiliza­
tion against the regime. The outcome however, was very different from 
what it had been in 1973. The weakness and internal divisions among
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the Peronists resulted in the election of the candidate of the progress­
ive middle sectors. Though by a relatively narrow margin, Raul Alfonsfn 
of the Radical Party emerged victorious as Argentina’s new president 
in December of 1983.
Who then are the major actors and what are the significant 
issues in the current drama? There is the traditional oligarchy which, 
though it has had its economic project discredited, still controls the 
means of production for what remains practically Argentina's only 
source for revenues on the world market. There is the multinational 
corporate sector which, though not as strong as in its heyday of the 
sixties, continues to be the major presence in the industrial sector. 
There are the foreign financial interests which have a gargantuan 
claim on any future prosperity Argentina might be able to muster.
Though of negligible importance during the first Peronist period, 
foreign banks and international financial institutions have become a 
factor none of the other participants in Argentina's economic and poli­
tical life can afford to ignore. There is the bourgeoisie which, though 
composed of diverse and often conflicting sectors, currently has more 
influence that it has had since the late fifties with at least some 
of its major interests being represented in the state. There are the 
Peronists who, though badly splintered, weakened, and lacking any 
charasmatic figure that can bring them together, still hold the key to 
the future viability of the Alfonsin government. The Peronist movement 
is made up of at least two wings. One contains the sectors comprising 
what can be termed "Official Peronism." These include, the petty bour­
geois elements, the professional politicians, and the trade union 
bureaucrats. The other wing is even more amorphous, but it is the heart
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and soul of Peronism: the workers, the youth, and the rank and file 
militants. Though it lacks organizational expression, this grouping 
is not to be minimized as it continues to have the potential to make or 
break any economic and political project. Finally there is the military 
which, though clearly on the defensive and in the background for the 
moment, retains the capacity to impose its will through the force of 
arms, and will continue to do so until it is disarmed.
There are basically two critical and one very important sub­
sidiary issue to be confronted by the new regime. The most basic issue 
is what economic direction will the regime chart and whose interests 
will receive primary consideration. A subsidiary issue of obvious impor­
tance is how will Argentina’s indebtedness be handled? The other basic 
issue is how Argentina's rulers propose to come to grips with the 
legacy of the recent and not-so-recent past. Who is to be held account­
able, and in what way, for the thousands of victims of political repres­
sion, is just the most dramatic manifestation of this issue. It also 
involves coming to grips with Peronism's contribution, past, present, 
and future. The relationships forged among and between the major 
actors as they confront these basic issues will determine Argentina's 
future course.
Many alignments among the major actors on these issues are 
possible. Though some may be more likely than others, it is impossible 
to anticipate which will emerge. At best, a detailed study of the type 
undertaken in this analysis of Peronism could clarify and perhaps narrow 
down possibilities. Hopefully, this study contributed to laying the 
necessary groundwork for such an endeavor.
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To begin to answer some of the questions involved, it is 
necessary to work backwards. We inust fill in the outline presented 
in this chapter. The analysis developed in the following chapters 
aims to unravel the complexities and paradoxes of the Argentine case. 
It offers an interpretation of Peronism that sheds light 
on the dynamic elements operative in Argentina’s current drama. The 
best way to gauge the utility of the theoretical model applied here is 
to show its results. Let us see then, if this analysis of the contra­
dictions within Peronist development succeeds in explaining the par­
ticularities of post-Peronist development.
CHAPTER II
ARGENTINA PRIOR TO 1930: EXTERNALLY ORIENTED GROWTH
Introduction
Following the theoretical model outlined above, the analysis 
begins with a brief examination of the externally oriented growth 
model which characterized Argentine development from about 1880 to 
1930. The contradictions that evolved during this stage provided the 
dynamic context within which the industrial development of the 
Peronist period took shape. In this chapter I lay the foundations for 
the analysis undertaken subsequently by singling out the significant 
and determinative interrelationships within and between the internal 
and external groups most closely tied to the predominant types of 
productive activity in the formative stage of Argentine development. 
Remaining chapters will follow out the reformulation of these inter­
relationships as the process of economic development unfolded in order 
to show in what ways they shaped Argentine history. The analysis will 
concern itself primarily with how these interrelationships affected 
industrial development and particularly with the problems arising from 
the fact that industrialization took place in the context of an 
economy based on agricultural production for export. The result was 
a socio-political structure containing conflicting class and sectional 
interests.
In laying the groundwork for the analysis developed subsequently, 
this chapter begins by tracing the material basis for the relationship
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between the landowning oligarchy and British commercial and financial 
interests. Referred to as the Anglo-oligarchic connection, this rela­
tionship proved decisive in determining the nature of Argentine 
economic and socio-political development during the first century of 
the nation's existence. This formative developmental pattern is 
shown to be a classic example of externally oriented growth— that is, 
development based on the export of rural commodities in exchange for 
the importation of manufactured goods.
The analysis of the externally oriented growth pattern examines 
the role of the state and the use of economic policy in consolidating 
the relationship between national and foreign groups controlling 
the predominant types of economic activity. Control of the state enabled 
these groups to formulate policies that further reinforced the ownership 
of the key means of production (land) by local groups while also strength­
ening the foreign, mostly British, domination of the economy's infra­
structure— the structures involved on the one hand, in the processing, 
transporting, and financing of exports and, on the other, those in the 
importation, distribution, and sale of consumer goods.
The analysis shows the dependent features of the externally 
oriented growth pattern. There is first of all the direct correlation 
between the level of demand in overseas markets and economic well-being: 
the greater the demand, the healthier the economy and, conversely, a 
drastic downturn in demand has serious repercussions. Second, the 
foreign control of the export-import sector's infrastructure meant that 
development was guided and shaped by outside interests. For example, 
the British owned railroads were used to expand the market for English 
produced goods which in many instances led to the dismantling of local
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industry. Another important aspect of externally oriented growth was 
the dependence arising from'the reliance on external sources for 
technology. This factor played a key part in determining the outcome 
of the transitional process during the Peronist period.
The chapter shows the impact of externally oriented growth on 
Argentina's evolving class structure. At the apex, commanding all 
important economic, social, and political institutions, stood the 
oligarchy and those associated with foreign capital controlling the 
export-import, transportation, and financial sectors. Next come the 
middle layers of the social structure, shown to constitute a dependent 
bourgeoisie. With the availability of large surpluses realized during 
boom periods, the middle sectors were by and large incorporated as 
secondary beneficiaries of the externally oriented growth pattern. 
Finally, there are the groupings whose interests were largely excluded 
in official policy: on the one hand, a tiny, nascent national bour­
geoisie centered around owners of establishments producing consumer 
goods for the domestic market, and on the other hand, the urban and 
rural working class along with the popular sectors in general.
Applying the theoretical model outlined in Chapter 1, this 
chapter looks at the factors responsible for shifting relationships 
between national and foreign groups which were subsequently decisive in 
determining future developmental patterns. The analysis traces the 
erosion of British hegemony and the growing influence of U.S. based 
interests to changes within the international system of the World War I 
era. The ability of U.S. heavy industry to technologically outstrip 
its English counterpart eventually altered the nature of the Argentine 
manufacturing sector. This chapter examines the manifestation of this
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process in a the shifting pattern exhibited by Argentina1 s ̂ 'foreign 
trade. Instead of a two-way flow in the exchange of rural exports for 
industrial commodities, a three-way flow developed whereby Argentina 
had to realize surpluses in her trade with the United Kingdom in 
order to cover the deficits incurred with the growing volume of imports 
from the United States. This pattern became most pronounced during the 
Peronist period of the late forties and early fifties and had crucial 
consequences, as will be seen further on. It is important here to 
note the theoretical point that patterns which subsequently become 
determinative, take shape within the prior stage. In tracing the im­
pact of changes on the international scene on the Argentine manufacturing 
sector, this chapter shows: 1) that the growing share of the U.S. in 
Argentina’s imports was accompanied by expanding U.S. investments in 
industry, and 2) discusses the process whereby U.S. interests moved 
from being suppliers of imported vehicles and machinery as well as dur­
able consumer and capital goods to becoming major‘.producers within 
Argentina itself.
Finally, this chapter's analysis establishes another point of 
decisive importance in determining the outcome of Peronism as a 
transitional stage. The industrialization that took shape in the first 
decades of the twentieth century was one wherein two diverse sectors 
developed. The more modern branches using more sophisticated and tech­
nologically advanced machinery and requiring larger concentrations of 
capital per worker employed were those in which foreign interests took 
root. On the other hand, national entrepreneurs owned the many estab­
lishments producing with less machinery and capital per worker, indeed 
often approximating the artisan variety, with an output tending to con­
sist of non-durable consumer and other wage goods.
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Externally Oriented.Growth in Argentina
From the beginning of Argentina’s history as an independent 
nation, British interests played a central role. Earlier, Britain 
had attempted to supplant Spanish rule directly. The abortive capture 
of Buenos Aires was repulsed by a hastily thrown together Creole 
militia in 1806-07. This successful experience, without the aid of 
Spanish regulars, gave Portenos— as the inhabitants of the port city 
of Buenos Aires came to be known— the morale and confidence they 
needed to militarily defeat their Spanish rulers a few years later.
Having failed to take over directly, the British shifted to indirect 
means to destroy Spain's hegemony in Latin America by aiding and 
abetting separatist forces financially and by providing them with war 
material.
The junta which took control represented the consolidation 
of the interests of Buenos Aires merchants over those of the producers 
from the interior. While the activities of the largely artisan and 
handicraft manufacturers of the interior were artifically shored up 
and depended on an elaborate system of imperial regulations and on the 
markets of Upper Peru, those of the Porteno groups tied to overseas
trade had been ascendant and barely held in check by the Crown's offi­
cials. They had circumvented prohibitions through smuggling to the 
extent that it assumed major proportions in the economic life of the
Viceroyalty in the last decades of colonial rule.
The conflict between the groups whose interests were tied to 
producing for internal markets.and those linked to external trade, played 
a key part in the upheavals .of the first half of the nineteenth 
century. The years between 1810 and 1880, often referred to by histor-
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ians as "the period of anarchycontained intense and frequently 
bloody struggles in which catidillos:with bands of followers confronted 
each other in loose and shifting alliances, grouping and regrouping 
into confederations that vyed for national power. Nevertheless, with 
ups and downs, the externally oriented growth pattern was b'ing 
gradually but steadily consolidated.
The material interests of the groups comprising the emerging 
ruling class were oriented to the exterior. On the one hand, there 
were those whose position rested on ownership of vast tracts of land 
which produced raw materials for export, first livestock and later 
wheat, corn and flaxseed. There were also those whose positions de­
pended on the commercial structures of the export-import trade, who 
consequently favored the increased exchange of products from the pampas 
for commodities from the countries where the industrial revolution had 
taken root. Being intermediaries, merchant groups benefited from the 
lucrative trade which developed as a result of the fact that produc­
tion cost advantages enabled European capitalists to undersell Argen­
tine producers, in spite of the aided costs of having to ship their goods 
for thousands of miles.
After 1810 the externally oriented growth pattern gained 
momentum with the expansion of trade based on the export of cattle for 
salted meat and hides. Foreign traders hastened this process through 
their incursions into export trade in the 1810's which eased out 
many of the native merchants. "Old merchant families, therefore, shifted 
their assets into land and cattle for the first time. Sons of colonial
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merchant families became the new estancieros of the 1820's and 1830's."
According to James Scobie, the yearly slaughter of cattle for salted
meat increased "from 7,000 head in the 1790's, to 60,000 in 1822, and
to 350,000 by 1827." And, "in the decade following 1810 the revenues
2from the export of a million-odd hides had tripled."
From this period on, the state became the pivot with which the 
emerging ruling class of landowning oligarchy and porteno merchants 
sought to consolidate their material position. For example, the gov­
ernment centered in Buenos Aires enacted regulations which confined the 
importation of goods to that port and its environs. The government also 
became an instrument used to promote the monopolization of landownership.
Once they gained control of the state, the estancieros used it to award 
each other more land, thereby securing the sources of their power even 
more. In the 1820's for example, title to some twenty-one million acres
^■Jonathan C. Brown, A Socio-Economic History of Argentina, 1776- 
1880. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979), p. 147.
2James Scobie, Argentina: A City and a Nation (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1964), p. 78. This section relies on Scobie's work. It 
provides a concise yet broad-ranging treatment that nevertheless does 
justice to the complexities of Argentine history. The following can be 
consulted on the rural sector and the role of agriculture in promoting 
the dependence of Argentina's economy on production for external markets:
Miguel Carcano, Evolucion historica del regimen de la tierra publics, 
1810-16 (Buenos Aires: n.p., 1925).
H.S. Ferns, Britain and Argentina in the 19th Century (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1960).
Horacio Gilbert!, Historia economica de la ganaderia argentina (Buenos 
Aires: n.p., 1961).
Jacinto Oddone, La burguecia terrateniente argentina (Buenos Aires: Edi- 
ciones Populares Argentinas, 1956).
Vernon Lovell Phelps, The International Economic Position of Argentina 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1938).
Roberto Schopflocher, Historia.de la colonizacion agricola en Argentina 
(Buenos Aires: n.p., 195577”
Peter H. Smith, Politics and Beef in Argentina: Patterns of Conflict and 
Change (New York: Columbia University Press: 1969).
Juan Tenenbaum, Orientacion economica de la agricultura argentina (Buenos 
Aires: n.p., 1946).
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of public lands was transferred.to about five hundred individuals.
The state thus gave away some 32,813 square miles, an area roughly 
equivalent to the New England states excluding Maine and Rhode Island. 
Juan Manuel de Rosas who as governor of Buenos Aires province became 
Argentina's de facto ruler, "himself magnanimously turned down the 
huge island of Choele-Choel in the (remote) Rio Negro Valley, which was 
offered to him by the Buenos Aires legislature after his Indian campaign, 
and accepted instead four hundred thousand acres (about 625 square miles] 
situated within sixty miles of Buenos Aires.
It was under Rosas' (according to many, tyrannical) rule that 
the process of creating a landowning oligarchy and then converting it 
into the ruling class was consolidated. The loser was the sector 
among the Porteno mercantile elite which, like Bernardino Rivadavia, had 
favored a project for creating the material base for a yeoman-type 
democracy of small landholders through the distribution of parcels to 
European immigrants.
The state was also used as a coercive instrument to ensure the 
availability of the labor power needed by landowners. As the value of 
cattle increased, Argentina's legendary gaucho was transformed into a 
peon through stiff vagrancy laws that subjected anyone without legitimate 
employment on an estancia to imprisonment and a five year sentence at 
a frontier detachment. Interestingly, this process was carried on by 
Juan Manuel de Rosas, himself owner of the vastest tracts of land in his 
day. He was feared and despised by the Porteno upper class and loved 
and revered by the lower classes. Rosas used populist.techniques to
^Scobie, p. 79.
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which Peron's efforts one hundred and twenty years later have often
been compared. Thus, the famous quote attributed to Rosas:
You well know the attitude of the have-nots against the wealthy 
and powerful. I have always considered it very important to 
acquire an influence over the poor in order to control and 
direct them; and at great cost in effort, comfort, and money, I 
have made myself into a gaucho like them, to speak as they 
do, to protect them, to become their advocate, and to support 
their interests.*
Shipping through the port of Buenos Aires in the nineteenth
century reflected the increased Argentine demand for European goods
2as well as the growing volume of exports. According to Scobie, the
total value of imports from Europe doubled from 1860 to 1880.
On the other side of the ledger, wool exports rose from an 
average of 7,000 tons annually in the 1840's to over 100,000 
tons per year by the 1880's, by the latter decade contributing 
more than half of the value of Argentine exports. Cereals, 
frozen mutton and beef, and on-the-hoof shipments of cattle 
would soon swell this trade, but until 1880 the traditional 
products of wool, hides, and salted meat constituted more than 
90 percent of the value of exports.3
By 1880 the relationships between national and foreign groups 
defining the externally oriented growth pattern had been firmly estab­
lished. Local capital was concentrated on land and national groups 
thereby assured themselves ownership of the means of production for the 
economy's key products. By 1880 too, the role of foreign capital in 
Argentine development had become clearly defined. According to Jonathan 
Brown, "the importation of foreign capital, a rare phenomenon prior to
As cited in Scobie, p. 78, who is also the source for the data 
on land distribution and trade.
2Ibid., p. 108. Scobie.states that 500 ships a year cleared 
Buenos Aires for European ports in the mid 1850's, while that number 
had increased to more than 4,000 by 1880.
3Ibid.
1860, became commonplace thereafter. British, French, and American
financiers established themselves.in Argentine banks with connections
abroad."1 Along with financial control, strategic investments assured
foreign groups control over the nation’s economic infrastructure: its trans
portation and communication network, the railroads-and port facilities,
the telephone and telegraph system, the electrical plants and gasworks.
By virtue of owning the railroad network, the port facilities,
and (along with U.S. capital) the meat packing plants, the British
controlled the base of the Argentine economy, the export sector. The
fact that more than forty percent of all British investments before
World War I in Latin America went to Argentina, gives some idea of the
2importance Argentina held for British investors.
The dominant presence of the British in the export structures
on which the Argentine economy rested does not convey the full extent
of the dependency built into the externally oriented developmental
pattern. Though national groups owned the means of production, their
controlling position was undercut by their dependence on foreign sources
for modem technology. This is an important point because, from the
dependency theory point of view, the Argentine case represents the least
dependent situation, being at the opposite extreme from the "enclave
model" in which foreign groups own the means of production and control
the processing and distribution structures for the export commodities
3on which the economy depends. The fact that all modern technology was
1Jonathan Brown, pp. 227-8.
2Ibid.
3
Classic examples are copper in Chile, tin in Bolivia, oil in 
Venezuela, and bananas in Honduras.
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in foreign hands played a key part in determining the course of
Argentine development.
Steam locomotives, rolling stock, and the iron rails over 
which the trains traveled came from abroad. At the turn 
of the century, Argentines'were importing all their farm 
machinery, milling equipment, and steam engines. Natives 
neither manufactured modern equipment nor had the operating 
knowledge of the technical advances that stimulated their 
economy. Foreign technicians ran most of the railways and 
meat-packing plants.
Despite agreement on the strategic position of foreign, 
primarily British, groups in its dynamic sector, there has been consid­
erable debate on whether one should therefore consider the Argentine
2economy dependent or not. Jonathan Brown for example argues against 
the applicability of dependency theory on the grounds that it was the 
growth of the export sector which promoted the development of the 
internal transportation network ("backward linkages") as well as the 
processing plants, port facilities, and so on ("forward linkages").
For Brown the development of these structures as such is the determining 
factor, not who controlled them or the fact that they were specifically 
developed to meet the needs of external markets. Similarly, the fact 
that manufacturing grew out of activities complementary to the export 
sector and that manufacturing therefore had its further development 
constrained by the needs of the groups controlling the export structures,
^"Jonathan Brown, pp. 227-8.
2Works applying dependency theory to Argentina are:
Jose Maria Rosa, Analisis historico de la dependencia argentina (Buenos 
Aires: n.p., 1974).
Andres M. Caretero, Or^genes de la dependencia economica.argentina (Buenos 
Aires: n.p., 1974).
Juan Eugenio Corradi in LatinrAmerica: The Struggle with Dependency and 
Beyond (N.Y.: John Wiley and Sons, 1974), edited by Ronald Chilcote 
and Joel Edelstein, pp. 305-408.
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does not present any fundamental problems for Brown. While Brown’s 
analysis is relevant to dispelling simplistic notions of dependency, his 
failure to take into account the more sophisticated formulation of 
dependency theory leads him to overlook the importance of the relation­
ships his own work establishes.1 By applying the Cardoso and Faletto 
version, this study contributes to the debate on the applicability of 
dependency theory to the Argentine case by showing 1) that Peronism is 
best understood as an outcome of the contradictions resulting from an 
industrialization subordinated to the requisites of the export sector, 
and 2) that problems of dependence on external sources for modern 
technology played a key role in undermining the Peronist program for 
liberating the Argentine economy from foreign domination.
In a study which contains valuable information on how the 
United States deliberately set about to displace the United Kingdom as 
the hegemonic foreign power in Argentina, Carlos Andres Escude specifi­
cally rejects the applicability of even the "more refined and sophisti­
cated" Cardoso and Faletto version of dependency theory to the Argentine 
case. He states that "these authors do not seem to understand or wholly
Another analysis which argues against the applicability of 
the dependency theory framework to the Argentine case is that of 
Laura Randall in her An Economic History of Argentina in the Twentieth 
Century (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978). For example, 
she states that "since the domestic sector of the economy in the 1920's 
was about three times bigger than the export sector, and rose to about 
ten times bigger than the export sector in the post-war period, it would 
take considerable ingenuity to show that any other nation determined 
Argentine economic history during the past half century." (p. 5)
Randall's quantitative focus is such as to exclude analyzing the nature 
of the relationships between the.two sectors and of the groups controlling 
the predominant activities in each.
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perceive the magnitude of Argentina's development during this period 
1860-1950."'*' Unfortunately, in his haste to jump on the anti-depend­
ency theory bandwagon, it is Escude who has not understood the contents 
of Cardoso and Faletto's writings. Like previous critics he has lumped 
their formulation together with other versions of dependency theory 
that do not account for "development." Escude ignores the structural 
element in Argentina's dependency. It is the structures connecting the 
locally dominant groups to foreign interests which insure external con­
ditioning of the rate and direction of accumulation.
For Cardoso and Faletto the question is not whether 
"development" (in the sense of economic and social growth), distorted 
or otherwise, took pl^ce. Rather the question is what are the relation­
ships forged among and between the foreign and national groups 
that in fact determined the type of development that did take place.
Escude faults dependency theory for not taking into account
such variables as "international politics, geography, market size,
international terms of trade, domestic policies," which, he says, "can
be responsible, in different situations, for a shift in the type of
2peripheral insertion a given country is subject to." Contrary to 
Escude's assertion, Cardoso and Faletto are indeed careful to include 
these variables in their analysis of shifts from one modality or 
pattern of dependency to another. As this study shows, far from an
*Carlos Andres Escude, "The Argentine Eclipse: The International - 
Factor in Argentina’s Post World War II Decline, " Ph.D. dissertation 
(Yale University, 1981), p. 29.
2Ibid., pp. 39-40.
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inability to explain or account for what Carlos Andres Escude refers 
to as "the miracle of Argentine underdevelopment,"* only an application 
of the Cardoso and Faletto model brings out the underlying process in 
Argentina's failure to achieve self-sufficient growth, despite the 
auspicious beginnings of the forties.
To answer the question of whether Argentina should be considered 
an example of dependent development one .must analyze the actual role 
played by foreign capital in Argentina's economic development. When 
foreign capital entered the Argentine economy it was not as much in a 
competitive capacity as it was a means of monopolizing the particular 
branch or sphere of economic activity in which it was invested. More­
over, this was usually accomplished with relatively minor investments 
which were used strategically, with the help of the local government, 
to incorporate national capital under the control of foreign concerns. 
This procedure is exemplified by the way the British took over exist­
ing railroad trackage built with Argentine capital and later obtained 
rather generous governmental subsidies and regulations for expansion
2which assured them a monopoly over the commercially profitable lines.
*This involves the dramatic decline from Colin Clark's 1942 
projection wherein Argentina held the fourth highest per capita income 
in the world.
2This is the subject of Raul Scalabrini Ortiz's study, Historia 
de los ferrocarriles argentinos. Scalabrini Ortiz was one of the 
populist-nationalist ideologues whose polemics in the 1930's,had a wide­
spread impact in preparing the intellectual climate for Peron's policies 
a decade later. In his book he stresses how the British used the rail­
roads as. an instrument of their economic policy.
It the English need flax, they will lower the rate for it and it
will be sown. Economically (Argentine producers) will not be
independent citizens; they will be colonial subjects of His 
Britannic Majesty. . . . The English will impede our spontaneous
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The railroads played a key part in focusing the Argentine
economy on the production of agricultural raw materials for export and
in undermining national producers of manufactured goods by making
cheaper goods from Europe and the United States widely available.
"This competition forced local economies either to produce raw materials
or to face gradual stagnation, with the accompanying drift of population
toward the coast."1 Buenos Aires became the terminus for all major
railroad lines and thus secured its position as the center through which
all of the nation's economic intercourse moved. By contrast with the
European and United States railroad networks,
the Argentine system developed without feeder lines or connecting 
links. Frequently the only way to move cross-country was— and 
sometimes still is— to take the train into the nearest port and 
then come out again on another of they system's spokes. Yet, 
since this method of transportation met the basic needs of an 
export economy, few roads, buses, or trucks penetrated beyond 
the urban radius until after 1930.^
The patterns of Argentine social and political life followed
these lines of economic movement. Politically Buenos Aires became the
undisputed center. After 1880 conflicts between social classes and
economic groups took the form of struggles to control the national
administration. Even wealthy landowners "established their center of
operations, and often their homes, in Buenos Aires and soon lost touch
3with their provincial origins."
development, foreclose industrial possibilities, and maintain 
us in the state of agricultural and stock producers. (4th edi­
tion published in Buenos Aires in 1964, pp. 61-2)
As quoted by Mark Falcoff, "Raul Scalabrini Ortiz: The Making of an 
Argentine Nationalist" in the Hispanic American Historical Review 52 
(Feb. 1972): 92.
1 2Scobie, pp. 137-8. Tv., , 3T, ...’ ibid., p. 137. Ibid., pp. 146-7.
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Besides becoming the social and political center, and the indis­
pensable link of the export-import trade upon which Argentina depended, 
Buenos Aires also attracted most of the country's manufacturing activ­
ity. The railroads continued to enlarge the internal market for all 
sorts of imported goods, from shoes to machines; but, simultaneously, 
a steadily growing portion of everyday needs were being supplied through 
the output of factories in Buenos Aires and Rosario, again to the 
detriment of local industries in the interior.
The rise of processing industries on the coast was reflected even 
in .the special cases of flour, sugar, and wines. Tariff rates 
helped the flour mills capture the internal market during the 
1970's, and in the next decade sugar and wines gained similar 
protection. By 1910, however, another trend was becoming notice­
able. Not only had modern flour mills, located in the coastal 
cities and controlled by European capital, put most of the small 
mills of the interior out of business, but mills in the city of 
Buenos Aires -were conquering the markets of Santa Fe, Cordoba, 
and Entre Rios— all major wheat-producing provinces. In the 
sugar industry, although cane mills producing raw sugar remained 
clustered around the cane fields, the only major refinery was 
located at Rosario. Even the final processing of wines from 
Mendoza and San Juan was centered at Buenos Aires.*
It is important to keep in mind that industry in Argentina 
developed as an appendage to the agricultural sector. Raising cattle 
and growing wheat for export provided the axis around which the nation's 
economic life revolved between 1880 and 1930. The meat-packing plants, 
controlled by British and North American interests, and improved refrig­
eration techniques..made possible the export of chilled beef— a product 
far superior to frozen beef in approximating the taste of fresh beef. 
With these improvements, cattle replaced sheep as the major livestock 
raised on the pampas.
^Scobie, p. 146.
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Cereals, which had represented a negligible share of agricul­
tural exports before 1880, rose to total 50 percent of export values 
by 1900. "Between 1882 and 1895 cultivated acreage on the pampas 
increased fifteen times— to almost ten million acres." The exploitation 
of the pampas' resources was expanded and intensified such that "by 
1910 the value of exports reached 390 million gold pesos, thirteen 
times the export trade of 1870."^ The indelible stamp left by rural 
production on Argentina's export trade can be seen in Table 1.
Apart from the overall picture— the insignificance of manufac­
turing for external markets— two particularly striking contrasts emerge 
from these figures. The repercussions of the first— the dramatic decline 
in the value of exports following the international economic collapse 
of 1929— will be analyzed in the next chapter. The second— the highest 
percentage of non-rural exports taking place in the 1940-44 period— is 
critical to the major hypotheses explored in this study and will be 
covered in Chapter 4.
The extent to which the Argentine economy was centered on rural
production becomes clear from contrasting the percentage contributed to
the gross national product by agricultural activities, 37 percent by the
beginning of the twentieth century, to the 14 percent contributed by
2manufacturing industries. Moreover, as will be seen, the fact that 
the industrial sector developed as an appendage to the rural sector 
posed particular problems for the Argentine economy in confronting the 
crisis of the depression in the 1930's and the war years of the 1940's. 
"Industrial capital gravitated.toward the processing of raw materials;
Scobie, pp. 119-20. 2Ibid., p. 177.
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TABLE 1.—  Argentine export trade by major products
Years Annual Average 
Value 







1871-4 95 95% - - 5%
1875-9 106 93 2% 5
1880-4 139 89 7 4
1885-9 209 81 16 3
1890-4 233 66 29 5
1895-9 299 64 31 5
1900-4 499 49 46 5
1905-9 761 39 58 3
1910-4 980 45 51 4
1915-9 1,608 55 39 6
1920-4 1,897 37 58 5
1925-9 2,126 37 59 4
1930-4 1,340 35 60 5
1935-9 1,702 37 57 6
1940-4 1,847 56 26 18
1945-9 4,207 43 50 7
1950-4 6,077 48 43 9
1955-8 18,941 52 40 8
1959 78,377 53 43 4
1960 89,212 48 47. 5
1961 79.640' 54 40 6
1962 136,181 45 50 5
SOURCES: Direccion nacional de estadistica (Buenos Aires), Boletin 
mensual; and FIAT, Oficiha tecnica. From Scobie, p. 277.
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materials; half the capital and production value was concentrated in 
the food industries alone. By 1914 Argentine plants supplied 37 per­
cent of the processed food consumed in Argentina, but only 12 percent 
of the metals and machinery and 17 percent of the clothing were locally 
produced."^ Thus the production of such badly needed items as tractors, 
trains, electric generators and machinery in general was neglected; 
energy resources too, remained undeveloped. This meant that Argentina 
depended on her exports from the pampas in order to import not only 
capital goods and machinery and luxury goods, but also consumer goods 
which could have been produced locally. "A quintupling of imports in 
the two decades preceding World War I emphasized the degree to which
European factories were called upon to supply the country's rapidly
2rising consumption."
Externally oriented growth in the Argentine case meant depend­
ency and not, as is often alleged, an interdependence resulting from 
Argentina's specialization and her role in the international division 
of labor. A North American observer, long before the advent of 
dependency theory, used its terms to describe the situation prevailing 
in the thirties.
A relatively small group of agricultural products is exported
to pay for a diversified list of imports. . . . When grains and
meat are in demand, Argentina is prosperous; a cessation of
this demand, and the effect is felt throughout the entire
Argentine economy. The country's entire economic life has
hinged upon the export trade; all branches of the national
economy have been organized to promote that trade and its
corollary, the import trade. Add to this the importance of
foreign loans to Argentina, with their accompanying debt service, 
and the dependence of the Argentine economy upon international
forces is clearly depicted.
1 2 Scobie, pp. 177-8. Ibid., p. 177.
2Vernon Lovell Phelps, The International Economic Position of 
Argentina (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1938), p. 11.
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More specifically, externally oriented growth in the Argentine case 
meant dependence upon the major external market for Argentine commo­
dities, Great Britain. Writing about a later period, another scholar 
observed that
when considering Anglo-Argentine trade, it must be remembered 
that the two countries have not suffered a mutual degree of 
dependence. While, during the earlier period, Britain might have 
been Argentina's major trading partner, Argentina never assumed 
the same function for Britain. Argentina was but one of many—  
admittedly an important one— of Britain's trading partners. For 
one or two commodities Britain might depend upon the Argentine 
source of supply, but in general she was less committed to one 
market or source of supply. Although this dependency has been 
reduced, Argentina still finds Britain a more important mhrket 
for her produce than does Britain Argentina.
Argentina's role in the world economy, becoming the major
2supplier of cereals and beef, enabled her to become Latin America's
economic and cultural leader. However, as Scobie notes, because of
the disadvantageous position arising from the dependency built into
Argentina's externally oriented growth pattern, she followed a very
different path from that of the United States, a country Argentina
resembled in many other ways.
The structure of national prosperity and the elite class 
itself conspired to subordinate everything to the exploitation 
of the pampas. Railroads radiating from the ports drew the 
products of the pampas to the coast for rapid transit to Europe, 
but construction of roads and connecting railroad links was
Colin Lewis, "Anglo-Argentine Trade, 1945-65," in Argentina 
in the Twentieth Century (Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: University of 
Pittsburgh Press, 1975) edited by David Rock, pp. 118-20.
2Phelps, pp. 134-6 and 141, offers these figures: between 1911 
and 1934 Argentina supplied more than half of the world's total beef 
exports and about 95 percent of her total exports were agro-pastoral 
goods. In 1925 Argentina occupied first place in the world's exports 
of corn, oats and falxseed, and second or third in those of wheat and 
flour.
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neglected. One metropolis effectively monopolized all nego­
tiations and decisions and served as the only connection to 
Europe. Mining or manufacturing activities not directly related 
to the pampas’ agricultural primacy were abandoned. It was as 
if, long before the Civil War, the South had emerged as the 
dominant and only area of United States expansion, with its 
capital at Savannah or Charleston, an economy based entirely 
on cotton exported to British mills, and an oligarchy composed 
of plantation owners and merchants.!
Externally Oriented Growth and Argentina’s Ruling Class
On the superstructural level, Argentina's externally oriented 
growth pattern took a form best described as the Anglo-oligarchic 
connection. The command posts of the nation's important economic and 
social institutions were controlled by the landowning oligarchy, those 
at the pinnacles of export-import structures, and British (and to a 
lesser extent, continental European) financial interests. The ideology 
of free trade and laissez faire expressed the mutual self-interest of 
these elites in the continued dependence on exporting agro-pastoral 
goods.
On the level of political power, the Anglo-oligarchic connec­
tion meant that representatives of the landowning oligarchy, of export- 
import groups, and lawyers for foreign enterprises occupied all important 
governmental posts. The pattern of foreign merchants establishing con­
nections with influential Argentines had already been established since 
the time when the Porteno elite were severing their colonial bonds.
For example,
David Curtis De Forestan  American who gained his interest in 
the Rio de la Plata while smuggling, formed a partnership with 
Juan Larrea around 1810. Three years later his partner became 
Minister for Finance. When De Forest then formed a company with 
a close friend of Juan Martin de Pueyrrddon, he obtained protec­
tion against Argentine merchants and received government contracts.
^Scobie, p. 222.
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De Forest left Argentina in 1818, taking with him accumulated 
capital of 101,952 pesos, then equivalent to 27,84Q«8 in gold 
sovereigns. De Forest's practices were not unusual.*
For its part, the landowning oligarchy had already firmed its 
grip on the state apparatus during the first fifty years of the nation's 
life to such an extent that the period from about 1880 until the advent 
of Peronism, excepting the interlude from 1916 to 1930 when the Radical 
Party controlled the government, is usually referred to by Argentines 
as "the period of oligarchic domination." Oligarquia in Argentine 
popular and scholarly parlance refers to the landowning class and is 
distinguished from burguesia nacional, the latter group's interests 
being tied to manufacturing activity.
Ownership of the means of production in the rural area consti­
tuted the oligarchy's base and they controlled the state. "They appoint­
ed presidents and congresses from their own ranks with only a pretense 
2at elections. The major institution representing the agro-pastoral
exporting interests, the Sociedad Rural Argentina (SRA), held a firm
grip over the most powerful branch of the government, the executive.
According to Peter Smith in his definitive study of the beef industry,
more than half of Argentina's presidents between 1910 and 1945 were
members of the highly elite SRA. More than forty percent a£ all cabinet
posts were likewise held by influential SRA members. Moreover, they
tended to control ministries of major importance, notably Foreign 
Relations, Finance, and military posts. . . . Perhaps the most pro-
*Vera Blinn Reber, British Mercantile Houses in-Buenos Aires, 
1810-80 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1979), p. 64.
This book provides an in-depth.study of "the Anglo-oligarchic connection."
2Scobie, p. 173.
82
vocative finding is that the Rural Society generally survived 
the vicissitudes of party politics. It was strongly represented 
in the cabinet before, during, and after the Radical administra­
tion of 1916-30. And the SRA even controlled 15 percent of  ̂
all the seats in the Congress' during these different periods.
The oligarquia was a small, exclusive, and extremely cohesive 
group. 'In politics as well as in society, this elite was far more 
united than any previous or subsequent ruling group." Scobie puts 
the composition of the oligarchy towards the end of the nineteenth 
century at two hundred family names totalling far less than one percent 
of Buenos Aires' population. Scobie also points out that, though 
landownership remained the economic base for the oligarchy's power, many 
of its members were not in fact landowners and only a minority were 
cattlemen. "Commerce, banking, politics, and, increasingly, the pro­
cessing industries built many family fortunes, and speculations during
3two economic booms created more financial empires than they destroyed." 
Significantly however, many of these individuals bought land for 
its social prestige value.
Through its ownership of the land on which the major income pro­
ducing exports were raised, government regulations in its favor, and 
its members' influential connections with export-import companies and 
banks, the oligarchy assured itself of the lion's share of Argentina's
Peter Smith, Politics and Beef in Argentina: Patterns of Conflict 
and Change (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), p. 48. The best 
data on the SRA's presence within the government is in Jose Luis de Imaz,
Los que mandan (Buenos Aires: Editorial Universitaria de Buenos Aires, 1968). On 
the SRA itself see Jorge Newton's Historia de la Sociedad Rural Argentina 
(Buenos Aires, 1966).
2Others give differing estimates but they all agree on the oli­
garchy's cohesiveness and that it represented a tiny fraction of the 
nation's population. See Ortiz below.
3Scobie, p. 172.
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lucrative trade relations. The benefits were large enough :to be 
spread to such groups within the middle sectors as the professional 
classes, lower level managers, teachers, government workers, and white 
collar employees in general. Indeed, the fruits of externally oriented 
growth were so plentiful in Argentina that its middle classes enjoyed 
one of the highest living standards in the world of the 1920's. Being 
junior benficiaries, instead of gravitating towards the national bour­
geoisie interested in expanding manufacturing activity, as their counter­
parts did, for example, in the United States, these middle class ele­
ments participated in the externally oriented growth pattern in a sub­
ordinated capacity. The losers were the rural and urban working classes, 
tenant farmers, and small-scale industrialists and merchants.
According to Ricardo Ortiz, the relative proportions of the 
significant groupings comprising Argentina's class structure in the 
immediate pre-World War I period can be broken down as follows: the 
oligarchy (large landowners, bankers, large industrialists and high 
financiers) represented about 3.1 percent of the economically active 
population; the middle sectors broken down into two groups made up 
about 41.8 percent of the total— middle sized farmers, merchants, in­
dustrialists, and public administrators representing 13.6 percent of 
this figure and small and poor farmers, merchants, artisans and lower 
echelon administrators the other 28.2 percent; the proletarian and semi­
proletarian class (seasonally employed and rural-to-urban immigrants) 
made up the remaining 55.1 percent of the economically active population.*
''■Ricardo M. Ortiz, Historia economics de la argentina, 1850-1930 
(Buenos Aires: Editorial Raigal, 1955), 2:191.
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The "Radical" .Period of 1916^-30
We have seen that the oligarchy’s economic and social position 
as major landowner and the group at the apex of the social structure, 
depended on the uninterrupted flow of agro-pastoral commodities to the 
exterior and the corresponding reflux of manufactured goods. It is 
therefore not surprising that after two decades of pressure from the 
middle sectors supported by a few abortive coups, the oligarchy moved 
to coopt this potential threat at a time when its socio-economic posi­
tion was most'secure and it could afford to share political power. With 
the ascent to the presidency in 1910 of the leader of its reform wing, 
Roque Saenz Pena, the oligarchy laid the groundwork for this cooptation 
of the middle class. After a bitter fight in congress, Saenz Pena suc­
ceeded in having the law which mandated the secret ballot and universal 
male suffrage enacted in 1912. This law, which subsequently bore Saenz 
Pena's name, made possible the election to the presidency in 1916 of 
Hipolito Yrigoyen, whose Radical Party had openly appealed to the 
middle sectors for support.
The liberal-reform fraction of the oligarchy chose a propitious 
time for its cooptation of the middle sectors. On the one hand, the 
oligarchy's control over the means of production (landownership) and its 
linkages with the foreign interests participating in the exploitation of 
Argentina's wealth were secure in the global order of the twenties. On 
the other hand,the middle sectors inducted into the state's machinery 
did not represent dynamic groups pressing for changes in the relations 
of production and thus posed no internal threat. Rather than represent­
ing an aspiring industrial bourgeoisie pitted against formerly dominant 
rural barons, the Radical Party represented those who had a stake in
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preserving the on-going relations of production based on agro-pastoral 
production for export. The state became a vast patronage machine, a 
source for income from thousands of bureaucratic jobs, and thus a means 
for increasing the participation of'the middle sectors on the consumer 
side, not the creation of wealth side of the reproductive cycle.
Opening the doors of political system to the middle class 
reinforced its stake in the system. At the time, the working class 
was beginning to emerge as a significant factor. Under the influence 
of immigrant workers, a militant anarchist movement had led various 
strikes. And, while they had no intention of overhauling the system, 
the middle sectors nevertheless wanted a larger share of the spoils de­
rived from agricultural surpluses and expressed their dissatisfaction 
by fomenting discontent :in the universities and the military. A link­
ing up of middle class discontent with the workers’ unrest might have 
undermined the social relations on which the oligarchy's economic and 
social position rested. The Radical Party changed from being one of 
the chief instigators of the political instability to being the main 
instrument for curbing that instability.
Yrigoyen thus came to power with "a conditional mandate to rule 
circumscribed by two central objectives: the preservation of the elite’s 
economic position and the elmination of popular unrest which had led to 
previous political instability. He was thus to placate the middle class 
and the working class, but at the same time to perpetuate the economic 
system which underlay their expressions of discontent."'*' The Radicals 
were able, for the most part,-tP fulfill this contradictory mandate
^David Rock, "Radical Populism and the Conservative Elite, 
1912-30," in Rock, p. 74.
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because of the exceptionally favorable circumstances for Argentina's ex­
port oriented economy prevailing on the international scene from the 
post-World War I years up until the 1929 crash. In much the same way, 
as will be shown subsequently, Peron was able to implement policies
containing implicit contradictions because of favorable international
/conditions. Another parallel between the Yrigoyen and Peron regimes 
lay in their populism. A contemporary newspaper account (La Epoca 
on January 11, 1920) characterized Yrigoyen's style and impact in 
these terms:
In assiduous and direct contact with the People, and with 
the progressive activities of the Nation, President Yrigoyen, 
the true democrat, has managed to win something which the presi­
dents of the class (the Oligarch^) were never able .to win— the 
love and confidence of the citizenry.1
Yrigoyen often projected himself as a symbol of national reconcilia­
tion and he undoubted enjoyed widespread popular support. Peron too 
showed these features some two decades later. In fact, on more than 
one occasion he legitimated his rule by alluding to its being a direct 
continuation of Yrigoyen's politics.
Though the use of populism to obscure class contradictions 
and deflect conflicting interests within the movement itself were 
common to both Yrigoyen and Peron, the class bases of these regimes made 
them two very different and distinct phenomena. In the first place, 
Yrigoyen's populism towards the working class remained largely on the 
level of rhetoric. Though his government occasionally engaged in inter­
ventions into strikes favorably towards the workers, and passed some 
favorable legislation, it did not go much further in protecting 
working class interests. It certainly did not, as Peron's government 
did, rest on the working class as its social base of support.
^"Quoted in Rock's "Radical Populism," p. 74.
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In fact, in January of 1919, during what became known as la semana 
tragica, Yrigoyen's government participated in one of the bloodiest 
massacres of working class militants in Argentine history. In the 
second place, the middle sectors tied to externally oriented growth in 
a dependent capacity, constituted the Radical Party's social base and 
were the same sectors that represented Perot's most vehement opposi­
tion. Whereas Yrigoyen's government represented the dependent middle 
sectors, Peron's policies incorporated the interests of an emerging 
national bourgeoisie.
Paradoxically, as will be shown in the next chapter, forced 
to make adjustments in the face of the disruptive impact of the world 
depression of the thirties on externally oriented growth, the oligarchy 
increased the presence within the Argentine economy of industrialists 
and other sectors oriented towards the internal market. In sharp 
contrast to the 1930-43 period when the oligarchy resumed its direct 
control of the state, the Radical governments of 1916-30 which espoused 
the interests of the middle and popular sectors, did almost nothing 
to promote or even protect the position of the embryonic national 
bourgeoisie. In the 1920's tariff rates protecting national industry 
declined to their lowest levels in half a century*- and this was also 
the decade when the exportation of agricultural raw materials in ex­
change for imported manufactures reached its zenith. In fact, the 
Radical Party's policies were quite consistent with, its social base—  
middle sectors who had been incorporated into the externally•oriented 
growth pattern as junior partners.
^Scobie, p. 182.
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The repercussions of the international economic crisis 
ushered in with the 1929 collapse, as we shall see in more detail in 
the next chapter, led the oligarchy to abandon the experiment with 
free and honest, democratic government. Though the severe interruption 
in Argentina's external trade did not directly threaten the oligarchy's 
ownership of the key means of .production, the internal impact the cutting 
back of production on the land and rising unemployment in the city 
beginning with food processing related industry, as well as the falling 
levels in the middle sectors' acquisitive power resulting from the 
shrinking of the wealth available to be spread about— did threaten 
the reproduction of traditional economic relationships. The oligarchy's 
response was to seize the state with the coup of 1930 and thus use 
naked political power to protect and strengthen its position. In the 
period between 1930 and 1943 which became known in Argentine history 
as "the infamous decade," the secret ballot was replaced by the stuffed 
ballot box, as the fledgling democratic practices were thrown overboard 
in favor of the time-tested techniques that guaranteed the oligarchy 
control of the state. These techniques are aptly conveyed with the 
term coined by the oligarchy itself during those years , "the patriotic 
fraud." That is, there was only a pretense at elections and their 
obvious rigging was justified with pride by saying this was necessary 
in order to protect the best interests of the nation. In much the same 
way, far from being ashamed, Argentina's military rulers in the late 
seventies justified the most brutal acts of repression as the carrying 
out of their patriotic duty.
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British Hegemony Over Argentine Development and 
the United States1 Challenge 
Up until World War I Great Britain was the center of the 
world economy and, more than any other country, it was the outside 
pole in Argentina's externally oriented economic development. Britain's 
position rested on its role in the international division of labor 
based en specialization and trade. England became the world s workshop,
specialization and trade. England became the world's workshop, 
importing raw materials and exporting manufactures. Thus it has been 
estimated that at the height of its supremacy, around 1870, British 
industry produced one third of all manufactured goods in the world.
On the other hatid, as the factors of production were shifted from 
agriculture to industry, Britain came to rely more and more on im­
ported raw materials and foodstuffs. This became particularly evident 
after the abolition of the corn laws. By 1870. half of the flour and 
wheat consumed in England was imported, and beef commenced to be an 
important import.
The material base that enabled Britain to achieve indisputable 
preeminence in the international economy of the day also contained the 
sources for its erosion. Its industrial supremacy had rested primarily 
on textiles (cotton based) and steel. Around 1870 four fifths of 
Britain's exports consisted of these types of goods. After that date 
British hegemony was increasingly squeezed by the newly rising industrial 
powers, particularly Germany and the United States. Faced with this 
challenge, the English fell back on the economic links they had forged 
with their colonial possessions and.other spheres of influence. Thus 
in 1913, Argentina and India alone bought more iron and steel from the
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English than all of Europe did. The proportion of Britain's exports 
to countries and territories within its imperial orbit shows how 
important they were to the English economy. This proportion rose from 
25 percent in 1870 to about 40 percent in 1913.^
The relative descent of British exports and its rising imports 
brought about a constantly growing deficit in its visible commerce. 
These however, were more than compensated for by favorable balances in 
its invisible commerce. Incomes derived from shipping, insurance, 
banking services, and above all dividends and interests on foreign 
investments rose consistently throughout the nineteenth century until 
the First World War. The problems this might have caused the inter­
national system were avoided through the increasing rhythm of foreign 
loans. Thus it was not so paradoxical that as the competitive capacity 
of its exports fell, Britain's importance as the world's financial cen­
ter grew. Between 1870 and 1914 British investments overseas increased 
from 700 million to 4 billion pounds. London became the largest 
source for finance capital in the world. In 1914 these investments
were equivalent to the combined foreign investments of Germany, France,
2Belgium, and the United States.
In the end what proved pivotal in Britain's displacement from 
the center of the global economic order was the fact that it was out­
stripped technologically in the capital goods sector.
^These figures are from the source this analysis paraphrases: 
Pedro Skupch, "El deterioro y fin de la hegemonia britanica sobre la 
economia argentina 1914-1947," in Estudios sobre losorfgenes del 
peronismo (Buenos Aires: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 1973), 2: 6.
2Ibid., pp. 8 & 5.
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In 1913 British exports of machinery represented 30 percent 
of the total exported by the seven major exporting countries 
in this category, those of Germany amounting to 32.5 percent 
and those of the United States 25.9 percent. By 1926 her par­
ticipation had fallen to 25 .6 percent as opposed to the 37.6 
percent from the United States and the 23 percent from Germany.
The United States had displaced'Great Britain as the world's 
foremost exporter of machinery.
It is not surprising that New York began to replace London as the 
world's financial and commercial center during the 1920's.
Latin America played a crucial part in maintaining British 
hegemony over the international order of the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. The United Kingdom's trade with the area never 
fell below 10 percent of Britain's total overseas trade after 1840. 
Moreover, from the end of the century until the First World War, Latin 
America was one of the most important areas for English investors. In 
1913 Great Britain had one billion pounds invested in Latin America, 
one fourth of all her foreign investments. Compared to the 350 million 
pounds in French investments that year and the 250 million in U.S. in­
vestments, Britain easily occupied the foremost position among the 
foreign investors in the area. It can even be said that in the mid­
nineteenth century, Latin American markets saved Britain's industry which 
was based on the export of cotton textiles. In 1840, Latin American
2markets absorbed fully 35 percent of all British textiles shipped abroad.
Within Latin America, British interests were oriented towards 
South America and focused particularly on Argentina, Brazil and Chile 
which together in 1913 accounted for 67 percent of Britain's Latin
3American investments and 72 percent of its trade with the area. Of the
1 2Skupch, p. 11. My translation. Ibid., p. 13.
3Ibid.
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three, Argentina held the most prominent position for British interests. 
This is not surprising given that, until the thirties, Argentina took 
up the lion's share of South America's economic activity, as Table 2. 
shows.
TABLE 2.—  Argentina's economic importance relative to the rest of 
South America
Activity Percentage of all South America
Exports, 1932 41
Imports, 1932 . 47
Total Foreign Trade, 1932 43
Railroads, mileage, 1930 40
" , freight tonnage, 1930 40
" , passengers carried, 1930 44
Automobile vehicles, 1935 55
Petroleum consumption, 1935 50
Telephones, instruments, 1930 49
Telephones, messages, 1930 35
Radios, 1930 66
Postal Service, pieces of mail, 1930 63
Educational expenditures, 1930 65
Print paper consumed, 1924 57
Telegrams sent, 1930 60
SOURCES: Revista de ecohbmia argentina (Buenos Aires) 35, (April- 
June 1936): 47^9. George Wythe, "Manufacturing Developments in Argen­
tina j" Trade Information Bulletin (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Foreign 
and Domestic Commerce, p. 34): no. 820; U.K. Norton, The Coming of 
South America (New York: n.p. ■> 1932) . From Phelps, p. .11.
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Argentina represented Great Britain’s most important market in 
the Latin American area, absorbing in 1913 and 1927 44 and 46 percent 
respectively, of its exports to the region. Nevertheless, it is impor­
tant to note that the overall trend was one of stagnation, with Great 
Britain's exports increasing only 6 percent during these years while : 
those from the United States increased 142 percent.'*' After World 
War I, simultaneously as the United Kingdom became the critical market 
for Argentine beef, Britain’s role as a provider of goods decreased 
while imports from the United States were on the rise. The European 
conflagration of 1914-18 marked the beginning of the shift away from 
England's hegemony over the Argentine economy towards that of the 
United States, a shift which was not consolidated until the late 1950's.
The shift toward the growing importance of U.S interests in 
the Argentine economy began in World War I, gained momentum in the 
twenties, suffered a setback in the thirties, and regained its momentum 
in the post-World War II era. In Argentina’s external commercial 
relations this shift was manifested by the trend showing a growing pro­
portion of exports to Great Britain while imports from the United King­
dom declined and, simultaneously, those from the United States increased. 
Analyzing a set of trade figures similar to those in Table 3, Eduardo 
Jorge concludes that before the First World War almost half of Argen- 
tina's imports came from continental Europe, while 35 percent came from
^kupch, p. 16,
2Interestingly, he points out that Germany alone surpassed the 
United States in this respect.in the pre-World War I era, a position 
it never recovered after its defeat.
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Great Britain and 15 percent from the United States.
TABLE 3.— Proportional participation by the United Kingdom and the 
United States in Argentina's exports and imports
Exports to Imports from
(percentage (percentage <
of total) total)
U.K. U.S. U.K. U.S.
1910 21.8 6.8 31.1 13.8
1919 28.7 18.4 23.6 35.5
1927 28.2 8.3 19.4 25.4
1936 35 12.2 23.6 14.4
SOURCE: Revista de la economj^a argentina 39 (Oct. 1940): 304-5. From 
Colin Lewis in Rock, p. 115.
In the twenties, given the tremendous increase in the volume of Argen­
tina's exports, her imports from all sources rose. However, in 1929, 
while imports from the United States quadrupled, those from the 
European continent did not quite double and those from England in­
creased by less than 40 percent. Jorge estimates that immediately 
prior to the international economic collapse of 1929, 26 percent of 
Argentine imports came from the United States, 17 percent from Great 
Britain and 30 percent from continental European countries.*
With the exception of the World War I and World War II years 
and a short period between 1936 and 1938 when the U.S. market was briefly 
opened to Argentine corn, Argentina has consistently realized deficits 
in its trade with the United States. The three-way trade pattern where­
*Eduardo F. Jorge, Industria y concentracion economics (Buenos 
Aires: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 1971), pp. 83-5.
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by Argentina had to realize favorable balances in her trade with 
England in order to cover her deficits with the United States— a 
pattern which as will be seen had a profound impact on Peronist indus­
trializing efforts— became the most pronounced trend in Argentina's 
external commercial relations in the decade of the twenties. Thus 
while Argentine exports complemented European needs, the United States' 
agricultural sector was not only capable of satisfying its domestic 
market but also competed with Argentina on the world market. That is 
why the United States' trade orientation towards Argentina has always 
been one of a seller rather than a buyer. Even in that brief period when 
Argentina had a favorable balance of trade, it sent only 11 percent of 
its thirteen principle exports to the United States in 1937-8.*
The tripartite trade pattern of the 1920's expressed Argentine 
dependence on exports to the United Kingdom in order to cover growing 
imports from the United States, as shown in Table 4.
TABLE 4.— Balance of payments in commodity trade with U.S., U.K. and 
other countries (millions of gold Pesos)
1919-20 1921-30 1913-34
U.S. U.K.. .Others U.S. U.K. Others U.S. U.K. Others 
Exports 993 1,733 2,375 769 3,000 4,644 131 1,161 1,041
Imports 1,077 885 1,504 1,826 1,618 4,253 249 409 1,111
Surplus:
exports(+) +848 +871 +1,391 +391 +752
imports(-) -144 -1,057 -151 -70
SOURCE: Phelps, p. 190.
This shift toward the'increasing importance of the United States 
in Argentina's external commercial relations was accompanied by the con-
Silvio Frondizi, La realidad argentina (Buenos Aires: Editorial 
Praxis, 1957), 1: 123.
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sistent rise of U.S. investments within the Argentine economy during 
the twenties. Though Argentina was an important market for U.S. pro­
duced goods prior to 1914,^ Argentina only absorbed about 3.2 percent
of the United States1 Latin American investments before the First 
2World War. By 1929 Argentina took in 11 percent of the United States'
investments in Latin America and registered the highest increase in
3U.S. investments in the area after Venezuela. Concurrently, British 
investments remained more or less stable. Table 5 provides an idea 
of the magnitudes involved.
TABLE 5.— Foreign capital invested in Argentina (millions of U.S. 
dollars)
1913 1918 1926 1939
Great Britain 1861 1900 2100 1698
France 450 400 425 250
Germany 220 250 375 350
U.S.A. 40 100 600 619
SOURCE: Luis Sommi, Los capitales yanquis en la argentina (Buenos
Aires: Editorial Monteagudo, 1949), as cited by Silvio Frondizi in La 
realidad argentina (Buenos Aires: Empresiones El Sol, 1960), 1: 120.
Though comparatively less important than British investments, United 
States investments showed the most dramatic increase in the twenties 
and, significantly, were the only ones to increase between 1926 and 
1939. By excluding the British-owned railroad system, Table 6 shows 
the comparative gain in U.S. investments even more dramatically.
According to Skupch, p. 25, 21.4 percent of the United States' 
exports to Latin America found their way to Argentina.
2Ibid. 3Ibid., p. 26.
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TABLE 6.— British and U.S. investments in Argentina in branches other 
than the railroads (millions of U.S. dollars)
1913 1917 1923 1927 1931 1934 1940 1945
U.K. 823 820 772 815 714 705 624 405
U.S. 39 82 193 487 654 743 629 565
SOURCE: Economic Commission for Latin America, "El desarrollo 
economico de la Argentina" (Santiago, Chile: mimeographed version, 1958). 
From Jorge, p. 91.
From this data Eduardo Jorge concludes that the pattern is one wherein 
U.S. investments doubled through 1927 and by 1931 were practically 
equal to England's. Meanwhile, Britain's investments suffered declines 
resulting from the impact of the war from which they recovered by 1927, 
only to decline consistently after the 1929 crash.
In 1907 U.S. capital began to make its presence felt within 
the Argentine economy in the meatpacking plants. The real upsurge in 
U.S. investments took place during the years of the First World War 
and in the following decade. Initially subsidiaries of U.S. firms were 
established largely in the area of extractive activities; for example, 
the International Cement Company and Standard Oil were set up in 1917.
In the next decade, along with the increase of machinery and automobile 
exports from the United States, plants dedicated to the assembly of 
these imported parts were founded: Ford Motors in 1922, General Motors 
in 1925, Otis Elevator in 1927. "By 1933 manufacturing and processing 
facilities for some thirtyr-one enterprises had been established; among 
them three of .the big meatpacking plants, the largest automobile and 
tire companies, two major utility companies, and the biggest producers
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of petroleum, mineral, and farmaceutical products and materials for 
cons tructlon."^
By concentrating on meeting a demand for goods which Britain 
did not supply because it had been outstripped technologically in their 
production, U.S. interests began to undercut the British position within 
the Argentine economy. North American companies made inroads through 
the increased sale of products requiring some form of after-sales ser­
vice, especially cars and other consumer durables. This promoted direct 
dealing between manufacturers and retail distributors and thereby under­
cut the British monopoly based on export-import agencies. U.S. firms 
also advertised heavily to enlarge their market, something the British 
had neglected because of their past secure position. And, most signi­
ficantly, U.S. interests began their assault on what had been the back­
bone of Britain's position within the Argentine economy, their control 
of the transportation network.2
U.S. investors began to buy shares in the British railroads.
This provoked a reaction from the directors who feared the loss of 
control and who were also concerned that business might be diverted 
away from the English companies providing material for the railroads.
In May of 1929 the British Ambassador made the following statement 
about the railroads:
I look upon them as the mainstay, the backbone of our whole 
position out here. If they go, we all go. Their loss would be 
a death blow to us out here and a serious one to our industry 
at home of which they are,loyal supporters.3
^Skupch, pp. 25-6. He cites Dudley Maynard Phelps, Migration 
of Industry to South America (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1936), p. 293.
2Paraphrased from A.G. Ford, "British Investment and Argentine 
Economic Development, 1880-1914" in Rock, pp. 46-9.
3Cited by Ford in Ibid., p. 51.
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Recognizing the threat of being taken over, in the same month of 1929, 
the Buenos Aires and Pacific changed its by-laws so that non-English 
or Argentine shareholders were not allowed to vote. The other rail­
ways soon followed suit, some allowing Argentines or non-English to 
vote, but limiting the total number of shares they could hold to 
20 percent.*
The most serious assault on Britain’s strategic position in 
the transportation network took place with the massive influx of motor 
vehicles which were soon to take an increasingly larger volume of 
passengers and freight from the railroads. Between 1920 and 1930 Argen­
tina imported almost half a million vehicles, both cars and trucks. 
Almost all of them, 95.8 percent, came from the United States. Accord­
ing to the U.S. Department of Commerce, in 1929, the year which showed
the highest volume of exports for the decade, Argentina was the second
plargest market for motor vehicles after Canada.
The process involving the automobile companies exemplifies the 
pattern whereby United States groups challenged Britain's hegemony over 
the Argentine economy. First, they met a need which English imports 
did not supply. Second, their products required a servicing network 
which only the U.S. parent company could furnish. And, finally, the 
transition from importation of the finished product to that of parts 
and local assemblage was an easy one. The increased presence of U.S. 
interests in the Argentine economy was accompanied by the extension, 
and gradual change in the nature of the manufacturing sector. U.S. 
interests thus increasingly undermined what had been the foundation of
1Skupch, pp. 26-7. 2Ibid., p. 28.
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the Anglo-oligarchic connection: a limited manufacturing sector'*' 
and moreover, one tied to agricultural activity and relying primarily 
on rural goods as the main inputs.
In that it promoted manufacturing geared to the domestic market 
rather than export and, moreover, industrial activity not tied to 
the agricultural sector, U.S. capital ran counter to, and threatened the 
traditional arrangements which underlay the externally oriented growth 
pattern. By way of summary, the major factors involved in the displace­
ment of Britain's hegemonic role by U.S. interests can be outlined in
2the following manner.
The economic relations between British capital and the oligarchy 
controlling rural production were based on the exchange of commodities: 
foodstuffs in exchange for manufactures. As this relationship matured, 
British investors turned to activities that complemented the extraction 
and transportation of the products Britain needed and which, at the same 
time, facilitated an increase in the demand for manufactured goods, and 
in the satisfaction of this demand. Thus, the British-owned railroad 
system, the meatpacking and freezing plants, streetcar repair shops, 
port facilities, and public utilities such as electricity, gas, and 
sanitation. This process itself led to a greater demand for industrial 
products, most immediately those required by the development of public
*"In the 1910-14 period, the contribution of the manufacturing 
sector to the gross domestic product amounted to about 11.5 percent.
Ford in Rock, p. 33, citing figures from Diaz Alejandro.
2The "ideal-type" paradigms that follow are paraphrased from 
Silvio Frondizi, pp. 132-4. The author makes it clear that he is 
extrapolating the principal features that distinguished British from 
U.S. investments in their "pure form" from a complex reality.
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works and utilities. The process also produced a dependence on the 
importation of coal and the materials required for the construction and 
operation of the railroad network. Additionally, the process involved 
measures that favored the financial interests of British investors, for 
example, their control of many of the major commercial and banking 
institutions.
The solidity of this Anglo-oligarchic linkage began to be 
shattered in the twenties and thirties as a result of a complex of 
factors, among which was the fact that Great Britain was outstripped 
technologically, losing thereby her global monopoly of heavy industry 
and the production of machinery. In addition, as a result of concen­
trating on the export of finished consumer goods, British investors 
paid little attention to the development of Argentine manufacture.
It was in this area that North American investors, concentrating 
as they did on the migration of industrial plants, found the weak link. 
Moreover, North American interests, in their corporate form, had certain 
distinct advantages over their British counterparts: 1) proximity to 
the domestic market and therefore greater flexibility in responding to 
and creating local demand, 2) the capacity to use cheaper labor power 
and, 3) during the war, a sanctuary from the ravages of the battlefield. 
In brief, Britain's position suffered from the development of local 
industry, while that of North American interests gained from a certain 
type of industrialization.
Industrialization During Periods of International Crisis
In discussing the externally oriented growth pattern in Argentina 
and the'contradictions developing within it, this chapter showed how 
Argentina's class structure developed in the context of the nation's
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economy and its role of providing foodstuffs to major industrial 
centers overseas. The analysis also covered the changing economic 
relationships on the international scene and the weaknesses within 
Argentina's externally oriented growth pattern that led to the growing 
shift from Great Britain to the United States as the dominant external 
pole in Argentine development.
In accordance with the analytical framework of dependency 
theory outlined at the end of the last chapter, this chapter has shown 
shifts within one pattern which were to become decisive in determining 
the next developmental pattern. The next chapter will turn to the 
first stage of the transitional process itself. The point here is 
that the shifts which became pronounced in the transitional process 
between externally oriented growth and dependent industrialization, 
were already taking shape within the prior period.
In discussing the growth of manufacturing activity during the 
First World War and the twenties, this chapter covered another impor­
tant theoretical point raised in the previous chapter. It will be 
recalled that the second of four conditions mentioned for the success­
ful emergence of a transitional period was that the infrastructure 
necessary for the new pattern must have been developing within the 
prior stage.^
The next chapter focuses largely on the internal contradictions 
following upon the international economic collapse of 1929. Thus it 
deals with the second part of the first condition for the emergence of 
a transitional period: that the.repercussions of the crisis must be pro­
^See p. 24 above.
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found enough to throw into temporary disarray the alliance of domestic 
and foreign groups controlling the productive and marketing structures. 
The first part of this condition, it will be recalled, was that there 
must be a crisis on the international scene severe enough to disrupt 
the ongoing developmental process.* The decisive crisis which had 
these profound ramifications was of course the Great Depression of the 
thirties. , It is for this reason that the transitional period is dated 
from 1930.
In concluding this chapter I wish to note a point often made
2in major works on the Argentine economy: that historically, industrial
*See p. 24 above.
2Some of these are:
Alejandro E. Bunge, La economjfa argentina (Buenos Aires: Agencia 
General de Librerias y Publicaciones, 1928-30), 4 Volumes.
Dardo Cuneo, "Aspectos economicos de la historia argentina," 
C.uadernos americanos: 100 (July-Oct. 1958): pp. 385-99.
Carlos F. Diaz Alejandro, Essays on the Economic History of the 
Argentine Republic (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970)
Guido Di Telia and Manuel Zymelman, Las etapas del desarollo 
economico (Buenos Aires: Editorial Paidos, 1973).
Aldo Ferrer, The Argentine Economy (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1967).
Alcira Leiserson, Notes on the Process of Industrialization in 
Argentina, Chile, and Peru (Berkeley: University of California, Institute 
of International Studies, 1966).
Leopoldo Portnoy, La realidad argentina en el siglo XX (Mexico: 
Fondo de Cultura Economica, 1961), 2: analisis critico de la economia.
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development has shown its highest growth rates during periods of 
international crisis. Table 7 illustrates this trend.
TABLE 7.— Percentage of total demand for manufactured goods supplied 
through local production and importation, 1900-45
Period Local
Production
Imports ■ Period Local
Production
Imports
1900-04 41.4 58.6 1925-29 48.9 51.1
1905-09 40.2 59.8 1930-34 62.7 37-3
1910-14 42.0 58.0 1935-39 63.3 36.7
1915-19 53.7 46.3 1940-44 80.5 19.5
1920-24 50.8 49.2
SOURCE: Economic Commission for Latin America, "El desarrollo econq- 
mico de la Argentina," mimeographed version (Santiago, Chile: United 
Nations, 1958). From Jorge, p. 77.
The percentage of the total demand for manufactured goods supplied 
through local production rose from 42 percent to almost 54 percent by 
the end of the First World War. After that, the percentages declined 
although remaining above the pre-Wofrld War I level. The next sharp 
rise in the percentage of manufactured goods produced locally comes 
with the Great Depression. However, the really dramatic increase in 
local production of manufactured goods occurs during the World War II 
years. Indeed, as following chapters will show, these figures reflect 
a change in the role of the manufacturing sector that heralded a funda­
mental changes in the Argentine economy and its relations to inter­
national forces. The Peronist period marked the high point in the trans­
itional process that led to this new developmental pattern.
What lies behind these trends? What does their.content reveal 
about significant shifts in the relationships within and between
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national and foreign groups taking place at the time? As already 
indicated, the years of the First World War constituted the beginning 
of the shift away from the predominance of British interests within 
the Argentine economy and towards the preponderance of groups in 
the North American orbit. Another factor which played a key part in 
shaping the outcome of the transitional process in Argentina had also 
emerged with clarity by the time a major reordering on the international 
scene was being fought out on the European battlefields during the 
First World War.
The dual nature of the Argentine manufacturing sector that was 
to affect Peronist policies so profoundly was already apparent at 
this time. Two types of manufacturing operations coexisted.
One segment was made up of large-scale establishments: 
meat-packing plants, tanning factories, flour mills, elec­
tricity and gas plants, sugar refineries, and some breweries, 
wineries, paper and lumber mills, and textile plants. These 
factories employed the most modern equipment, technical skills, 
and accounting procedures, used a high ratio of horsepower to 
laborers, and commanded outstanding entrepreneurial abilities.
Their labor force ranged from a few hundred to a few thousand 
and their capital from one million to five million dollars. . . .
The other segment of industry was the myriad small factories 
that numerically comprised almost the whole of Argentina's in­
dustrial establishment but represented only tiny fractions in 
capital, horsepower, or value produced. It was on these indus­
tries that Argentina depended for its locally produced consumer 
goods: shoes, bread, paints, hairbrushes, bricks, cigarettes, 
macaroni, glass, blouses, hardward, furniture, matches, hats, 
candies, liquors, butter, acids, suits, and grain sacks. Like 
the large-scale processing industries, these small plants sprang 
from the initiative of immigrants and continued under family 
ownership. Few employed more than ten workers, and many artisan  ̂
shops depended only on family labor or at most a couple of helpers.
It was of course the modern sector which provided fertile ground for




The impact of the international crisis during World War I was 
to enlarge the scope of domestic production in general, but particularly 
that of the less modern, small-scale sector. The blockage of tradi­
tional trade patterns due to wartime conditions, meant a sudden shortage 
of manufactured goods that had been forthcoming from Great Britain and 
Europe. This had two immediate consequences. On the one hand, mer­
chandise from the United States partly filled the vacuum and the United 
States temporarily replaced England as the principal foreign supplier 
of goods during the wartime years. On the other hand, the absence of 
competition from more efficiently produced commodities, gave local pro­
duction a tremendous boost. Since capital goods were not produced in 
Argentina, this expansion was largely confined to that area of manufac­
turing activity that did not depend on large-scale, technologically 
advanced machinery. Even so however, "by 1918 importation of foodstuffs, 
hardward, paper, metals, and clothing decreased 50 percent from prewar 
levels."^
With the return of "normalcy" on the international scene follow­
ing the war, the relationships determining Argentine economic development 
moved toward the renewal of pre-World War I trends. Agro-pastoral ex­
ports reached an all-time high and much of domestic manufacturing that 
had grown behind the protection of wartime conditions was dismantled.
The textile and metal industries were particularly affected. As pre­
viously noted, the Radical Party government of the dependent middle 
sectors was not intent on challenging the foundations of externally 
oriented growth. During this golden decade for that pattern, Argentina's
^Scobie, p. 179.
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traditional orientation towards British interests reappeared in full 
force.
Nevertheless, industrialization during the period of inter­
national crisis of World War I gained sufficient momentum for the 
trends of this earlier period to reeinerge with greater force in the 
depression years of the thirties. This time around their impact was 
much more intense and this was even truer for the years of the Second 
World War, as will be seen when we examine the Peronist period. For 
this reason the transitional process towards dependent industrializa­
tion begins in earnest in the 1930's. Peronism responded to the con­
tradictions which emerged in the process of the oligarchy's attempt 
to stem the shifts away from the externally oriented growth pattern.
Conclusions
This chapter analyzed externally oriented growth as the material 
basis for the "Anglo-oligarchic" connection determining the course of 
Argentine development. The oligarchy owned the land and profited from 
the production of agro-pastoral commodities for export. They established 
mutually beneficial relationships with the foreign, mostly British, 
groups controlling the economy's infrastructure— the transporting, pro­
cessing, distribution, and financing of exports and imports. The role 
of the state was seen as pivotal in consolidating the relationships un­
derlying externally oriented growth through the enactment of policies 
reinforcing the interests of the national and foreign groups involved.
The analysis concluded that contrary to the conventional interpretation» 
this pattern promoted dependency and did not reflect the interdependency 
that results from specialization in the international division of labor.
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The effects of externally oriented growth on the evolving class 
structure were portrayed as leading to a pyramidical hierarchy. At the 
apex of the important economic, social, and political institutions 
stood the tiny elite comprised of the landowning oligarchy and the 
British, and to a lesser extent continental European and North American, 
providers of imported manufactured goods as well as the groups con­
trolling the financial and transportation systems involved. Below 
them were the dependent middle sectors— professional groups, state 
functionaries, lower level managerial personnel, smaller scale commer­
cial interests— who also benefited, though in a subordinated capacity, 
from externally oriented growth. Finally, the broad bottom base was 
occupied by the largely excluded groups— the emerging national bour­
geoisie and the urban and rural working class and the popular sectors.
The chapter also examined the process leading to the erosion of 
British hegemony over Argentine development and the growing influence 
of U.S. based interests. This process resulted in increasing the weight 
of manufacturing activity withinin the Argentine economy, producing an 
industrial sector with more modern, capital intensive, foreign-owned 
plants, alongside more labor intensive, smaller scale, nationally- 
owned enterprises generally producing non-durable consumer goods. Re­
maining chapters analyze the subsequent course of Argentine development 
in terms of the contradictions implicit in a limited industrialization 
taking shape within the context of an economy based on agricultural pro­
duction for export. These contradictions are traced as manifested in 
the shifting relationships within and between national and foreign groups 
tied to the predominant forms of economic activity. Chapter 3 applies 
this analysis to the transitional process leading away from externally 
oriented growth.
CHAPTER III
BEGINNING OF TRANSITION TOWARDS DEPENDENT INDUSTRIALIZATION: 
OLIGARCHIC ATTEMPT TO SALVAGE EXTERNALLY 
ORIENTED GROWTH, 1930-43
Introduction
In outlining the model of dependency theory applied in this 
study, I stressed its dynamic character. Each stage was not to be 
conceived in a static, but rather in a fluid sense, containing within 
it the elements for the next stage. Accordingly, in analyzing how 
the externally oriented growth pattern took shape in Argentina, I 
focused on those shifts on the international and national scene which 
were to become decisive in the transitional process.
In the last chapter, I examined the shift away from Great 
Britain towards the centrality of the United States in the inter­
national economic system. I looked at the ramifications of this 
trend within Argentina through the United States' challenge of 
England's hegemony over Argentine economic development. This process 
was manifested in the growing importance of manufacturing activity 
within the local economy geared to supplying the internal market for 
consumer goods. We saw how the growth of local manufacturing developed 
in the context of the international crisis of the First World War. We 
saw also that the reestablishment of the traditional international 
channels of trade in the 1920Ts led to the golden age for Argentina's 
externally oriented growth pattern.-
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The trends of the First World War were repeated with even 
more intensity after the 1929 crisis in the international order. The 
severity of this crisis and of its repercussions led representatives 
of the oligarchy to introduce modifications in the externally oriented 
growth pattern in an attempt to salvage it. In the end these modifi­
cations further intensified the shifts which characterized the transi­
tional period between externally oriented growth and dependent indus­
trialization in Argentina. As noted in Chapter 2, the Radical Party 
governments of 1916-30, integrating the dependent middle sectors, did 
not seek to challenge an economy based on agricultural production for 
export. By contrast, in their attempt to save this economic pattern, 
one segment of the oligarchy did initiate policies in the thirties 
which increased the presence within the economy of industrialists 
and other sectors oriented toward the internal market.
The oligarchy’s attempt to stem the shifts away from externally 
oriented growth created contradictions which, in turn, were key in 
Peronism's rise to power. Just as the previous chapter laid the 
groundwork for this one, a dependency theory analysis of the Peronist 
period requires a two-fold focus on the immediately prior period. On 
the one hand it must focus on the external factors affecting Argentine 
economic development. Chapter 2 looked at this external pole by 
examining the rivalry between British and North American interests.
On the other hand, the analysis must also focus on major modes of 
economic activity and shifts therein, as these affect the local class 
structure and the relationships within and between national and foreign 
groups. This chapter continues this discussion begun in the previous 
chapter with the analysis of the contradictory development of the
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manufacturing sector. It must be mentioned however, that the distinc­
tion between the focuses is purely for analytic convenience. They are 
in fact integrally interwoven and constitute in reality one process.
The transitional process between externally oriented growth 
and dependent industrialization can also be conceptualized as "the 
substitution of imports phase" which, in Argentina, began in 1930 and 
was pretty much exhausted in the early years of the fifties. The 
Great Depression and then World War II produced, at first modifica­
tions, and then profoundly altered the relationships among and between 
internal and foreign groups. Peronism was a response to the contra­
dictions in the process that led to the disintegration of the hegemony 
of the Anglo-oligarchic interests on which externally oriented 
growth rested. The ways in which Peronism sought to resolve these 
contradictions were, in turn to lead to its undoing.
This chapter examines how the policies formulated in the 1930- 
43 period intensified the economic and socio-political demands of the 
groups that provided the base for Peronism. * The argument can be 
stated in summary form. Confronted with the disruption of the tradi­
tional trade patterns resulting from the 1929 crisis, the faction of 
the rural oligarchy controlling the government essentially proposed 
increased import substituting industrialization to compensate for 
declining imports of European consumer goods. The goal of these 
policies was to preserve the traditional pattern of economic growth 
based on agricultural production for external markets. Nevertheless,
^For a more detailed treatment, see Prologue to Peron: 
Argentina in Depression and War: 1930-43 (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1975), edited by Mark Falcoff and Ronald Dolkart.
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though designed merely to modify the existing relationships in order 
to preserve them, these policies significantly affected the traditional 
alliances within and between internal and external groups. They ex­
panded the manufacturing sector but kept it in a subordinated position; 
and they vastly increased the labor force while suppressing and post­
poning its demands. Peron based his bid for power on these social 
sectors. He promised continued expanded production to industrialists 
and built a mass movement on labor's demands. These were the basic 
elements in the winning formula with which he overcame his military 
rivals between 1943 and 1945 and the civilian coalition confronting him 
in the 1946 elections.
The Crisis and the Need for State Intervention
This chapter focuses on the first two of four conditions 
specified previously* as having to be operative for a transitional 
process to take place: firstly, a crisis on the international scene 
with severe enough internal repercussions to throw into disarray the 
alliance of domestic and foreign groups controlling the productive and 
marketing structures; and secondly, the existence of the infrastructure 
for the new pattern. The crisis on the international scene which dis­
rupted the ongoing developmental process was the depression that 
followed the 1929 crash. One of the immediate impacts of this crisis 
was a drastic reduction in the volume of goods produced in the advanced 
capitalist areas. There was, on the one hand, a serious decline in 
the availability of industrial goods that raw material producing areas 




Eduardo Jorge ̂"estimates a 60 percent reduction in the 
value of global trade between 1929 and 1933 and a diminution of 50 
percent in Argentine exports for the same period. He notes that 
in the case of Argentina’s exports this reduction was in their values 
alone, the physical volumes remaining more or less constant. This 
decline in the prices for Argentine exports in the world market 
meant, of course, a reduced capacity for imports, their physical 
volume shrinking by almost one half from 13 million tons in 1929 to 
6.9 million in 19.33.
To grasp the meaning in these figures one should recall the 
extent to which Argentina depended on importing manufactured goods 
during its externally oriented growth phase. Thus, while local pro­
duction could satisfy about 95 percent of the demand for processed 
foodstuffs and tobacco and these constituted only about 5.3 percent 
of Argentina's total imports between 1925 and 1929, "metals" and 
"machinery and vehicles" took up about 38 percent of all imports for 
that period and local production could only satisfy between 30 and 
40 percent of the demand for these types of goods. Even in textiles,
only 25 percent were produced locally and their importation represented
2about 22 percent of all the goods imported during those years.
^Jorge, p. 109.
2Ibid., p. 133. Jorge cites Carlos Diaz Alejandro, Stages 
in the Industrialization of Argentina (Buenos Aires: Instituto Torcuato 
Di Telia, 1966). Diaz Alejandro's sources are E.C.L.A.’s El desarrollo 
economico de la Argentina (Santiago, Chile: 1958) and the Consejo 
Nacional de Desarrollo's Cuentas nacionales de la Republica Argentina 
(Buenos Aires, 1964).
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The internal repercussions of this crisis were indeed pro­
found enough to throw into temporary disarray the existing alliance of 
domestic and foreign groups controlling the productive and marketing 
structures. The immediate result was the military coup of 1930 led 
by Jose^Uriburu which put an end to the experiment with democratic 
procedures under the Radical Party. A systematic response to the 
crisis in the form of a coherent set of policies by representatives 
of the ruling group within the oligarchy was not, however, immediately 
forthcoming. There followed a period when various approaches were 
suggested and sometimes pursued at cross-purposes. The direction of 
the policies of the group within the oligarchy that won out emerged 
gradually and reached its quintessential expression with the Roca- 
Runciman Pact signed between Great Britain and Argentina in 1933.
In the chapter above, I pointed out that the Radical Party 
governments of the 1916-30 period did not introduce any significant 
departures from the free trade policies underlying externally oriented 
growth. On the contrary, protectionist measures for manufacturing 
were at their lowest point and the export of agro-pastoral goods in 
exchange for imported industrial commodities reached its high point 
during those years. It was therefore not the threat from a middle 
class government representing an aspiring industrial bourgeoisie 
which accounted for the 1930 coup. In fact, the Radical Party took 
the most reactionary position in the debate over the most appropriate 
response to the crisis of the thirties, essentially calling for a 
return to the status quo ante.
It was not the fear of an aspiring bourgeoisie, rather it was 
the impact of the crisis of the thirties which threatened the ongoing
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relations of production, that convinced the dominant oligarchic fac­
tion of the need to use the machinery of the state to strengthen its 
position. The danger to the established order as well as the futility 
of laissez faire economics and the need for state intervention 
became apparent as the level of production dropped some 40 percent, 
salaries and wages 60 percent, and almost 13 million people were 
thrown out of work in the expectation that the -economy would recover 
spontaneously between 1930 and 1933.^
A more activist role for the state required increasing the
size and power of the state apparatus itself. Between 1935 and 1941
the personnel employed by the state increased some 3.9 percent per
year. This rate almost doubled between 1941 and 1950, reaching a 7.7
2percent increase per year. Thus the Peronist state not only continued, 
but greatly expanded the trend toward more intervention and the cor­
responding growth in the state bureaucracy. Ironically, Peron further 
strengthened the state in order to use it against the very sectors 
that had set the process in motion. However, as we shall see, the 
state was not used to dismantle the oligarchy's power in the economic 
realm. Peronism neutralized the oligarchy politically and succeeded 
in displacing it from its central position in the nation's economic 
life. But one of the Peronist regime's major flaws was that it did 
not challenge the oligarchy's ownership of the means of production.
The fact that the large landed estates were never expropriated,
^Jorge, p. 108.
2E.C.L.A., El desarrollo de la Argentina (Mexico: United 
Nations, 1959), p. 82.
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enabled the oligarchy to be one of the principal participants in 
Peron's overthrow in 1955 and in the subsequent attempt to eradicate
Peronism from the Argentine body politic.
Just as the Peronist state continued strengthening of the 
state apparatus, so too did it continue the trend towards a more 
autonomous role for the state, and for the same reasons. As the 
state moved away from laissez faire towards more active policy-making 
in the thirties, its structures increased in number and complexity.
This growth and differentiation in state apparatus was both the result 
of and, in turn, a further cause leading to increasingly complex 
economic relationships. On the one hand, the stronger and more 
heterogeneous state reflected the greater complexity in the economic 
and social structures that came about with the growing manufacturing 
sector; and, on the other, the state's policies helpful to industriali­
zation further eroded the greater homogeneity and simplicity of the 
old economic and social structures resting on the clear-cut supremacy 
of rural production for export. This dialectic was also involved in 
the tendency towards greater autonomy for the state. That is, the 
state became relatively more independent of unmediated class interests 
as the socio-economic structure became more complex; and, at the same 
time, this greater autonomy enabled the state to enact policies 
accentuating the differentiation of economic interests.
The growth of the industrial sector reinforced the more 
autonomous role for the state in that its principal role was no 
longer to simply translate the ruling class' agrarian interests 
into policies. Now these policies had to be adjusted to take 
into account the interests of other property owning sectors
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structured around the accumulation of industrial capital. During 
the thirties the state becomes more of a mediator, moderating within 
an increasingly complex power block. If the correlation of class 
forces became more complex in the thirties, this was even truer in 
the forties. The Peronist state resolved contradictions in the 
industrializing policies of the thirties in a direction which intensi­
fied the growth rate of manufacturing activity even further. With 
greater economic and social complexity, came even more autonomy for 
the state.*
It is important to keep in mind that though the policies of 
the thirties did incorporate interests tied to the industrial sector, 
these policies were nevertheless formulated under the sponsorship of 
the dominant faction within the landowning oligarchy. Their hegemony 
over the decision making process confined policies within a framework 
that sought to keep dependency on the traditional external links intact. 
As we will see below, industrialization was kept within the limits 
fixed by the system from which the ruling class derived its income. 
Nevertheless, the process went far enough to substantially increase 
the sector of manufacturers who stood to benefit from a popular 
mobilization pushing for economic growth oriented towards the internal 
market. This was the context that made Peronism a viable response to 
the contradictions arising from the policies of the thirties.
The state was strengthened in the thirties, it became more 
autonomous, and its policies further intensified these tendencies by
^This analysis is paraphrased from Miguel Murmis and Juan 
Carlos Portantiero’s "Crecimiento industrial y alianza de clases en la 
Argentina (1930-40)" in Estudios sobre los origenes del peronismo. 
(Buenos Aires: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 1971), pp. 42-3.
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making the correlation of class forces more complex in promoting 
the potentially conflicting interests of diverse sectors. Thus when 
the military seized control in 1943 it meant the opposite of what it 
had meant in 1930. It indicated the weakness and exhaustion of the 
landowning oligarchy as the ruling class. "In assuming state control, 
the armed forces filled a class vacuum and became the bulwark of the 
system."^ It was during the Peronist period that the state achieved 
its maximum autonomy wherein no one class controlled state power. What 
then were the policies of the 1930-43 period that led to this situation?
Oligarchic Response to the Crisis of the Thirties;
Modified Externally Oriented Growth 
The impact of the world crisis on the Argentine economy led 
the regime to shift away from the traditional free trade policies 
towards measures benefiting many marginal domestic enterprises in the 
industrial area. The disruption of the trade of agro-pastoral goods 
for manufactured commodities caused a change in the traditionally 
aloof attitude towards domestic manufacturing. The erection of 
protective barriers became economic policy and such measures as 
devaluation of the currency, multiple exchange rates, and import con­
trols, measures which were also a fundamental part of Peronist economic 
policy, made marginal local enterprises into profitable ventures. In 
essence, these policies addressed themselves to the lessons learned from 
the disruptive impact of the First World War.
^Ed Daniels, "From Mercantilism to Imperialism: The Argentine 
Case," Part II, N.A.C.L.A. Newsletter 4 (October 1970): 5.
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These industrializing policies were instituted under the 
auspices of the dominant faction within the landowning oligarchy, and 
they were designed to aid the agricultural sector. Therefore, only a 
limited and partial industrialization took place, one that remained 
subordinated to maintaining agricultural production as the foundation 
of the nation's economy. The thrust of the regime's efforts at pre­
serving the functional primacy of the agro-pastoral sector in the 
economy during the "infamous decade,"* amounted to compensating for 
the decreased role of agro-exporting economies in the world market 
with a corresponding decrease in imports from the industrial nations. 
Table 8 shows the drop in volume and value of imports during the 
thirties.
TABLE 8.— Quantity and value of imports, 1928-40 (using the 
base of 1910=100)








Source : Anuarios de comercio exterior de la Republics Argentina
Adapted from Jorge, p. 122.
Because of the widespread misery of the poorer sectors, the 
blatant use of the "patriotic fraud" by the conservative regime to en­
trench itself in power, and what the nationalist critics of the olig­
archy of the period considered to be the scandalous subservience to 
Britain and other imperialist powers, the thirties became popularly 
known as la decada infame.
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Jorge notes that the slight increases registered for 1936 
and 1938 were a corollary to increases in the level of exports for 
those years. He goes on to observe that if one keeps in mind that 
national production continued to grow throughout the decade, then it 
becomes evident that a drastic reduction in the coefficient of impor­
tation took place in the thirties.^-
In promoting this strategy, the hegemonic group within the 
oligarchy showed a good deal of political sophistication. The inter­
national economic collapse of 1929 disrupted the traditional pattern 
of exchanging foodstuffs for imported manufactured goods. The 
falling prices commanded by agro-pastoral goods in the advanced capi­
talist nations meant a corresponding reduction in the volume of 
goods Argentina could obtain. Hence by promoting industrialization 
but limiting it to filling the vacuum previously covered by the 
importation of consumer goods, the dominant oligarchic group was able 
to maintain its source of income and power intact. If it had resisted 
rather than promoting the needed readjustments, the ruling group with­
in the oligarchy could have lost control of the key economic processes 
and seen profound changes in the economic structures undermine its 
social and political position.
The groups which benefited from the import substituting 
industrialization of the thirties were the same ones whose positions 
were protected by the Roca-Runciman Pact, as we shall see below. The 
modifications in the externally oriented growth pattern introduced in 
the thirties reflected the realignment in the alliance of groups that
^Jorge, p. 123.
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emerged as dominant after the traditional configuration was thrown 
into disarray by the impact of the crisis. Of crucial significance 
for the unfolding of the traditional process were the facts that the 
landowning oligarchy no longer remained a homogeneous group, 
and that the subordinated sector within it came to form a part of 
the alliance of groups constituting the opposition. Indeed, the 
policies endorsed by the ruling faction exacerbated the split within 
the oligarchy by causing the income of the subordinated group to 
shrink further during the decade.
The split between the invernadores (cattle fatteners) and the 
criadores (cattle breeders) which had been developing in the twenties 
came to a head in the thirties. The technological base for the pre­
dominance of the invernadores came about through the progress of the 
meatpacking industry which permitted the export of chilled beef, a 
far superior product to frozen beef because it is virtually equivalent 
to fresh meat. In the twenties chilled beef assumed the first position 
in the export of meat products. The production of chilled beef 
requires animals of good stock and special preparation. Furthermore, 
since the product must be consumed within 45 days of slaughter, the 
supply must be constant to meet the demand; in contrast to frozen beef 
where a constant demand can be supplied with seasonal production. The 
production of chilled beef therefore, put a premium on having good 
pasture land available, especially during the winter months. For this 
reason, the invernadores tended to be owners of large tracts of grazing 
land within the province of Buenos Aires, while the criadores tended 
to come from the interior.
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Their ability to provide a constant and voluminous supply of
cattle, thus having sole access to the meatpacking plants, assured the
invernadores a virtual monopoly over the trade with Great Britain while
other cattlemen found their interest subordinated. The ascendancy of
the invernadores became formalized when one of theirs, Luis Duhau, be-r
came president of the powerful Sociedad Rural Argentina* in 1927. The
hegemony of the invernadores was further consolidated when Duhau took
over the pivotal post of Minister of Agriculture in the thirties. The
extent to which the interests of other cattlemen were subordinated is
revealed by the Roca-Runciman Pact which stabilized the annual export
of chilled beef at around 350,000 tons while the annual exports of
frozen beef declined from 269,000 tons between 1925-9 to 56,000 tons 
2between 1930-4.
While the invernadores found a limited form of import substi­
tuting industrial development compatible with their orientation of 
exporting to England, the subordinated pastoral groups found markets 
for their exports of frozen and canned meats, lamb and beef, primarily 
in the United States, Germany, and Italy. They looked to the United 
States, which forbid the import of chilled but not frozen beef, as a 
source for the provision of manufactured goods. They considered domes­
tic industry to be artificial and a violation of the natural division 
of international labor. They saw protective barriers as leading first
*The Sociedad Rural was the institutional expression of the 
traditional landed oligarchy. Its membership was restricted to the 
most prestigeous ruling class families.
2This analysis and data are taken from Murmis and Portantiero,
p. 27.
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to trade wars and ultimately to armed,conflict between nations.*
This orientation towards national industry and international trade 
was also espoused by representatives of the Radical Party in the 
Congress during the infamous decade. Thus the most privileged 
oligarchic group possessed a certain modernizing orientation while 
the subordinated agrarian owners found an echo for their views among 
the so-called progressive sectors in Congress. It must be noted 
however, that both groups still based their fundamental interests on 
external commerce.^
With the policies of the thirties the dominant faction 
within the oligarchy secured its traditional source of income and was 
therefore in a position to favor a limited form of industrialization. 
Industrializing policies produced, at least temporarily, a new equilib­
rium that allowed the system to function without fundamental structural 
change and thus preserved the hegemony of the privileged agro-pastoral 
group. These policies also had the advantage of producing new allies 
among the manufacturers who could offset the pressures arising from 
the agricultural groups whose interests were sacrificed. Finally, 
one should not overlook the impact these policies had on the financial 
investments in the manufacturing sector held by members of the dominant 
group within the landed oligarchy.
The policies of the thirties,therefore,led to a modified ver­
sion of externally oriented growth which preserved the interests of 
the dominant groups in the rural oligarchy and benefited manufacturers
1 2Murmis and Pbrtantiero, pp. 30-31. Ibid., p. 32.
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involved in import substituting production. These policies were an 
appropriate response to the economic and political repercussions of the 
crisis. On the one hand, they were designed to fill the vacuum in 
the supply of manufactured goods that resulted from the difficulty of 
obtaining them from the advanced industrial nations and, on the other, 
they compensated for the split within the oligarchy with support from 
new socio-economic groups.
It is important to keep in mind that because the policies of 
the thirties were formulated within the constraints imposed by main­
taining the material base on which the dominant faction within the 
oligarchy rested, only a limited form of industrialization took place. 
Though the regime had its self-conscious advocates of industrialization, 
the policies which were finally adopted were more the outcome of fol­
lowing the lines of least resistance than they were the product of a 
coherent and comprehensive design. Their basic aim was the maximum 
utilization of existing plant and facilities without major investments 
in machinery and equipment and without a coherent investment policy 
to promote diversification.*
2As Murmis and Portantiero point out, two strategies were 
proposed to confront the dilemmas posed by the profound economic crisis 
of the thirties: either stabilize the changes which had occurred almost 
spontaneously so as to maintain them under the hegemonic control of 
the most powerful sectors of the oligarchy, or reject all changes and 
promote a return to the situation prevailing before the crisis. The 
conservative elite attempted to implement the first alternative with
1 2 Murmis and Portantiero, p. 42. Ibid., p. 12.
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great difficulty which, among other things, intensified the develop­
ing split within the ruling class. The second alternative was the 
program espoused by the Radical Party. A third alternative, that of 
a program for autonomous industrial growth under the sponsorship of 
an independent entrepreneurial bourgeoisie— the classical model of 
capitalist industrialization— never achieved an institutional ex­
pression. Murmis and Portantiero perceptively note that this absence 
was one of the chief factors leading to the realignment of socio­
economic force's that emerged as dominant in the Peronist period a few 
years later.
The Roca-Runciman Pact of 1933 represents the quintessential 
expression of the policies of the period and of the interests they 
encompassed. The Roca-Runciman Pact took shape in the context of the 
displacement of Britain’s hegemony over Argentina's economy by interests 
centered around North American capital. It was an attempt to stem the 
tide of this shift and to recreate, on a modified basis, the links 
between local producers and the British interests which had been so 
central to economic life prior to 1930.
Ever since the First World War, Britain had been losing ground 
as a provider of manufactured goods, primarily as a result of the 
increasing importance of the United States as a supplier. At the same 
time, England's importance as a market for Argentine goods grew.  ̂ In 
1926 the United States prohibited the importation of Argentine meats 
and in 1927 France, Belgium, and Italy began to increase their duties
^Recall last chapter's discussion of the tripartite trade 
pattern developing in the twenties. See pp. 93-96 above.
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on imported chilled beef while Germany reduced her imports by
half.* In the beginning of the thirties 99 percent of Argentina's
chilled beef went to England and meat exports accounted for one half
2of her foreign exchange earnings. Thus when Great Britain summoned 
her dominions to the Ottawa Conference on Imperial Preference in 1932 
and this conference resolved to replace Argentine wheat and meat with 
imports from Australia, New Zealand and Canada, Argentina’s beef mag­
nates went into a state of near-panic. In 1933, General Augustin 
Justo dispatched his vice-president Julio Roca to negotiate with the 
president of the Board of Trade in London, Walter Runciman. The 
result was the Roca-Runciman Pact.
The Roca-Runciman Pact, mentioned above, was an expression of 
the control excercised by the dominant group within the agrarian sector. 
Its provisions indicated the extent to which this ruling sector of
landowners succeeded in orienting the nation’s economic life around 
their interests by recreating, on a modified basis, the previously 
successful Anglo-oligarchic connection. The first clause recognized 
the importance of exporting chilled beef for Argentina's economic life 
and established a guaranteed quota to be imported by Great Britain— at 
least 90 percent of the tonnage imported in the first trimester of 
1932. With this measure the beef "fatteners" secured their traditional 
source of wealth and power.
The remaining clauses cemented the relationship of this leading 
faction of the oligarchy with British commercial, financial, and manu­
facturing interests. These clauses guaranteed the consolidation of
1 2 Skupch, p. 17. Falcoff, p. 82.
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the meatpacking trust, the configuration of financial and commercial 
interests centered on it, and more. The second clause stated that 
after deducting a reasonable amount for payment of interest on the 
public debt, the remainder of the income generated by Argentine 
imports must be spent in England. Further, 85 percent of the im­
porting licenses for Argentine meat in England were to be distributed 
by the British government. The remaining 15 percent of the quota 
could be distributed by the Argentine government only to its nationals 
if they had property, control or administration of enterprises (meat­
packing plants) that did not pursue private profit. Moreover, the 
Argentine government agreed not to levy any duties on coal, a major 
import from England since it was the primary source for energy. No 
new duties would be imposed on any other goods, nor existing ones 
raised. Additionally, with respect to imports on whose duties Great 
Britain demanded a reduction, it was agreed to return to the duties 
and tariffs prevailing in 1930. When the Pact came up for renewal 
in 1936 "England obtained further concessions for British goods in 
Argentina, even to the extent of eliminating the private bus lines 
that posed a threat to the British-owned transport system in the city 
of Buenos Aires."^
While the Roca-Runciman Pact cemented the alliance between 
British interests and the dominant group within the oligarchy, it 
also widened the cleavage that had been developing in the ranks of 
the landowning oligarchy. In this sense too the Roca-Runciman Pact 
expressed an important feature of the period: no homogeneous class
^Scobie, p. 183.
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interests prevailed. Not only was the landowning oligarchy divided, the 
industrial bourgeoisie too was split into fractions with diverging 
interests.
The extent to which the policies of the thirties succeeded in
revitalizing the Anglo-oligarchic connection is evidenced by the
shifts in the trade patterns for the decade.
Imports from Great Britain rose from 17.5 percent to 22.2 
percent of the total from 1929 to 1939. Exports to Great 
Britain rose from 32.1 to 35.9 percent. The key item in 
trade relations with Great Britain during this period is 
that from 1934 to 1936, Great Britain purchased 98.6 percent 
of Argentine exports of chilled beef, 77 percent of frozeijL 
mutton and lamb, and 76.8 percent of frozen pork exports.
Not only did the Roca-Runciman Pact cement Britist interests with
those of the leading faction within the oligarchy, it also achieved
a partial reversal of the tripartite trade pattern that had been
developing in the twenties, reorienting the volume and flow of imports
away from the United States and towards Great Britain. In 1929, 31
percent of Argentina's purchases were of continental European origin,
27 percent from the United States and only 17 percent were of English
origin. By 1935 this pattern had changed so that 25 percent of
Argentina's purchases proceeded from Great Britain, another 25 percent
from continental Europe, and only 13 percent were of North American
origin. For the decade of the twenties, Argentina's imports from the
United States exceeded her exports to the U.S. leaving a negative
balance of trade of some 275.6 million pesos. For the decade of the
2thirties, this figure had decreased to 54.2 million pesos.
^Laura Randall, An Economic History of Argentina in the Twentieth 
Century (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978), p. 228.
2Jorge, p. 124.
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By favoring British imports to the detriment of those from the 
United States, the policies of the period reinforced the efforts of 
North American groups investing in subsidiaries producing or assembling 
goods within Argentina. In this way they accentuated the trend ob­
served for the twenties of U.S. investments oriented towards manufac­
turing and they hastened the transitional process leading to dependent 
industrialization. The policies of the thirties represented a tempor­
arily successful attempt to recreate the Anglo-oligargic connection on 
a modified basis. In the end however, it was a vain attempt to stem 
the tide eroding the traditional linkages.
The branches in which U.S. investments increased in the thirties 
were those that subsequently benefited from Peronist industrialization. 
In their results, the policies of the thirties produced the second of 
the conditions enumerated for the emergence of a transitional period.'*' 
That is, these policies rapidly buttressed the infrastructure, the 
industrial plant and equipment, necessary for the new pattern. Manu­
facturing became the fastest growing sector in the Argentine economy
2during this period. "In the ten year period, 1935-44, total indus-
3trial employment almost doubled, salaries more than doubled, and the 
estimated value of total industrial production nearly tripled."^
*See pp. 23-24 above.
2Guido DiTella and Manuel Zymelman, Las etapas del desarollo 
argentino, (Buenos Aires: n.p., 1967), p. 436.
3As will be seen, the years after the 1943 coup were critical 
in this respect.
^"National Economy of Argentina" in Commercial Pan America, 
(Washington, D.C., Pan American Union) (July-August 1946).
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Though manufacturing became the leading sector in the Argentine 
economy in terms of growth during the thirties, this growth was largely 
confined to the expansion of existing plant. Nor was this surprising 
given the integration of the industrial sector into an alliance of 
classes structured around the hegemony of the leading oligarchic faction. 
The industrializing project of the period was therefore confined to a 
limited framework which Murmis and Portantiero aptly define as "indus­
trial growth without an industrial revolution;"^ that is, industrial 
growth without basic structural changes. In summary, industrial growth 
under oligarchic auspices was limited to filling the vacuum previously 
covered by the importation of consumer goods, principally in the food­
stuffs and textile branches. Its limitation followed from its basic
aim which was the maximum utilization of the existing plant and facili-
2ties without major investments in machinery and equipment.
Contradictions in the Industrialization of the Thirties
Though limited and subordinated, the resulting industrial 
growth was nevertheless of such a magnitude that the process had es­
caped the control of its initiators by 1943. It was in this sense 
that the infrastructure for the developmental pattern implemented 
through Peronist policies was being vastly expanded in the decade be­
fore Peronism came to power. The Argentine Industrial Census of 1946 
shows the accelerated expansion in the total number of industrial 
plants established. It reveals a progression of approximately 1,700 
newly established enterprises per year in the decade of the twenties,
1 2 Murmis and Portantiero, p. 11. Ibid., p. 12.
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2,800 per annum in the thirties, and 5,000 new firms per year in the 
Second World War.
In one sense Peronism represented a continuation of trends 
gaining ground in the thirties. Peronist policies basically continued 
the import substituting industrialization of its predecessors. Though 
the balance of power in the bargaining area was shifted towards labor, 
these policies aimed to keep industrial activity within a capitalist 
framework. However, as we shall see, the very continuation and ac­
celeration of the pace of industrial activity required substantial 
modifications in the economic and socio-political patterns of the 
thirties, and it required fundamental shifts in the connections between 
local groups and external interests. The astronomical rise in manu­
facturing activity promoted by Peronist policies from 1943 to 1950 
represented a basic departure from the policies of the thirties. 
Reversing the traditional subordination of manufacturing activity to 
agricultural production was the cornerstone of the Peronist strategy 
for industrialization. In raising the primacy of industrial interests 
over those of landowners, Peronism diverged radically from the oli­
garchic developmental model. The reasons for these shifts are to be 
found in the contradictions being intensified with the policies of the 
thirties.
The contradictions implicit in the nature of industrial devel­
opment taking place in the thirties and its relationship to the class 
structure provided the conditions which made the rise of Peronism 
possible. As a by-product of the tremendous increase in manufacturing 
activity, the working class saw its ranks mushroom. According to one 
source, while industrial production expanded 53.7 percent between
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1937 and 1946, a half a million people entered the labor force, 
thereby more than doubling the numbers of workers in industrial 
establishments employing ten or more laborers in the 1935-41 
decade, from 440,582 to 936,387.1 This growing mass 
significantly swelled by rural immigration into Buenos Aires, was to 
provide the social base for Peron's rise to power. While industrial 
workers were increasingly incorporated into the economy, there was no 
commensurate integration of the working class into the political sys­
tem. Quite the opposite characterized the conservative regimes of the 
thirties. Moreover, repressive labor policies curtailed wages and 
benefits. Adding to the workers’ discontent was the fact that along 
with the rural to urban migration and low agricultural productivity, 
there was also an increased urban demand for foodstuffs which led to a 
rise in food prices. The result was further decrease in the living 
standards of the urban proletariat.
Industrial development of the thirties also produced disaf- 
fections among sectors of the industrial bourgeoisie. For one thing, 
though their economic importance rose,they too did not see their 
political power rise commensurately. For another, the rise in 
agricultural prices for the domestic market meant that low income con­
sumers had less to spend on manufactured goods. This brought the 
interests of sectors of the industrial bourgeoisie, particularly those 
producing wage goods— textiles and other non-durable consumer goods—  
into conflict with those of the landowning class. Additionally, the
^Victor,Testa, "Crecimiento (1935-46) y estancamiento (1947-63) 
de la produccion industrial argentina" in Fichas de investigaci<Tn 
economica y social 1: 6.
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tremendous expansion of national industry in the thirties created 
pressures for protectionism amongst sectors of the industrial bour­
geoisie that went beyond those envisaged by offical measures already 
instituted, and conflicted openly with the dominant "free trade" econ­
omics and the favoritism shown toward British imports. Thus the indus­
trialization of this pre-Peronist period created a dynamic of its own 
toward a nationalistic, self-sustained economic growth. Such orienta­
tions toward economic independence and autonomy conflicted with the 
oligarchy's trade alliance with foreign, particularly British, capital. 
Peronism, on the other hand, found fertile ground in these orienta­
tions. Indeed, the industrialists' acquiescence to Peronism's initial 
pro-Axis stance may be largely attributed to their fear of the more 
immediate Anglo-American competitive threat in the area of providing 
consumer goods.
Peronism resolved the contradictions arising from the economic 
formulas of the thirties and replaced them with new contradictions 
that ultimately led to its disintegration. The central contradiction 
in the oligarchic model of economic development was that it promoted a 
certain degree of internal industrial development in order to maintain 
the basic structures of externally oriented growth based on agricultural 
production. The needed modifications in the traditional arrangements 
generated tensions and produced a host of postponed demands and aspira­
tions. The limited import substituting industrialization promoted in 
the thirties began to conflict with the interests on which the alliance 
between the ruling faction of the oligarchy and British capital was 
based.
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The pressures in the direction of a nationalistic conception 
of a fully developed national industry providing for the nation's 
needs formed the basis for Peronism's economic program. And labor's 
accumulated demands provided the mortar with which Peron built the 
mass movement forming the regime's foundation. In order to push 
import substituting economic development to its full potential, a 
broad social base was essential to offset the political power of the 
oligarchy. This is precisely what Peronism accomplished with its 
populist base and its nationalist inspired First Five Year Plan. It 
resolved the tensions in the limited import substituting industrial 
development of the thirties in favor of the full scale import substi­
tuting model of internally oriented growth of the forties.
Two aspects of the economic and socio-political developments 
of the 1930-43 period should be stressed here because of their vital 
bearing on the emergence and content of the Peronist formulas of 
1943-55. First are the ramifications which follow from the fact that 
industrialization took place under the auspices of the pro-British 
faction of the rural oligarchy. The beneficiaries of import substitut­
ing manufacture did not represent an independent, progressive bourgeoi­
sie attempting to impose its socio-political formulas on a backward and 
recalcitrant feudal class. As we have seen, industrialization did not, 
as in the classical model, develop as a dynamic consequence of a rising 
industrial bourgeoisie. Indeed, what emerged in the thirties was not 
a homogeneous national entrepreneurial class, but rather an industrial 
sector with deep divisions among industrialists.
This heterogeneity and division within classes and sectors was 
the other important aspect of the economic and socio-political develop­
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ments of the thirties. It applied not only to the industrial bour­
geoisie, but to all classes as well. Both, the set of groups support­
ing the regime's economic policies and that of those opposing them, were 
comprised of fractions of classes and social sectors. One cannot 
speak of clear-cut homogeneous class interests; the social picture 
was characterized by tensions and conflicting interests cutting across 
all major socio-economic sectors. As we have seen, not even the 
ruling group enjoyed the solid support of its economic and social base, 
but sought rather to construct an alliance of diverse interests cen­
tered on its hegemony. This rather fluid social situation, characteris­
tic of a transitional period, also had an important bearing on the 
development of Peronism.
The Populist-Nationalist Critique 
This discussion of the developments in the thirties which made 
Peronism a viable alternative, would be incomplete if it omitted the 
intense critical ferment that took the form of a progressive nationalism 
challenging the oligarchy's leadership. Peronism as a doctrine anchored 
itself on the populist-nationalist critique that developed in response 
to the contradictions of the "infamous decade." The collapse of Argen­
tina's position in world trade and the adjustments in the traditional 
arrangements to meet the new situation, produced a sense of disequili­
brium and a climate of uncertainty and tensions. Not surprisingly 
therefore, the 1930-43 period was filled with critical ferment repudiat­
ing the society's dominant values of economic and political liberalism, 
values which after all were being negated with the policies of the 
elite that came to power through the military coup of 1930. Moreover,
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though these policies aimed to preserve the functional primacy of the 
agricultural sector, they depended, as we have seen, on a certain type 
and degree of industrialization. Though intended to have a limited 
scope, the industrializing process developed a dynamic impetus which 
pushed it beyond the envisioned confines. This too found its expression 
in the populist-nationalist critique of the thirties.
Essentially the populist-nationalist polemics of the period did 
not trace the causes of Argentina's problems of the bottom of the socie­
ty, as elite historians had done by pointing to the uncivilized masses 
of the interior or the ignorant proletarian immigrants from Europe. 
Instead they traced these problems to. the top . of the society. The 
national dilemma was framed in terms of the unholy alliance between 
the vendepatria (selling out the country) oligarchy and foreign imperi­
alists.* This type of nationalism was therefore more inclusive than 
exclusive; it struck a responsive chord with the urban masses and the 
intelligentsia. Programatically, it "offered the Argentine middle 
class the gratifying possibility of pursuing its own corporate 
interests— social mobility, economic opportunity, political influence—  
within the framework of a crusade for national sovereignty."
*Books like Benjamin Villafena's La tragedia argentina 
(1943), Julio and Rodolfo Irazusta's La argentina y el imperialismo 
britanico (1934), Jose Luis Torres' Algunas maneras de vender la patria 
(1940), and Raul Scalabrini Ortiz's Pol£tica britahica en el Rio de la 
Plata and his Historia de los ferrocarriles argentinos (both 1940) "de­
picted Argentina as a sort of gigantic estancia whose agricultural and 
stock-raising capacities were being mercilessly exploited by Great 
Britain through a pliant Argentine elite." From Falcoff, pp. 77-8.
This section relies on the analysis developed in his article.
2Ibid., p. 78.
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✓ ,As enunciated by Peron in lusticialismo's famous trinity—
economic independence, political sovereignty 
and social justice— the movement's reason for being as well as 
its fundamental aims, expressed the essence of the populist-nationalist 
polemics. Each side of this trinity was conceived as firmly bound to 
the other; one could not exist without the other and the pursuit of 
one would naturally lead to the others. Thus the Peronist goal, to 
free Argentina from the domination and exploitation of British and 
North American imperialists, and from the rule of the vendepatria 
oligarchy in alliance with them, could only be achieved by exercising 
the nation's political sovereignty. At the same time, removing the 
primary barrier to the attainment of popular aspirations— the domina­
tion of the imperialists and vendepatrias— would also lead to social 
j us.tice.
Populist-nationalism provided Peronism with the content of
its program and its class orientation. Peron himself acknowledged his
indebtedness to its major exponent, Raul Scalabrini Ortiz. According 
sto Peron, Scalabrini Ortiz
shaped the entire nature of the resistance to the usurpers 
(during the 1930s), elucidating what everyone else sought 
to discover--the "causes of the Argentine defeat." He was 
a born fighter, and I am especially indebted to him for the 
original ideas set forth in my La fuerza es el derecho de las 
bestias and Los vendepatrias. He exercised, in a certain way,
the first moral magistracy of the republic, and when he departed^
this world, he made me the recipient of his political testament.
1 * *Enrique Pavon Pereyra. Coloquios con Peron (Buenos Aires: n.p.,
1965), p. 59 as quoted in Falcoff; p. 79.
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It was from the propagandists efforts of Scalabrini Ortiz and others 
that Peronism derived its view of Argentina tied to Great Britain 
though economic structures that made a colonial type of relationship 
inevitable.^ The program for "economic independence" was designed 
to remedy this national disgrace.
Three interrelated aspects of the populist-nationalist per­
spective both gave Peronism its resiliance and strength and also made 
for its limitations and weakness. The first of these is alluded to 
above. Its populist and nationalist thrust linked the activities of 
foreign imperialists to their connections with the local ruling class. 
In this respect the populist-nationalists were definite precursors of 
the dependency theory analysis. In his definitive study, Juan Jose 
Hernandez Arregui says of Raul Scalabrini Ortiz:
This Argentine writer, who does not cite Marx, proved to be 
more of a revolutionary than the impostors of the left. These 
men (populist-nationalists), who were not Marxists, were the 
first to analyze our national history and its relationship to 
Latin America with methodological and historical criteria 
very close to Marxism. In one of his first works with a his­
torical orientation, he said: "Europe never looked to America
as a source for establishing offshoots. It was hostile and 
almost cruel, first with the indigenous and then with the as­
similated. Europe only wanted to extract from America, gold
For example, in Pol£tica britanica en el Rio de la Plata, 
Scalabrini Ortiz convincingly showed the process whereby British 
interests achieved their economic domination of Argentine life by 
extending strategic loans. In Historia de los ferrocarriles argen- 
tinos he showed how the British took control of the railroad network 
by acquiring already functioning Argentine lines with generous condi­
tions facilitated by the Argentine government or gaining from it con­
struction subsidies and later acquiring its shares. In both instances 
he demonstrated that the process was not so much one of foreign 
capital investing in a virgin area because of the lack of national 
capital, as much as one of foreign capital gaining access to the 
apex of a base of indigenous capital through the all-too eager 
intermediary of the national government.
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in the beginning, minerals later, and raw materials and 
foodstuffs today. Formerly it used force and compulsion, now 
it makes use of financial ability and astuteness. In any 
case, gain was always the motive. That is why the study of 
the economic factor^is fundamental in the relations between 
Europe and America.
"If British capital and investment had been unnecessary— indeed, 
dysfunctional— to Argentine development,' of what value had Argentina's 
commercial relationship with the U.K. been?" Scalabrini argued that a 
key lesson derived from the crisis of the thirties was that whatever
•h
purposes the exchange of Argentine raw materials for English manufac­
tures might once have served, since 1930 the terms of trade had turned
2increasingly disadvantageous for Argentines. Another lesson for Argen­
tine patriots to be learned from the crisis of the thirties according 
to Scalabrini Ortiz— and here we come to the second of populist- 
nationalism's aspects providing both for Peronism's strength and weak­
ness, the class analysis implicit in the populist-nationalist perspec­
tive— was that the thirties revealed the true divisions within Argen­
tine society.
On one hand stands the whole nation, the whole people, without 
distinction as to rank and class. On the other stand the 
English and North American capitalists and their (Argentine) 
representatives, who are . . . hoping to direct the outburst 
of national passion either into internecine (class) conflict 
or into xenophobic outbursts against the innocent, defenseless^ 
new immigrants, who work side by side" with native Argentines.
Juan Jose Hernandez Arregui, La formacion de la conciencia 
nacional (Buenos Aires: Editorial Plus Ultra, 1973), pp. 334-5. My 
translation.
2
Mark Falcoff, p. 94. He mentions Scalabrini Ortiz's Polixica 
britanica en el Rio de la Plata (p. 224) as the source for his argument.
3Ibid., p. 86. Falcoff quotes from "Who Owns Argentina," p. 28.
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"Argentina was an agricultural and pastoral nation, Scalabrini 
asserted, not because it was ’particularly suited' to be so, but 
because its primitive state suited the interests of Great Britain 
and the Argentine oligarchy."*
Internally, this analysis drew the conclusion that the pri­
mary contradiction was that between "the people" as a whole (without 
distinctions as to rank and class) and the oligarchy, for it was the 
latter through whom the foreign imperialists implement, their ex­
ploitative design. Populist-nationalism lent itself admirably well 
for the purpose of mobilizing a broad, socially inclusive base, 
strong enough to offset the political power of the oligarchy. Its 
potential for uniting diverse sectors on a crusade for national 
salvation served a useful ideological function for Peronism. It 
was populist-nationalism that inspired Peronism’s programmatic 
orientation that sought, simultaneously, to satisfy the interests of 
the working masses and the national bourgeosie. In a conjunctural 
circumstance where the local entrepreneurial class is very weak and 
industrial capitalism is a largely foreign phenomenon, it does not 
appear contradictory to maintain that the evils of capitalism will 
disappear through economic development guided by the state and managed 
by the national bourgeoisie. By utilizing populist-nationalism's 
class formula, Peronism was able to mobilize a very powerful social 
base behind the regime, enabling it to keep its enemies in check for 
a decade. As we shall see, populist-nationalism's weakness was its 
failure to recognize that the viability of its class formula was limited 
to a specific conjunctural situation.
*Falcoff, p. 87.
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The populist-nationalism that emerged from "the infamous 
decade" represented the response of an incipient national bourgeoisie 
at a moment of crisis when its class position should have been, and 
to a certain extent was, in ascent, but when it was also being con­
tained by the representatives of the traditional order. It remained 
for Peronism to push its interests to the forefront. The limitations 
in this nationalist perspective did not therefore become fully appar­
ent until they found their full expression in governmental policy a 
decade later. They were however, already implicit in this nationalism’s 
petit bourgeois class base. Thus although populist-nationalism's 
lack of class distinctions in its analysis enabled it to have such 
wide appeal that it became the popular political conscience of its 
time, its lack of class analysis also became its principal weakness. 
Beyond vague generalities, it had no penetrating social analysis. This 
was not accidental; it resulted from its being the product of a petit 
bourgeois intelligentsia. Speaking of populist-nationalism's 
chief organizational expression in the thirties, the Fuerza de 
Orientacion Radical de la Joven Argentina (FORJA), Juan Jose^ Hernandez 
Arregui notes that the proletariat was non-existent in their analysis 
of the historical development of nationalism.
In its extensive pamphletary and political literature of ten 
years, the word proletariat was mentioned only once, and then 
in a purely incidental manner. The term working class, never.
FORJA preferred to speak of the people as an idealizing gen­
eralization which is, precisely because of the petit bourgeosie's 
fear of class, an ideological technique to avoid recognizing 
the existence of classes and real social antagonisms.
^"Hernandez Arregui, pp. 389-90. My translation, emphasis in 
original.
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On the other hand, as Hernandez Arregui also points out, without this 
type of nationalist agitation, the entrance of the Argentine masses 
onto the political stage and the emergence of a mass anti-imperialist 
struggle would never have taken place.
The third interrelated aspect in the populist-nationalist 
perspective that provided Peronism its strength and made for its 
limitations was populist-nationalism's emphasis on, and attitude 
towards, industrialization. The populist-nationalist critique helped 
undermine the deep-seated belief in the inevitability of Argentina’s 
agro-pastoral role in the world economy. By attacking the oligarchy, 
its agro-pastoral base and its free trade orientation, Scalabrini Ortiz 
and others contributed to the goal of industrialization through govern­
ment policies. But while the diagnosis of Argentina's economic ills 
was accurate, the type of industrialization prescribed was an insuffi­
cient remedy. Scalabrini Ortiz saw industry as
the results of economic independence rather than its cause. 
Scalabrini saw industry as something toward which the Argen­
tine economy automatically tended . . . The conservative oli­
garchy had deliberately placed obstacles in the way of indus­
trialization— low tariffs on imports, high duties on raw 
materials, high railroad rates, manipulation of credit and 
currency— so that the problem was not so much to plan and 
promote industry as to dislodge the oligarchy and the British 
from power and allow events to take their 'natural' course.
The economic policies of the Peronist government based themselves on
this analysis and assumed that self-sustaining industrialization was
the automatic result of economic independence rather than its necessary
foundation. This was one reason why so many key problems were ignored
and vigorous action postponed, until it was too late for the Peronist
falcoff, pp. 99-100.
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regime. Consequently, while industrialization was certainly very 
high on the agenda, the regime's policies did not go far enough beyond 
those that had already been instituted by its oligarchic predecessor.
As will be shown further on, an important reason for Peronism's 
failure to deal decisively with the roots of foreign dependency within 
Argentina's class structure, was due to the fact that Peronist anti­
imperialism did not go beyond that of the populist-nationalist critique. 
Though it effectively attacked the oligarchy's political control with 
popular mobilizations, Peronism did not substantially challenge the 
oligarchy's material base in landownership. Even the oligarchy's 
institutional expressions like the Sociedad Rural Argentina and the 
Catholic Church were not confronted by Peronism. The hypothesis ex­
plored in this study maintains that the Peronist government followed 
economic policies, such as protective barriers, that sought to strengthen 
national industry. It did not however, seek to alter the class rela­
tions involved in this process. In this way, the regime neglected the 
internal foundations that later reversed the trend towards economic 
independence and autonomous growth.
Conclusions
This chapter addressed two of the conditions for the emergence 
of a transitional period: 1) an international crisis with internal 
repercussions severe enough to disrupt the ongoing pattern, and 2) the 
development of the infrastructure for the new pattern. The chapter 
showed how the industrial plant and equipment, on which the new 
pattern would base itself, were being rapidly expanded as manufacturing 
became the leading sector in growth rate.
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The analysis focused primarily on the domestic repercussions 
of the international crisis set off by the 1929 crash. It discussed 
the growth of the state apparatus and the tendency toward greater 
autonomy for the state, which resulted from the increasing complexity 
of the class forces structured around the ruling alliance and those 
opposed to it. Factors instrumental in the emergence of Peronism 
were examined in the context of analyzing the modifications of the 
externally oriented growth pattern introduced during this period. In 
providing an increased role for the manufacturing sector and the 
groups tied to it, these modifications succeeded in intensifying the 
contradictions that brought Peronism to power. By sponsoring a certain 
degree of internally oriented growth as a prop to maintaining an externally 
oriented economy, the oligarchic regime provided an increased role for 
industrialists and labor, but it also constrained them and postponed and 
suppressed their demands. These were contradictions utilized by 
Peronism in pushing the import substituting developmental model 
initiated in the thirties to its full potential in the forties. In 
the above pages we also noted that the populist-nationalist critique 
of the thirties provided Peronism its class orientation and programmatic 
direction. These will be looked at further as we analyze the Peronist 
regime's strengths and weaknesses.
CHAPTER IV
PERONISM1S ACHIEVEMENTS, 1943-50 
Introduction
In Chapter 3 I covered the first two conditions for the 
existence of a transitional period. This chapter analyzes the factors 
involved in the remaining two conditions: the mobilization of a 
social base into a political force strong enough to counter that of 
the traditional ruling strata and determine the use of available 
resources; and the presence of the material conditions needed for the 
emerging developmental patterns to succeed.* As will be seen, though 
theoretically distinct, these two conditions were in reality closely 
interconnected.
Peronism achieved its greatest successes in the areas of 
industrialization and social welfare. These achievements were closely 
related in that they depended on a very favorable confluence of external 
and internal factors. This chapter argues that in the first place, the 
increased demand for traditional exportables and the lessening of for­
eign competition in the industrial area due to the war, provided the 
material foundation to cover the costs for both industrialization and 
social benefits. In the second place, the policies enacted to achieve 
these ends depended on the mobilization of social forces strong enough 
to offset the power of the previously dominant groups. The diverse
*See pp. 23-4, above.
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social sectors mobilized into Peron's power base, in turn, were held 
together by the benefits derived from the regime’s policies.
Following the theoretical framework adopted in this study, 
the analysis focuses on the continuities and differences with shifts 
already present in the prior period. Understanding the basic con­
tinuities of Peronism and the ways in which it departed from its 
oligarchic predecessors reveals the contradictions within Peronist 
development. The theme of the analysis is that Peronist policies 
intensified the contradictions emerging from the shifts of the 
thirties to the point that their impact went beyond quantitative to 
qualitative change.
The analysis will show that the type of manufacturing 
activity initially benefiting from Peronist policies was essentially 
the same as that which had experienced rapid expansion in the 
thirties. In promoting a basically import substituting industrializa­
tion within a capitalist framework, Peronism did not depart from the 
policies of its predecessors. This was true not only in the type of 
enterprise which proliferated— small scale, producing non-durable 
goods for domestic consumption— but also in the fundamental social 
relations governing industrial activity, which remained the same in 
spite of shifting the balance of power in the bargaining arena towards 
labor.
Though the nature of manufacturing activity promoted did not 
differ from that of the thirties, the amount of industrialization en­
couraged did represent a departure and did lead to fundamental shifts 
in the developmental pattern. The years between 1945 and 1949 marked 
the most intense industrialization Argentina had ever experienced.
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Indeed, 1944-45 represents the turning point at which the proportion 
of the Gross Domestic Product contributed by manufacturing became 
consistently larger than that contributed by the rural sector.
The Peronist years were the critical juncture in Argentine 
history when the relationship between agriculture and industry was 
reversed. In other words, the 1943-45 period represents the decisive 
stage in the transitional process toward dependent industrialization 
because the nature of productive activity underlying Argentine economic 
life was fundamentally altered during those years. Industrial produc­
tion oriented to the internal market became the predominant form of 
economic activity.*
This chapter looks at the external and internal conditions so 
favorable to the rapid and consistent expansion of manufacturing 
activity, and to the development of the national market for consumer 
goods between 1943 and 1950. In relating the external factors, follow­
ing pages explore the beneficial effects of World War II and of the 
immediate post-war period on Argentina's international position. 
Europe's increased demand for Argentina's traditional exports produced 
the foreign exchange reserves needed for purchasing machinery and 
equipment. Moreover, Britain's weakened position as an exporter of 
manufactured goods and North America's preoccupations in the war 
effort, enabled Argentine industry to fill the vacuum. As far as the
*The fact that Argentina's proportion of the population em­
ployed in industry was the highest in all of Latin America in 1950, 
indicates how important the manufacturing sector had become. See 
John P. Cole, Latin America; An Economic and Social Geography, (London: 
Butterworth and Co., 1965), p. 169.
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internal factors are concerned, industrialists benefited both directly 
and indirectly from the sectoral and social redistributive policies 
of the regime. They were aided directly through availability of 
state financing on easy terms, and indirectly via expansion of the 
domestic market and minimized industrial strife, resulting from higher 
wages and increased purchasing power of workers.
To achieve the astronomical rise in manufacturing activity 
that took place from 1943 to 1950, Peronism incorporated aspects into 
its policies that diverged radically from the oligarchic developmental 
model. Whereas industrial activity in 1930-43 was subordinated to 
preserving rural production as the foundation of the economy, in the 
1943-50 period agricultural production was clearly subordinated to the 
requirements of the manufacturing sector.^ Indeed, reversing the 
traditional subordination of manufacturing to agricultural production 
was the cornerstone of Peronism's strategy for industrialization. With 
the creation of I.A.P.I. (Instituto Argentino de Promocion del Inter- 
cambio), Peron channeled the surplus generated by the rural sector into 
industrial production. Besides the monopolization of agricultural 
exports by the state, other policies designed to achieve industrial 
growth and economic liberation included: nationalization of British- 
owned railroads and foreign-owned utility companies, development of a 
state-owned merchant marine with considerable tonnage under Argentine 
flags, creation of the Banco Central de la Republics Argentina, and 
Five Year Plans with a priority on industrialization using such means
^Next chapter's analysis deals with the retrogression in 
this relationship during the 1950-55 period.
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as state investments and subsidies and the liberalization of credits.
Essentially, these policies.resolved the contradiction between 
production for external markets and economic activity catering to 
domestic needs, in the direction of the internally oriented growth 
pole. Obviously these policies undermined the interests of the foreign 
and national groups that had determined the developmental process prior 
to Peronism. For this reason, in order to assert the new developmental 
pattern, a mass mobilization under nationalist banners, Peronism1 s 
political tool, became an essential component in overcoming the resis­
tance to the traditionally dominant groups.
Populist-Nationalism 
This section appraises the doctrine that served Peronism in its 
mass mobilizing efforts. An outgrowth of the nationalist polemics of 
the crisis of the thirties, populist-nationalism called on "the people," 
including all popular sectors— workers, peons, small farmers, middle 
classes, national entrepreneurs— to band together in a crusade to 
rescue the nation from the domination of foreign interests and their 
local allies, the vendepatria (sellout) rural oligarchy. Populist- 
nationalism provided Peronism with its class orientation and its pro­
grammatic direction. In tracing these, the survey that follows concen­
trates on those aspects of Peronist doctrine which cast light on the 
regime's strengths and weaknesses-. I begin with the consumerist 
orientation in Peronist economic policy.
With more than a little exaggeration, Peron remarked that 
"We have overthrown an entire [economic] theory and system that has 
been applied for a century and a half throughout the world and on which
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thousands of volumes have been written."* He was referring to the
primacy of the sphere of consumption in the orientation of the regime's
economic policies during its first period in power.
When we improve the standard of living and increase consumption, 
we subordinate capital to the economy and production to consump­
tion. We do not ask the industrialists if they will produce 
more when we raise salaries five-fold and increase consumption.
. . . They are producing more. . . . Everybody eats more, dresses 
better, and lives more happi£y> and the capitalists make more 
profit than they did before.
This orientation accorded with the propitious economic conditions for 
Argentina at the time which allowed the regime the possibility of 
instituting reforms with a minimum of social turmoil. However, be­
cause it confined itself to the sphere of consumption, this orientation 
also proved a liability in that it diverted attention from consideration 
of the sphere of production. Hence, when the situation favoring a 
consumption orientation approach shifted, Vexon and his policy-makers 
failed to move aggressively in changing the social relations of pro­
duction. In this way, they diminished their chances of successfully 
confronting the burgeoning crisis.
Though the emphasis on consumerism ultimately created more 
problems than the regime could cope with; while the advantageous 
conditions prevailed this policy orientation obviously brought the 
Peron government enormous popularity thereby solidifying its bonds 
with the popular sectors. Those aspects of Peronist economic doctrine
1 * ' /Juan Peron, Conduccion polftica (Buenos Aires: Editorial 
Freeland, 1971), p. 74. My translation.
2Ibid., p. 75.
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which confined the regime's attention to the sphere of circulation
were thus both a source of strength as well as being responsible for
serious limitations.
There were also strengths and weaknesses implicit in how
Peronist doctrine treated the international dimension. The connection
between economic dependence and foreign domination was one of the
maxims frequently repeated in Peron1s statements. "Without economic
independence," he said in a speech at the Military School on August
7, 1945, "we shall always remain a semicolonial country."* On another
occasion Peron observed, "I have said many times that in our internal
as well as international actions, we face but one problem and that
2 *problem is the international problem." Peron compared the functioning 
of the international system to a central tank, representing the ad­
vanced industrial nations, and a series of tanks connected to it repre­
senting the peripheral economies. Labor and wealth Are the liquid 
travelling through the system and the volume contained in the central 
tank depends on how much is siphoned off from the periphery. "There 
is then only one remedy: put a shut-off valve on the pipe connection 
to the central tank. . . . Our economy was only able to achieve this
3with the first phase of its economic independence. It was not easy."
^Quoted by Alejandro Peyrou and Ernesto Villanueva, "Documentos 
para la historia del peronismo" in El peronismo (Buenos Aires: Carlos 
Perez Editor, 1969, p. 204. My translation.
2 * /  yPeron, Conduccion politica, p. 244.
3In a statement made bn July 23, 1947. Cited by Peyrou and 
Villanueva, pp. 239-40.
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/■Despite his simplistic analogies, Peron disseminated a fairly 
sophisticated understanding of the international system. It encom­
passed a clear awareness of the consequences of challenging dependence 
on external interests.
(Though threatened with economic pressure and the sabotage of 
foreign tradgj . . .  we have decided to remain in the category 
of those who choose not to submit . . .
That is why foreign interests will never forgive us and
will try for many years to recover what they have lost. That 
is why they aim to boycott us by again invoking economic blockades 
and international controls. But here too we know how to overcome 
them.
On this latter point Peron proved to be wrong. Though Peron's govern­
ment struggled to resist direct foreign pressures, it was less able 
to overcome the more subtle forms of economic penetration by foreign 
interests. The analysis in these two chapters shows that in spite 
of drawing the connection between the international and the national, 
Peronist doctrine did not lead to directly challenging these internal 
manifestations. This was a key factor in the ousting of Peronism from 
state power.
No discussion of the international dimension in Peronist doc­
trine would be complete without mention of the "third position." Peron 
used "the third position" to distinguish justicialism,/from capitalism—
the first position— to which his movement was a response, and communism
2— the second position— which had failed as a solution. The term was 
defined in a variety of ways including, in the economic realm, as "the
*From statement dated July 6, 1951 in Peyrou and Villanueva, p. 244.
2For example in a lecture given at the Escuela Superior 
Peronista on July 2, 1953. In Juan Peron, Filosof{.& peronista 
(Buenos Aires: Editorial Freeland, 1974), p. 265.
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abandonment of free enterprise and a planned economy, and their 
substitution by a system of a social economy to which one arrives by 
placing capital at the service of the economy."^ But its most enduring 
meaning was in the area of international relations where Peron right­
fully claimed to be a founding father of the movement of Third World, 
non-aligned nations. In a later, definitive statement on the subject, 
Peron asserted:
Recovery of national dignity requires taking a position, 
defining this position vis-a-vis the conflict between the 
two camps, such as Argentina has done. But she has defined 
herself, not within one ofjthe two camps; instead she has 
opted for an independent third position.
Nevertheless, Argentina does not pretend to create a 
third force to intervene between the conflicting imperialist 
camps; she wishes only to act in her sovereign capacity to 
decide her own destiny and to integrate this destiny fraternally 
with her sister nations of Latin America.^
In one of his many earlier anti-imperialist statements,
Peron pointed out that the struggle for economic independence, to 
put into effect the principles of sovereignty and nationhood and the 
conception of the juridical equality of states, meant "preventing the 
interference of capitalist imperialism which, in its hunger for profits 
and in accordance with its own interests, withholds from the natives 
the benefits of their labor and of the exploitation of their wealth, 
taking fabulous earnings out of the country and having a negative 
impact in the economic and social realms, and often condemning the 
country's children to live a life of misery."
Message to Congress on May Day 1950. In Filosophia peronista, p. 271. 
All citations from this source are my translation.
2Ibid., p. 269.
3Made on the 24th of May of 1948. Cited by Peyrou and Villa­
nueva, pp. 295-6/
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It is important to stress the anti-imperialism in Peronist
doctrine because it provided.a key basis for the movement's mass
appeal. It is also important to note that contrary to the allegations
which view Argentine expressions of anti-imperialist solidarity with
Latin American nations as a cover for continental hegemonic aims,
such expressions reflected a sympathetic understanding for parallel
struggles against a common enemy.
Getulio Vargas, authentic representative of the Brazilian people, 
triumphs against the pressure of the North and the dollars of 
Standard Oil. Paz Estenssoro in Bolivia overcomes the same 
foreign opposition. Ibanez in Chile wages a similar struggle 
against the imperialist interests. Venezuela squashes a coup 
attempt of the foreign type, so common on this continent of 
"the Good Neighbor." Near her, other countries suffer the same 
threats. Guatemala has been the victim of almost twenty coup 
attempts in four years, all discharged from the same direction.
Puerto Rico fights for her independence against the common
danger of all our people. In Central America Guatemala, Hon­
duras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, etc., get together, all of them 
being on "the list" and jointly exploited and threatened. *
It must be noted however, that despite his vigorous statements,
✓Peron was essentially a pragmatist. Thus in the same year that he 
made the above statement, in observing that there would be a war be­
tween the two imperialisms in which "one would triumph and the other 
be defeated but in which neither of the two, neither the victor nor
the vanquished, would win the war," Peron justified Argentina's parti­
cipation in the U .S.-sponsored anti-Soviet bloc. "For political, ideo­
logical, geographic, and strategic reasons, we cannot come out in favor
of Communism. . . .  We know where the center of gravity for our actions
2must lie: within the Western bloc."
^Dated October 25, 1951 in Peyrou and Villanueva, p. 317.
2 /Conduccion politics. p. 251.
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/Nevertheless, Peron responded to and, in turn, deepened the 
anti-imperialist consciousness of the Argentine masses. Following in 
the footsteps of populist-nationalist polemicists of the thirties, 
Peron found a responsive echo when he taught Argentines to respect 
their own and despise the elitists who downgraded the indigenous and 
identified with the "superior" culture emanating from abroad. He 
characterized the renowned Argentine intelligentsia as "constantly 
looking to Europe with envious eyes, ashamed of being Argentine and 
American, underestimating their own people, who could be the only 
source of something substantial and authentic." "The ruling classes," 
he said, "had a predilection for the French, the British or the Yankee, 
and absolute contempt for the Argentine."* The consequences of cul­
tural imperialism, Peron taught, were "to create deceptive ideas about 
superiority and foment petty conflicts among people of a common des­
tiny, such as those of South America." Such conflicts undermined the 
basis for an international solidarity against imperialism.. "Just as
freedom is vital for a person's full development, so a people need
2freedom if they are to achieve their cultural destiny."
I must emphasize a point that is essential to this analysis of 
Peronism. Though Peron often tended to identify his anti-imperialism 
with anti-capitalism, he was not an enemy of capitalism per se and was 
in fact, in his own words, its best friend. He was a firm supporter 
of national capitalism and a foe of international capitalism. In
*Filosoffa peronista, p. 253.
2Ibid., pp. 254-5.
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one of his clearest expressions on the subject, Peron underlined this 
point:
We are not in any way enemies of capital and the future will 
show that we have been its true defenders. It is necessary 
to clearly discriminate between the international capitalism 
of the great consortiums of foreign exploitation and the patri­
monial capital of industry and commerce. We have defended the 
latter and mercilessly attacked the former. International 
capitalism is cold and inhuman; patrimonial capital of indus­
try and commerce represents, in our view, a working tool for 
businessmen. International capitalism is an instrument for 
exploitation while patrimonial capital {[i.e., national capital] 
is one for well-being. We are not enemies of capital, even 
foreign, that dedicates itself to its business; we are however 
enemies of capitalism, even Argentine, that erects itself into 
an oligarchy in order to challenge the nation's right to govern 
itself and the state's privilege to defend the state against 
ignominy and against treason.!
Peron proved to be a good friend to national capitalism. His 
policies promoting industrialization were motivated by a desire to 
aid indigenous entrepreneurs. In enacting policies proceeding from 
the view which considered the growth of national industry and economic 
independence to be fundamentally interrelated, Peron was implementing 
a program agitated for by Argentine industrialists in the thirties. 
Consider the following written by Benjamin Villafane in the December 
1930 issue of the Anales de la Union Industrial, the major organ of 
the industrial bourgeoisie:
October 21, 1946, as cited by Peyrou and Villanueva, pp.
237-8. This contradictory assessment of capitalism as both progressive 
(when national) and reactionary (when imperialist) is consistent with 
those interpretations such as Jorge Abelardo Ramos' in Revolucion y 
contrarevoluci^n en la Argentina (Buenos Aires: Plus Ultra, 1965), 2: 
619, which see the Peronist period as one of bourgeois "democratic- 
national" development towards socialism. Though it also recognizes 
the progressive strains inherent in Peronist populism and nationalism, 
this study differs in that it does not conceive of the outcome of 
Peronism's contradictions to be inevitably in one direction.
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What were the prospects for national industry the day the 
European war (World War l| finished? The most indispensable plants 
for our national life had been born. They were strong and 
potent, and a moderate protective barrier would have been suffi­
cient to achieve the industrial emancipation of the nation.
That would have been tantamount to gaining our true freedom.
Because a people are not free if to dress themselves their 
wool must be knit for them and they depend on others to provide 
them with machinery they need to till the soil and harvest their 
crops. The steel industry, mother of all industry, backbone 
of the nation's wealth and indispensable to the army and the 
navy for national defense, was flowering. . . .  It was well on 
the road to providing the nation’s needs. . . .
Factories producing peanut oil were in bloom. . . .  We were 
manufacturing a good part of the clothes to dress our people.
What happened then? Instead of protecting these industries they 
were deliberately decimated. . . .
Customs doors were thrown open to oils from Italy and 
Spain, at precisely the time when these countries were rejecting 
our meat. And our peanut oil factories, producing a product 
superior to the imported ones, had to close their doors and our 
farmers abandon their fields.
The same thing happened to the wool-processing industries, 
textiles, and many others. . . .
Without a doubt, if we had not insensitively killed off our
national industries born out of the European war, we would have 
been in a better position and could have told Europe and the 
United States when they closed their doors to our grains and 
cattle, "You don't buy our products, well we won't buy anything 
from you even though it will cost us more to produce what we 
need locally." And we would have come out ahead because the 
money that stays at home enriches everybody. Today we have no 
choice but to complain uselessly about our foolishness and to 
deliver the fruits of our labor at the prices they are willing 
to pay us and pay dearly for what they are willing to sell us. -
A people without economic independence is not a free nation.
Thus, far from threatening the interests of national capitalists,
the Peronist push for economic independence in fact incorporated the
programmatic orientation of important sectors of national capital. But 
what about that other basic foundation of Peronist economic policies:
Cited by Antonio Cafiero in Cinco anos despues (Buenos Aires: 
Impresores El Grafico, 1961), pp. 206-7. My translation; emphasis in 
original.
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to put capital at the service of the economy?* Here it must be
stressed that, in spite of occasional rhetorical lapses— especially
when Peron was under attack and needed counterpressure from the
masses— Peron had no intention of reversing the role of capital in
defining the relations of production. Quite the contrary. His
reformist intentions were motivated by the desire to undercut the
/potential for revolutionary transformations. Peron repeatedly justi­
fied his policies redistributing wealth on these grounds. For example, 
in a speech to the Chamber of Commerce on the 25th of August of 1944:
Capitalist gentlemen,: do not fear my pro-labor orientation.
Now more than ever, capitalism is secure because I too am a 
capitalist. I have a ranch and workers on it. What I wish 
to do is to have the state organize the workers so that it 
can direct them and orient them in the right direction. This 
way we can neutralize the ideological and revolutionary currents 
within the working class that threaten our capitalist society 
in the post-war years. One must give the workers something 
and they will be a controllable force.2
Defining the basic foundations for his policies at the height 
of his achievements in opening the legislative session on May Day of 
1948, Peron stated:
We found the economy at the service of capital. The reform 
consisted in placing capital at the service of the economy.
We found a colonial economy. The reform consisted in achieving 
economic independence.
And he added:
These two achievements of the new Argentine economy are the 
basic foundations for any economic and social evolution to 
be carried out in the future.
Cited in Eldon G. Kenworthy, "The Formation of the Peronist Coalition," 
Ph.D. Dissertation (Yale University, 1970), pp. 274-5.
^As cited in Pardo.Cuneo, Comportamiento y crisis de la clase 
empresaria (Buenos Aires: Editorial Pleainar, 1967), pp. 171-2. My 
translation. Note the similarity of these views to those expressed one 
hundred years earlier by that great populist of his day, Juan Manuel 
Rosas. See footnote 1 on p. 68 above.
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Though clearly aimed at eliciting his audience’s sympathy, the senti- 
ments expressed here are a consistent theme in Peron's pronouncements.
There is no doubt that one of Peron's almost obsessive pre­
occupations was to win the workers away from communism which he per­
ceived to be his major adversary for the workers' loyalty. In the 
same speech cited above, given in the initial period when Peron was 
still Secretary of the Department of Labor and Social Welfare, he 
characterized the problem presented by the unions in terms of their 
leadership being forty percent Communists or Communist-sympathizers.* 
That is why, he argued, it was so important to use his Department to 
win the workers' trust so that they could be organized into a force at 
the state's disposal. On another occasion Peron described his initial 
preoccupations as Secretary of Labor and Social Welfare more graphically:
Some, when they heard me give my first speeches at the 
Secretariat of Labor and Social Welfare, said, "This guy is a 
Communist."
And indeed I did speak a little like a Communist. Why?
Because if I had spoken in any other language for my first 
speech I would have received the first orange thrown at me.
Because these were men that came with forty years of Marxism 
and with Communist leaders.
I wanted to please the latter a little bit but it was really 
the others who interested me because it was these that I wanted 
to take away from them.
The Communist leaders brought me these people because they 
wanted me to see that they were backed by the masses.
I received them and made them believe that I believed that.
But what I really had in mind was to take the masses away 
from them and leave them without any backing.2
"Putting capital at the service of the economy," "humanizing 
capital," and "the social economy;" indeed the Peronist; focus on "social
■^Peyrou and Villanueva, pp. 215-6.
2 ^
Conduccion politica, pp. 290-1.
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justice" emphasized redistributing income towards the workers. On
/the 25th of April of 1945, Peron said:
A national duty of first rank importance which nowadays is 
an already universally accepted postulate, demands that economic 
organization be transformed to serve the people. This is democ­
racy's true objective in the social realm. If industry resists 
being put in the position of paying remuneration to the workers 
that allows them to buy and utilize the products produced by 
their labor, then it will experience a considerable regression 
and we return to the ancient crises of underconsumption.1
Peron readily admitted that his initial efforts at redistributing
wealth did not flow from a concern about the production of wealth.
It would have been logical to see how much we produced, how 
much we could afford to pay, and then pay in relationship 
to this calculus. We did the exact opposite without thinking 
whether we could or whether we had it, we said: "Pay, later 
we will figure out how." That is to say, "we burned our 
bridges behind us" because there was no turning back.2
Though Peron clearly envisioned his reforms in the redistribu­
tion of wealth as salvaging capitalism, he encountered stiff resistance 
from the industrial bourgeoisie. His social policies provided the 
impetus for their opposition and the chief rationale for their enthu­
siastic participation in the "Democratic Front" opposing Peron in the 
1946 elections. The going over of the industrial capitalists into the 
camp of his enemies caused Peron some bitter disappointment. On May 
Day of 1947 he said:
if something hurts me deeply, it is that some capitalists have 
not given my social policies the collaboration they deserve and 
that, united with the oligarchic opposition, they have fought 
us. They are blind and they cannot even appreciate what is 
going on in the world. I have warned them repeatedly: by wanting 
to defend it all, they will wind up losing it all if they don't 
change their behavior.3
1 2 /Peyrou and Villanueva, p. 255. Conduccion polrftica, p. 79.
3Peyrou and Villanueva, p. 249.
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The theme that emerges from Peron1s pronouncements on capitalism 
is that he viewed it as a necessary force in the organization of the 
economy which, however, left entirely unchecked would be driven to self- 
destruction by the capitalists' greed for profits. Consequently, it 
was the state's role to confine the capitalists' striving for gain 
within just limits and ensure that benefits were spread to the people. 
The state should not, however, overstep its proper bounds. Beyond en­
suring equitable distribution of income, its legitimate function lay 
in stimulating economic forces in the production of wealth by preventing 
them from working at cross-purposes. In other words, the state should 
assist indirectly and not take a direct part in the organization of the 
forces of production.
Early on, on the 6th of September of 1944, in a speech inaugura­
ting the National Post-War Council, the organization formulating the 
regime's economic policy, Peron set the tone for the role the state was
Ito play in economic matters. He stressed the part played by private 
capital in achieving economic growth and emphasized that the state's 
role must not interfere with private capital's initiative. The state 
must confine itself to setting ground rules promoting the most effi­
cient utilization and expansion of economic resources, including labor, 
and ensure a just equilibrium so that the workers would also benefit. 
This was one of those occasions where he drew the analogy of the state's 
directing role as not interfering with economic freedom any more than 
the setting of traffic regulations interfered with a driver's freedom 
to go anywhere.
^Peyrou and Villanueva, pp. 231-33.
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Peron viewed the state as an instrument whose "natural
function" was that of "coordinating the general interests of society."1
The state should coordinate the; general interests because this was
necessary in order to prevent conflict and struggle between classes
as well as to achieve the happiness and well-being of the whole people,
without distinction of class or social status. Since they were both to
be used for the same end— the happiness and well-being of the people—
Peron saw no contradiction between freedom and authority. Thus he
rejected the notion of liberty propounded by liberalism as an end, and
saw it rather as a means. According to Peron, "Once the Justicialist
Revolution abolished the privileges of oligarchy, the Argentine State
would be transformed into a social democracy thus overcoming the
antagonism between the common citizen and the state because the people
2would be sovereign."
/One of the motivations which played a key part in Peron1s
actions from the beginning to the end of his political career was the
desire to avoid discord and social turmoil. It is one reason why he
placed so much emphasis on achieving national unity. With the recent
experience of the Spanish Civil War in mind, he said in a speech on
August 25, 1944:
We seek this unity (of all Argentines} because we understand 
how any departure from the national consensus, no matter how 
insignificant at the time, will end up as a negative factor 
for future solutions. And if this departure is of major pro­
portions and the people do not unite, they will be the authors 
of their own undoing because it is beyond doubt, gentlemen, that 
if we continue playing at partisanship, we'll end up fighting; 
and in this struggle ho one will win and everyone will lose. . . .
1Filosofdfa peronista, p. 170. ^Ibid., p. 150.
3Peyrou and Villanueva, p. 227.
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Peron seemed to have been sincere in this desire to.avoid civil 
strife. The fear of precipitating a civil war was the reason cited 
by Peron why he chose not to put up a fight at a time when he 
probably could have overcome the forces which overthrew him. Instead 
he peaceably chose to go into exile in 1955.*
The fear of social discord spilling over into insurrectionary 
violence forms a persistent theme in Peron1s thinking. Repeatedly he 
justified the state's role in integrating the masses by giving them 
a material stake in the system on those grounds. He used the same 
reasoning in stressing the state's instrumentality in organizing the 
masses structurally because, as he put it, the greater danger comes 
from a fluid, unorganized mass. From this one could conclude that 
Peron was nothing but a demagogue bent on manipulating the masses for 
his egotistical ends. The manipulative element undoubtedly played a 
part in Peron's actions but, at the same time, it would be a serious 
error not to see his faith in the masses and his sincere desire to
According to Arthur Whitaker, the forces directly involved in
Peron's overthrow were confined to "a part of the armed forces, with
little active civilian^participation, except in Cordoba. . ." Up 
"to the moment of Peron's resignation the forces loyal to him still 
controlled the country's second largest city, Rosario, and most of the 
provinces, in addition to metropolitan Buenos Aires, which contains one 
quarter of Argentina's 19 million inhabitants." Arthur P. Whitaker, 
Argentine Upheaval: Peron's Fall and the New Regime (New York: Praeger, 
1956), pp. 29-30.
Though at a high cost, a movement of loyal troops against Cor­
doba, would probably have crushed the revolt. Peron refused to order 
such a mobilization. In his open letter of resignation to the Army and 
the people, he said he wished to spare the nation a civil war and the
city of Buenos Aires a bombardment.
2For example, in the speech referred to above. Peyfou and 
Villanueva, pp. 214 and 217.
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defend their interests as a motivating factor. To see only the
demagogic in Peron is to completely miss the dynamic aspect that made
Peronism such a living force for over a quarter century of Argentine
politics. The following is, I believe, a relatively honest assessment 
/.by Peron of the role of the masses in his movement:
Peronism ha£ an essential task to accomplish among the 
Argentine people: to raise their political and civic conscious­
ness.
Without it we will always be vulnerable to having the masses 
taken away from us; but if we teach the masses to distinguish 
for themselves, to appreciate for themselves, to understand for 
themselves, then we can rest assured that they will never be 
fooled again.
And, if they cannot be fooled, the masses will not go with 
those who have bad intentions, but will instead go with those 
who have good intentions.
And this will be a safeguard for Peronism, so that we may 
never have any bad intentions, and that we be the instruments 
of the people, and never make the people our instruments.
The massive popular support enjoyed by the Peronist regime has 
often been misinterpreted as evidence for, either Peron's demagogic 
skills, or the charismatic nature of the ties between Peron and the 
masses. Though there is an element of truth to both views, the impor­
tant point is the rational and instrumental connection between the 
regime and its popular base. Eldon Kenworthy develops this argument 
in his careful and detailed critique of Seymour Martin Lipset's inter­
pretation of Peronism as an instance of "working class authoritarianism."
Lipset assumes that "a desire for immediate action," a rejection 
of "a gradualist image of political change," and a tendency to 
place more faith in strong leaders than in liberal democratic 
institutions constitute prima facie evidence of projection, sub- 
rational political behavior. But is this not merely a projection 
of Upset’s own values? There are situations in which "extremist"
Conduccion pol^tica. p. 141.
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politics are instrumental politics and in which adherence to 
liberal democracy represents an evasion of reality.1
Analyzing the best empirical data available in studies of election 
results of the forties and fifties, Kenworthy shows that Peron's 
labor voters were clearly rational from the point of view of self- 
interest. As will be shown shortly, the regime's redistributive and 
pro-labor measures benefited workers and lower income groups in a dra­
matic and unprecedented way. The Peronist slogan "Peron cumple"— Peron 
delivers— was no empty rhetoric. Though the promotion of the popular 
sectors' material interests was clearly self-serving for the regime 
in the sense of building and solidifying a base, I believe it is mis­
leading to see Pero*n's views of his relationship to the masses and his 
characterization of their role in purely manipulative and demagogic 
terms. Certainly Peron's exhortations of popular sovereignty served 
his purposes and were cast in supremely egotistical terms, yet they 
were also sincerely felt. The intense loyalty of Peron's followers is 
best understood in both an objective and subjective sense: gratitude for
the real improvements Peron's rule had brought and a recognition of the
/ 2sincerity of Peron's belief in the masses as the real Argentina.
This genuine commitment to popular sovereignty in Peronist doc­
trine runs counter to the interpretation of Peronism as an example of
Eldon Kenworthy, "The Function of the Little-Known Case in 
Theory Formation or What Peronism Wasn't," Comparative Politics 6 (1973): 
30. Emphasis in the original.
2For a different view on Peronist conceptions relating to 
organizing the masses and a different portrayal of the regime's rela­
tions to its mass base, see Walter Little, "Party and State in Peronist 
Argentina, 1945-55," Hispanic American Historical Review 53 (1973): 644-62.
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corporatism. Though the regime's practice often deviated, the fact 
that there was an official commitment in Peronist doctrine to an 
autonomous role for the inasses served to spur on initiative from 
below. Thus, for example, on October 6, 1952, Peron said:
We must then listen to the genuine voice of the people as 
expressed by their own organizations and for that we need 
the people to be organized. That is why our system needs real 
representation, that is to say the organization of the popular 
forces so that they ensure that their representatives execute 
from within the government what the people want. That is to 
say, that the government be controlled. It is necessary to 
avoid placing numbers of people in jeopardy through discretion­
ary acts or the personal excesses of a leader, In other words 
that the people act as weight and counterweight in the organiza­
tion; so that if the government wants to adopt a measure that 
might be contrary to the interests of the community, they can 
make themselves felt to prevent its implementation. This is not 
limiting government but rather collaborating with it in order 
to avoid all possible inconveniences that can result from a 
strike or any other reaction of the people to something that 
does not accord with the interests of their representatives. . . .
The only guarantee against bad government is popular or­
ganization. That is why I fight for it. I fight for it so that 
there will be no bad government, and if some day we become a bad 
government we will perish from our own creation, because it will 
be the popular organizations that will eliminate us.1
Peron's conception of how to structure and organize his move­
ment allowed for relative autonomy for lower level cadres so that they
would exercise ingenuity and initiative. He demanded allegiance 
to general directives but also encouraged independence and initiative
from below in carrying them out. Peron's distinction between military
and political leadership is instructive in this regard. The former
commands and orders, the latter relies on persuasion and winning people
over. A political leader mobilizes people's convictions and can
^Cited in Peyrou and Villanueva, 288-9. This orientation con­
trasts with the clearly corporatist and elitist notions espoused by 
Francisco Jose^de Oliveira Vianna, Getulio Vargas' advisor on labor 
matters. See Kenneth Paul Erickson, The Brazilian Corporative State 
and Working Class Politics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1977), p. 16.
/therefore count on their fervent support. After Peron1s overthrow 
in 1955, independent initiative from below expressed through militant 
actions by workers apart from, and quite often against,the express 
orders of the trade union bureaucracy, allowed Peronism to survive as 
a dynamic force within Argentina’s working class in spite of over 
fifteen years of severe repression. Indeed, it was the resilience of 
its working class backbone, that enabled Justicialism to emerge as 
the majoritarian expression of the Argentine people in 1973.
Peron1s insistence on the organization of all interests and 
on the state setting the guidelines for their legitimate activities, 
so that the general, and not some particularistic interest emerges, 
exemplifies the regime's corporatist tendencies. The corporatist 
aspects in Peronist doctrine can be traced to a combination of 
nationalist and military influences. We have already seen how 
Peronist doctrine came out of the populist-nationalist critique of 
"the infamous decade." Peronist emphasis on industrialization and 
even its commitment to progressive reforms can also be explained as 
arising from military influences.
In the famous conference on the "Significance of National Defense 
From the Military Point of View" given in La Plata on the 10th of
June of 1944, the then Colonel Peron— deliberately citing von der
Goltz— applies the idea of "the Nation in Arms" to Argentine reality:
The two words "National Defense" may lead some to think that 
we are dealing with a problem of interest only to the Armed Forces. 
Nothing could be further from the truth. In reality its solution 
involves all of the nation's inhabitants, all of its energy resources, 
all its wealth, all its industry, its means of transportation and 
communication, etc., the armed forces being but . . .  a fighting in­
strument in this great complex which makes up "the Nation in Arms."
Peron criticized the shortsightedness behind opposition to 
production of war material, for it had to be bought abroad at high
prices and by not "establishing the factories that could
produce these within the country, which would now be operational,
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we also failed to gain considerable Industrial experience."
And he adds: "What I say about war materials can be extended 
to farm machinery, means of transportation, land, river, and 
sea, and any other order of activity.111
Peron's rhetoric betrays his military background. He re­
peatedly used terms like strategy, tactics, campaign, retreat, enemy, 
traitors, victory, and so on. However, though he certainly stressed 
leadership and authority, one should not take the military element too
far in accounting for his perspective on the organization of the move-
2ment and government. Nevertheless, in the economic realm, not only
did the military extend its influence by backing industrialization in
general, but it also played a direct and significant role in heavy
industry through its participation in steel production with the Direc- 
/• / *cion General de Fabricas Militares in 1947. Because it favored reliable
knowledge on what material and human resources were available for
mobilization, the military was also a large factor in Peronism1s
remarkable statistical and census data gathering. Even the Peronist
emphasis on women's rights was acceptable to the military in view of
the potential need for female labor on the home front in the event of 
3war.
This survey of Peronist doctrine highlighted several areas of 
significance to the analysis of Peronism as a transitional period. We
^"Alberto Ciria, Peron y el justicialismo (Buenos Aires: Siglo 
Veintiuno Editores, 1971), pp. 33-4. My translation.
2Peter Waldmann in Per Peronismus, 1943-55 (Hamburg: Hoffmann 
and Campe, 1974) tends to do this. See p. 171, for example.
^Ibid., pp. 170-1.
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saw that Peronist doctrine called attention to and stressed the 
economic link between international circumstances and national 
realities. The wide appeal of Peronism*s anti-imperialism aided 
Peron in his ability to mobilize the masses. Moreover, the expression 
of faith in the masses and the non-elitist character of Peronist doc­
trine encouraged the movement's broad-based rank and file to exercise 
initiative and ingenuity in supporting the regime.
Another theme in the survey needs to be stressed. Though 
strongly anti-imperialist, Peronist doctrine was not anti-capitalist.
The regime had no intention of changing the social relations of pro­
duction. It confined its preoccupations to the sphere of circulation, 
instituting substantive distributive reforms. These reforms, which 
were indeed impressive achievements and constituted a source of strength 
for Peronism, were facilitated by Peronism*s inclusive class orienta­
tion. In the favorable economic climate for Argentina in the World War 
II and immediate post-war period, the regime could use its populist- 
nationalist doctrine to mobilize political pressure behind its redis­
tributive policies and, the results yielded by these policies in turn, 
reinforced the regime's broad social base.
On the other hand however, Peronism's class orientation was 
also responsible for its major limitation: the failure to attack the 
internal base for dependency. The hypothesis explored in this study 
maintains that Peronism's populist-nationalist doctrine prevented the 
regime from making changes in the social relations of production.
These changes would have given the regime a better chance to survive 
once the favorable context of the earlier period was gone. In the 
remainder of the chapter I elaborate on these points by showing how
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the strengths and weaknesses in Peronism1 s populist-nationalism were 
reflected in the regime’s class orientation and its programmatic 
direction.
Corporatism
In considering Peronism's class orientation, as distinct 
from its actual class base, it should be noted that the regime's 
populist-nationalist doctrine was heavily influenced by and contained 
a significant dosage of corporatism. Peronist doctrine is most use­
fully conceived as populist because it proclaimed its legitimacy as 
resting on the popular sectors while it also legitimized the state's 
role in terms of promoting their interests. At the same time Peronist 
doctrine can best be described as nationalist because it justified pro­
moting the interests of the working class and the poor in nationalist 
terms. It also stressed "the people" as the embodiment of the 
nation as the ideological reason for their being the source of legiti­
macy. It is in drawing such a close correspondence between "the people" 
as a whole and "the nation," rather than connecting the popular sec­
tors principally to class criteria, that Peronist populist-nationalism 
can be seen within a corporatist framework.
Certainly Peron articulated the classic corporatist position 
in his views on the proper function of the state as being above particu­
lar interests and acting as a neutral arbiter between them in enacting 
policies expressing the general interests of society over those of its 
narrow constituent segments. In particular Peron's views to the effect 
that the interests of capital and labor are not necessarily contradictory 
and that the state can and should mediate between them in formulating
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a balanced economic program, conform to the corporatist paradigm. In
/  /this Peron was influenced by the ideas of Jose Figuerola who had come
to Argentina from his native Spain in 1930 after having served in the
Ministry of Labor under the dictatorship of Miguel Primo de Rivera.
Figuerola published a book outlining concepts of state-labor 
relations which served ap a model for Peron*s ̂ labor ideology.
The work, La colaboraclon social en Hispanoamerica, stressed 
the role of the state as mediator between capital and labor, the 
necessity of transcending "class conflict" and replacing it with 
social collaboration, and finally, of integrating non-political 
union organizations into the state structure.1
Significantly, it was Jose^Figuerola who was largely responsi­
ble for reorganizing the Labor Department into the Secretariat of 
Labor and Welfare when Peron took it over.
However, if he had corporatist aspirations for his regime,
/Peron was unable to translate them into reality. From a corporatist 
point of view, the political practice of the Peronist government was, 
at best, ineffectual. Though he may well have been guided by a cor­
poratist ideal in his outlook on class relations, the fact that his 
regime was firmly based on the popular sectors and on the working class 
in particular, made it politically impossible to achieve a corporatist 
model. Indeed, in the sense of succeeding at "balancing" the interests
of capital and labor, contemporary Northern European social democracies
2can be considered to have come closer to the corporatist model.
David Tamarin, "The Argentine Labor Movement in an Age of 
Transition, 1930-45," Ph.D. dissertation (University of Washington, 1977), 
pp. 294-5. See K. H. Silvert, ''The Costs of Anti-Nationalism: Argentina," 
in his Expectant Peoples; Nationalism and Development (N.Y .: Random 
House, 1963), for a general discussion of Peron's corporatist tendencies.
2 . . .See Lee Panitch, The Development of Corporatism in Liberal
Democracies" in Philippe C. Schmitter and Gerhard Lehmbriich, eds.,
Trends Toward Corporatist Intermediation (Beverly Hills: Sage Publica­
tions, 1979).
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It is the actual role of the working class that differentiates 
Peronism from Getulio Vargas' Estado Novo, which can more properly be 
seen as an instance of corporatism. The Estado Novo kept a tight rein 
on the Brazilian working class. Though not in fact organs of the state, 
the syndicates enjoyed little actual autonomy. By contrast, though 
the Peronist regime sought to control the unions, especially through 
the appointment of the top officials, Argentine unions had enjoyed a 
strong institutional life prior to Peronism. Indeed, the Peronist gov­
ernment openly recognized the CGT's role as the mediator between the 
workers and the political authorities. Because Peronism was never able 
to come close to corporatism in its actual political practice, it is 
more useful to conceptualize it as an example of populist-nationalism.
Peronism1s Class Perspective
Justicialism came close to corporatism because Peron's deep- 
seated aversion to the divisiveness of social turmoil led him to make 
the pursuit of social harmony over class struggle an all-encompassing 
aim of the regime. The importance Peron attached to defusing the 
impetus toward revolution is evident in the speech he gave at the 
Military College on August 7, 1945. There he stated that just as the 
French Revolution had ended aristocratic government, the Russian Revolu­
tion had put an end to government by the bourgeoisie and ushered in the 
era of the popular masses in government. "This is a fact the Army must 
accept and place itself within this evolution. This is fatal. If we 
do not make a peaceful revolution, the people will make a violent one." 
This does not imply becoming a Communist, he continues, but it does mean 
placing oneself within the stream of world evolution
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for to resist it is like swimming against the current; it 
won't take long to drown. And the solution to this problem 
is to be found in bringing social justice to the masses. This 
is the remedy which in suppressing the cause also suppresses 
the effects. One must organize the popular formations and 
have sufficient force to maintain the equilibrium of the state.
Thus, to prevent a violent revolution, the redistribution of
wealth was necessary and it could be accomplished in only one way:
taking from those who have much in order to give to those 
who have too little. Undoubtedly this will arouse the reaction 
and resistance of those gentlemen who are their own worst enemies 
because for not wanting to give up 30 percent, they will lose it 
all in a few years or a few months, and on top of that, their 
necks as well.*
Peronist doctrine viewed the state as the chief instrument in
promoting class harmony over class struggle. In one of his more famous
✓statements on the subject, given in his May Day speech of 1944, Peron 
approvingly quoted this maxim as providing the guiding beacon to his 
efforts: "We seek to suppress class struggle,replacing it with just 
agreement between workers and employers, under the sheltering justice 
that emanates from the state." The state was to act as equilibrator 
. and arbiter in reconciling the interests of capital and labor which, 
without its intervention, would lead to conflict. Instead of basing 
itself on the conflicting interests of capital and labor like those pro­
moting class struggle, the Peronist state sought to undercut these 
efforts by the purveyors of "foreign ideologies" by building on the
common ground shared by workers, employers, and the state, including 
3their nationalism. Thus their harmonious interaction would be
1 2Peyrou and Villanueva, pp. 206-8. Ibid., p. 252.
3 sThese themes appear repeatedly throughout Peron's statements.
For example, those of May 1 and August 12, 1944 and March 23, 1949 
cited in Ibid., pp. 252-3, 254-5, and 258 respectively.
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heightened through the campaign to free Argentina from the domination 
of foreign interests and their allies.
As the last chapter noted, in a conjunctural situation where the 
local entrepreneurial class is very weak and industrial capitalism 
a largely foreign phenomenon, it does not appear contradictory to main­
tain that the evils of capitalism will disappear through economic devel­
opment guided by the state and managed by the national bourgeoisie.
Being a continuation of the populist-nationalist critique that gained 
momentum in the "infamous decade," Peronism traced the primary cause 
of Argentina's problem to the Anglo-oligarchic connection. This struck 
a responsive chord among groups whose interests had been held in check 
by the oligarchic policies of the prior decade, including the workers 
as well as significant sectors of the national bourgeoisie. The 
resentment against restrictions growing out of the pro-British economic 
policies of the 1930's oligarchic regime and the fear of potentially 
disastrous consequences from competing with the major foreign suppliers 
of manufactured goods (the U.K. and the U.S.), also account for the 
tolerance of Peronism's pro-Axis sympathies on the part of a large 
number of industrialists.
Because the Socialist and Communist parties levelled most of
their criticism against the regime's foreign policy, Peron's pro-Axis
sympathies also helped him to win workers away from them. Pro-Allied
activists had a definite upper class coloration reminiscent of the
✓groups in power before Peron. Take for example an account quoted by 
Eldon Kenworthy of the March of the Constitution and Liberty held in 
Buenos Aires on September 19, 1945. The account is by Juan Jose^ Real 
who represented the Argentine Communist Party on the Junta de Coordina-
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cion Democratica, the coalition of forces opposing Peron.
In the "March," I soon saw myself surrounded by figures that 
brought back memories of September 6, 1930, of the infamous 
decade, of the frauds Present were the most extreme repre­
sentatives of conservatism, of the foreign banks, of the 
Sociedad Rural. I didn’t see my class, the workers, except 
for a scant number of communist militants. Barrio Norte 
(the upper class section of Buenos Aires) applauded us from 
the balconies, while in the service entrances maids stared 
at us with rancor, with hate. Put off by the sight, I said^ 
to a comrade, "Those applaud us because they are afraid Peron 
will take their lands." I said it spontaneously without 
realizing the full thrust of my words.1
In using the state as an instrument to combat divisiveness and 
social turmoil and promote class harmony, Peron1s aim was to achieve 
profound social change without class struggle. He sought to improve 
conditions for workers while also providing profits for capitalists—  
a program which, if realizable, was naturally congenial to all concerned. 
Indeed, in the conjuncture of 1) an internationally favorable situation 
for the Argentine economy during World War II and the immediate post­
war years and 2) a situation internally in which the traditionally 
dominant groups were in disarray because of intensified contradictions 
resulting from their readjustments to the world crisis, the Peronist 
program was realizable. But this program was opposed by the oligarchy 
and even by the organized expressions of the industrial bourgeoisie 
who were in a sense, as Peron noted, acting against their own self- 
interest. Hence, the basic thesis that emerges from this analysis is 
that the Peronist state acted as a substitute for a weak and non-self- 
conscious national bourgeoisie implementing a program serving their 
interests on their behalf.
^Eldon G. Kenworthy, "The Formation of the Peronist Coalition," 
Ph.D. dissertation, (Yale University, 1970), p. 210.
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If Peronist policies basically amounted to implementing the 
interests of the national bourgeoisie on their behalf, what then about 
Peronism*s claim to be fundamentally centered on the interests of 
the working class? As Peron put it, nothing is more important than 
that "work and the worker constitutes the means and the end for 
Justicialist humanism."^ Not only did the regime dramatically improve 
the living conditions for workers, but labor was invested with a sense 
of dignity and pride that it had never enjoyed before or since. Not 
only did workers experience an uplifting of their material circumstances 
but they could also honestly feel that they were the cornerstone of 
"the new Argentina." Thus they could look around and see the creation 
of a whole new educational system catering to their needs and culminat­
ing in the opening up to their children of the previously inaccessible 
and hallowed preserve of the middle class, the National University.
And the new system would turn out, in Peron's words, "engineers and
technicians who would not, as before, speak a strange language, but
2would be the sons of our own people." Perhaps the most dramatic 
illustration of Peron's intention to elevate the prestige of workers 
was, as he put it, the fact that "the President of the Nation himself 
has accepted with honor the title of 'First Worker.'" And if he chose 
to call himself a worker, others would feel themselves privileged to 
do likewise.
A doctor would consider it an honor to call himself a 
scientific worker, as would schoolteachers or writers to call 
themselves cultural workers, and there are thousands of 
children throughout the country today who dream of becoming 
qualified workers, technicians, teachers, tractor drivers, etc.
'*'Peron, FilosofiTa peronista, p. 236. ^Ibid.
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And it will no longer be true, as it was in the oligarchic 
epoch, that everyone from the President of the Republic on down, 
would try to become anything but a worker.^
Instead of being an insult, the status of being a worker would become
a mark of distinction. Additionally, the Argentine proletariat had
its champion in Peron's wife,Evita,whose inilitantly pro-working class
orientation was much more extreme and clear-cut. While Peron attempted
to forge a multi-class alliance behind his regime, Evita's sole concern
was to solidify the regime's base among the popular masses and the
organized working class.
Doesn't all this contradict the thesis of the Peronist state
as a functional instrumentality of the national bourgeoisie? In a
fundamental sense, yes, but not in the immediate conjuncture within
which the Peronist state came to power. In the first place,it must
be remembered that the purpose for which Peronism undertook class
mobilization was not to promote, but rather to undermine class struggle.
Paradoxically, in order to initiate a program beneficial to the
interests of the national bourgeoisie against the opposition of the
traditionally dominant groups, Peron needed to mobilize the urban
proletariat. As Secretary of Labor and Social Welfare, Peron promulgated
his pro-working class reforms because he needed the workers as a base
of support. On June 17, 1944 he made the following appeal:
The Secretariat of Labor cannot function without your being 
well organized. What is more: the Secretariat of Labor will 
some day in the future need you to defend it since it will 
be you who will be left to your own resources and the injustices 
that have always prevailed, if you cannot preserve the existence 
of the Secretariat of Labor and Social Welfare with your own 
efforts.^
1 2 Filosoffa peronista. Peyrou and Villanueva, p. 262.
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Peron was therefore caught in a contradiction which did not
become immediately apparent because it was obscured by the conjuncture
✓of favorable external and internal factors. Peron promoted the workers' 
interests because he needed their force to offset that of his enemies. 
Though his aim was a social balance which would enable the state to 
mediate between social forces in bringing about a just equilibrium, to 
achieve this he had to encourage the workers to organize, to be mili­
tant up to a certain extent, and to express their class unity. In 
other words, he needed a controlled degree of class struggle as politi­
cal pressure behind policies that would give workers a material stake
in the system in order to undermine the causes for class struggle.
✓It will be recalled that Peron encouraged workers to organize
in order to erode the influence of the Left within the working class.
Though the state obviously played the key part in organizing workers,
Peron was not prompted by corporatism as much as by the fear of the
Left and the susceptibility of unorganized workers to spontaneous
violence. As Peron saw it:
We are not state syndicalists, or corporatists, or any of these 
strange things: we are only men who want united and well-led 
unions, because unorganized masses are always the most dangerous 
for the state as well as for themselves. An unorganized working 
class mass, such as some people want, is an easy prey for exotic 
political and ideological conceptions. Those who unite for 
bread and butter issues must be supported and defended by the 
state, but those unions that pursue political or ideological 
ends must be pushed outside of the law.
To win the workers' trust and cement this newly found loyalty to the 
regime, Peron had to provide tangible material benefits for the members 
of unions that supported him, as well as improving conditions for the
Statement of November 17, 1944 in Peyrou and Villanueva, pp. 269-
70.
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working class in general. However, because of the bitter opposition 
from his adversaries, in order to provide these benefits, Peron had to 
promote a certain degree of class struggle. The equation of "class 
unity and militancy equals improved material conditions for workers" 
posed a contradiction to Peron*s aim of class conciliation and harmony 
which could be and was obscured in the favorable conjuncture. But, 
as we shall see, it surfaced when circumstances arose that adversely 
affected the working class' standard of living. It was this contra­
diction, and Peron* s hesitancy in confronting it, stemming from his 
populist-nationalist orientation, that was involved in. the chain of 
events that ultimately resulted in his overthrow in 1955. On August 10 
of 1944 he had said: "the decrees we have dictated from the Secretariat 
of Labor make every backward step impossible. You can be completely 
assured that in order to suppress what we have achieved for the working 
class, it will be necessary to fundamentally alter the institutional 
organization of the s t a t e . H o w  prophetic these words proved to be!
Though the working class constituted Peronism*s most solid
foundation and though Peron delivered unprecedented gains for the
urban proletariat, it is nevertheless important to keep in mind that 
*Peron viewed the working class from a populist-nationalist, and not 
a Marxist, perspective. Thus he did not view workers as the harbingers 
of the new society and the troops that would bring it about. Of 
course Peron did not shrink from using the working class as a political 
force, but only as a countervailing power and not as the social force 
that would sweep away all others. Moreover, whereas Marxists draw
Peyrou and Vi-llanueva, p. 269.
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sharp distinctions between working class and bourgeoisie in terms of 
their relationship to the means of production, Justicialism also pro­
claimed itself to be based on the workers but defined them in a way 
that obscured distinctions, particularly between industrial workers 
and smaller scale entrepreneurs. In the Justicialist lexicon a 
worker was anyone who performed "a useful social function." Useful 
social function was itself broadly defined to include just about any 
work, including that which Marxists would consider unproductive labor. 
For example, though they create no surplus value through their labor,
merchants would be considered "workers" in the Peronist view.
/
Peron1S conception of the working class and his relationship 
to it in practice reflect his own class position, indeed, in that it 
was based on the proletarianized masses with its leadership being pro­
vided by upper and middle class sectors excluded from the former 
ruling coalition, Peronism illustrates the strengths and weaknesses 
in populist-nationalism. Its strengths came from the fact that it 
corresponded to the conjuncture of internal and external factors and 
thus provided a realistic and viable approach in that context. In 
addition, while it was based on the proletariat, it was also a multi­
class phenomenon and therefore possessed the potential for a broadly 
based mobilization. Peron and Evita— the marriage between the middle 
and proletarian sectors— symbolized this aspect of populist-nationalism1s 
strength.
Important consequences.followed from this populist-nationalist 
orientation toward the workers. Walter Little provides a good summation 
of the points raised above:
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Although the popular support which the Peronist regime enjoyed 
was largely working class in character, its leaders showed 
little more than rhetorical enthusiasm for the pursuit of strictly 
working class interests. On the contrary, they repeatedly subor­
dinated them to what they believed to be the interests of the 
nation as a whole. There is nothing very surprising about this.
It is a reflection of the fact that they were drawn for the / 
most part from among middle-class stratae, never became declasse, 
and remained dependent throughout their exercise of power upon ^
the tacit acquiescence of important business and military interests.
This rejection of class struggle in Peronist doctrine and its 
corresponding emphasis on class cooperation was reflected in the regime's 
policies. The basic lack of a class analysis prevented Peronism from 
developing a revolutionary approach to the problems it confronted.
Herein lay its major weakness. The populist-nationalist rejection of 
class struggle and the promotion of manufacture without altering 
relations of production, made Peronism an essentially bourgeois doc­
trine. Moreover, despite its strong nationalism and anti-imperialism, 
Peronism in power remained a reformist regime, an outgrowth of socio­
economic currents and accumulated grievances that found fertile ground
2in the favorable circumstances prevailing during the forties.
Summing up, Peronism's populist-nationalist doctrine sheds 
light on its impressive successes during the first half of its rule, 
and also on the post-1950 weaknesses leading to its overthrow. Peronism 
achieved an unprecedented mass mobilization based on the alliance of
Walter Little, "The Popular Origins of Peronism" in Argentina 
in the Twentieth Century (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 
1975) edited by David Rocl^ p. 162.
2 ✓David Tamarin points out that even "Peron's labor programs of 
1943-5 accomplished the reformist platform that labor had drafted during 
the thirties." "The Argentine Labor Movement in an Age of Transition, 
1930-45," Ph.D. dissertation : (University of Washington, 1977), p. 316.
My emphasis. In general, Tamarin's thesis about basic continuity con­
curs with that developed here.
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classes and social groups in a crusade against the oligarchic 
minority and its British and other foreign partners In contra­
distinction to Marxism, Peronism rejected class struggle and preached 
class conciliation and cooperation under.a common national interest. 
Even the oligarchy was not principally attacked by Peron for its class 
position and privilege, as much as for its dishonorable subservience 
to foreign interests. In its use of a doctrine which openly called 
for the alliance of the working class and the industrial bourgeoisie 
in the joint venture of national development under the guidance of the 
patriotic armed forces, Peronism1 s efforts were aided by the inter­
national economic trends prevalent at the time, which provided the 
material conditions that made this alliance feasible. However, this 
class alliance aspect also accounted in great part for the demise of 
Peronism as a viable socio-economic alternative for Argentina,once the 
external conditions were no longer so favorable.
In retrospect it is easy to see the validity of the Marxist 
position that a movement for national liberation devoid of class 
struggle loses its revolutionary potential. For the Marxist, economic 
independence is the first step toward a socialist economy, while for 
Peron it was the final step necessary to the achievement of national 
prestige and power, a necessary antidote to the humiliation of foreign 
exploitation. In his study Julio Mafud concludes that Peronism con­
tributed mightily to the Argentine tragedy by providing the masses with 
a social consciousness without giving them a doctrine for social change.
*This point is made by Bertram Silverman in his "Labor and 
Left Fascism: A Case Study of Peronist Labor Policy," Ph.D. disserta­
tion (Columbia University, 1967), p. 107.
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Its great achievement was to integrate the masses into political life. 
Its great shortcoming was its failure to overhaul Argentina's social 
and economic structures when it seemed to possess the power to do so. 
"If Peronism comes back into power it must initiate structural 
changes." And he added prophetically, "if it does not, it will 
remain trapped in the bourgeois-capitalist framework"^ and hence be 
rendered impotent to deal with the problems arising within capitalist 
structures.
To this point I have focused my concerns on the context that 
made Peronism a viable response and on its doctrine and orientation.
In the process I raised the major themes of the analysis in a prelim­
inary way. I now propose to trace these in more detail by examining 
the relationships with the groups the regime sought to benefit, the 
actual impact of its policies, and the attitudes of the major actors 
towards the regime.
Peronism and the Class Context: The Regime's 
Programmatic Intent and Its Impact 
Distribution of Income
The coup mounted by the G.O.U.^ in 1943 took place amidst a 
mounting crisis resulting from the conservative regime's inability to 
contain processes it had set in motion during "the infamous decade."
^Julio Mafud, Sociologia del peronismo (Buenos Aires:
Editorial Americalee, 1972),,p. 171.
2Grupo de Oficiales Unidos, a lodge of nationalistic Army 
officers with pro-Axis sympathies, of which Peron formed a part. The 
Axis sympathies resulted in part from the influence of German military 
thought and training within the Argentine Army. More important, in 
my view, was the anti-British component of Argentine nationalism which 
featured so prominently in the populist-nationalist polemics of the 
period.
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On the one hand, conservative policies had promoted a certain degree 
of industrialization in an attempt to salvage externally oriented 
growth on a modified basis, but had also contained and subordinated 
this industrialization by allowing British imports to compete with 
Argentine goods as called for in the Roca-Runciman Pact. Peronist 
policies responded to the increased clamor for more national industry 
which resulted from this contradiction. On the other hand, more manu­
facturing in the thirties brought about an expanding labor force along 
with the regime’s suppression and postponement of workers' demands. As 
the decade progressed, the number of strikes and strikers grew, with the 
year before the G.O. U. coup marking the high point of workers' com- 
bativity measured in number of strikes. Significantly, only ten percent 
of these strikes in 1942 were won.^ It was here that Peron found the 
reservoir of disaffection that he molded into his power base.
The Peronist program did not however, emerge full blown in 
June of 1943; nor did the military team which seized power possess any­
thing resembling a worked out and detailed platform. The immediate moti­
vation for the officers involved was to prevent the succession of a pro- 
British Conservative candidate to the presidency. The G.O.U. voiced 
strong nationalist sentiments, were sympathetic to national industrialists 
and disliked the Anglo-oriented rural based ruling class. In an atmos­
phere of distrust and contempt of the Argentine masses toward the gov­
ernment, their first priority was to win a measure of trust for the new 
regime. Thus, among its first measures, the regime decreed a prohibition 
of rent increases until further.notice and the prices for articles essen-
"*■866 Murmis and Portantiero, pp. 87-91.
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/tial to daily survival, including food, were fixed. Indeed, Peron's
activities when he took over the Departamento Nacional de Trabajo in
keeping the cost of living frozen and, when possible, even lowering it,
were not only tolerated but, at first, were carried out with the full
knowledge and approval of the other senior members of the junta. 
sPeron was able to expand his working class base of support so 
rapidly because his efforts went beyond rhetoric and, as Table 9 shows, 
achieved an almost immediate impact in improving material conditions 
for workers.
TABLE 9,—  Employment and real wage rates for Buenos Aires (1929=100)







~SOURCEdnvestigaciones sociales, 1943/54, pp. 61 and 258. From 
Murmis and Portantiero, p. 105.
When the Peronist propaganda machine said "Peron cumple!" (Peron 
delivers!), for the workers this was not an empty slogan. Their 
improved conditions were all the more dramatic contrasted to the 
thirties when the urban proletariat had been the sector bearing the 
heaviest burden in the accumulation of capital. During the 1943-55 
years, on the other hand, wages and salaries’ share in the distribution 
of the national income rose, as Table 10 clearly indicates.
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TABLE 10.--Wages and salaries as a percent Qf national income 
Year Wages and Salaries Other Year Wages and Salaries Other
1943 44.1 55.9 1949 56.1 43.9
1944 44.8 55.2 1950 56.7 43.3
1945 45.9 54.1 1951 52.8 47.2
1946 45.2 54.8 1952 56.9 43.1
1947 46.6 53.4 1953 54.6 45.4
1948 50.2 49.8 1954 56.4 , 43.6
SOURCE: Presidencia de la Nacion, Producto e ingreso de la
Republica Argentina (Buenos Aires, 1955). Cited by Bertram Silverman, 
"Labor Ideology and Economic Development in the Peronist Epoch" in 
Studies in Comparative International Development 4. 11 (1968-9); p. 243. 
From Cafiero,
Table 11 shows that in considering the longer frame of 1935 to 1960, 
the distribution of income towards the workers reached a high point 
around the midway mark of the Peronist period.
TABLE 11.— Distribution of net internal income









SOURCES: "Producto e ingreso de la Republica Argentine en el 
periodo 1935/54" and Boletiui Estadistico del Banco Central. Cafiero, p. 128.
*Includes personal and managerial contributions to retirement funds. 
**Includes estimated replacement costs for consumption of capital.
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Clearly the Peronist period represents a departure in that labor's 
share in the distribution of income was significantly higher than 
that it commanded before 1943 and after 1955. The figures also show 
the highest increase in wage income occurring in the 1945^-50 stretch, 
with the high point being reached in 1949-50.
The Capitalists 
It is important to note that while industrial capitalists' 
share of income distribution decreased relative to that of workers, 
their absolute earnings did not fall. On the contrary, like wage 
earners, managerial personnel (assuming this category to be generally 
reflective of industrial capitalists) also experienced a rise in their 
incomes during the Peronist years, as can be seen in Table 12.
TABLE 12.— Index of managerial and rentier income during Peronist 
years (1943=100)
Year Managerial Rentier Year Managerial Rentier
1944 118.9 107.8 1950 170.3 53.1
1946 126.5 100.6 1952 113.2 34.7
1948 170.2 64.6 1954 115.2 34.9
SOURCE: Panorama de la economia argentina (November 1957), p. 119 
Adapted from Silverman, p. 244.
As far as workers and capitalists were concerned, the Peronist period 
represents a situation in which both sectors' slice of the pie in­
creased because the pie as a whole got bigger, the pie being the 
expanding output of the industry. However, the slice of the pie 
going to the financial interests seems to have decreased, if the 
declining income for rentiers shown in Table 12 can be considered 
representative of this sector.
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Responding to the new government's positive orientation to 
industry and, indeed, to the obviously improved business climate, the 
Union Industrial Argentina's (UIA-r-the organization representing manu­
facturing interests) initial relationship with Peron was quite cordial 
and favorable. Not only did the UIA appreciate policies which 
increased industrial activity, its members specifically approved of 
the Colonel's anti-communism and his emphasis on solidifying harmonious 
relationships between capital and labor. On "Industry Day" of 1944 
the UIA's president, Luis Colombo, proclaimed:
We therefore understand the concerns of the Vice President of 
the Nation, Colonel Juan D. Peron, who as Secretary of Labor and 
Social Welfare attempts to resolve the problems of Argentine 
industry, just as he collaborated in the solution of the problem 
of apprenticeship of minors and is now doing with that of pensions 
and retirement funds, with the aim of ironing out difficulties 
without upsetting the public order and within the realm of the 
economically feasible; because it would be of little comfort to 
those who would benefit, if.these benefits were built on a 
foundation of sand.*
It was on these two grounds— the concern for order in the labor 
process and redistributive measures confined within what is thought to 
be economically reasonable— that the relations between Peron and the 
UIA deteriorated. The fallout between the UIA and Peron dates to the 
end of 1944/beginning of 1945 and arose basically over the UIA's unhap­
piness with the regime which it perceived to be fomenting labor unrest 
and the breakdown of industrial discipline. The UIA's publication, 
Revista de la UIA of January 1945 (dated December 21) bemoaned "the 
breakdown of discipline that necessarily accompanies the ever more 
prevalent use of certain terminology that portrays the bosses in a
^Cited by Dardo Cuneo, Compbrtamiento y crisis de la clase 
empresaria (Buenos Aires: Editorial Pleamar, 1967), p. 170. My
translation.
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position of power and every agreement, not a just accord, but a 
'conquest,* which if necessary, the workers would defend by force.
What is involved is the use of words and concepts poorly assimilated, 
similar to those used by the old socialist organizers during the first 
phase of trade unionism."*
As 1945 progressed, increasing uneasiness and opposition was 
manifested by the industrial bourgeoisie over the redistributive 
measures coming out of the Labor Secretariat, The April 1945 issue of 
the Revista de la UIA, referring to paid holidays, contributions to 
pension funds and more vacation time, found that these "indirect redis­
tributive measures are the most troublesome because they cannot be
modified as easily as wages, even though circumstances may make it
2imperative to do so." There was also opposition to minimum wages and
equal pay for men and women. On the latter issue, the March 1945 issue
of the Revista de la UIA saw "a theoretical principle involved which,
under the guise of improving women’s economic conditions, actually
achieves the opposite by making the employment of women more difficult
3compared to that of men."
1 /• 'Cuneo, p. 175. As reflected in this section, Cuneo provides a
very useful compendium of citations from the organs of the major inter­
est groups, as well as organizing these into a cohesive and comprehensive 
analytical framework.
For another good source covering the conflict between Peron and 
the employers over his redistributive measures, particularly on the em­
ployers' fear of the danger of labor insubordination and lack of disci­
pline as well as their opposition to workers' participation in the 
profits of firms, see Argentine Republic, Cronica mensual de la Secre- 
taria de Trabajo y Prevision; ano 2, no. 15-6 (July-August 1945), 
especially pp. 47-50. In general, the Cronica is a useful source for 
tracing how Peron wooed the workers and how the Peron-employer relation­
ship developed over time.
^Cuneo, p. 176. ^Ibid., p. 177.
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In spite of the fact that they too benefited, bourgeois 
sectors resented Peron1s redistributive policies because, regardless 
of the actual magnitude, they felt threatened by the comparative 
ascent of proletarian sectors. Traditional distinctions in standards 
of living were being eroded and the regime seemed to encourage "the 
working classes1' to have pride; the latter, for their part, were 
getting "uppity" and haughty, actually demanding to be treated with 
dignity and respect. For these reasons, although it. had initially 
declined to do so, the UIA joined the opposition to Peron spearheaded 
by the financial interests represented by the Bolsa de Comercio de 
Buenos Aires (Chamber of Commerce)— a group even more pro-British than 
the UIA, and much more oriented to the interests that had thrived under 
the externally oriented growth pattern.^- The coalition centered around 
the Bolsa first came together to resist Peron1s compulsory holiday bonus 
decreed in December of 1945. Later it became an important component in 
the block of forces behind the Union Democratica— the coalition of all 
parties, including the Conservatives, Radicales, Socialists and Commu­
nists, facing Peron in the 1946 elections.
October 17 and the February Elections:
Clash between the Classes
/
Peron’s redistributive measures during 1944 and going into 1945 
thus aroused resentments among bourgeois sectors. Indeed, he was per­
*Commenting favorably on the proceedings leading to the Roca- 
Runciman Pact, the Memoria de la Bolsa de Comercio de Buenos Aires of 
1933 assigned to British capital the role of being "the greatest accel­
erator of our progress, and hence arriving at an agreement reaffirming 
the mutual interests of both - countries is considered imperative to safe­
guard the bases of Anglo-Argentine trade." Found in Cuneo, p. 233.
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ceived as having gone too far even by his junta colleagues. Of 
particular concern to them was Peron's effectiveness in building a 
working class base which could potentially enable him to exercise 
power independently of the force of arms and thus free him of having 
to rely on the army's consent. For these reasons he was forced to 
resign his various positions and placed under arrest in 1945. But 
not for long.
/News of Peron1s arrest naturally caused apprehension among 
union members that the unprecedented gains and recognition they had re 
ceived from Peron would now be reversed. Their national organization, 
the Confederation General del Trabaj o (CGT), decided to call for a 
general strike on October 18 to drive home their demand for a govern­
ment sympathetic and responsive to labor. However, some union leaders 
like Cipriano Reyes, who had been direct beneficiaries of Peron's 
interventions as Secretary of Labor and who were closer to the rank 
and file, were instrumental in mobilizing them. By noon on the 17th
of October, thousands upon thousands of them had taken to the streets
*
converging on the Plaza de Mayo in front of the Presidential Palace, 
demanding Peron's release in the largest mass demonstration Argentina 
had ever seen.* The spontaneity and magnitude of the demonstration 
caught the army off guard. The sea of humanity concentrated before 
the Casa Rosada kept growing ever larger and more ominous. They had 
been chanting incessantly for Peron for more than half a day and they
^One of the best accounts, conveying the electricity of the 
events, is that of Felix Luhaih El 45 (Buenos Aires: Editorial Sud- 
americana, 1973), pp. 272-99. See also Hugo Gambini, El 17 de octubre 
(Buenos Aires: Centro Editor, 1971).
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showed no signs of leaving before being reassured by Peron's physical 
presence and words that their beloved leader was safe and sound, and 
back in power. The junta gave in. They really had very little choice: 
the alternative was a bloodbath, of vast proportions. Peron was not 
worth that. He might be dangerous and he might be flirting with forces 
that could get out of control, but he was still one of theirs.
October 17 proved to be the turning point for Peron's fottunes.
A hastily thrown together Partido Laborista (Labor Party), organized 
by some of the same trade unionists active in the mobilization of the 
17th of October, was able to parlay the massive support shown for 
Peron into a decisive electoral victory in February of 1946. What 
made this triumph all the more remarkable was that contrary to the 
image of Peron the totalitarian, controlling all the media and bludgeon­
ing his opposition with a massive propaganda campaign, in fact he had 
to face a well organized and powerfully financed array of forces. Felix 
Luna for example, points out that the space dedicated by the two major 
so called independent dailies, La Nacion and La Prensa, to coverage of 
the activities of the Union Democratica contrasted with those of the 
Peronist front, was in the order of 90 percent to 10 percent. The 
latter tended to concentrate on scandals within Peronist ranks and on 
desertions. Peron1s name seemed to be scrupulously avoided and he was 
referred to as "the retired military personage active in politics" or 
"the candidate of forces recently created."1
An interesting aspect of the electoral campaign was Peron's 
skill in turning to his advantage the clumsy efforts orchestrated by 
Spruille Braden-— the ex-U.S. Ambassador very active and closely identi-
^elix Luna, p. 439.
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/  /fiedwith the coalition opposing Peron— to smear Peron as a Nazi.
Peron relied on the nationalist and anti-imperialist sentiments of the 
Argentine masses. In his last speeches he no longer bothered to refer 
to Tamborini and the Union Democratica. Instead he hinted that sinis­
ter plans were afoot between Braden and the oligarchy which would turn 
back the clock to undo Argentina's independence from foreign influences 
and roll back gains for the workers. He ended with the slogan that 
spread like wildfire: "It’s Braden or Peron."
The results of the 1946 elections, one of the most free and 
open in the country's history, gave Peron a solid 54 percent majority 
thereby decisively establishing both the strength and depth of the 
regime's social support, and the legitimacy for its rule. In the 
smaller towns a coalition of small property owners and lower income 
groups rallied to Peron and in the big cities the solidity of the 
industrial working class' support gave him the votes needed to carry 
the large urban concentrations.'*' The bourgeois sectors which had been
See Peter Smith, "The Social Base of Peronism," in the Hispanic 
American Historical Review 52 (feb. 1972): 56-68. This article also pro­
vides a strong empirical case for rejecting the notion held for so many 
years that Peron derived his major support from a "new working class" 
of recent immigrants from the countryside not integrated into the tradi­
tional left groupings of the "old working class." Smith shows that 
Peron's most solid and loyal support came from industrial workers con­
centrated in large unionized factories. E. Spencer Wellhofer, "Peronism 
in Argentina: the Social Base of the First Regime, 1946-55," Journal of 
Developing Areas 11 (1977): 335-56, generally confirms Peter Smith's 
findings. See also Walter Little, "Electoral Aspects of Peronism, 1946- 
54," Journal of International Studies and World Affairs 15 (1973): 267-84.
Apparently Peronism retained its ability, unique among popular 
political movements, of obtaining massive electoral support from both 
industrial working class areas as well as the poorest rural regions.
See Manuel Mora y Araujo and Peter H. Smith, "Peronism and Economic Dev­
elopment: the 1973 Election" in Frederick G. Turner and Jos^ Enrique 
Miguens (eds.), Juan Perdii and the Reshaping of Argentina (Pittsburgh: 
University of Pittsburgh, 1983), p. 174. -In analyzing electoral results 
by departamentos (the equivalent of counties), Mora y Araujo and Smith 
found a strong relationship between higher Peronist vote and less devel­
oped, economically and socially backward, poor, and less urban areas.
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/at the heart of the coalition opposing Peron in the elections, accepted
the decisiveness of the election results and did not overtly attack
the regime until the fifties. The Bolsa de Comercio for example, whose
✓President not many months before had characterized Peron s regime as 
totalitarian and issued a call to join in the battle of "democracy 
against totalitarianism, of the respect for the dignity and rights of 
human beings and against the absorption of the individual and his goods 
by the state,"1 now endorsed and urged support for the government's First 
Five Year Plan (FFYP). The Bolsa de Comercio de Buenos Aires' Memoria 
for 1946, in defining the FFYP as a series of measures aimed at 
"bettering the worker's standard of living and at the same time digni­
fying him with the undeniably worthy pursuit of his social welfare,"
,2went so far as to call on the ruling classes patriotic duty to facili­
tate the execution of the plan in every way compatible with the respect 
and defense of their legitimate interests, since great benefits are to
3be hoped for from this coordinating and harmonizing action."
The Workers
A somewhat complex picture emerges of Peron's views on the 
proper role to be played by the major actors in Argentina's class 
structure and of his actual relationships to them. At first his con­
cern was probably the pragmatic one of achieving some stability for the
, 1Quoted in the Revista de la UIA of January 1946, cited by 
Cuneo, p. 225.
2The text speaks of "clases dirigentes" and "fuerzas vivas."
The former has no direct English equivalent and the latter can be 




new regime by providing it with civilian support. His position as 
Secretary of Labor and Social Welfare gave him the opportunity of 
gaining some working class friends. Very early this must have inter­
twined with his personal ambitions,and he used his advantageous posi­
tion to build his own constituency. In terms of Peron’s views on the 
proper nature of class relations, he probably believed what he espoused 
officially. He probably saw himself as implementing what Justicialist
doctrine called for, deviating only to the extent that political exi-
✓gencies required. Peron described his initial pro-labor measures as 
necessary to balance out past inequities. Social justice was need as 
an antidote to prior policies which always sided with business and 
deprived workers of the just rewards for their labor. These rectify­
ing measures were not conceived as contradicting the Justicialist aim 
of forging a multi-class alliance around the common project of building 
up national industry for national needs. ' Each sector was to contribute 
that share for which it was best suited, and receive, in turn, the fruits
to which it was justly entitled. Therefore, bourgeois opposition to 
✓ ,Peron's redistributive measures before 1946, probably drove him to estab- 
lishmuch closer links to the workers than he would have preferred 
under calmer circumstances.
Peron had effectively countered the opposition to his rule 
with the massive backing he obtained from the urban proletariat and 
he had, in fact, relied upon his working class base for his political 
survival. His remarkable success rested on his ability to deliver 
tangible material benefits from his post as the Secretary of Labor and 
Social Welfare. Now that he had neutralized his bourgeois opposition 
and was therefore in a better position to do so, it was time to consoli­
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date his political ascent by improving the material conditions for 
workers even more. In this way he forged the link between his politi­
cal future and the fortunes of the working class. Indeed, not only 
did the working class provide Peron’§ most solid bulwark and reliable 
ally, it was also the only sector that remained loyal to him throughout 
his long career. The workers never wavered in their personal allegiance 
to Peron— though there were times when their enthusiasm was not so 
intense— because they saw him as a friend who had concretely demonstrated 
his willingness to pursue their interests, and because they understood 
that whatever rhetoric might be employed— whether democracy versus dic­
tatorship or freedom versus fascism— a basic motivation underlying the 
opposition was to reverse the working class’ material gains achieved 
under Peronism. Reduced real wages and declining living standards after 
Peron's overthrow confirmed what Argentine workers had feared all along 
and reaffirmed their loyalty to the man who had stood by them when he 
was in power. Realistically, there was no political alternative to 
Peronism for the workers.
The persistence of Peronism within the Argentine working class 
must be traced to the 1945-50 period. It is important to keep in mind 
that the relationship between Peron and the workers was not merely one 
between charismatic leader and masses; the persistence of Peronism had 
a material foundation. Even the Wall Street Journal of February 23, 1945 
("Argentine Appraisal") characterized Argentine in glowing terms as the 
best fed country in the world. Clothing was abundant, housing adequate, 
transportation good, and prices low.
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Looking at the trend in the distribution of income displayed
on Table 11* it will be recalled'that the working class' proportional
2share peaked in the 1945-50 period, the percentage of wages in the 
distribution of net internal income being more or less constant from 
1935 to 1945 (around 46 percent), then rising to 60.9 percent by 1950, 
and declining to 50 percent by 1959. Table 13 confirms this trend.
TABLE 13.— Real wage index (1943=100)
1939 100 1946 112 1953 135 1960 120
1940 97 1947 140 1954 153 1961 130
1941 97 1948 173 .1955 140 1962 127
1942 97 1949 181 1956 164 1963 126
1943 100 1950 173 1957 134 1964 131
1944 111 1951 145 1958 148
1945 106 1952 135 1959 119
SOURCES: Gilbert W. Merckx, "Sectoral Clashes and Political Change:
The Argentine Experience." Latin American Research Review 4 (Pall 1969): 
97. He uses tables which subsequently appeared in Carlos Diaz Alejandro 
Essays on the Argentine Economy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979), 
p. 538, for 1939-50 and Clarence Zuvekas, Jr., "Economic Growth and In­
come Distribution in Post-war Argentina," Inter-American Economic Affairs 
20. (Winter 1966), p. 28 for 1950-64. Taken from Kenneth P. Erickson, 
"Populism and Political Control of the Working Class in Brazil," Pro­
ceedings of the Pacific Coast Council on Latin American Studies 4 (1975): 
122.
On page 186above. Since the source's concern is to justify 
Peronist policies, these figures are undoubtedly on the high side. How­
ever, though the magnitudes involved can be disputed, most authorities 
agree that the trend these figures show is accurate.
2Table 10 on page 186 had shown that the highest single jump of 
wages and salaries as a percentage of national income occurred from 
1948 to 1949, from 50.2 percent to 56.1 percent.
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The trend that emerges so sharply from the figures in Table 13 
verifies an important aspect of this analysis of Peronism. The real 
wage index in Table 13 represents the most accurate indicator available 
of working class living standards. We can thus be relatively certain 
that the working class saw its material conditions rise steeply from 
1945 to 1950. After 1950, these conditions levelled off somewhat but 
were still considerably higher than before Peron came to power.
Table 13 establishes another key hypothesis in this interpreta­
tion of Peronism. The data shows that after 1955, with the exception 
of 1956 and 1958, the working class suffered a severe setback in its 
living standards. This confirms the point to be made in Chapter 6 
covering the stage of dependent capitalist industrialization that took 
place in the decade after Peron's ouster: that the workers as a class 
paid a heavy price in the consolidation of the new pattern. ̂
Indeed, the regimes of the sixties, and especially that of 
General Ongania as will be seen in Chapter 6, enacted an exact reversal 
of Peronist incomes policy. Whereas Peron used governmental policy to 
raise the working class' living standards, in the sixties the effort
was to combat inflation by containing wages. Whether intentionally or 
/not, Peron's lasting contribution was the elevation of the labor move­
ment to the center stage of national politics. As we saw, Peron en­
couraged workers to politicize income distribution, to refuse to abide
Erickson, the source for Table 13, also provides real wage indexes 
for Brazil and Mexico. These show'substantially the same relationship 
to workers' living standards during the populist periods in those 
countries-— Vargas and Goulartregimes in Brazil and Cardenas' in Mexico—  
and the reversal of this relationship for the period of capitalist con­
solidation which followed. The same trend as in the Argentina case 




by market forces. Few items on the political agenda plagued Peron1s 
successors after 1955— or indeed Peron himself in 1973—74, as we 
shall see~as much as the question of equitable wages and salaries.* 
Another reason for the persistence of Peronism within the 
working class which also goes back to the 1945-50 period, lies in the
history of the relationships between the national federation of labor—
/ /the Confederacion General del Trabajo (CGT)— and Peron: the tremendous
impact he had on its growth and its elevation into a major factor in 
national politics. It will be recalled that labor had been severely 
burdened by the process of capital accumulation of the thirties. Miguel 
Murmis and Juan Carlos Portantiero in their study on the role of the 
workers' movement in the origins of Peronism, while not denying the 
existence of diverse sectors within the working class, note that the 
very severity of the impact of capital accumulation in the thirties 
on industrial workers was a factor leading to homogeneity, unifying 
rather than exacerbating such differences as those between the more re­
cent internal immigrants and the older proletariat of European ori- 
2gins. Murmis and Portantiero's chief point is that the containment 
and postponement of labor's demands in the thirties— a period when 
industrial output and employment were on the rise while labor's share 
of the national income declined— provided Peron with ready-made material 
that he could parlay into winning support for the fledgling regime by 
addressing some of the backlog of grievances. Labor leaders for their 
part, were more than eager to make up for lost time.
*Gary W. Wynia makes'this point. See his "Workers and Wages: 
Argentine Labor and the Incomes Policy Problem" in Turner and Miguens, 
p. 33.
^Murmis and Portantiero, p. 76.
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Declining strike activity in relation to lowering number of
strikes won provides a good indication of the unfavorable climate the
unions were forced to operate in as the thirties progressed to the
coup of 1943. According to official tabulations 34 percent of those
out on strike in 1935 won a victory, while this was true for 27 percent
in 1940, and for only 10 percent two years later. Not surprisingly,
attendance at union meetings fell by some 27 percent between 1939 and
1942.  ̂ These conditions had a negative impact on unionization itself.
According to Eldon Kenworthy,
Between 1936 and 1941, the industrial work force grew at an 
average annual rate of 6 percent, while union membership 
climbed at a rate of 4 percent. Between 1941 and 1945, a lag 
is still apparent. Industrial workers increase some 8 percent 
per year, while the figure for unionization is 5 percent. In 
fact, knowledge of what transpired in these years makes it al­
most certain that the increase in union membership registered 
for 1941-45 was confined to the years 1944-45, when Peron actively 
encouraged the process. Attendance at union meetings, for in­
stance, which declines steadily throughout the late thirties, 
reaches its nadir in 1943, from which it suddenly jumps.
Kenworth concludes that "in relative— perhaps even in absolute— terms,
unionization lost ground until Peron captured the process in late 1943
2and this in a period of full employment and stagnant wages!"
Using official sources, Kenworthy presents figures that show 
the dramatic reversal effected by Peron in the short span from 1943 to 
1945 when he was most directly concerned with labor policies, 
as shown in Tables 14 and 15 on the next page. With Peron's personal 
blessings and support, the CGT experienced an astronomical growth 
rate during the first half of the Peronist decade. Its
^Cited by Eldon G. Kenworthy in his "The Formation of the 
Peronist Coalition," Ph.D. dissertation (Yale University, 1970), 150.
2Ibid., pp. 149-50.
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numbers jumped from 528,523 unionized workers in 1945, to a million 
and a half by 1947, thereby almost tripling its membership; and then 
again doubling it to some three million unionized workers by 1951.*
TABLE 14.—  Yearly indicators of union activity, 1942-45
Change in Number of Workers Striking Attendance at
Union Meetings
1943 over 1942 down 83% down 58%
1944 over 1943 up 35% up 85%
1945 over 1944 up 384% up 87%
SOURCES: Argentine Government, Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad 
Social, Direccion General de Estudios e Investigaciones, Conflictos del 
trabajo. Buenos Aires: 1961 and 1965; Argentine Government, Direccidn 
de Estadxsticas Sociales. Investigaciones sociales 1943-45. Buenos 
Aires, 1946. From Kenworthy, p. 162.
Table 15 displays the impact on labor struggles of Peronist intervention.
TABLE 15.— Official tabulations of who wins strikes
Percentage of strikers involved in outcome classified as:
Victory Compromise Victory Pending
for Strikers for Management
1942 10.3 82.8 6.1 .9
1945 95 .2 4.8 0
SOURCES: Argentine Government, Ministerio del Interior, Departamento 
Nacional del Trabajo, Division de Estadxstica. Estadxstica de las 
huelgas. Buenos Aires, 1940, 1947; Argentine Government, Ministerio del 
Interior, Departamento Nacional del Trabajo, Division de Estadxstica. 
Investigaciones sociales, 1940, and 1943-45. Buenos Aires, 1941, 1946. 
From Kenworthy, p. 162.
/The CGT became Peron*s most solid and reliable institutional 
base of support and the only one that remained loyal to him throughout. 
However, though at times it'came close, the CGT never became a mere
Figures cited by Murmis and Portantiero, p. 79, from official
sources.
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appendage to Peron. In a' detailed study of strikes during the first 
Peronist period, Louise Doyon demonstrates that the greatest incidence 
occured during the 1946-49 years which suggests that the workers sought 
to extend their victory at the polls to the workplace.1 Moreover, 
the most strike prone were those workers who had benefited the most 
from Secretariat of Labor interventions in earlier years, thus dis­
pelling the notion of their being mere rubber stamps of the state 
apparatus. Hence the Doyon data suggest that even those parallel 
unions Peron succeed creating in 1943 and 1944 to counter those led by 
Communists and Socialists who refused to cooperate with him, were not 
docile extensions of his regime. It is well known that Peron had
been most adept at interceding on key issues and providing the bene­
fits that enabled the new leadership to successfully compete for the 
right to represent workers in the given branch. Such leaders as 
Cipriano Reyes of the packinghouse workers, Angel Perelman of the 
metal workers, and Mariano Tedesco of the textile workers played a
/crucial part in the mobilizations of 1945 and 1946 that brought Peron 
firmly into power. Yet it is also clear that Peron did not control 
their actions. All available evidence indicates that the initiative
for the mass mobilization of October 17 came from below and was not
/ 2orchestrated by Peron s immediate coterie.
The workers gravitated to Peron not because they were easily 
manipulable or particularly susceptible to demagogic appeals, but
1Doyon argues that the relative decline of strikes after 1948 
was due to the greater capacity of the Labor Secretariat to mediate 
effectively. It was not as equipped to do so in the earlier period. 
Louise M. Doyon, "Conflictos obreros durante el regimen peronista 
(1946-55)," Desarrollo ecohomico 17 (1977): 460-1.
2See pp. 48-9 above.
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/because they saw that Peron best represented their interests. Ken­
worthy quotes Tedesco as representative of the motivations of this 
group of "young people not fighting for any ideology."
In 1945 people were tired. For years and years in their 
hunger they had been deceived by songs of liberty, but 
liberty begins with economic liberation. I never wasted 
time with (Marx's theory of) surplus value with which the 
Socialists and Communists entertained themselves so much.
I clearly saw that Peron was fixing things and that everybody j 
had more liberty because there was more money in their pockets.
Not only were they attracted by Peron's willingness and ability 
to provide material benefits, they were also reacting to opportunism 
on the left: particularly of the Communists who seemed less concerned 
with defending their interests than in gaining the workers' compliance 
with the Party's international line. A. Lawrence Stickwell illustrates 
this point with a discussion of the history of the Communist-led 
Federacion de Obreros de Industria de Construccion (FVO.I.C.) from 
1943 to 1946. Led by the immensely popular Jose^Peter, the F.O.I.C. 
represented the pivotal working class sector comprised of packinghouse 
workers. This was the sector that with Peron's help was successfully 
wooed by Cipriano Reyes' rival union. In accounting for this case 
where the workers had been so strongly devoted to their leadership but 
nevertheless tolerated the emergence of a rival leadership, Stickwell 
stresses the erosion of the Party's reserves of influence resulting 
from its international line. Peter had asked the workers to suspend 
their job action— he had been rearrested and the workers were striking 
to attempt to secure his release— in the interests of supporting the 
allied war effort. Moreover, he was asking them to subordinate
^From an interview in Primera Plana. Aug. 31, 1965, p. 44.
Cited by Kenworthy, p. 160.
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grievances against their bosses who happened to be Allied owners of 
the packinghouses.
The Communist Party from 1943 . to 1946 thus found itself in the 
contradictory position of defending foreign industrial inter­
ests while claiming to be the'true representatives of the Argen­
tine workers. In early 1943 Peter had called for better rela­
tions between packinghouse workers and management. As reported 
in La Hora, Peter pointed out "the necessity to better relations 
between the workers and management of the frigorificos in order 
to avoid the handiwork of Nazis and saboteurs." To solve the 
problems of Argentina, Peter asserted the need to create the 
"broadest national unity of all political and social sectors."
. . . While Peron actively sought tomeet, at least symbolically, 
the demands of Argentine workers, the Argentine Communists be­
came linked with a broad spectrum of political parties which 
wished to reestablish electoral democracy and put Argentina in 
the Allied camp. Included in these parties were representatives 
of the oligarchy and foreign interests.
The history of the packinghouse workers during this period 
illustrates how aptly Peron used state power, on top of the Communist
Party’s self-imposed limitations and equivocations, to undermine the 
party’s base among the working class. In April of 1945, just six 
months before the massive spontaneous demonstration that brought 
Peron firmly back into power, the Cipriano Reyes group called a general 
strike over some dismissals. The government intervened and ordered the 
plants to take back all workers with the promise that it would pay the 
salaries of up to 12,6000 workers for three months if it proved econ­
omically unfeasible for the companies to do so. Pay the government
did, to the tune of 10 million pesos, probably using foreign exchange
2reserves the Argentine state had accumulated during World War II.
^A. Lawrence Stickwell, "Peronist Politics in Labor, 1943" in 
New Perspectives on Modern Argentina edited by Alberto Ciria (Blooming­
ton: Indiana University, Latin American Studies Program, 1972), p. 42.
2See the account in.Peter H. Smith’s Politics and Beef in 
Argentina: Patterns of Conflict'and Change (N.Y.: Columbia University 
Press, 1969), p. 238.
205
Peron. succeeded not only in undermining the influence of 
Communist and Socialist leaders in specific unions, he was also able 
to capture or replace the top leadership of the CGT. In early 1947 Pe­
ron appointed Aurelio Hernandez, a man with no strong opinions or inde­
pendent base, to replace Luis F. Gay who had been elected Secretary 
General of the CGT in November of 1946. Not long after he too was 
replaced by the even more docile Jose Espejo>who had been the janitor 
in the building in which Eva Duarte and Juan Peron had resided in 1944- 
45. This process culminated in 1950 when an extraordinary Congress of
the CGT was convened and the organization's statutes were modified to
/adhere officially to Justicialism as its doctrine and to Peron as Chief 
of the Movement.
Though there is no question that Peron controlled the top levels
of the CGT's hierarchy, it would be a mistake to conclude that the
CGT was thereby transformed into a mere extension of Peron, an appendage
of the Peronist state, or as Alberto Ciria puts it, into an agency for
"state trade-unionism" ("sindicalismo de Estado").'*' Peron controlled
the top but he did not thereby destroy the autonomy and independent
initiative exercised by the CGT's rank and file. Indeed, as was 
2pointed out, Peronist doctrine approved of independent initiative from 
below. The independence of the working class and the fact that Peronism 
never extinguished initiative from the CGT's broad base, distinguishes 
the Argentine from the Brazilian case of populism.
^Alberto Ciria, "Peronism and Political Structures, 1945-55" 
in Ciria, p. 11.
2See pp. 162-6 above.
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Certainly to fail to recognize the long history of autonomy and 
independent initiative on the part of Argentine workers would lead to 
an inability to understand and place in their proper context many of 
the most crucial events in the last thirty-five years of Argentine his­
tory. Juan Carlos Torre for example, notes a strong parallel between 
the Peronist period of the forties and that of the seventies in regard 
to working class militance. The highest level of labor conflict— de­
fined by the greatest number of strikes and work stoppages— during the
J
populist decade took place between 1946 and 1949, right after Peron was
confirmed and legitimized at the polls. The same pattern occurred in
the seventies after Peron*s election. Torre concludes that the workers
sought to duplicate their political victory in the electoral arena
with an economic victory at the workplace.*- One thing is certain: if 
/Peron controlled the unions, that did not mean a docile working class. 
Whether on their own initiative or encouraged by the regime, the workers 
did not pursue their interests with passivity.
The Partido Peronista provides another example of the Peronist 
practice of combining control at the top levels with relative freedom 
and democracy at the lower levels. Its predecessor, the Partido Labor- 
ista which had been hastily thrown together just four months before the 
February 1946 elections, nevertheless achieved an impressive victory 
only to be dissolved and replaced by the Partido Peronista shortly after 
the elections. Peron disbanded the Partido Laborista because inspite 
of offering Cipriano Reyes official posts and honors in.exchange for 
dissolving the party and urging its union affiliates to give their first
*Juan Carlos Torre,"The Meaning of Current Workers' Struggles," 
Latin American Perspectives 1 (Fall 1974), p. 74.
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allegiance to Peron, the top leadership refused and insisted on main­
taining the party’s independence as the legitimate arm of the working 
class' aspirations.1 Even though the Partido Peronista was set up to 
counter this autonomous trend in the.working class' top leadership, it 
nevertheless encouraged a good deal of freedom of initiative from its 
own base. Though it was a hierarchical organization with. Peron at its 
summit, its two basic units— the unidades basicas gremiales made up of 
trade unionists in the same occupational category and the unidades 
basicas ordinarias— elected their leaders by direct vote of the member­
ship .
Workers, Capitalists, and the State 
In his efforts to undercut the influence of the revolutionary 
left within the working class, Peron understood quite correctly that he 
had to eliminate the potential for revolutionary upheavals by using the 
state as an instrument to give excluded sectors a material stake, inte­
grate them into the system, and thus achieve a greater social balance.
/Peron s stiffest opposition came from upper sectors who perceived his
pro-labor policies to be directly opposed to their interests. As we have 
/seen, Peron countered this opposition by basing his regime on an even 
closer identification with the lower sectors. Hence, even if Peron had 
wanted to control the working class by exercising a rigid hold from top 
to bottom of the trade union structure, he could not because he depended 
on impetus and initiative from below to make himself a credible inter­
mediary. He needed the thrust from below to show the traditionally 
leading groups that he could defuse the threat from the masses.
1For an account see Walter Beveraggi Allende (the Partido Laborista's 
Vice President), El fracasode Peron-y el problems argehtino (Buenos 
Aires: Talleres Gr^ficos'L. J. Rosso, 1956), p. 53.
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In fact, a certain degree of independent initiative from the 
rank and file accorded well with Peron*s conception of his role and 
that of the state as an arbiter above, and independent of,classes and 
social forces, assuring a just and equitable distribution of the 
society's wealth, and thus achieving a harmonious balance. To counter 
the opposition from oligarchic and bourgeois groups while not at 
the same time becoming the expression of an exclusively proletarian 
project, Peron relied on mobilization but only to a point. He needed 
mobilization but he had also to keep it within limits so that it would 
not spill over and upset the social relations associated with an econ­
omic system based on the private property framework. To maintain him­
self independent of his working class base, Peron had to adopt difficult 
and sometime contradictory tactics. He sought on the one hand to pre­
vent open conflict between antagonistic social forces, but on the 
other hand he also benefited from promoting tension between them.
Some analysts have seen Peron*s concern for an equitable dis­
tribution of wealth as subsidiary to, and motivated by, his desire for 
an autonomous state independent of any social attachments. Waldmann 
for example, notes that Peron paid as much attention to the problem of 
an equitable distribution of wealth as he did, because this allowed him 
to anticipate and sidetrack the demand of the masses for more intensive 
participation in the political decision-making process. He thus sub­
stituted their potential pressure for more political power with a greater 
share in the distribution of wealth.. ̂  There is no doubt that Peron 
strongly believed that the.state should not be tied to any particular
^Waldmann, p; 118.
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class or sector. In my view Peron,believed that achieving a just 
distribution of wealth was a proper goal for the state, not simply 
because he was motivated by an opportunistic quest for power, but also 
and more importantly, because he felt that the state's all-consuming 
mission was to bring about national greatness. It could do so only by 
preventing social discord and by promoting the cooperation of all 
legitimate national groups, including capital and labor, in a common 
crusade for national reconstruction. For this reason, because it had 
to be able to lead all sectors and not as an end in itself, the state 
had to be kept free from being tied to any one particular sector of the 
social complex.
The different functions performed by Peron and Evita and their 
corresponding leadership styles, conveniently allowed Peron to pursue 
his contradictory relationship to the masses.*' Evita championed the
cause of the humble and the working class; she was their undisguised
2 /partisan. This allowed Peron to be the statesman, the leader of the
Among others, Waldmann makes this point, p- 141.
2In this regard mention should be made of the enormous efforts 
undertaken by the Fundacion de Ayuda Social which bore Evita's personal 
stamp. It was responsible for thousands of clinics, old age homes, 
orphanages schools, homes, all of the best quality. Evita did not be­
lieve in charity, which she felt was a way for the aristocracy to humil­
iate the poor. In her view she was providing services which all Argen­
tines were rightfully entitled to as full-fledged participants in 
their society. She felt that the poor had as much of a right as the 
rich to enjoy, for example, the best medical care and facilities that 
money could buy. Drab hospital rooms and second-rate equipment were a 
way to humiliate the recipients who had no choice but to rely on public 
facilities. See Marysa Navarro, Evita (Buenos Aires: Corregidor, 1981).
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nation above narrow group interests, and thus able to arbitrate the con­
flicts arising between them. It was Evita1s passionate partisanship 
*which allowed Peron to perform his role while still maintaining the 
loyalty of the descamisados. Evita*s final speech on May Day of 1951 
provides a good example both of her style and the function she per­
formed for Peron.
My dear descamisados. . . be on your guard. The enemy are 
preparing an ambush for us. Stand by Perdn, who stands by you, 
and then we can never be defeated, for we are the real Argentina. 
. . .  We will never again let ourselves be kicked around by the 
traitorous and corrupt oligarchy and their foreign masters.
Woe to them the day they lift a hand against Per^n. For that 
day . . . I will go out into the streets with the workingmen, 
with the women of the people, with the descamidados, and we will 
not leave one stone upon another that is not Peronista.1
Once the policy shifts of the fifties began to dry up the
✓popular enthusiasm for his regime, Peron tried to shore up the eroding 
support of the workers through rhetoric, reverting to Evita*s oratorical 
style. Quoting her directly, he said on May 13, 1953: "The class strug­
gle will end only when one class disappears." The Peronist movement, 
he insisted, would "destroy the oligarchy because in Argentina there 
could only be the class that worked." The fact that Peron was forced 
to interchange his more characteristic conciliatory role for Evita1s 
firebrand militance after her death in 1952, made it even more difficult 
for him to confront the growing problems he had to face in the second 
half of his populist decade.
An occasional lapse into class struggle rhetoric notwithstanding,
✓
Peron sought very hard to avoid being tied to a specific.class or sec-
As quoted by Samuel L. Baily in Labor, Nationalism and Politics 
in Argentina (New Brunswicki New'Jersey: Rutgers University, 1967), 
p. 147.
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tors within classes. This does not however, mean that his regime 
lacked a social base or that the state did not in fact implement a 
social project benefiting definite interests. The Peronist state pur­
sued a program of internally oriented industrialization that rested on 
the interests of the urban proletariat, the medium and small managerial 
groups in industry and commerce, and, to a lesser extent, those of the 
rural middle class and proletariat. Thus the common denominator for 
all these classes, which underlay the possibility for their political 
convergence, was given by the centering of their interests on internal 
development.* In that it attacked the imperialist control and monopoly 
of export commerce and finances, and checked foreign interests at the 
level of imports as well as direct investments, the Peronist program 
met their needs. Protection from foreign competition was essential to 
permit the survival and expansion of new branches of medium and small 
industry that had sprung up at an accelerated pace in the prior period.
However, though the Peronist project certainly benefited their 
✓interests and though Peron sought to center the social base for the re­
gime on a coalition of labor and national capitalists, industrialists 
never played the part in the movement or enjoyed the proximity to the 
state apparatus that labor did. As we saw, this was largely a result 
of their opposition to Peron prior to the 1946 election. This opposi­
tion— centered on the Sociedad Rural Argentina, the Bolsa de Comercio,
/ / .and the Union Industrial Argentina— led Peron to rely, probably more
heavily than he would have liked on working class mobilization. This 
in turn produced an almost revolutionary transformation,of the Argentine
*These points are extrapolated from Jorge, pp. 11-2.
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political system: 56% of the 1946 congressional seats were held by mem­
bers of the working class.* Nine-tenths of the seats in the lower house 
were held by people new to politics^only fourteen had served previously
(12 Radicals and 2 Peronists)— and seventy were held by working class
2people, mostly union leaders.
When the UIA made its peace after Peron’s overwhelming electoral 
victory in 1946, its support for the regime was never as spontaneous and 
enthusiastic as that which came from the CGT. While the UIA accorded 
Peron respect, the CGT gave him love.and adoration. In fact there was 
dissension within the UIA in 1946 between those who favored closer rela­
tions with the government and those who wanted to continue the organiza­
tion’s oppositional stance. Indeed, it was because the UIA could not 
be won over completely that the Consejo General Economico (CGE) was 
founded in December of 1952. In its formation, dissidents from the UIA 
who were closest to the Peronist regime played an important part. In
contrast to the more traditional and British oriented UIA, the CGE with 
/ 3its president Jose Gelbard represented those sectors associated with the 
national bourgeoisie. Less tied to traditional foreign linked entrepre­
neurs, it brought together organizations representing small businessmen 
from the interior and industrialists oriented to the domestic market.
The CGE was also a more democratically structured organization along
^Gilbert Merkx, "Sectoral Clashes and Political Change: The 
Argentine Experience," Latin American Research Review 4 (Fall 1969): p. 92.
2Luna, p. 505.
3As we shall see, Gelbard was responsible for the brief attempt 
at formulating an economic projects seeking to promote the interests of 
the national bourgeoisie when'Peron returned to power in 1973.
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federative lines, with each region and branch of economic activity hav­
ing its own chamber.*
Perhaps it was because the bourgeoisie failed to play a dynamic 
part in developing the productive forces within the Argentine economy, 
that the Peronist government acted'in a surrogate capacity pursuing 
policies which therefore led to a marked tendency towards state capital­
ism. By monopolizing export-import structures and utilizing credit and 
fiscal devices, Peronism succeeded in reorienting capital flow towards 
circuits based on the internal market. The state speeded the expansion 
of the productive forces inherent in pushing internally oriented growth
to its full potential by aiding in the development of the needed infra-
/structure. The proceeds from the Instituto Argentino para la Promocion 
del Intercambio’s (I.A.P.I.)— the state's agency monopolizing export 
trade— operations for example, were used in nationalizing public utili­
ties, expanding the state's merchant marine fleet, purchasing other 
means of transportation, and capital equipment for the state's oil
company (Y.P.F.). The state also played a more direct role in this pro-
2cess via state-owned enterprises. It must be emphasized that this con­
stituted state capitalism rather than a move towards socialism, because 
though the state sector owned significant means of production, there 
was no attempt to alter the relations of production from a private prop­
erty framework. Indeed, the state sector acted to enhance the conditions 
that would give the private sector a. greater return on its capital.
^Cuneo's work, pp. 186-202, contains a good discussion of the CGE. 
2Though this was primarily in military-related.production, it 
was not confined to this area. Thus the nationalization of the railroad 
network and of public utilities.
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The thesis that sees the Peronist regime as an incident of 
state capitalism^ is correct to the extent of the ownership of means 
of production and their use to promote a capitalist relations of pro­
duction and distribution. However,.understood in the sense of the
regime’s class base being restricted to a privileged bureaucratic
2caste within the state apparatus, the state capitalist thesis would 
be incorrect for the Peronist case. The analysis developed in this 
study maintains that the Peronist state tended to be autonomous, that 
it was not specifically tied to, nor was it a mere expression of a par­
ticular class. This view is not, of course, tantamount to asserting 
that the regime lacked a social base or that the regime did not in fact 
represent interests, both in terms of its personnel and its policies.
In terms of social base, I find Eldon Kenworthy’s view of the
Peron government as having rested, at least initially, on a military/
3labor coalition to be essentially correct. In terms of governmental
personnel, these and other interests not usually represented in prior
governments were present throughout the entire structure. For example,
Kenworthy compares the members of a 1942 pre-Peron cabinet with those
of Peron1s first cabinet and finds among the latter but not the former,
labor leaders and industrialists not engaged in the elaboration of
/agricultural goods. In Peron’s cabinet there was also a very signifi-
4cant increase in the members who did not possess an elite background.
^Juan Carlos Esteban argues this position in his. Imperialismo 
y desarrollo economico (Buenos Aires; Merayo Editor, 1972).
2As for example in Leon Trotsky’s analysis of the Soviet instance 
in The Revolution Betrayed.
3See the first part of the section beginning on p. 183 above.
4Kenworthy's Ph.D. dissertation, p. 248.
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The 1946 group apparently contained no members of the 
prestigious Jockey Club or the more exclusive Circulo de 
Armas, while half of the 1942 cabinet are known to have been 
members of one or both. No less novel than union leaders is
the presence in the 1946 cabinet of at least one self-made
industrialist. Previous governments contained;— the precise 
mixture depending on the party in power-— representatives of 
large beef-raisers and wheat growers, and those associated 
with the processing and trade of these products. . . .
Totally missing in 1942, and in all previous cabinets
to my knowledge, are men like Rolando Lagomarsino, a medical 
school drop-out who built up his own company, manufacturing 
hats and other products.
Kenworthy underlines the difference between the two cabinets, noting 
that though Peron's Minister of Agriculture was a landowner and 
member of the Sociedad Rural like his predecessors, he was also "a 
president of a chemical concern and Under-secretary of Industry and 
Commerce."1
In discussing whether the interests of industrialists were 
represented within Peron1s government, Kenworthy makes a very useful 
distinction between "old" and "new" industrialists. The former refers 
to those engaged in activities related to the agro-exporting sector, the 
quintessential example being the meatpacking plants. The latter involves 
the import substituting sector oriented to domestic consumption and 
often depending on protective barriers and other governmental assistance 
against foreign competition. Within this type one can make a further 
distinction between those lighter industries which first came into 
existence, more labor intensive and with a lower organic composition 
of capital, such as textiles and foodstuffs, and the newer, heavier
Kenworthy, pp. 250-1.
2Eldon G. Kenworthy, "Did the 'New Industrialists' Play a 
Significant Role in the Formation’of the Peronist Coalition, 1943-6?" 
in Ciria, p. 27.
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industries with a higher organic composition, such as metallurgy. This
distinction hecomes very important further on when the analysis turns
to the dual, contradictory nature of the industrial development taking
place during this period.
The "new industrialists" certainly benefited from Peronist
policies and their interests were well represented within the regime.
Their personnel occupied the key economic policy making positions. For
example, as Kenworthy points out, Miguel Miranda was the "economic czar"
behind the changes in early 1946, among which were the nationalization
of the Central Bank and the creation of I.A.P.I. He was also the major
influence in the formulation and administration of the First Five Year
Plan (FFYP). "Once an employee of a typical ’old1 firm, Bunge y Born,
Miranda had struck out on his own in tin- and chrome-plating and in
the related field of canned f o o d s . M i r a n d a  personified the "new
industrialist," a self-made captain of industry of manufacturing plants
in the import substituting sector "which had grown under the protective
2shadow of the Depression and the Second World War."
Though it is tempting to identify the regime's industry pro­
moting policies with Miranda and Lagomarsino, Kenworthy correctly notes
3that these policies actually predate them. Miranda and Lagomarsino
✓were not even associated with Peron prior to 1945; in fact, Miranda
4was one of the UIA's anti-Peronist leaders before 1945. "The evidence
1 °Kenworthy, p. 17. '‘'Ibid., p. 16.
3He cites the expansion of industrial credits on August 23, 1944, 
the integral industrial promotion law of June 1944, the establishment 
of the Industrial Credit Bank in April, and in July of 1944, the crea­
tion of the Secretariat of Industry and Commerce. Ibid., p. 18.
4Ibid.
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suggests, then, that the adhesion of any significant group of industri­
alists, new or old, to Peron's Army-labor coalition came only after the
triumph of the coalition was a fait accompli. As a group the new
/industrialists did not play an important role in bringing Peron to
p o w e r . B y  contrast, as we have seen, labor did play a very important
role, first in saving Peron from his erstwhile military comrades and
then in reinforcing his hold on power. In ousting Peron from the junta
in 1945, the military was responding to pressures being fomented largely
by landowners and industrialists.
Budgetary allocations are indicative of the changing role of
the military within the Peronist coalition. As Alberto Ciria points
out,^ the military budget allocation for 1945 was five times as high
as that for 1942. On the other hand, once his labor base had secured
him more firmly in power and the industrial bourgeoisie began to be
✓more responsive to his appeals to join in the coalition, Peron pre-
3ferred to rely less heavily on the military as the base for his regime.
The Oligarchy
This survey on the attitudes of classes and sectors within them 
towards the regime, and the regime's relationships with them, would be
* Kenworthy, p. 22. Emphasis in original.
^In his previously cited Peron y el justicialismo, p. 42.
3Waldmann, pp. 162-3, According to Peter Waldmann, the military 
received one half of the state's expenditures in 1945, one third on 1946, 
and only one fifth of the state's expenditures by 1951. On this subject 
Waldmann cites Cafiero, p. 109 and Robert Alexander, The Peron Era (New 
York: Russell and Russell, 1965), jd. 119 and Alain Rouquie, "Adhesion 
militar y control politico del Ejercito en el regimen peronista (1946-55)" 
in Aportes, No. 19 (Jan. 1971), p. 79.
incomplete without a discussion of the landowning oligarchy. There seems 
to be little doubt that during the first half of the Peronist decade, 
the rural sector bore the costs of the industrializing drive. According 
to David Rock, "the weight of the evidence suggests that the sector 
mainly penalized by this.policy was the agricultural producers. E.C.L.A. 
figures suggest a 27% decline in agricultural incomes between 1946 and 
1949."* Though Peronist industrializing efforts represented a basic con­
tinuity with the limited import substituting policies of its predecessors 
Peronism also went far beyond the scope of the latter and indeed funda­
mentally reversed the relationship between the sectors by subordinating
rural production to the requirements for furthering expanded manufac-
✓turing activity. Thus, even though Peron was in a sense merely carrying 
out, albeit in an accentuated manner, policies proposed by members of 
their own class, the oligarchy could not help but be hostile once the 
impact of the Peronist project began to be felt.
It must however be stressed that, though he instituted such
✓measures as the Estatuto del Peon which provided for increased wages 
and better working conditions for the rural proletariat, Peron did not 
directly attack the social relations prevalent in the countryside. He 
did not seek to undo the oligarchy's material base; indeed, as has been 
noted by analysts with differing political perspectives on Peronism, the 
failure to expropriate large landed property may well have been the 
regime's major error.^
-̂Rock, "The Survival of Peronism" in the book edited by him, p. 
189. He also points out that I,A.P.I., the primary Peronist instrument 
for redistributing agriculturally generated surplus, "had been among 
the proposals of the conservative Pinedo Plan of 1940."
2Even Antonio Cafiero,who represents Peronist orthodoxy, seems 
to have grudgingly accepted this conclusion ex post facto; see pp. 441-2.
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Nevertheless, though their material base was not being 
attacked directly, the oligarchy was right to feel threatened by the 
political and social climate introduced by Peronism into the country­
side. The notion gaining currency among peons and rural workers that 
the state represented a higher authority than their boss, and that 
they could appeal to this authority to protect their interests, was 
much more dangerous to the oligarchy's position than the granting of 
wage increases. To the oligarchy, and as we have seen there were 
similar sentiments among the industrial bourgeoisie, the Estatuto del 
Peon was just one more example of a process being set in motion which 
could run out of control.^ For example, the December 1944 issue of the 
Anales de la Sociedad Rural insisted that it could no longer remain si­
lent in the face of public declarations surrounding the Estatuto del 
Peon in which landowners are portrayed as
egotistic and brutal beings who satisfy their inhuman sensual 
needs at the expense of the misery and hardships of those who 
must work for them. . . . Work in the countryside was and re­
mains an extension of the boss' personal intervention. The 
latter frequently joins the peasants in common labor, which 
may lead some to confuse this relationship as one of the 
owner and slave when in reality it comes closer to being that 
between father and sons.
In addition to posing an indirect threat with the potential of a
/breakdown in labor discipline, Peron's active crusade to bring dignity 
and pride to working people, and his use of governmental machinery to 
back them up, seemed to insolently flaunt the traditional rules of the
1-Luna makes these points, pp. 43-4.
o /^Cited by Cuneo, pp. 154-5. My translation.
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political game. It is significant that all groups representing agri-
✓
cultural property owners were united in their opposition to Peron. As 
Peter Smith aptly notes, as long as the rural groups controlled the 
country, they fought among themselves over the distribution of the 
spoils. When however, the whole arrangement seemed to be challenged 
by the urban proletariat, they joined together in a common effort to 
salvage their society,*
The opposition of the landowning interests to the Peronist re­
gime reached a crescendo and peaked by the 1946 elections. Thus, in 
1945, the socially and politically significant annual exhibition spon­
sored by the Sociedad Rural, was used as a political demonstration.
When the Army officers who were to participate in the equestrian events 
came on the field, they were greeted by boos and shouts of Libertad.
By contrast, at the 1946 exhibition, Peron was received as an honored 
guest. Though it did not cease to criticize the regime on interference 
with labor relations, just like the UIA, by 1946 the reconciliation with
the regime had been completed and relations remained officially cordial
2for the duration of the Peronist period.
As we saw, this reversal came about as a result of the vivid
demonstration of the solidity of Peron1s working class base through
street mobilizations and then the resounding victory at the polls. These
pragmatic reasons were undoubtedly facilitated by the fact that although 
sPeron might represent an indirect threat through his disruptive impact 
on labor discipline, he was not a foe of private property, nor, despite
*Smith, p. 258.
2 /On relations between the SRA and the regime, see Cuneo, espec­
ially pp. 159-60, 163-5.
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the militant rhetoric, did he seem intent on expropriating large 
landed estates. Article 38 of the Justicialist Constitution of 1949 
had stated:
It is incumbent on the state to.control the distribution 
and utilization of the land and to intervene with the ob­
jective of developing and increasing its yield in the interest 
of the community, and to secure for each rural worker and for 
his family the possibility of becoming the owner of the land 
which he tills.
The Second Five Year Plan also contained a series of measures along 
these lines, but it was clear that the regime did not consider them 
seriously since it never undertook the mobilization of popular forces 
which their implementation would have necessitated. Indeed, after 1949, 
the regime's hostile stance towards the oligarchy changed and its 
relations with the agro-pastoral exporting interests mellowed consider­
ably. As we shall see, faced with the agricultural crisis of 1951-2, 
rather than moving towards expropriation, Peron chose to allay the 
large landowners' fears.
Some have argued that Peronism's fatal error was its failure 
to expropriate the landowning oligarchy not only because this left its 
major opposition's material base intact, but also, because in failing 
to grasp the closeness of the connection between the oligarchy and the 
industrial bourgeoisie, the regime deprived itself of the only effective 
way of undermining opposition from that source as well. Julio Mafud, 
for instance, argues that Peronism's inability to see that the industrial 
bourgeoisie was the child of the landowning oligarchy led it to the 
futile policy of promoting the growth of industrial capital as a means
^As cited in Silverman's thesis, p. 112.
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of offsetting the oligarchy’s.power.
Peronism did not understand* or understood too late, that there 
can be no national liberation or emancipation from imperialism 
that does not involve the destruction or elimination of the 
landowning oligarchy's socio-economic structure. . . .  It did 
not comprehend that as it promoted industrialization it in­
creased dependency on two sides. On one side, the government 
depended on the landowning oligarchy, owner of almost all 
industrial capital. On the other side it depended on foreign 
imperialist capital if it wanted' to maintain the technical 
rhythm of modern industrial production, as it discovered after 
1950 when it lacked the technical capacity for further develop­
ment.3-
To the extent that Mafud calls attention to Peronism's failure 
to dismantle the social relations that provided the base for Argentina's 
dependency, and in that he portrays industrialization within the private 
enterprise framework as merely replacing one set of dependent foreign- 
national relationships with another dependent set, the above statement 
paraphrases the major thesis developed in this study. However, Mafud's 
analysis diverges from ours in its implication of an almost total iden­
tification of agricultural with industrial capital. Having said this,
I would also add that the more serious mistake is the opposite one. It 
would be even more misleading to adopt the conventional paradigm that 
asserts an inherent conflict between the rural-based landowning elite 
and the urban-based bourgeoisie tied to the development of the factory 
system, assigning the latter a dynamic and progressive role in undoing 
the former's traditional society.
Although the truth lies much closer to Mafud*s interpretation 
than to the latter, both err in that they characterize the Argentine 
industrial bourgeoisie of the period as a more homogeneous entity than
^Mafud, p. 168. My'translation.
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it was in reality. It was composed of diverse sectors with the dom­
inant group in fact being closely linked to the oligarchy and materially 
tied to agro-exporting activities.* There was also however, another 
sector developing within the industrial bourgeoisie with an interest 
in an economy centered on manufacturing activity oriented to the 
domestic market. This is the sector Kenworthy calls the "new industrial­
ists" and which this study refers to as the "national bourgeoisie." It 
was the sector which Peronist policies sought to promote and which indeed 
benefited from them.
Stressing the proximity of the dominant sector within the indus­
trial bourgeoisie with the landowning oligarchy offers an explanation 
for the seeming paradox of the hostility of the industrial bourgeoisie 
towards the regime in spite of its policies favoring the growth of manu­
facturing activity. This proximity was fostered by the landowning oli­
garchy which, as an "open" ruling class not unlike its British counter­
part, maintained its control over newly rising elites through selectively 
incorporating their most dynamic members. This not only deprived the 
emerging industrial bourgeoisie of its most dynamic elements, it also 
led to a lack of an independent orientation since its most successful 
members aspired to oligarchic status and identified with the ruling 
stratum’s values. Dardo Cuneo cites a dramatic illustration in the per­
*In a 1965-6 survey, Cardoso shows a close linkage between 
entrepreneurs and estancierbs, at least as far as attitudes are con­
cerned. When entrepreneurs were asked whether important divergences 
existed between the interests of rural and industrial sectors, 51 
percent of them said "no," with only 21 percent answering affirmatively, 
and another 20 percent saying "sometimes." F.H.. Cardoso, Ideologias 
de la burgues^a industrial emsociedades dependientes (Argentina y 
Brasil) (Buenos Aires: Siglo Veihtiuno Editores, 1972), p. 146.
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son of the founder of the Jockey Club, one of Argentina's most presti­
gious social institutions. Carlos Pellegrini was an industrialist, and 
yet when the Jockey Club honors.its founder with an edition of his 
speeches, not a single one with a pro-^industrializihg theme is included.*" 
Nor was this a one-way street. "Indeed, the aristocracy can he seen 
moving in a symbiotic direction, its members turning their backs on a 
declining rural income in order to parlay social influence into new
wealth through lending their names and connections to business, both
2foreign and domestic."
The close connection between the landowning ruling class and
the industrial bourgeoisie also makes less paradoxical the espousal
of the qualified industrialization program of the thirties on the part
of a regime so closely identified with the oligarchy. Thus it is not
so contradictory that Luis Duhau who was the Minister of "Agriculture
in the Justo Administration and who was a member of the Sociedad Rural,
should have been one of the proponents of that policy. In its defense
he made this revealing statement:
The historic stage of our prodigious growth under the direct 
stimulus of the European economy has finished. . . . After 
writing off the external stimulus, due to the confused and 
disturbing state of the world economy and policy, the country 
should look to itself, to its own resources, for relief from 
its present difficulties.^
Did the oligarchy use its material base to sabotage the Peronist 
regime's efforts to build up the national economy by cutting back on
^Cuneo, p. 278. ^Kenworthy, p. 25.
3Cited by Carlos F. Diaz Alejandro, Essays on the Economic History 
of the Argentine Republic (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970), 
pp. 37-8.
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rural production? There is controversy on this subject and the data do
not clearly support either side of the question. Robert Alexander is
one of those who have argued that Peronism's attack on
the economic and political power' of the rural landowning class . . . 
had a disastrous effect on Argentina's agricultural output.
According to the January, 1956 issue of the Boletin economico 
de America Latina, published by the Economic Commission for 
Latin America, the total amount of land under cultivation in 
Argentina dropped from 21,814,000 hectares in the 1934-38 
period to 17,254,000 in 1955. The amount of land under cul­
tivation in cereals and vegetable oils dropped by 1955 to only 
74.4 percent of what it had been in 1934-38. Some observers 
have argued that the fall in the amount of land in use was 
even greater than these figures would show. ̂
Jorge Fodor, in an excellent analytical article interprets the 
same kind of data in the context of how international economic factors 
impacted upon Argentina and concludes that, far from being wasteful 
and capricious, Peronist policies toward the agricultural sector were 
the most appropriate and rational under the circumstances. He argues 
that what "happened was simply that beef production increased." Citing 
E.C.L.A.*s Economic Survey 1949 (p. 133) he maintains that it increased 
by 24 percent between 1937 and 1947 and that this was largely in re­
sponse to what seemed excellent prospects for beef to gain access to 
the U.S. market in 1946 and become a dollar earner. On the other 
hand, because of the lack of markets, "cereals had to rot or be used 
as fuel. It was estimated that in 1943 alone, 1.7 million tons of 
wheat and 1.5 million tons of linseed had been burnt. (United Nations, 
E.C.L.A., Economic Survey 1949. p. 132)"
Meat exports had, on the contrary, remained comparatively 
stable. These relatively favourable conditions for livestock 
explain why cattle increased at the expense of cereals. This
^Robert J. Alexander, Prophets of the Revolution (New York: 
MacMillan, 1972), p. 253.
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shift also explains what had happened with the land. The 
total decline in cultivated area in Buenos Aires, Cordoba,
Santa Fe, La Pampa, and Entre Rios between 1936-7 and 1946-7 
had increased in these same provinces by 7.4 million heads, 
an addition in land terms of slightly over 8 million addi­
tional hectares. (.United Nations, E.C.L.A., Economic Sur­
vey 1949, p. 133)1
Fodor1s basic point is that cultivated land declined and agri­
cultural production suffered in those areas producing for overseas 
markets and that the government's policies were a rational and appro­
priate response to circumstances and factors over which it had very little 
control. On the other hand, he points out, agricultural production 
geared to the internal market increased dramatically in the Peronist 
years.
With the development of the edible oil industry in Argentina, 
sunflower increased from zero in 1933 to 1.5 million hectares 
in 1948. The area cultivated with industrial crops (sugar 
cane, wine, peanuts, tobacco, yerba mate, and cotton), ex­
panded from a yearly average of 439,000 hectares for 1925-9 
to 1,061,000 hectares in 1945-8.
Table 16 partially confirms Fodor's analysis, showing that, based on
the government's figures, if one takes the yearly average of cattle
slaughtered in the five year period immediately preceding Peron and
compares this figure with the five year period immediately after the
1943 coup, there was a slight drop in beef exports. Of course this does
not necessarily invalidate Fodor's argument, since it is relative and
hinges on perceptions of trends. That is, the foreign demand for wheat
and cereals declined more drastically and the prospects for placing beef
abroad looked relatively good. What is significant about the figures in
*Jorge Fodor, "Peronist Policies for Agricultural Exports 
1946-8; Dogmatism or Commonsense?" in Rock, pp. 154-5.
2Ibid., p. 153.
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Table 16 is that the output of beef did not decrease and that production 
for domestic needs seems to have gone up significantly.
TABLE 16.— Average of cattle annually slaughtered in millions of head 
Period Export Internal Consumption Total
1938-42 2.45 4.79 7.24
1944-48 1.85 5.48* 7.40
SOURCE: Adapted from figures found in Anuario EstadHstico, Tomo I 
(Buenos Aires: Presidencia de la Nacion, Ministerio de Asuntos Tecnicos, 
1948), p. 408.
*Does not include cattle slaughtered for industrial use.
With a growing proportion of its production destined for domestic 
needs, the agricultural sector mirrored the overall impetus of Peronist 
policies promoting an internally oriented growth pattern. Table 17 shows 
this trend: the contrast between the 60 percent of agro-pastoral produc­
tion for foreign markets in 1927 with the 78 percent for domestic consump­
tion in 1955 provides a sharp illustration. Table 17 also corroborates 
my argument that Peronism represents the culmination of a transitional 
process whose trends accelerate after 1930. The figures show that the 
inversion of the proportions destined for foreign and domestic markets 
took place in the 1930-4 period and that the gap between them increasingly 
widened after that.
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TABLE 17.— Proportions of agro-pastoral production destined for external 
and internal consumption
Period Percentage Going to Percentage Destined for








✓SOURCE: E.C.L.A. El desarollo economico argentino. Part II. Los 
sectores de produccion agropecuaria y sus posibilidades de crecimiento. 
Adapted from Juan Carlos Esteban, p. 130.
Overview
The example of the oligarchy illustrates limitations inherent 
in Peronism's class alliance formula. At this point I want to raise 
in a preliminary and theoretical way a key theme that the remainder of 
the analysis seeks to demonstrate: by using the state and popular mobili­
zation as "pressure," choosing to influence class relations through indi­
rect means, rather than restructuring state power on a class basis in 
order to use it in altering existing class relations, Peronism determined 
the nature of the succeeding developmental model.
In accordance with its populist-nationalist doctrine, Peronism 
used the state as an instrument to undercut class struggle, to expand the 
common ground shared by all social sectors by involving them in the cru­
sade to build the new Argentina free from the domination of foreign im-.
/perialists and their vendepatria allies.- As we saw, Peron believed in 
an activist state, but not one tied.to any particular social group, be­
lieving instead that its proper role lay in the forging of the widest 
possible alliance in this common national enterprise. Being committed 
to achieving this objective while preserving the private property frame­
work, he had no intention of tampering with the social relations under­
lying production and indeed was strongly opposed to any such attempt.
For this reason the Peronist state confined its reforms to the sphere 
of circulation, believing a redistribution of wealth to be essential to 
prevent class struggle from spilling over into the sphere of production.
As we saw, the bourgeoisie vehemently disagreed with Peron on this score, 
its perception being that such reforms tended to undermine labor disci­
pline by creating the sense among workers that they could count on the 
state as their ally.
It must be stressed that Peronism1s populist-nationalist program 
of displacing class struggle onto a common effort in the development of 
national capitalism was only possible because of the very favorable con­
ditions for the Argentine economy internationally at that time. Because 
the regime's developmental program was congruent with these conditions, 
it could provide simultaneous benefits to social sectors with antagonistic 
interests in the distribution of surplus value. In this way the regime 
was able to maintain its populist-nationalist base intact and deliver 
the material pay-offs essential for social peace. However, though 
obscured for the time being, contradictions between sectors comprising 
the Peronist coalition remained and, in the end, proved instrumental 
in the 1955 coup. An important factor in the regime's overthrow was the 
fact that it was never able to overcome the distrust felt by the military
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and the bourgeoisie as a result of its identification with the working 
class and popular sectors.
Contradictory Industrialization of the Forties 
Key to populist-nationalism's class alliance formula was the 
provision of higher wages and an improved living standard for the working 
population along with increased profits for industrialists. Peronism's 
developmental program sought to do this with a two-pronged approach:
1) it aimed to expand the domestic market by raising the purchasing power 
of the broad masses through redistributive measures, and 2) it sought to 
encourage local manufacturing through protective tariffs and easy financing^ 
by shifting agriculturally generated surplus toward industry. This program 
was successful in the forties because of its congruence with exceptionally 
favorable circumstances for the Argentine economy.
These external factors were a direct result of wartime conditions. 
The most important were: 1) the relative lack of competition from foreign 
manufacturers which created a gap in the demand for industrial products 
that Argentines could fill, not only in Argentina itself but to an impor-
*0ne of the primary instruments was the Banco de Credito 
Industrial founded in 1944 with the aim of "fomenting national industry." 
According to Cafiero it financed the installation and expansion of more 
than twenty thousand establishments between 1946 and 1951. Its wide- 
ranging activities included supporting many projects and developments 
requiring large scale capital investments with little immediate return 
such as manufacturing railroad cars, rebuilding locomotives, fabrication 
of diesel engines and farm machinery, and so on. Significant to the 
thesis about Peronist industrialization in this section, the Banco de 
Credito Industrial also aided small scale, artisan type enterprises.
As a matter of policy, it benefited proprietors relying on manual tools 
and in many cases financed the.installation of simple auxiliary machines. 
According to Cafiero, the bank approved more than two thousand requests 
for credits of this type during the first months of the program's existence.
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tant degree in other Latin American.countries, and even to some extent 
in the more advanced industrial nations^ and 2) the requisites of war­
time production and the disruption of international trade which affected 
Argentina less in her status as a neutral nation, produced a boom in 
the demand for Argentine agro-pastoral goods.
In contrast to the past, where the oligarchy would have further 
enhanced its position, the Peronist state reaped the benefits of this 
favorable situation because it had moved to monopolize the export 
structures for agricultural commodities. I.A.P.I., which in its initial 
years forced landowners to sell their products at prices below those 
that prevailed on the world market, to be resold by I.A.P.I. under the 
best terms it could secure, reflected both the regime's strength and 
the disdain it felt for the oligarchy during this phase. As a result of 
all these trends, manifested in a record of favorable balance of payments, 
Argentina possessed in 1945 the highest amount of gold, dollars, and 
European currencies in her history. These were used to pay off all past 
debts the Argentine government had contracted and to provide handsome 
compensation for the British railroad system and the North American and
Iperon was able to claim in a speech he gave on December 2, 1944, 
that Argentina's exports of industrial goods for 1943 equalled the value 
of her agricultural exports for that year. Peyrou and Villanueva, p. 285. 
Murmis and Portantiero cite figures from the UIA's Memoria for 1943 
comparing exports in 1939 and 1943. These show that the export of fin­
ished manufactured goods for 1939 amounted to one percent of that year's 
total exports. The corresponding figure for 1943 had risen to 11 percent. 
Semi-elaborated Industrial goods rose from 3 percent of the total in 
1939 to 14 percent by 1943. Similarly, processed primary goods exported 
increased from 32 percent in 1939 to 44 percent of total exports in 1943. 
On the other hand, according to the same source, for the same years, the 
export of primary goods decreased from 64 percent in 1939, to 31 percent 
of the.total for 1943, Another interesting effect of the wartime condi­
tions is revealed by the fact that Latin America absorbed 47 percent of 
these exports in 1943. Murmis and Portantiero, p. 129.
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English owned utilities that were nationalized. Even though these 
measures practically wiped out all the.foreign exchange reserves Argen­
tina accumulated during the wartime boom, these were monumental achieve­
ments which a weaker government would not have dared to undertake. This 
was the context that enabled Peronism to expand manufacturing to the 
point that it replaced agricultural production-as the nation's predomi­
nant form of economic activity. Table 18 shows this expansion of manu­
facturing activity and how its output began to surpass that of the rural 
sector.
TABLE 18.— Contribution to the GDP of the rural and manufacturing sectors 
(at factor cost, current prices in billions of pesos) between 1935 and 1950.
1935 1940 1943 1944 1945 1957 1949 1950
Rural 2.1 2.46 3.04 3.58 3.58 6.27 7.8 9.06
Manuf ac turing 1.21 1.77 3.01 3.71 4.0 7.73 11.84 13.7
SOURCE: Poder Ejecutivo Nacional, Secretar/a de Asuntos Economicos, 
Producto e ingreso de la Rep&blica Argentina en el periodo 1935-54 
(Buenos Aires, 1955). Extrapolated from tables contained in the Statis­
tical Appendix found in Diaz Alejandro.
Though not strictly comparable, the figures in Table 19 nevertheless 
show the continuation and intensification of the trend established in 
Table 18.
TABLE 19.— Contribution to the GDP of the rural and manufacturing sectors 
Cat market prices, current prices in billions of pesos) between 1950 and 
1960
1950 1953 1955 1957 1960
Rural 9.0 23.1 26.1 41,8 152.3
Manufacturing 22,0 39,1 59.5 92,2 336.9
SOURCE: Presidencia de la Nacion, Consejo Nacional de Desarollo, 
Cuentas nacionales de la Republics Argentina (Buenos Aires, 1964), 
pp. 66-7. Extrapolated from tables contained in the Statistical Appen­
dix found in Diaz Alejandro.
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It is noteworthy that the amount of the GDP contributed by the manufac­
turing sector does not surpass that originating in the rural sector un­
til 1944, although the gap between them steadily decreases until that 
point. During the Peronist period, compared to the manufacturing sec­
tor, the rural sector's contribution.remains relatively stagnant. The 
data also suggest that the process set in motion during this period con­
tinued unabated past 1955. Additional data further on shows this to have 
been the case.
This tendency towards the predominance of the industrial sector 
and production for national needs was affecting the countryside itself. 
According to Luis V. Sommi in El plan Prebisch y el destino argentino 
(p. 23) production of cereals and flax dropped 26.1 percent from 1939 to 
1954. However, according to him, this drop was more than offset by the 
increase registered in the cultivation of industrial crops, 72 percent, 
and the harvesting of fruits and vegetables for domestic consumption which 
increased by 82.8 percent.^"
Peronist policies promoting industrial activity clearly achieved 
their intended results. The years between 1945 and 1949 mark the period 
of the most intense industrialization in Argentine history. The Indus­
trial Census of 1946, shows the accelerated expansion in the total num­
ber of industrial plants established. It reveals a progression of approxi­
mately 1,700 new industries per year in the decade of the twenties, 2,800 
per annum in the thirties, and 5,000 new firms per year in the Second World 
War. Another indicator of this accelerated pace of industrialization was 
the expanded output of the manufacturing sector. According to Cafiero 
the volume of physical output from industrial production increased by
^■Cited by Esteban, p. 51.
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almost one third (31%) from 1945 to 1949, while that of agriculture rose 
some 30 percent, construction 17 percent, and that of the service sector, 
which Peronism is often accused of having artificially expanded at the 
cost of productive activities, by only 17 percent.* As a corollary to 
this rapid increase in manufacturing activity, Peronism's social base, 
the industrial working class, continued to expand. According to George 
Blanksten, the industrial labor force rose by almost one third, from 
732,799 workers employed in non-agricultural industries in 1943 to 
955,890 workers in 1949.^
To understand the contradictions within Peronist development one 
must first understand the basic continuity of the Peronist developmental 
model and the ways in which it diverged from the experience of the 
thirties. The type of industrialization that initially took place did 
not basically differ from that of the prior period. In essence, Peronist 
policies promoted an import substituting manufacturing sector. Even 
though the balance of power in the bargaining arena was shifted towards 
labor, pro-labor policies were conceived within a capitalist framework. 
Even the trend of continued expansion of industrial activity represented, 
as we have seen, an element of continuity with the immediate past.
However, this increased scope and intensity of the industrializa­
tion of the Peronist years also produced divergencies from the patterns 
of the past. In one estimate based on data available from Argentine 
government sources, Eprime Eshag and Rosemary Thorp calculate that where­
as the gross national product rose at a rate of three percent during the
*Cafiero, p. 294.
2 'George Blanksten, Peron's Argentina (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1953), p. 255.
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war years, it rose at least ten percent per annum from 1945 to 1948.*
The even greater magnitude of industrialization of the Peronist years, 
added to the already considerable expansion of the thirties, produced a 
situation where quantitative changes led to qualitative changes. In 
other words, contradictions which had already intensified, intensified 
further to the point that they resulted in qualitatively different ones.
To achieve the tremendous rise in manufacturing activity that 
took place, Peronism incorporated an aspect into its policies that diverged 
radically from the oligarchic developmental model. A qualitatively new 
set of relationships emerged from the fact that Peronist strategy for 
industrialization rested on reversing the traditional subordination of 
manufacturing activity to agricultural production. We saw how I.A.P.I. 
represented the institutional embodiment of this reversal.
Peronist policies which undermined the British presence in the 
Argentine economy represent another example of the industrializing drive 
of the forties leading to a qualitatively new set of relationships. In 
Chapter 3 we saw that the policies of the thirties deliberately sought to 
confine industrialization so as not to compete with British interests, as 
exemplified by the Roca-Runciman Pact. Peronism on the other hand, pur­
sued policies designed to dismantle the infrastructure for the British 
presence. Besides the state monopolization of the export of grains and 
cereals (undercutting commercial interests), other such policies included: 
nationalization of British-owned railroads and foreign-owned utility 
companies, development of a state-owned merchant marine with considerable 
tonnage under Argentine flags (previously most trade had been under
*Eprime Eshag and Rosemary Thorp, "Economic and Social Conse­
quences of Orthodox Economic Policies in Argentina in the Post-War Years," 
Bulletin of the Oxford University Institute of Economics and Statistics,
Vol. 27, No, 1 (Feb. 1965), p. 9.
/British flags), creation of the Banco Central de la Republica Argentina 
(there had been a strong foreign influence in the financial sector), and 
Five Year Plans with a priority on industrialization.
Indeed, there was a very close association between breaking out 
of a semi-colonial relationship with the United Kingdom and the promotion 
of industry. As we saw in Chapters 2 and 3, free trade and the exchange 
of agro-pastoral primary goods for British manufactures had provided the 
underpinning for the Anglo-oligarchic connection.* Now, as England's 
influence weakened further as a result of the Second World War, the 
Peronist state moved systematically to dismantle the apparatus of the 
United Kingdom's hegemony. The regime's successful promotion of industry 
was therefore, both cause and effect of Great Britain's deteriorating 
position within the Argentine economy.
Also interwoven with this qualitative shift away from policies 
favoring the British presence, was a third critical qualitative shift 
accentuated by Peronism's quest for economic independence. This was the 
shift away from externally oriented growth towards an internally oriented 
growth model. As national industry expanded benefiting from the regime's 
policies, economic activity came to be increasingly bound up with pro­
viding for an enlarging domestic market.
It is interesting to note here that the debate around the need to 
erect protective tariffs for an infant national industry went back almost 
a hundred years. Cuneo, pp. 44-6, provides fascinating excerpts from a 
congressional debate that took place in 1876 and involved some of Argen­
tina's legendary figures including Vincente Lopez and Carlos Pellegrini. 
For example, he quotes Congressman Miguel Cane: "Today America is no 
more than England's farm; England is the world's workshop." And he adds, 
"I understand that one must begin with protectionism in order to thereby 
arrive at free trade. Bright will be the day when our country can say, 
like Sweden, like Australia: Throw open customs, because it will be as a 
result of protectionism having borne fruit, because industry will have 
developed." (p. 46)
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The considerable expansion of industry therefore involved a 
case of quantitative change resulting in qualitative shifts 1) reversing 
the traditional subordination of industry to agriculture, 2) imposing 
policies diametrically opposed to those which had prevailed favoring 
British interests, and 3) promoting an internally rather than externally 
oriented growth model. However, useful as their distinct conceptualiza­
tion is to analyzing and understanding the process under consideration, 
it is important to keep in mind that these shifts were closely inter­
related: in fact what is involved are three facets of one single process.
To see the shifts towards qualitative impact of contradictions 
inherited from the prior period, it is necessary to look a little more 
closely into the nature of the industrializing process itself. It can 
be characterized as a process of dual, potentially contradictory devel­
opment. Economic planning began in September of 1944 with the creation
/of the Consejo Nacional de Postguerra over which Peron presided. It was 
responsible for formulating the First Five Year Plan (FFYP) which Peron 
presented to Congress on October 21, 1946 and which covered the years 
from 1947 to 1951. The FFYP sought to protect those industries that had 
developed just prior to, and during the World War II years. It was in 
this sector, producing non-durable consumer goods, that a growing national 
bourgeoisie was grounded. With its emphasis on economic independence and 
protective barriers, Peronism promoted the interests of these national 
entrepreneurs. With their relatively less efficient and more labor in­
tensive productive techniques, the regime shielded them from the poten­
tially disastrous competition of foreign suppliers. Clearly the owners 
of businesses in this sector did quite well as indicated by both its 
growing size and increased output. As a result of the FFYP they enjoyed
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very respectable profit margins. According to a 1949 study cited by 
George Blanksten, of 1000 firms participating in the FFYP, 87 of them 
realized profits of over 50 percent, "213 of them reported profits be­
tween 20 and 50 percent, 528 of them relized profits up to 20 percent,
28 broke even, and the remaining 144 suffered losses."*' In this sense 
the FFYP was an effective instrument for providing the material basis 
with which the regime sought to cement an alliance between the working, 
class and national capitalists.
Industrial growth in the thirties had been largely confined to
the light, non-durable consumer goods sector, principally in the area
of textiles and foodstuffs. By widening the domestic market through
its redistributive measures and by consolidating this market for national
producers through its protective measures, especially after the wartime
conditions which had hindered foreign competition began to dissipate,
Peronism further accelerated the expansion of this light consumer goods
producing sector. This was the element of continuity in Peronist indus- 
2trialization. On the other hand, the very expansiveness of this
*Blanksten, pp. 255-6.
2The following sources can be consulted on economic development 
during the Peron period:
Carlos Diaz Alejandro, Essays on the Economic History of the Argen­
tine Republic (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970).
Banco Central de la Republica Argentina, Memoria Anual (1945-1956).
E.C.L.A. (U.N.), Analisis y proyecciones del desarrollo economico. 
Vol. V: El desarrollo de la Argentina (Mexico, 1959). This was Prebisch's 
report.
Aldo Ferrer, La econom^a argentina: Las etapas de su desarrollo y 
problemas actuales (Mexico, D.F.: Fondo de Cultura Economica, 1963).
/ Guido Di Telia and Manuel Zymelman, Las etapas del desarrollo 
economico argentino (Buenos Aires: Editorial Paidds, 1973).
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industrialization also led to the growth of other branches of production 
that had not been so active in the increase of manufacturing activity 
during the prior period. The development of a heavy durable and capital 
goods sector along with the wage goods sector is what this study refers 
to as the dual development of the industrial sector during the Peronist 
period.
Table 20 shows the dual nature of Peronist industrial development 
at the height of the FFYP's achievements.
TABLE 20.— The manufacturing sector in 1948
Branch Percentage of Total Number of Plants
Food Processing 20
Vehicles and Machinery (excluding electrical) 15
Garment 12
Metals (excluding machinery) 12
Subtotal 59
All other branches had less than 10 percent of the total except for 
lumber (12 percent).
SOURCE: The 1948 Industrial Census in Ministerio de Asuntos 
Tecnicos, Anuario estadxstico, tomo III (Buenos Aires, 1949-50), p. 9.
The.picture presented by Table 20 is one of a manufacturing sector cen­
tered on providing non-durable consumer goods for the domestic market with 
important branches producing metals and vehicles and machinery; in other 
words, a light industrial economy with an emerging durable and capital 
goods sector.
The preponderance of the food processing branch within manufactur­
ing emerges from the fact that the same Industrial Census shows it to 
represent almost one quarter (24.3%) of the total value of all products, 
whereas vehicles and machinery represents only 6.2 percent of this
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total, garment 7.6 percent, and metals 8.1 percent, with all four 
branches together accounting for almost half (46.2%) of the total value 
of industrial production. These figures reflect a static view of the 
manufacturing sector in 1948. What about the directions of movement 
taking place within it? What changes in the composition of the industrial 
sector were taking place? What branches were experiencing relatively 
higher growth rates?
It appears that up until 1949 all branches were experiencing 
rapid growth rates. No branch or group of branches was outstripping the 
others to such an extent as to change the nature of the industrial 
sector in any dramatic way. Nevertheless, as might be expected, there 
are indications that the more dynamic, durable and capital goods producing 
branches of industrial activity expanded at a relatively faster pace 
during this period. Consider Tables 21 and 22 which continue to use 
"vehicles and machinery" and "metals" as representative of the durable 
and capital goods sector, while "garment" and "food processing" are 
taken as branches representing the light, non-durable consumer goods 
producing industries.
TABLE 21.— Relative dynamism of selected industrial branches between 
1937-9 and 1946-7
Branch Percent of Increase in Value of
Products and Subproducts 
Produced
Vehicles and Machinery 109




SOURCE: Based on series prepared by Carlos F. Diaz Alejandro, 
"Stages in the Industrialization of Argentina" (Buenos Aires: Instituto 
Torcuato Di Telia, 1966), using data from E.C.L.A., "El desarrollo 
economico de la Argentina," mimeographed version, (Santiago de Chile,
1958) from Jorge, p. 161.
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The data in Table 22 focus on the most intense period of indus­
trialization. They show the relatively faster growth rate of the Peronist 
years. Juan Carlos Esteban presents figures comparing growth rates for 
the period immediately prior to Peronism with those covering the Peronist 
years, which strikingly illustrate the trend under discussion. According 
to him "textiles" registered an annual growth rate of 11.8 percent for 
the 1937-45 period and their comparable figure for the 1945-55 period 
declined to 1.4 percent. Meanwhile, "metals" which had a negative 
annual growth rate of 0.1 percent for 1937-45, showed a positive one of 
9.1 percent for 1945-55.* Thus in its commitment to lift all existing
TABLE 22.— Relative dynamism of industrial branches between 1946 and 1948
Branch Percent of Increase in Value of 
Products and Subproducts 
Produced
Vehicles and Machinery 109
Metals 96
Garment 92
Average of all Branches in Source 60
Food Processing 28
SOURCE: Based on Ministerio de Asuntos Te'cnicos, Anuario 
estadistico, tomo III (Buenos Aires, 1949-50), p. 20.
, P. 19.
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restraints on industrialization, Peronism also further developed basic 
industries. To the extent that it did so, and especially with some of 
the plants run directly by the state, Peronism began to alter the nature 
of the manufacturing sector. Not however, fast enough to prevent this 
dual development from becoming a contradictory one.
The dual development of the industrial sector promoted by the 
FFYP can be characterized as follows: On the one hand, a sector comprised 
of relatively less efficient national industries nurtured behind protec­
tive barriers producing non-durable wage goods and owned and operated by 
a captain of industry type of national entrepreneur and, on the other 
hand, another sector consisting of relatively more modern plants producing 
durable consumer and capital goods using a more advanced technology. The 
latter branches operated under the direction of a managerial staff, many 
of whom already owed their positions to external economic groups and many 
more were later recruited into the orbit of industrial activity -dependent 
on foreign interests. This groups of industrialists represented the core 
of what was to become the "'internationalized’ national bourgeoisie.1,1
The distinction between these industrialists and the captain of 
industry type is important because of their potentially conflicting 
interests. During the period of the FFYP they both provided the bour­
geois base for a nationalist ideology because, though resting on differing 
material foundations, their interests temporarily coincided. However, 
their divergent economic base propelled them to advocate differing and 
conflicting "nationalistic" policies when the conjunction of economic 
forces that could satisfy both sets of interests shifted.
^"Cardoso and Faletto develop this term, pp. 149-50.
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The interests of both of these sectors within the national 
bourgeoisie, and those of North American and continental European capital, 
coincided in that they required the consolidation of the industrial sec­
tor and the expansion of the domestic market. Their interests did not 
conflict initially with the emphasis in Peronist doctrine and policy on 
expanding the national market by raising the acquisitive power of the 
producers, nor even did they disagree with the state's efforts to secure 
the market for domestic manufacturers by dismantling the control of 
foreign groups over the export-import trade. This coincidence was, how­
ever, transitory and limited to the conjunction of circumstances wherein 
the state succeeded in undermining the competing set of foreign and 
domestic interests and in expanding the economic pie. So long as the 
manufacturing sector and the domestic market were weak, the interests 
of the two sectors within the industrial bourgeoisie coincided and an 
alliance with the working class was possible; but as the economic forces 
in the industrial area began to grow within the framework of capitalist 
ownership, the contradiction in their divergent economic foundation be­
came explicit.
Understanding the dual nature of the industrial development that 
took place in the thirties reveals the origins of the contradictions that 
arise from the class structures characterizing the more industrially 
developed Latin American nations today.* The sector which, in Marx's 
terms, operates with a higher organic composition of capital (more 
machinery per unit of labor) is by now almost exclusively owned by
*This section paraphrases arguments developed by Frederick 
Stirton Weaver, "American Underdevelopment: An Interpretive Essay on 
Historical Change," in Latin American Perspectives 3 (Fall 1976), pp.
45-7.
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foreign interests or the state, and produces mostly (durable and capital) 
goods for the upper income consumer market or inputs for making these 
goods. Private domestic capital is confined largely to smaller units, 
operating with a lower organic composition, which produce wage goods.
The competitive market as an allocative and governing mechanism is impor­
tant only for this latter sector, whereas the former thrives on monopoly 
conditions and depends heavily on centralized planning in which the 
state’s policies play a crucial role. "The need for centralized direc­
tion is so strong .that, as already in the case of late nineteenth century 
England, a liberal heritage is a marked drawback; the social and political 
decentralization crucial for economic growth in competitive capitalism is
inappropriate for material advance when the organization of economic life 
2changed."
The fact that the dynamic industries are within the monopolistic 
sector explains to a large extent the unevenness of industrial development 
in Latin America, being characterized by stagnation of relatively low 
overall growth rates. Monopoly capitalism requires strong stimuli from 
extra-market sources and conscious coordination to avoid stagnation and, 
in contrast to competitive capitalism, does not contain the internal dy­
namics that lead to the compulsive drive to expand productive capacity 
and supplant the remnants of previous modes of production.
The duality of the industrial sector goes a long way in accounting 
for the failure of reformism in Latin America and of Peronism in Argentina. 
Given the fact that the modern, technologically sophisticated sector caters 
to the high income market and that there is a tremendous gap in the distri­
^Weaver, pp. 46-7.
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bution of income between the upper and lower strata, it becomes evident 
that Keynesian generalizations about marginal propensities to consume do 
not apply.
Even slight changes in income distribution towards the poorest 
strata alters the composition of demand such that output from 
wage goods firms expand at the expense of profit and employment 
levels in large, modem firms. This shift of demand away from 
the more efficient to the less efficient firms disrupts estab­
lished patterns, reduces average labor productivity and probably 
overall growth, and diminishes the incomes of the most powerful 
portions of the national and foreign industrial bourgeoisie and 
of the best organized segments of the working class . . . With 
the structure of the Latin American industrial sectors— particu­
larly the need for high income markets in poor countries— reform 
politics breaks down under the tremendous weight of its own 
contradictions.^
These contradictions were contained in the forties, but in the fifties 
they underlay the gradual disintegration of the Peronist attempt to pro­
vide for economic liberation and social justice within the framework of 
national-capitalist development.
Given their larger scale of operation, it seems reasonable to 
assume that those branches of industry involved in producing durable con­
sumer and capital goods employ a greater number of workers per plant. 
Given this correlation, the Industrial Census of 1948 provides additional 
confirmation of the dual character of the manufacturing sector of the 
period. It finds that firms with more than 500 employees occupied about 
one quarter of the labor force while the companies which had from 100 to 
500 workers employed another 25 percent of the labor force. Hence, if 
we take the former category to correspond with the heavier, more modem, 
corporate-managerial type, and the latter with small to medium size, cap­
tain of industry type of enterpriese, we again obtain a more or less even 
distribution between the two.
^Weaver, p. 47.
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The juridical status of firms provides another way of concept­
ualizing dual development of manufacturing in the mid to lata forties. 
Generally speaking, the Sociedad Anonima (S.A. or company whose stocks 
are traded on the Stock Exchange) tends to be a large corporation relying 
upon technologically sophisticated— i.e., high organic composition of 
capital— production and or distribution techniques. The other juridical 
forms are more likely to correspond with small to medium size, more 
labor intensive firms, often owner-managed. According to Juan Carlos 
Esteban, citing the Industrial Census for 1948, there was a fairly even 
split between the sector encompassed by the Sociedades Anonimas and all 
other juridical forms. The S.A.s employed approximately 36 percent of 
the labor force and produced about 46 percent of the total value of pro­
duction for 1948. For the same time period, state enterprises employed 
about 8 percent of the workers and absorbed around 7 percent of produc­
tion. Meanwhile, all other juridical forms took in about 56 percent of 
all workers employed but produced only 46 percent of the total value 
of industrial output,^ reflecting their lower levels of labor productivity.
According to Esteban the stocks of 222 S.A.s were traded on the
Exchange in 1947, seven years later, by 1954, their number had only
risen to 275. In the following four years however, by 1959, their number
2had increased to 472. Esteban identifies the activities of the S.A.s 
with the social sector Cardoso and Faletto term the "'internationalizedf 




to indicate that their interests did not conflict with, arid in fact 
were largely incorporated into the industrial complex dominated by for­
eign capital. The trend in the above figures shows that, though the 
process had clearly begun in the Peronist years, the accumulation and 
concentration of capital that gave the sector with a high organic com­
position of capital its preponderant weight within manufacturing, really 
did not gather steam until the late fifties.
Actually, the degree to which capital was concentrated during
the Peronist period is a controversial question. There are those who,
like Eduardo Jorge,* maintain that a low concentration of capital char-
2acterized the Peronist years. Others, like Juan Carlos Esteban argue 
just as strongly that the opposite trend was prevalent: that there was a 
high degree of concentration of capital, and that the process of accumu­
lation was increasing rapidly. It may be that this controversy in itself 
mirrors the dual nature of Peronist development. Neither position 
should be construed to exclude the other. Thus, while the manufacturing 
sector was characterized by a relatively low concentration of capital and 
there were Peronist policies that encouraged this tendency; it is also 
true that the process of concentration was taking place, particularly in 
the more dynamic branches, like the electrical and chemical industries, 
and that other Peronist policies reinforced this trend. To a large 
extent the argument can be resolved as a question of timing and relative 
emphasis. Thus while Peronist policies benefited both industrialists 
based on small, light industry and those connected to larger, more 
efficient facilities producing capital or durable goods, the former group 
was favored more up until 1950 and the latter*s position enjoyed more
1 2Jorge, pp. 169-89. Esteban, for example on p. 107.
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support after 1950. This shift is consistent with the priorities 
spelled out by the two Five Year Plans: the first emphasized protection 
of industries that had developed and expanded as a result of the favorable 
conditions arising from the World War, while the Second Five Year Plan 
emphasized the promotion of the capital goods sector.
Impact of the International Dimension
The policies contained in the FFYP of 1946-51 were officially 
designed to achieve independence from the domination of foreign imperial­
ists over the economy. 'The FFYP’s major concern was to protect industries 
that had sprung up just prior to, and during World War II. Not intending 
to alter the private ownership of capital and land, the FFYP nevertheless 
sought to increase consumer demand by using the state to pressure for 
higher wages. This expanded domestic market was to be satisfied by 
national industry thereby releasing foreign exchange for the purchase of
commodities essential for economic development.
✓Peron once said:
Give me the financial system— banking— , imports, exports, 
the overland and maritime transportation of my country; I'll give 
you the rest and still control the country. . . .
Before we had to pay two and a half million a day in services 
on our foreign debt. Today. . . it no longer exists. The rail­
roads represented two hundred million in services and dividends.
Now they are ours. Today the telephones, gas, port facilities, 
grain elevators, hydroelectric services are in our possession.
All this . . .  in our hands permits us to follow our own economic 
policies to benefit our producers and consumers.*■
The FFYP achieved its aims of increasing the productive output of national
groups and of wresting control of decisive economic levers from foreigners
because these goals accorded with the propitious conditions of the wartime
*Peyrou and Villanueva, p. 245. Statement dated July 13, 1951.
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period. The favorable export market for agro-pastoral goods resulting 
from the wartime conditions, the accompanying forced reduction of imports 
relative to exports which gave Argentina large trade surpluses and finan­
cial reserves, and the lack of competition from foreign producers, enabled 
the Peronist regime to temporarily liquidate Argentina's foreign debt as 
well as to substantially reduce the presence of foreign capital within 
the Argentine economy. As a result, Argentina was among the five nations 
in the world with the least per capita transfer of capital abroad in the 
1947-53 period: $1.16 dollars per inhabitant in contrast to Venezuela's 
$74.85 dollars per capita, Canada’s $20.80, Australia's $18.20 and Japan's 
$0.07 dollars per inhabitant.*
Those successes in the direction of economic independence were
all the more remarkable in the context of pre-Peron Argentina whose
economy Peron justifiably characterized as colonial. In 1940, according
to George Blanksten,
Fifty-five percent of the individual owners of industrial estab­
lishments in Argentina were foreigners, and at least twenty-eight 
percent of the corporate profits made in the country belonged to 
foreign holders. The principal activities in Argentina controlled 
from abroad included railroad transportation, meat packing, the 
production of tires, the development of electric power, assembling 
automobiles, the operation of subways and streetcars, the main­
tenance of telephone systems, and the production of quebracho 
extract, used in tanning leather.^
By contrast, according to Cafiero, during the 1946-55 period the presence
of foreign capital was reduced to the point that it amounted to 5.1 percent
of the nation's capital, foreign investments constituted only 3.1 percent
of all investments made annually, and the service on these capitals and
*From E.C.L.A.'s El desarrollo economico de la Argentina (Appendix 
VII, p. 294) as cited by Esteban, p. 86.
2Blanksten, p. 239.
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investments absorbed a mere 1.5 percent of export earnings (which 
Cafiero says wenat as high as 66.2 percent of export earnings in prior 
years).^
The wartime years also saw the nationalization of foreign-owned 
utility companies: the British-owned Primitiva Gas Company which supplied 
the federal capital, U.S.-owned electric companies supplying power to 
Tucuman, Entre Rios, and Corrientes, the Buenos Aires telephone company, 
a subsidiary of I.T.&T., culminating in the acquisition of the English- 
owned railroad network in February of 1947. Considering the central 
role of the railroads in the United Kingdom’s predominance within the 
Argentine economy, their nationalization represented the high point in 
the Peronist campaign for economic independence. Nevertheless it is im­
portant to note that the Peronist nationalizations were accomplished
through more than adequate compensation. Most sources agree, for example,
2that the railroads were purchased at a price well above their value.
The regime could afford such generous terms because of the reserves that 
had piled up from the favorable wartime trade. "Argentina was . . .  a 
leader in the wartime accumulation of gold and foreign exchange, adding 
$200 million to her reserves in 1944 alone and amassing a total reserve 
by March 1945 of $1.25 billion, or almost one-third of the entire foreign 
exchange holdings of Latin America."
^Cafiero, p. 338.
2According to Ed Daniels, "the British received $300 million above 
the real value." "From Mercantilism to Imperialism: The Argentine case 
(Part 2)," NACLA Newsletter 4 (Oct. 1970), p. 12.
3David Green, The Containment of Latin America: The History of the 
Myths and Realities of the Good Neighbor Policy (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 
1971), p. 239.
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According to Blanksten the railroad deal cost Argentine most of 
the assets she had accumulated in Great Britain. The United Kingdom was 
unable to liquidate the approximately $750 million worth of Argentine 
credits frozen during World War II. After lengthy negotiations the 
Anglo-Argentine agreement signed on February 13, 1947 "provided for the 
expropriation of the railroads in exchange for $600 million of Argentine 
credits already frozen in London."* Not only did the English owners re­
ceive very generous compensation, they also unloaded a progressively less 
profitable venture. The profitability of the railroads had been consis­
tently declining. Before the world economic crisis they paid out 13.3 
million pounds annually in profits between 1925 and 1929, by 1940-4 that 
sum had declined to 4 million pounds per annum. The interest on capital 
invested in the railroads went down from 5.3 percent in 1925-9 to 1.5 per­
cent in 1940-4, while the corresponding percentages on other investments
2were 5.9 and 3.8 respectively. Thus, Britain pulled something of a coup
in unloading the railroads in 1947 in exchange for the mounting British
debt. By then the railroads represented unprofitable and rapidly depre-
3dating capital stock that had assumed burdensome proportions. Moreover,
1 2 Blanksten, p. 241. Skupch, pp. 35-6.
3It is interesting to note that in a meeting on June 14, 1945 
between Sir Wilfred Eddy, a railroad director, and the then vice presi­
dent Percfn, the latter categorically rejected any interest on the part 
of the Argentine government in the purchase of the railroads since great 
amounts of the capital were needed for industrial development and "it 
would be folly to spend a large sum in the nationalization of something 
that was already in the country, that was rendering a service, and that 
was proving to be unprofitable." Carlos Andres Escude, "The Argentine 
Eclipse: The International Factor in Argentina's Post World War II 
Decline," Ph.D. dissertation (Yale University, 1981), pp. 387-8.
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the Mitre Law which exempted the companies from provincial taxation and 
restricted the national government to a three percent income tax, expired 
at the beginning of 1947. Even the English government considered the 
prospects for a deal involving the railroads to be almost utopian.'*' Yet, 
Argentina’s bargaining position appeared more favorable than it was in 
fact. Considering that its sterling accounts were blocked and that the United 
Kingdom was unable and unwilling to provide the capital goods Argentina 
needed, the use of Argentina's credits to gain uncontested control over 
the internal transportation network was not as foolish as it might seem 
with the benefit of hindsight.
Given the railroads' role as a factor of economic domination, as 
an instrument that assured the hegemony of British interests within the 
Argentine economy, their nationalization had an importance that went 
beyond strictly business considerations. In one sense, British investors 
made a good business deal in disposing of the railroads, but in another 
sense it was bad business for the British presence in Argentina as a 
whole.2 No government would have attacked such a key control lever as the 
railroads unless it also meant to decisively confront the Anglo-oligarchic 
connection as the basis for economic policy.^ in fact, the volume taken 
up by the physical plant and facilities comprising the railroad network
*"Escude, p. 386.
2Recall that the British Ambassador in 1929 had stressed the impor­
tance of the railroads when he said:
I look upon them as the mainstay, the backbone of our whole 
position out here. If they go, we all go. Their loss would be a 
death blow to us out here . . . .
Cited by Ford in Rock, p. 51.
3These observations are paraphrased from Esteban, pp. 98-9.
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was considerable. According to Esteban it represented 38 percent of the 
foreign capital invested in Argentina in 1945* and, without a doubt, the
2major portion of the United Kingdom’s capital in the Argentine republic. 
But, of course, the Peronist regime paid dearly for the measure of economic 
independence it was able to achieve. Scobie estimates that the generous 
payments for Argentina's nationalizations absorbed 45 percent of the
3country’s postwar foreign exchange. The point to stress here is that 
Peronism could pursue such a cavalier approach in its campaign for economic 
independence, and yet succeed, because of the temporary weakening of the 
dependent relationships tying Argentina to the international economy.
The Peronist government has often been criticized for not care­
fully husbanding the country's hard-won reserves and using them only in 
areas needed to sustain industrial development after the advantageous 
conditions had evaporated. Instead, it is maintained, the regime squan­
dered them much too quickly and too easily on show-case nationalizations 
and the purchase of capital stock at inflated prices. The nationalizations 
and liquidation of the foreign public debt "had the beneficial effect of 
reducing the servicing charges of foreign capital from about $170 million 
to $10 million a year." However, echoing one of Raul Prebisch's critiques, 
Eshag and Thorp continue: "It is not clear that an even greater saving of 
foreign exchange could not have been effected by using the equivalent
*Esteban, p. 78.
2According to George Blanksten, British investments in Argentina 
were valued at $1,287,005,000 in 1940, and these "had fallen to approxi­
mately $17,300,000 by 1952." (p. 241.)
3Scobie, pp. 224-5.
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amount of foreign exchange for investment in such import-replacing in­
dustries as petroleum and steel; in the years 1946 to 1948 annual fuel 
imports alone averaged about $100 million."*' Though essentially correct, 
this is one of those criticisms that is conveniently made ex post facto. 
Indeed, as we will see, the regime tried precisely the course suggested 
above with its Second Five Year Plan (SFYP), but by then the dual devel­
opment promoted by the FFYP made this an even more difficult goal to 
achieve.
Referring to the practice of using up Argentina's reserves to pur­
chase equipment, even at inflated prices, Peron justified his government 
in an article authored by him under the pseudonym of "Descartes." He noted 
that at the end of the war the United States owed Argentina a considerable 
sum, which it blocked. According to "Descartes," since no interest was 
payed on this sum and prices were manipulated, Argentina's credit evapor­
ated in half. Nothing could be done about that then and, moreover, "if 
we complained, they told us we were Nazis." Then, threatened by continuing
evaporation of its earnings, the government hastened to spend them in 
2 ✓dollars. Peron argued that this was a wise policy in view of the infla­
tionary spiral which increased the prices of goods and the difficulty of
3obtaining these goods at all because of the United States' blockade.
*Eshag and Thorp, p. 8.
2The article entitled "This is the Way the Devil Pays" was pub­
lished on October 11, 1951. It was one of a series which appeared in the 
Buenos Aires newspaper Democracia between Jan. 1951 and Sept. 1952 signed 
by Descartes. It was known that Peron was their author. These arguments 
appear in Peyrou and Villanueva, p. 308.
"Ibid., p. 314 from the article titled "The Other Side of the 
Coin II."
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The United States' boycott of the Argentine economy began in 
February of 1942 and ran with varying characteristics and intensity 
until 1949. In March of 1942 the Board of Economic Warfare began refusing 
licenses to U.S. exporters wishing to sell electrical equipment and chemi­
cals to Argentina. The blockade was tightened during 1944. On September 
4,Secretary of State Cordell Hull telegraphed his revised export program 
for Argentina:
a) With the exception of projects directly contributing to 
the war effort no Argentine development project will be approved.
b) Operational equipment used in connection with the production 
of petroleum products and boring and oil field equipment, as well 
as all other types of petroleum equipment, shall not be exported.
The exports of fuel oil shall be limited to the minimum amounts 
necessary to assure the continued services of Argentine tankers in 
transporting vegetable oils to the United States.
c) The exoort of automobile vehicles, railway locomotives or 
rolling stock is forbidden.
d) No further increase in the number or value limits of products 
exportable to Argentina under general license shall be permitted.
e) Exports to the Argentine Armed Forces and supplies and mater­
ials for the Argentine armaments industry are forbidden.
f) The export of Fourdrinier phosphorous bronze screens suitable 
for the production of newsprint is forbidden.
g) Through navicert control or other appropriate devices an en­
deavor shall be made to obtain similar reductions in exports to Ar­
gentina by other countries.
h) The quarterly issuance of licenses for the export of all 
products not otherwise limited herein shall be restricted to the 
requirements of those industries in Argentina whose products are 
essential to the Allied war effort. . . .  It is desired that the 
foregoing changes be accomplished with a minimum of publicity. No 
announcement will be made here, and it is expected that Central 
Bank certificates of necessity issued in accordance with existing 
procedure will continue to be accepted, and then screened closely 
against the above stipulations. No intimation of the change should 
be given the Central Bank. The foregoing program will be presented 
by the Department to the British with a request that they adopt 
similar restrictions.
At the same time efforts were made to deprive Argentina of strate­
gic materials not supplied by the United States. The State Department suc­
1Escude, pp. 332-3.
256
ceeded in preventing the export of Bolivian tin and Brazilian rubber, 
as well as substantially reducing Chilean copper exports to Argentina.^- 
In this way the United States blocked vital supplies, such as tires and 
fuel, from reaching Argentina thereby disrupting industry and transporta­
tion even to the detriment of Argentina's being able to meet commitments 
to provide critically needed food shipments to Europe.
In the postwar years the United States used its foreign policy 
and its dominant international position to further harm the Argentine 
economy. In 1947 the United States adopted a policy of preventing Euro­
pean food procurements in Argentina with Marshall Plan dollars. The 
Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) which administered the Marshall 
Plan, used its power to systematically undermine Argentine interests. A 
secret and extremely revealing State Department document of January 25,
1949, described thirty-three instances of ECA discrimination against 
2Argentina. For example:
*Advising the Army that because it had been decided not to make any pur­
chases from Argentina, it was immaterial that Mexican meat was more 
expensive.
*Recommending to the Swedish Foreign Office, contrary to an agreement 
between Sweden and Argentina, that trade between them not be balanced and 
that Argentina be forced to pay in dollars.
*Advising Paris to insist on US prices for Argentine exports sold for soft 
currencies without offering any assurance that European exports, selling 
far above US prices, would be offered to Argentina at US prices.
Such discriminatory measures in addition to the British declaration of 
sterling inconvertability in August of 1947 (at the urging of the U.S. 
State Department) deprived Argentina of desperately needed dollars. These 
were the external factors that were primarily responsible for the failure 
of Peron1s FFYP.
1 2 Escude, pp. 336-7. Ibid., pp. 406-12.
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While the United States had made European recovery possible 
with the Marshall Plan, Argentina was subjected to the exact opposite. 
During the war years and into the mid forties, materials and inputs 
needed for development were withheld and then, in the late forties, 
Argentina was cheated out of the foreign exchange reserves it had accu­
mulated. The U.S. saw to it that Argentina was deprived of the dollars 
that would have alleviated the financial plight imposed on Argentina. By 
1950 the financial prosperity Argentina had managed to salvage,despite 
the boycott, was wrecked and Argentina symbolically capitulated when it 
was forced to apply and accept a 125 million dollar loan. To make things 
worse, the Anglo-Argentine connection had been irrevocably severed.*
In 1947, only one country— the US excluded but the Empire included—  
exported more to the UK than Argentina, this number rising to two 
in 1948 and three in 1949— still normal rank orders. But in 1950 
Argentina was. already down to number 6 in British imports, in 1951 
down to number 12, and in 1952 further down to number 18. From 
1912 until 1950, Argentina had never been below fourth place, and 
very seldom that low, in British imports. Similarly, in British 
exports, Argentina fell from number two non-Empire importer in 
1947 and number three in 1948 and 1949, to number 11 in 1950, number 
13 in 1951, and number 16 in 1952, a position never before heard of 
in modern Argentina and that would be all too common in the years 
to come.^
A new era had commenced.
Given the United States* power in the immediate post World War II 
years and its tenacious determination to subordinate Argentina, Peron*s 
shortcomings did not lie in the manner he confronted the external pole in 
the relationships of Argentine dependency. The steps his regime took in 
its quest for economic independence represented about all that could have 
been accomplished. The Peronist government manipulated to its greatest




advantage those structures of Argentina's foreign trade over which it 
had some measure of control. Take, for example, I.A.P.I. which was set 
up as a state agency to negotiate the best terms possible in the sale of 
rural produce overseas. Its monopoly was meant to counter that of the 
successor to the Combined Food Board set up by the Allies during the 
war to avoid competition and thus obtain the lowest prices for agricul­
tural products.* I.A.P.I. was able to obtain price increases on the 
international market outstripping production costs in Argentina, the sur­
plus being primarily shifted to industrial producers. The United Kingdom, 
which continued to be Argentina's major market, consistently paid the 
United States more for frozen beef, mutton, and wheat than Argentina 
received in 1946 and 1947. However, Argentina was able to obtain better 
prices for these goods than either Australia or Canada. From this 
Fodor concludes "that the price obtained by each country depended mainly 
on its bargaining strength" and that "Argentina had used all its bargaining 
power, but not having the position of strength of the U.S., it could not
obtain similar prices. It is highly unlikely that any other Argentine
2government would have obtained similar prices."
Minimizing Argentina's financial dependency was another successful 
aspect of the Peronist program for economic independence. Even though the 
regime's inability to set in motion an autonomous process of industriali­
zation soon undid this success, it was nevertheless a remarkable achieve­
ment— not duplicated since then— to have slowed the public and private 
outflow of capital to a trickle. Moreover, in nationalizing the railroads
*This analysis follows Fodor's in Rock, beginning on p. 155.
2Ibid., pp. 156-7.
259
which were such a key part of the nation's transportation network,
Peronism undid one of the principal means promoting Argentina's dependency 
on foreign purchasers and suppliers. In addition, to undercut Argentine 
dependence on foreign shipping— particularly the English who used their 
"rule of the seas" as yet another way of cutting into Argentina's pro­
fitable trade with the U.S.— Peron succeeded in building the Argentine 
State's Merchant Fleet into one of the fastest growing merchant marines 
in the world. "It carried 27.8 percent of the nation's entire foreign 
trade in 1950, and the U.S. Maritime Commission reported the following 
year that the Argentine merchant marine was then ten times larger than 
it had been in 1936."'*' Finally, the Peronist emphasis on industrializa­
tion, meant to break Argentina's dependence on imported manufactured goods, 
proved at least partially successful.
Conclusions
In covering the rapid industrialization and the more equitable 
distribution of income that took place in the forties, this chapter 
examined the two areas wherein Peronism realized its greatest achievements. 
The analysis dealt with factors that made these achievements possible and 
with their interrelationship.
The rapid industrialization of these years was possible because 
of the conjuncture of favorable internal and external conditions. Exter­
nally, wartime conditions proved favorable for the Argentine economy.
There was an increased demand for traditional exportables and very little 
that could be imported which resulted in the accumulation of foreign ex­
^George Blanksten, p. 243. Blanksten notes that in his May Day 
message to Congress in 1950, Peron reported that only about seven per­
cent of the nation's seaborn foreign trade had been carried in Argentine 
bottoms as late as 1946.
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change and reserves; and there was the lack of competition from foreign 
manufactured goods which enabled Argentine manufacturers to expand
their market. Internally, the aftereffects of the world-wide depression
had left the traditionally dominant groups in disarray and thus facilitated
sectoral and social redistributive efforts benefiting industrial development.
We saw that though the content of Peronist policies represented 
a continuity with those of the prior period, the policies of 1943-50 
increased the magnitude of industrial activity to such an extent that 
qualitatively new sets of relationships arose. As the scope and inten­
sity of the manufacturing sector expanded, the quantitative impact resulted 
in these interrelated qualitative changes:
1. The traditional subordination of industrial development to the 
requisites of maintaining agricultural production as the economy's 
foundation was reversed; surplus derived from the rural sector was 
now applied in raising manufacturing to the predominant form of 
economic activity
2. Directly counter to previous policies designed to benefit British 
interests, Peronism dismantled the infrastructure of England's 
hegemony within the Afcgentine economy
3. The predominant forms of economic activity shifted from being oriented 
to providing external markets to being oriented to the internal market
In looking at the nature of the industrialization taking place during this 
period, the data analyzed showed that the First Five Year Plan promoted a 
dual, potentially contradictory, development of the industrial sector.
The upcoming chapter examines the importance of this factor in the next 
stage which shaped the outcome of the transitional process under considera­
tion.
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This chapter noted that the Peronist state filled a vacuum 
resulting from the bourgeoisie's failure to play a dynamic part in 
developing the forces of production. The Peronist state acted as a 
surrogate for a weak, non-self conscious national bourgeoisie and imple­
mented a program serving its interests. The result was a tendency towards 
state capitalism. Though not apparent for the duration of the favorable 
conjuncture within which Peronism came to power, the Peronist state acted 
as a functional instrumentality of the national bourgeoisie in fundamental 
contradiction to its social base. The discussion of Peronism's class 
base utilized Kenworthy's analysis which essentially portrayed it as a 
labor/military coalition. The military acted as the national bourgeoisie's 
substitute with its influence decreasing after the 1946 elections and 
that of the representatives of local industrialists rising correspondingly.
One of the paradoxes encountered in this chapter was the fact 
that despite the regime's itaplementation of an industrializing program 
benefiting the national bourgeoisie, most bourgeois sectors remained either 
hostile or at least cool toward Peronism. One possible explanation may 
have been the proximity of the dominant sector of the industrial bour­
geoisie to the landowning oligarchy which would also account for the seem­
ingly paradoxical espousal by the latter of the industrializing policies 
of the thirties.
Opposition from the traditionally dominant groups made it necessary 
for Peron to promote and rely on massive popular mobilization. Peronist 
doctrine appropriated the populist-nationalist critique. Its inclusive­
ness and multi-class orientation were well suited and served Peron in his 
mass mobilizing efforts. This strong point in Peronist doctrine arose 
from its conjunctural congruence with the transitorily beneficial factors
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for the Argentine economy. The importance of analyzing the Argentine 
variant of populist-nationalism of the period lies in that it provided 
Peronism with its class orientation and its programmatic direction.
Peronist policies functioned effectively in preventing class 
struggle over the distribution of wealth, brewing from the thirties and 
bound to intensify in the expansive economy of the forties, from spilling 
from the sphere of circulation to that of production. The promotion of 
manufacturing without altering the relations of production revealed 
Peronism's essentially bourgeois nature. The regime remained reformist, 
an outgrowth of socio-economic currents and accumulated grievances that 
found fertile soil in the favorable circumstances of the forties. The 
strength of Peronist doctrine lay in that it allowed the regime to pro­
mote capitalist growth while also being able to contain its accompanying 
contradictions.
But Peronism's strength was also its weakness. Though the 
policies flowing from an orientation confined to the sphere of consump­
tion accorded well with the conditions prevailing through the forties, 
the very successes of an anti-imperialist but not anti-capitalist program 
blinded the regime to the shortcomings inherent in its approach. As 
the analysis in the next chapter shows, the limitations arising from the 
use of the state and popular mobilization as "pressure," choosing to in­
fluence class relations indirectly rather than restructuring state power 
on a class basis in order to alter the relations of production, proved de­
cisive in determining the nature of the succeeding developmental model.
CHAPTER V
PERONISM'S LIMITATIONS, 1950-5 
Introduction
Chapter 5 analyzes the Peronist period as the height of the trans­
itional process leading away from the externally oriented growth pattern 
of dependency. In outling this study's theoretical framework, I noted 
that shifts occurring during the culmination of a transitional process 
prove determinative in shaping the contents of the next stage. Hence 
changes taking place during such periods offer the key to narrowing down 
possible outcomes of the process.^ This aspect of the theoretical frame­
work is applied in the analysis that follows.
Chapter 5 analyzes the internal and external factors of the 
fifties responsible for the reversal of Peronism's successes achieved in 
the forties. Around 1949 Argentina's favorable international position be­
gan to deteriorate. European postwar recovery and competition from North 
America in the industrial area had an increasingly adverse impact after 
that date. In this process, the United States' economic boycott of Argen­
tina played a key role. This boycott included the refusal to supply Argen­
tine industry with badly needed inputs as well as the Marshall Plan's 
policy preventing the procurement of agricultural goods from Argentina. 
Compounding these external difficulties, Argentina's agro-pastoral sector 
experienced some of the most severe droughts on record between 1950 and 
1952. As resources available to the government shrank, the limitations
^See PP- 15-23, and especially pp. 15-8 and 21-3.
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in its policies became clearer. The type of industrialization promoted 
in the forties*and the regime's doctrine that inspired its policies, 
proved decisive in consolidating the relationships underlying the 
pattern of dependent industrialization taking shape in the fifties.
Chapter 5 explores the hypothesis that import substituting 
industrialization within a capitalist framework and in the context of 
an underdeveloped capital goods sector shifted the traditional pattern 
of dependency to a new one based on external sources for machinery and 
technology. The changing relationships between internal and external 
groups that this shift gave rise to were themselves but a stage in the 
transitional process that culminated in domination of local production by 
multinational corporations and domestic monopoly capital. The analysis 
shows how Peronist doctrine's stress on inter-class cooperation facili­
tated the development of a dependent industrial economy. Not only did 
the regime leave the economic base of its enemies intact, but it also 
narrowed its options because of the hesitancy to use its popular and 
working class wing for the decisive confrontations which an alternative 
developmental strategy would have required at this stage. Furthermore, 
by opting to maintain the capitalist rather than the socialistic side of 
the relationships implicit in its 1943-50 policies, Peronism reinforced
the transformations that were critical in determining the nature of 
subsequent developmental patterns.
The analysis finds that Peronism's shortcomings did not lie in 
the steps the regime took to confront the external pole in Argentina's 
dependent relationships. In nationalizing the agricultural export 
structure and the internal transportation network, in increasing Argentina's 
control over the external transportation network, in liquidating
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the nation’s public debt, and in decreasing its reliance on consumer 
goods manufactured abroad, Peronism attacked those mechanisms over which 
it could exercise control. Peronism's shortcomings arose from the regime's 
failure to extend its campaign for economic liberation to the internal 
pole in the relationships determining Argentine dependency. This chapter 
shows how the limitations in the Justicialist program became apparent 
once the external factors over which the Peronist regime could not exer­
cise control changed from having a beneficial impact on the Argentine 
economy-to having an adverse one. The hypothesis I explore maintains 
that if Peronism had moved against the base for dependency within Argen­
tina's class structure, a different outcome would have resulted from the 
transitional process.^-
The Crisis of the Fifties
The impact of the shift in international conditions affecting 
Argentine development began to be felt from 1949-50 on. This demarcation 
point also corresponds roughly with the end of the FFYP which ran from 
1947 to 1951. European postwar reconstruction and especially the protec­
tive barriers that provided the foundations for Common Market agricultural 
production led to declining exports and a depletion of Argentina's foreign 
exchange reserves. This made it increasingly difficult to pay the costs 
for Peronist social reforms and maintain the availability of easy credit 
for consumer goods producing industries. The regime's immediate response 
to this burgeoning crisis was to restrict imports. However, given the 
FFYP’s orientation towards industrialization, curtailing imports could not 
be taken too far without further aggravating the crisis since this would
^It will be recalled that dependency theory as formulated by 
Cardoso and Faletto draws our attention to the internal base on which 
dependency rests. See pp. 4-5 and 10-3 above.
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force local industry to reduce production. Due to the advantageous 
conditions of the forties, the FFYP had been able to develop the branches 
producing manufactured consumer goods without having to resort to 
forceful appropriations to promote the capital goods sector. This 
would most certainly have led to conflicts and thus was contrary to 
Peronism's objective of achieving social harmony. As a result the capi­
tal goods sector remained underdeveloped. In the fifties therefore, 
reducing imports meant reducing the raw materials and capital goods 
needed for production. Indeed, the decline in the demand for Argentine 
exports in conjunction with the substantial increases in the cost for 
imported machinery and industrial goods^ had a severe impact: the
nation's capacity to import fell by almost 50 percent from 1948 to 1952. 
"Except for the year 1951, imports declined steadily and steeply from
1949 to 1953, by which time the volume of imports was less than half
2what it had been in 1948." The impact on industrial production was 
devastating: "By 1952 industrial production had slumped almost back to 
the level of 1946."^
It was the changing impact of these factors on the international 
scene, over which the regime had no direct control, that brought the con­
tradictions within Peronism to the surface. After the Second World War 
the international terms of trade consistently worsened for Argentina. As 
Argentina industrialized, it came to depend ever more on imported machinery
Taking a base of 100 for 1950, the terms of trade between farm 
and industrial goods for 1948 were 117.6, while for 1952 the equivalent 
figure had dropped to 73.1. Cited by Rock, "The Survival of Peronism" in 
the volume edited by him, p. 190.
2 3Eshag and Thorp, p. 11. Rock, p. 190.
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and parts which were scarce and whose prices rose faster than those
Argentina could obtain for its agricultural goods. Argentina could
only sell rural commodities to Europe but, with the devastation of the
war, Europe could not pay or provide the industrial products Argentina
needed. Only the United States could, but the United States would not
buy from Argentina.* Moreover, the situation worsened as Europe recovered
from the war and rebuilt her agrarian sector. Thus, for example, while
Argentina supplied 35 percent of the world's exports of beef in the 1945-9
2period, that percentage dropped to 18.9 for the 1950-54 period. This 
decline occurred in spite of the fact that in response to the favorable 
climate during the war and its aftermath for meat exports, Peronist poli­
cies shifted resources in the countryside from wheat and cereal to beef 
production.^
In relation to its exports of wheat and flour, Argentina was 
being constrained not only by the growing vitality of Western European 
agriculture, but also by increased competition from the United States 
and Canada which harmed Argentina's position as a major supplier of these 
commodities on the world market. In the five pre-World War II harvests 
between 1934-5 and 1938-9>the United States contributed 4.15 percent and 
Canada,25.6 percent of the world's exports in these commodities.^ By con-
*These points are from Fodor in Rock, pp. 149 and 150.
2
Figures are cited in excerpts from Felix Luna's Argentina de Peron 
a Lanusse, 1943-73 serialized in the Buenos Aires newspaper Clarxn, Jan. 18, 
1973, p. 8.
3See pp. 225-6 above.
4From United Nation's F.A.O. Annual for 1951, Vol. 5, 2nd part,
p. 13.
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trast, for the six post-World War II harvests between 1946-7 and 1951-2,
the United States held 49.2 percent and Canada 29.7 percent of the total
world-wide exports.'*’ For the 1951-2 harvest, both countries combined ac-
2counted for 87.7 percent of the world’s exports in wheat and flour.
To these factors of external origin, one must add the contradic­
tion posed by the Peronist internally oriented growth model based on ex­
port. As an unavoidable outgrowth of Peronism1 s populist-nationalism, 
it further inhibited Argentina's ability to secure the foreign exchange 
with which to obtain the capital inputs so critical to continued industrial 
expansion. Recall that the Peronist model was based on the expansion of 
the domestic market to be achieved by increasing the acquisitive power of
the producers. One of the immediate results was the steady rise in the
3internal consumption of foodstuffs. Some estimates place the internal
demand that had to be satisfied at 60 percent of the nation's total food
production before the Second World War; by 1952 more than 80 percent of
4the total was consumed internally. This trend obviously had a negative 
effect on the volume of agro-pastoral goods for export. Though it insti­
tuted some controls— one meatless day per week, for example, and asked for 
voluntary abstinence— a regime which based its legitimacy on populist-
■*■ According to the Corn Trade News published by The Times of 
Argentina (Buenos Aires) in the Dec. 1952 issue.
2Quoted by Frondizi, 1: 176-8, who also cites the above data on 
world-wide wheat and flour exports.
3Tables 16 and 17, on pp. 227 and 228 respectively, confirm the 




nationalism could ill afford to deprive its popular base in order to 
raise earnings abroad. •
v
The inability to obtain needed capital goods, both as a result 
of insufficiently developed local production and the declining volume of 
rural exports which reduced the financial base for the importation of 
machinery, equipment, fuels, and raw materials, led to a decline in the 
productivity of the manufacturing sector. With the contraction in the 
accustomed rate of economic growth, it became impossible to satisfy con­
sumer demands. And with the decline in the acquisitive power of the 
workers the circle was completed, for this contraction of the domestic 
market spelled disaster for the hundreds of marginally operating enter­
prises that Peronism had fostered in its ascendency. In brief, it was 
no longer possible to provide both increased profits for capitalists and 
rising real wages for workers— the formula that made or broke Peronist 
populist-nationalism.
Looking at Peronism as the culmination of the transitional 
process, the trends described here reveal the contents of the emerging 
developmental pattern. As an expression of the contradictions within the 
emerging pattern, these trends were manifested with more frequency and 
greater intensity as the pattern of dependent industrialization was con­
solidated from the late fifties on. The basic contradiction already con­
tained in the developmental program of the SFYP can be expressed as follows:
a) an internally oriented growth model based on manufacturing founded on
b) an agro-exporting sector; in the context of 1) external dependency and 
2) capitalist relations of production internally. The dynamics in this 
contradiction found expression in the cyclical trend of economic growth 
that characterized the development of the Argentine economy in the post-
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1955 period. Oscar Braun provides a paradigm of this cyclical growth 
trend.'*' Its essential characteristics are:
1. A fixed volume of agro-pastoral production
2. An internal demand for agro-pastoral products not responsive to vari­
ations in relative prices but sensitive to changes in the distribution 
of income
3. A demand for imports inelastic with respect to changes in relative 
prices and with a high elasticity in relation to changes in the 
volume of industrial production
4. Exports concentrated on non-industrial products
In its ascendent phase, the cycle is marked by a deterioration in the 
balance of payments. It results from the decrease in agro-pastoral 
exports which, in turn, comes about through the Increase in the volume 
of industrial production. The latter leads to real wage gains which pro­
duces a rise in the internal demand for agro-pastoral goods and thus cuts 
into the volume available for export. As the crisis develops, the Cen­
tral Bank’s reserves shrink leading to a stabilization plan which includes 
devaluation and restrictive fiscal and monetary policies. In the end, 
there is a transfer of income distribution towards agricultural producers 
and high income brackets. This produces a lower demand for industrial 
products which leads to a slackening of the internal demand for agro-pas­
toral goods. Falling demand for manufactured goods reduces investments 
in the industrial area. The slowing of industrial activity in turn, 
lowers the importation of capital goods and thus the equilibrium in the 
balance of payments is reestablished. The conditions are now given for a 
repetition of the cycle.
Oscar Braun, "Desarollo del capital monopolista en la Argentina" 
in El capitalismo argentino en crisis (Buenos Aires: Siglo Veintiuno 
Editores, 1973) edited by him. The paradigm is adapted from pp. 19-21.
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Returning to the increasingly serious crisis the Peronist 
regime faced in the fifties, it is important to note how much it was 
exacerbated by the critical need to replace worn-out capital stock 
which had been systematically depleted due to the difficulty of obtaining 
it overseas &s a result of the upheavals in the international system from 
1930 on, including the impact of the depression, World War-II, and the 
U.S.'s economic blockade.) "It is estimated that the dollar value of 
imports of machinery and vehicles in 1938 was only about half and in 
1945 about one-tenth of what it had been in 1929."^ The FFYP primarily 
expanded industries producing non-durable consumer goods. The prior de­
pletion of capital stock and the insufficient development of this sector 
therefore necessitated vast increases in the importation of capital 
goods during this period. According to Cafiero, a yearly average of 153.8 
thousand tons of vehicles and machinery were imported between 1935-9. The 
ravages of the war took this figure down to 48.1 thousand tons per year 
in 1940-5. However, 1946 saw the imports of vehicles and machinery jump 
to 129.8 thousand tons, which increased to 430.2 tons in 1947, and to
611.8 thousand tons in 1948. Significantly, more than half of this amount,
2328.9 thousand tons, came from the United States alone. By 1949 Argentina 
had depleted the reserve accumulated during the wartime years which had 
made this restocking of capital goods possible. Hence, when these favor­
able conditions on the international scene deteriorated, there was no way 
to avoid the resulting crisis.
Having experienced the impact of the crisis resulting from the 
changed international conditions for two years, the Second Five Year Plan 
(SFYP) which took effect in 1953 and only ran half of its course by the
1 2 Eshag and Thorp, p. 5. Cafiero, p. 56.
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1955 coup, represented the regime's progammatic response to this emer­
ging crisis. The SFYP specifically addressed those contradictions 
implicit in the FFYP which had not become problematic until the favorable 
context deteriorated. "The socio-economic priorities in the sponsorship, 
promotion, and state support of industrial productions were listed as 
follows:
1.) the production of energy, 2) agro-pastoral activities, 3) explora­
tion and exploitation of mineral reserves, 4) the maintenance and 
reequipment of existing installations, 5) transportation and communi­
cations, and 6) housing.
The industrial priorities as such, the actions related to industrial 
promotion, will be adjusted according to the following order: 1) 
iron and steel, 2) smelting, 3) aluminum, 4) chemicals, 5) mechani­
cal engineering, 6) electrical engineering, 7) building and con­
struction, 8) forestry, 9) textiles and leather, and 10) food 
products.*
Strikingly, the branches of manufacturing that had been prime benefic­
iaries under the FFYP, such as food processing and textiles, were now 
placed at the bottom of the government's list of priorities. With the 
SFYP, economic policy makers recognized that the limits of import sub­
stituting industrialization producing consumer goods had been reached and 
that the critical need for continued industrial expansion lay in the 
development of heavy and capital goods industries.
In his study Juan Carlos Esteban discerns a substantial financial
/commitment to the capital goods sector on the part of the Peron government 
and a dramatic contrast with its immediate successors in this area. Ac­
cording to him, thirty percent of all credit in 1954 was extended to in­
dustries producing machinery and vehicles which, he states, amounts to a
*Camara de Senadores de la Nacion, Diario de sesiones, Die. 20, 
1952, 41a Reunion (continuacion de la Primera Sesion Extraordinaria), p. 
823.
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reorientation of economic policies after the 1952 depression.
Assuming a close correspondence between the capital goods sector and
high organic composition of capital, larger concentration of capital,
and bigger plant size, then related findings emerge from a study con-
2ducted by Jorge Katz. Katz compares the relationships between produc­
tion, productivitiy, growth of the labor force, and wage trends, before 
and after 1952. He concludes that after 1952, middle and small enter­
prises stagnated while large, capital intensive undertakings showed sig­
nificant increases in productivity and profits and were therefore able 
to grant wage increases. These finding corroborate a central thesis ana­
lyzed in this study: the shift from an orientation in the FFYP favoring 
an emerging national bourgeoisie based on producing non-durable wage 
goods, to one in the SFYP beneficial to the sector with a higher organic 
composition of capital which was to be the locus for the penetration and 
eventual control of industrial activity by multinational capital.
The new conditions of the fifties no longer corresponded with 
those which had made the alliance between an emerging national bourgeoisie 
and the workers viable for the forties. As this alliance became increas­
ingly unviable and the contradictions implicit in the FFYP became explicit, 
the industrialization envisioned by the SFYP represented a substantial 
readjustment. The interests of the small to medium size national indus­
trialists were no long the primary focus. Instead, the SFYP shifted its
^Esteban, p. 66. He cites figures which show that financial 
policies for the immediate post-coup years were designed as a kind of 
punishment for this sector.
2
Jorge M. Katz, "Caracterfsticas estructurales del crecimiento in­
dustrial argentino 1946-61" in Desarollo Economico 7 (July-Sep. 1967).
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emphasis onto the capital intensive side of the dual industrialization 
taking place, and sought to promote the sector requiring a high organic 
composition of capital. The crisis situation exacerbated the social con­
sequences of this policy shift and these therefore conflicted all the 
more severely with redistributive, social justice commitments the FFYP 
had expressed. Previously, consumer aspirations had been promoted with 
much fanfare as the visible manifestation of the regime's ties to the 
masses; now they were checked in order to stimulate capital accumulation.
• I.A.P.I.'s changed role represents another fundamental shift
brought about by the regime's response to the crisis of the fifties.
I.A.P.I. was now used to provide the landowning oligarchy with subsidies,
hoping in this way to enhance output from the rural sector. In addition,
a larger volume of agro-pastoral goods was to be freed for export by
restricting domestic consumption through freezing wages and raising prices
for these goods. Again this penalized lower income sectors and ran
directly counter to the policies of the prior period. Moreover, the SFYP
placed more emphasis on better economic performance and higher productivity
of workers in the industrial arena than on the social justice the FFYP had
emphasized. This was consistent with the trend that had been taking shape
since 1949, which had been designated the "Year of Productivity."
Reflecting Peron's shifting relations to the oligarchy, in 1952
the government granted landowners their first substantial price increases
since 1946 and liberalized farm credits. Moreover, the fifties also saw
a major policy shift towards attracting foreign investments. Indicative
of this reversal, Milton Eisenhower, brother of the president of the
United States, received an enthusiastic and warm welcome in July of 1953 
/and Peron spoke of his friendship with the United States.
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Most workers considered these shifts daring Peron's second term
/■to be contrary to their interests. Peron had led them to believe that
the interests of labor were identical to those of the nation. The policy
changes of the fifties seemed to contradict this congruence.
The industrial workers resented not only the decline in real 
. wages, but also the favoritism shown the agricultural sector 
of the economy, the invitation to foreign capital to invest in 
Argentina, and the development of more friendly relations with 
the United States. . . .  By and large, the workers went along 
with these programs, but this was because of their personal 
loyalty to Peron. They did not fail to notice that participation 
in what they thought were anti-labor programs reduced them to 
one among several influential elements in society, whereas 
formerly they believed they had been the most important repre­
sentatives of the Argentine nation.
The regime's new relationship with workers had been incrementally 
forged in the prior period during the years of prosperity after Peron 
was firmly in power. From 1946 on, the more independent union heads were 
replaced by bureaucrats distinguished by their loyalty to the ruling 
couple. Union officials tended to act more as the regime's representa­
tives to the workers than as representatives of the workers conveying the
proletariat's interests to the government, as earlier leaders with a 
strong rank and file base had done. By 1950 an Extraordinary Congress of
the CGT was convened which modified the statutes of the organization to
✓adhere officially to Justicialism as its doctrine and to Peron as chief 
of the movement. However, it must be noted that this was not achieved by 
manipulating unrepresentative leaders; on the contrary, the years of sys­
tematic material gains experienced under Peron up to that point, made the
This quotation and above text summarize Samuel L. Baily's percep­
tive analysis in the chapter entitled "Peron Abandons the Workers' Nation" 
found in his Labor, pp. 142-3.
2Waldmann makes these points on pp. 209-10. Recall also the earl­
ier discussion on the dissolution of the Partido Laborista after Perons'
elections and Peron's success in capturing the top leadership of unions 
on pp. 205-7 above.
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workers quite receptive to this move. It merely represented an insti­
tutionalization of the immense loyalty and affection the workers felt 
for the Perons. At the same time, it is undeniably true that the coop­
tation of the CGT's officialdom served to undercut the organization’s 
availability to workers to register their disenchantment over the worsen­
ing conditions of the fifties.
The regime’s relationship towards the workers began to shift as 
conditions on the international scene worsened. Up until 1949 workers and 
unions on strike or in conflict with management could always count on neu­
trality, if not benevolent intervention, from the authorities. Until 
that time the government paid no attention to employers' complaints 
about absenteism or lack of productivity. After 1949 the government 
seemed to intervene increasingly against workers and on the side of em­
ployers in strikes and, significantly, undertook a propaganda campaign 
against laxity in work discipline and for increased productivity. The 
government's decreasing support for workers was reflected in the fall of 
their real wages and in the decline of their participation in the distri­
bution of wealth between 1949 and 1952. According to Clarence Zuvekas, 
average real wages decreased 3.4 percent in 1950, 7.5 percent in 1951, and
11.4 percent in 1952.  ̂ Similarly, Javier Villanueva shows that after the 
upswing from 1946 to 1949, the real income of industrial workers declined. 
Taking an index of 100 for 1950, total real payments per hour in industry 
(which includes fringe benefits, allowances, etc.) increased from 67.2 in 
1946 to a high of 102.5 in 1949, declining to 90.4 for 1951 and 82.1
Clarence Zuvekas, "Economic Growth and Income Distribution in 
Postwar Argentina, Inter-American Economic Affairs 20 (1966): 27.
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for 1952, then rising again to 90.6 for 1953 and 98.9 for 1954.^
The immediate crisis seems to have peaked by 1952 and the econo­
mic picture for Argentina showed signs of a slight recovery towards the 
mid-fifties. Real wages for workers rose again and the inflationary 
process slowed down between 1952 and 1955. According to Cafiero>the 
1952 cost of living index for the Federal Capital stood at 579.3, 1943 
representing a base of 100. By September of 1955, this index had reached 
689.7, a 19 percent increase over the three year period, or about 6 per­
cent per annum. In the same time period, the gross income per inhabitant,
which had fallen to 3,382 Argentine pesos in 1952, rose to 3,568 pesos
2in 1955, a 12 percent rise over three years. However, in spite of this 
slight recovery, the impact of the earlier crisis was more lasting; the 
programmatic readjustments made to respond to it remained in force and 
were decisive in orienting the nation's economic life.
Programmatic Readjustments of the Fifties 
What were these readjustments and how were they decisive? This 
is the key question addressed by the analysis in this chapter. The 
answers must be sought by considering various economic aspects in the 
determination of social structure. It is therefore important to emphasize 
the discussion here on the regime's changing relationship to the workers. 
This discussion involves one of the principal hypotheses examined by this 
study: in taking those tentative programmatic steps which moved it in a 
direction away from the workers from 1949 on, Peronism exercized a key
^Javier Villanueva, The Inflationary Process in Argentina (Buenos 
Aires: Instituto De Telia, 1966), p. 75.
2Cafiero, pp. 140-1.
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choice which affected its subsequent programmatic choices and was there­
fore a decisive factor in shaping the outcome of the transitional process.
The theoretical model followed by this study stresses that a 
particular historical period contains within it the relationships that 
subsequently become determinative. Hence policies reinforcing relation­
ships among certain social groups or strengthening certain aspects of 
the social structure, narrow down the range of patterns likely to emerge 
as dominant at the next stage. Thus the steps which led Peronism away 
from a programmatic orientation which would have been closer to its 
working class base were implicit in the regime's policies prior to 1950, 
particularly those that strengthened capitalist relations of production.
It is within this context that one should understand the Congreso Nacional 
de Productividad y Bienestar Social convened in Buenos Aires in March of 
1955. A precursor to the short-lived Gran Acuerdo Nacional presided over 
by the Peronist government of the seventies, this congress brought together 
delegates from the CGE and CGT— respectively, the employers' and the 
workers' organization— under the slogan of producir, producir, producir.
It represented the most clearly corporatist effort undertaken by,the regime.
Significantly, the Central Organizing Committee convening the 
Congress was composed of an equal number of delegates from the C.G.T. and 
the C.G.E. In its call for the Gongress, the Central Committee stressed 
the need to increase productivity and went on to state that no people's 
organization is in a better position to bring this about than the two 
organizations participating most directly in the process of production. 
They bring together the two basic factors in raising productivity: the 
capabilities of the workers on the one hand, and the economic and techni­
cal means on the other. In a speech before the Congress, Jose‘SGelbard, 
then president of the C.G.E., added a third element: "the worker who must 
incessantly adapt his capacities to new requirements, the entrepreneur 
who must continually be adapting the organization of the enterprise ac­
cording to the needs of the hour, and the state which must always stand 
ready to assist in providing the equipment needed for production." Cuneo, 
pp. 208-9. See note on Gelbard below.
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In one sense it was quite consistent with and flowed from Peronism's 
populist-nationalist doctrine, yet in another sense it was not the only 
conceivable outcome of Peronism's relationships to the working class up 
to 1949.
Peronism's populist-nationalist thrust during the FFYP period 
was expressed in the regime's policies which aimed to provide the basis 
for cementing a class alliance between workers and national industrial­
ists. When the changed conditions of the fifties made this an increas­
ingly difficult formula to carry out, the regime was under pressure to 
choose one of two opposing programmatic directions, both of them arising 
from the policies of the 1943-50 period. On the one hand, the regime could 
have chosen to deepen the process of national liberation it had set in 
motion with its program for economic independence. At this point, con­
tinuing the struggle against dependency would have led Peronism into a 
socialist direction. Economically, this path would have necessitated the 
expropriation of the landed oligarchy and the key industrial monopolies, 
while increasing the state sector of the economy. Politically, it would 
have meant sharpening the class struggle, giving leadership of the process 
to the working class base of the movement, and purging it of careerists 
and opportunists. It would also have required transforming the armed 
forces into popular militias. In general terms, this line was associated 
with Evita just before her death. Though these conclusions clearly go 
beyond Peronist doctrine and were not favored by Peron, they are neverthe-
In 1973 Jose Gelbard became Peron's Minister of Economics. As a 
self-made industrialist he represented a continuity in Justicialism's 
populist-nationalist orientation towards the national bourgeoisie and, at 
the same time, Peron's final futile attempt to bring about a program for 
the construction of a viable national capitalism.
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less not inconsistent with elements of Peronism*s practice up to 1950.
It is important to note this programmatic direction for two reasons.
First, it'underlines the significance of the shift away from the workers 
after 1949. Secondly, this line was resurrected in the late sixties as 
Peronism*s "true" meaning and provided the ideological basis for Justi- 
cialism's mass appeal.
A major reason for the survival and later revival of this 
"socialist" thread within Peronism was that the regime's response to 
the emerging economic crisis was not an unambiguous one. To have pur­
sued either programmatic direction implicit in the 1943-50 formula head- 
on, clearly and directly, would have resulted in very heavy social and 
political costs. Peron sought to avoid these, relying on his genius to 
keep otherwise warring factions within the fold by making each believe 
it was the the true object of his concerns. He postponed a decisive 
reckoning which, in the end, proved even more costly. Nevertheless, 
even though incrementally and with much vacillation, by attempting to 
resolve the contradictions of the prior period within capitalist rela­
tions of production and thus placing the burden of "development" onto 
the workers, the SFYP revealed the programmatic direction of the regime's 
intended socio-economic readjustments.
Even if introduced with some ambiguity and vacillation, the direc­
tion indicated by the policy readjustments of the fifties proved decisive. 
Referring to the set of guidelines framed in 1949-50 which took hold with 
the SFYP in 1953, Kenworthy states:
Particulary with regard to agriculture, but also affecting organized 
labor, this change was pronounced enough to warrant being called a 
reversal. Many of the new policies adopted in 1949-50 were followed, 
at least in general outline, by subsequent administrations. Writing
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in 1962, the Argentine economist Aldo Ferrer frequently commented 
on policies pursued "since 1950," taking no note of Peron's fall 
from power in 1955.^
Others, too, date the decisive shift for the Argentine economy to 1949.
In their analysis Eshag and Thorp describe it as "measures aimed at
restraining domestic demand and providing price incentives to the export
sector of the economy"— in other words, attempting to revive Argentina's
traditional role within the world economy. "The shift of emphasis from
governmental intervention and controls to a reliance on the operation of
the price mechanism and on demand restriction continued throughout the
period, culminating in the International Monetary Fund Stabilisation
Programmes implemented over the years 1959 to 1963." They label this
approach "orthodox economic policy" and attribute Argentina's current
problems to it. By locating it to the changes introduced from 1949 on,
they trace the beginning of Argentina's contemporary difficulties to that 
2date.
This interpretation of Peronism also stresses the decisiveness of 
the shifts undertaken by the regime after 1949. However, it diverges 
from those who point to 1950 as a turning point in that it does not see 
the changes occuring quite so abruptly. The theoretical model applied 
here, by focusing on the social relations promoted through economic 
policy, attempts to go beneath surface manifestations and trace these 
changes as they were developing within the relationships fostered with 
the policies of the prior period. However, it should be noted that these 
shifts remained implicit within the populist-nationalist formula up to
1Eldon Kenworthy’s Ph.D. dissertation, p. 61.
2Eshag and Thorp, pp. 3-4. •
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1950, became gradually more explicit after the crisis of 1950-2, and 
were not pushed to their full potential until after the ambiguities and 
encumbrances of populist-nationalism were removed from power in 1955. 
Moreover, this was not the only possible outcome contained in the earlier 
policies. Therefore, to understand why the transitional process moved 
in the direction of dependent industrialization, the analysis focuses on 
the determinative shifts as these began to unravel with the impact of 
the policies of the fifties.
The policy shifts encompassed in the SFYP reordered the class 
alliance that had been expressed in the FFYP's policies and thereby in­
tensified contradictions that resulted in the coup ousting Peronism 
from power in 1955. The FFYP's foundation had been the alliance between 
the industrial proletariat and bourgeoisie at the expense of the agro­
exporting sector. In the fifties, the SFYP began to formalize a new 
relationship between bourgeois sectors. The embryonic alliance encom­
passed in the SFYP both expressed the increased complexity in the social 
structure, and in turn further reinforced the growing weight of the 
bourgeois sectors based on capital intensive production. This new alli­
ance therefore revolved around bourgeois sectors involved in the production 
of durable and capital goods as well as the landowning oligarchy, at the 
expense of urban workers. Lower wages, it was hoped, would compensate 
for increased production costs resulting from the higher prices of imported 
capital inputs. On the other hand, lower incomes meant a reduction in 
the domestic consumption of food goods thus allowing more to be exported 
which, in turn, would provide the exchange needed to import vital capital
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goods.^ Peronism did not definitively break its ties to the workers, 
this emerging programmatic thrust was not fully carried out until after 
Peron's overthrow.
Nevertheless, the four major programmatic shifts which proved 
decisive in defining the outcome of the transitional process were already 
discernable in the SFYP. They were:
1. Shifting the cost of development onto urban labor
2. Giving priority to heavy and capital goods industry
3. Promoting rural production under oligarchic ownership and
4. Increasing the role of foreign capital in Argentine economic 
development
In the first place, the cost of development was shifted increas­
ingly from the surplus generated by the rural sector to that created by 
urban labor. Moreover, it followed from the fact that economic policies 
were formulated within the framework of the private ownership of the 
means of production and the profit motive as the economic propellant, 
that the gains of the entrepreneurial class were not held back while 
those made by the workers in the period of presperity were reversed.
Secondly, the SFYP gave priority to the development of the nascent 
heavy and capital goods industries. The Peronist government began to 
understand that without a developed sector producing means of production, 
its quest for the economic independence of Argentina would remain an 
elusive goal. Even under the best of circumstances, a concerted effort 
at developing the sector producing means of production poses serious 
problems and difficulties. For Argentina this was made even more difficult
*These points are made in Rock in his article on "The Survival 
of Peronism," in Rock, p. 192.
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because it was the undeveloped state of this sector that provided the 
United States with a handle for exercising its dominance. It was the pol­
icy of the United States government to preserve that situation. In a 
telegram to the U.S. Charge^D1 Affairs in Argentina on February 3, 1945, 
the Secretary of State expressed it as follows: "Export of capital goods
should be kept at present minimum— it is essential not to permit the ex­
pansion of Argentine heavy industry. . .
To the external difficulties one must add the internal ones. 
Developing a sector producing capital goods requires amassing very large 
concentrations of capital. This would have been problematic enough at 
the time of the FFYP; in a period of economic contraction these diffi­
culties were compounded even more. As suggested above, the Peronist 
regime met this problem through an attempt to extract more surplus from 
the industrial proletariat, enforcing higher productivity and providing 
less recompense. However, hampered by its populist-nationalism, the 
regime pursued this course with a great deal of ambiguity. Though 
delaying for longer or shorter periods, the Peronist government usually
responded favorably to pressure from organized workers. Certainly,
✓Peron s government never exercised the kind of brutality against workers 
that later military dictatorships employed. Nor, for that matter, in 
spite of all the accusations of fascism and totalitarianism, did Peron's 
regime ever subject its political opponents to the kind of repression 
later governments levelled against Peronists.
In addition to extracting surplus from the workers, the other 
source lay in the agrarian sector. This brings us to the third of the 
determinative shifts in policy responding to the deterioration of the
^Quoted by Fodor in Rock, pp. 159-60.
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favorable international context after 1950. In this area too, there 
were two possible programmatic directions contained in the populist- 
nationalist practice of the forties. On the one hand, given its anti- 
oligarchic stance, the regime could have expropriated large landed 
property. In view of the deterioration in the terms of international 
trade and the inappropriateness of Peronism in squeezing surplus from 
workers, the further expansion of the internal market was an essential 
step if there was to be any advance in the sector producing means of 
production. A comprehensive agrarian reform was the only means through 
which the domestic market could be immediately enlarged. Expropriating 
the oligarchy undoubtedly entailed heavy political risks and would have 
forced the regime to rely on class mobilization and militancy so intense 
that it very likely could not have been contained within populist-nation- 
alism. On the other hand, the programmatic direction Peron embarked on 
had political costs which, though perhaps not as immediate and direct, 
were severe enough to result in his overthrow.
After 1950, Peron chose to promote the agrarian area under oli­
garchic ownership as the way to enhance Argentine exporting capacities. 
Given its commitment to the private property framework and the social 
relations of capitalism, in order to promote the productivity of the agrar­
ian sector, the regime had to win the oligarchy’s trust. Thus, from 1949 
on, the state provided technical help and made special financing available 
for the purchase of farm machinery. In a step that clearly indicated 
which programmatic direction the state intended to pursue in the area of 
social relations of production, the regime lifted its regulations which 
had prohibited the help of family members in field work (child labor and 
superexploitation of women). Further, to promote rational planning, the
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state set in advance the prices it committed itself to pay for rural 
goods. Finally, in the last years, I.A.P.I. was transformed from an 
institution which skimmed off surplus from the agrarian sector to one 
which subsidized agricultural production.* This transformation indicates 
how far-reaching the reversal in the policy shifts of the fifties was. 
"Guaranteed farm prices and retail food prices were raised in successive 
stages. By 1953 these measures had raised the price paid to the farmer 
for wheat to 2.5 times its level in 1948, while food prices had more than 
tripled."^
Hence, the shift towards promoting the oligarchy’s material
interests, translated concretely into erosion of gains that had accrued
to the workers in the prior period. For its part, the Sociedad Rural
publicly expressed its appreciation for this shift. Referring to the
SFYP, the president of the SRA wrote in an open letter to Peron:
It gives us great satisfaction to express to the President 
the Republic our active agreement with the direction that the 
implementation of said plan will lead to, and we can be sure 
that we are not only expressing our personal point of view but 
that of the members and Board of Directors of the Sociedad 
Rural Argentina. We are certain of being faithful interpreters 
of the thinking of the great mass of the nations's agro-pastoral 
producers, among whom we have already detected the positive 
sentiments produced.
The letter goes on to enumerate reasons for approving the SFYP:
The policies announced on the question of expropriation will 
calm and reassure owner-producers whose support is fundamental in 
the process of production, and it means their greater efforts to 
perfect it with the introduction of improvements on their property 
and equipment.
The policy of setting positively encouraging prices will 
largely neutralize high production costs and undoubtedly bring 
about larger crops.
*0n this point see Di Telia and Zymelman, pp. 241-2. 
2Eshag and Thorp, p. 11.
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The elimination of limitations restricting the labor of family 
members and the possibility for the producer to mobilize his own 
resources according to the rhythm of his crops, will give producers 
the greatest satisfaction.1
However, it must be noted that in spite of the regime's promotion 
of the oligarchy's material interests and the latter's public stance 
moving closer to Peronism, the oligarchy did not abandon its enmity 
toward Peron and its opposition was in fact instrumental in his over­
throw. Thus, in retrospect, it is not at all clear that the economic, 
social, and political costs were any lower than if Peronism had moved 
programmatically in a socialist'direction. The regime was unable to win 
over bourgeois sectors opposing it while it probably succeeded in damp­
ening the enthusiasm of its working class support, which historically 
has been closely related to the rise and ebb of Peronism's political 
fortunes.
Turning to the fourth shift expressed in the policies of the fif­
ties which determined the contents of the emerging developmental pattern, 
let us examine the role of foreign capital. On the one hand, the SFYP 
reaffirmed the orientation in the FFYP which sought to loosen Argentina's 
dependent economic ties to Europe and North America by strengthening rela­
tions with Latin America. The SFYP formulated it as follows:
The foreign commerce of the country in relation to the Latin 
American nations will be guided by the recognition of the over­
riding need to complement the national economies in a mutual 
manner . . . with the aim of achieving the economic defense of 
Latin America.^
This approach remained an important component of Peron's foreign policy.
F̂rorn the Anales de la Sociedad Rural. April of 1952, as cited by 
Cuneo, pp. 216-7.
2 'Camara de Senadores, p. 833.
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Efforts were made to create a South American economic union. In 1953, the 
"Act of Santiago" was signed which set forth the foundations for an 
economic union with Chile: creation of a mixed commission to oversee the 
process, gradual lifting of customs barriers, exchange of products and 
financial resources, etc. That year Peron convinced his friend Alfredo 
Stroessner of Paraguay and Anastasio Somoza of Nicaragua to subscribe to 
the principles of the agreement. Shortly thereafter the Chancellors of 
Argentina and Ecuador signed a similar act in Quito which specifically 
referred to the Santiago Act. The following year the Bolivian government 
signalled its agreement to the principles enunciated in Santiago. However, 
though specifically invited to,the governments of Uruguay, Peru and Brazil 
refused for different reasons and the "economic union" never got much bey­
ond the stage of principles.*
While the SFYP committed Argentina to building economic links to 
Latin America as a means of countering dependent economic relationship to 
more advanced industrialized nations, immediately after the clause cited 
above comes the following, whose implementation undid Peronism1s achieve­
ments in the direction of economic independence:
It is the permanent objective of the Nation to favor the inter­
national exchange of technical knowledge and to stimulate the 
entry of productive capital that desires to cooperate in the 
economic development of the country.
Clearly, the implication of this commitment for the flow of Argentina's
economic relations is that these would not develop in the direction of other
Latin American countries but would rather be predominantly oriented to more
*For a brief discussion on "the Act of Santiago" and subsequent 
developments, see Ciria's Peron y el .lusticialismo, pp. 164-6.
^Camara de Senadores, p. 833.
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industrialized nations. The above statement is quite consistent with, 
and represents the cornerstone of, the policies promoted by the desaro- 
llistas following Peron*s overthrow. As we shall see, once those populist- 
nationalist elements in the Peronist program which contradicted dependent 
industrialization were removed from the scene, the process of linking 
Argentina to the industrialized world assumed particular intensity.
Like their counterparts in today's Third W&rld nations, the Per­
onist laws on foreign capital sought to achieve the contradictory aims 
of, on the one hand, stimulating and attracting the entry of foreign 
capital, while regulating it and protecting national capital on the 
other. Thus Law 14,222 of 1953 attempted to protect the interests and 
status of national capital while also providing benefits to foreign 
capital in order to attract it. In essence it declared foreign capital 
equal to national capital under the law. That is, once established in 
the country, it was subject to all national laws, regulations and privi­
leges. The executive was authorized to waive customs and duties on capi­
tal as it entered the country. A maximum return of eight percent could 
be repatriated annually and the principal could not be touched for at 
least ten years, after which it could be repatriated at ten to twenty 
percent per annum depending on the agreement reached at the point of 
entry.^ In the two years this law was in effect it attracted $512,232,780
9dollars of which $8,197,146 went into the automobile industry. In view
1 / Paraphrased from Felix Herrero, Aspectos legales de la promocion
industrial en la Argentina (Buenos Aires: Instituto Torcuato De Telia,
1962), p. 96.
2Ibid., p. 90, 73 percent of the total was of U.S. origins, followed 
by 14 percent from Germany.
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of the subsequent importance of this sector and of the role of U.S. 
based multinationals within it, these initial investments were of 
obvious strategic value.
After the removal of Peronism's populist and nationalist encum­
brances, the laws on foreign capital became much less restrictive and 
regulatory. For example, Law 14,780 placed no limitations on repatria­
tion except those stipulated in the original agreement allowing entry.
The contradictory nature of Law 14,222 was lessened as the concern became 
less with - protecting national capital than with attracting foreign 
capital.* By 1964, foreign investments totalling $535,999,924 dollars
had been approved with the United States accounting for 58.8 percent of
2this amount, followed by Switzerland with 10.2 percent.
/Another example of the ambiguity in Peron's shift towards foreign
capital is presented by the controversial negotiations over concessions
to award Standard Oil. Argentina had the distinction of possessing the
oldest state owned oil company on the continent——the Yacimientos Petroli-
f eros Fiscales (YPF) . When word leaked out in 1955 that the Peron
government had been engaged in talks with a foreign oil company that would
/break YPF's monopoly, Pelron s anti-imperialist supporters were outraged.
This outrage is often cited as one of the factors producing disillusion-
/•ment amongst the Peronist rank and file at the critical time before Peron's 
overthrow.
Antonio Cafiero, who had been the Minister for Foreign Commerce 
between 1952 and 1954 and Commerce Minister in 1954-5, includes an inter­
esting Appendix in his book,where he records the substance of responses
1 2 Herrero, pp. 105-6. Ibid., p. 107.
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to questions directed at Alfredo Gomez Morales— who had been Peron's 
Minister of Finances and Secretary of Economic Matters— by fellow inmates 
while they were both in prison after the 1955 coup. Gomez Morales justi­
fied the contract with California Argentina de Petroleo because no inter­
national agency would finance YPF's explorations. Argentina did not pro­
duce enough to meet its needs and the idea was to expand local production. 
The foreign company was required to sell to the YPF refinery and would 
thereby, be unable to make inroads into the domestic market which, accord­
ing to Gomez Morales, was really what the multinationals were after.*
Once again, what emerges here is the assigning of a greater role 
for foreign capital in Argentina’s development as the Peron government’s 
response to the crisis of the fifties. The regime attempted to bring in 
foreign capital, but also to regulate it and protect national capital, in 
this case YPF. It proved difficult to maintain these contradictory aims. 
Peronist militants were unhappy with what they perceived as compromising 
Argentine sovereignty, and foreign firms felt cheated of the rewards for 
their investments. Result: one more link in the chain leading to the coup 
that removed one of populist-nationalism’s conflicting poles.
*0n another occasion Alfredo Gomez Morales differentiated the 
Peronist approach to foreign investments from that of its desarollista 
successors-, notably Rogelio Frigerio's "open door to foreign capital" 
under president Frondizi's administration. The proper approach, according 
to Gomez Morales, was to proceed investment by investment, with great care 
for details. Otherwise, book increases in capital rather than real 
business would be attracted. Tariff and exchange protection would be 
required.
It is necessary to attract foreign capital, but also to act with 
great perspicacity, thinking that foreign capital will not come 
here as a benefactor; on the contrary, it will extract from the 
country all that it can. It is a question of finding conditions 
so that it can come to do business, yes, but dirty business, no. . . "
(Cited by Randall, p. 235.)
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Indirect to Direct Dependency: The Transition 
From British to U.S. Hegemony
International Context 
In looking at the process involved in undermining the hegemony 
of the United Kingdom's interests within the Argentine economy and their 
eventual replacement by United States interests, we may begin by consid­
ering the impact of the Second World War in the reordering of positions 
within the international system. Recall that the "British, who controlled 
approximately 60 percent of. the foreign investments in Argentina, had long 
been accustomed to treating that country as a species of sixth dominion 
in their economy."^ Wartime conditions seriously eroded the United King­
dom's' position as a world power and also undermined its dominant role 
within Argentine economic life. We saw that an analogous situation had 
developed in the previous major disruption of the international system 
during the Great Depression. In contradistinction with the policies of 
the thirties which attempted to salvage Argentina's economic ties to 
Great Britain, Peronist policy-makers deliberately set about to ensure 
that England would not again emerge as the major power in Argentine 
economic life.
World War II hastened the decline of the British Empire and led
to political independence of former possessions and economic independence
for Argentina which, in turn, accelerated the Empire's irreversible disso- 
«
lution. By itself, Argentina breaking out of the international network 
controlled by the United Kingdom,played a considerable part in the disin-
1George Blanksten, pp. 239-40.
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integration of Great Britain’s position as a world power. For example, 
Juan Carlos Esteban cites figures*- that show a decline of some 400 
million pounds sterling in British foreign investments from 2,400 million 
in 1945 to 2,000 million in 1953. During this period Argentina national­
ized the railroads which according to the same source, by themselves
2accounted for 150 million pounds sterling. Though the exact magnitude
3of the figures involved may be controversial, there can be no doubt of 
the prominence of the railroads in determining the relationship between 
foreign interests and the specific types of economic activities prevail­
ing at the time.
It is worth reiterating that the measures dismantling the infra­
structure of Britain's hegemony within the Argentine economy constituted 
one of Peronism's most impressive achievements. The final departure of 
the United Kingdom's presence was not a necessary outcome. Another group 
in power might have lacked the courage to attack the United Kingdom's 
position, or if might have chosen to foster and reinforce a different set 
of relationships which could have revived England's presence in the Argen­
tine economy or at least preserved a minimal role for English interests.^
*From Eugenio Varga's Problemas fundamentales de la economxa y 
de la polxtica del imperialismo.
2Esteban, pp. 77-8.
3Esteban maintains that the railroads amounted to 38 percent of 
all foreign investments in Argentina in 1945. For a more detailed discus­
sion of the financial aspects of the nationalization, and also of the pro­
gressive aspects of the nationalization in view of the railroads' function 
in assuring a dominant role for foreign capital, see above on pp. 250-3.
^Skupch, pp. 68-70 makes this point and also provides a good sum­
mary of the conditions leading to the deterioration of British hegemony 
within the Argentine economy and the ascent of U.S. interests, and of 
Peronist measures dismantling England's presence.
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Of course it is true that Peronism acted in a conjuncture in which 
Britain’s power had been weakened considerably. The point, however, is 
that Peronism chose to take advantage of the situation.
Just how much the international situation strengthened Argentina's 
hand in the wartime years can be seen in a dispatch England's Prime Minis­
ter Winston Churchill directed to President Roosevelt of the United 
States. The context was that the United States had tried to get the 
United Kingdom to use its influence in Argentina, assuming Britain's 
economic position as a lever, to prevail upon the new government that 
came in with the G.O.U. coup to break its realations with the Axis.
In their response, the English made it clear that it was Argentina that 
possessed leverage.
If the Argentine beef supply were cut off, Churchill asked, 
how are we to feed ourselves plus the American Army for 'Over­
load' (the Normandy invasion. . . ) The joint examination by 
the Combined Boards in Washington of the supply aspects will show 
you how much these people have us in their hands. An immediate 
cessation of the Argentine supplies, our Chiefs of Staff consider, 
will disrupt military operations on the scale planned for this 
year. . . .Before we leap, we really must look. We can always 
- pay them back when our hands are clear.*
In punishment for Argentina's insistence on maintaining her status 
as a neutral, the United States also worked hard to isolate her within 
Latin America. Because of Argentina's strength at the time, the campaign 
did not prove to be as successful as the United States had hoped. Being 
closely tied to the Argentine economy, Chile, Bolivia, and Paraguay felt 
they could not afford to abide by the United States' request that they
■'‘Cited by David Green (Memo by Hull of conversations with the 
British Ambassador, Jan. 23, 1944 in Folder 216 Hull MS.) in his The 
Containment of Latin America: The History of the Myths and Realities of 
the Good Neighbor Policy (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1971), p. 155. The 
analysis presented here follows that found in this excellent book.
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break their relations with Argentina. "Major Villarroel, the Provi­
sional President of Bolivia, had told a U.S. Embassy staff member that 
'if Argentine retaliation were aroused, Argentina could totally starve 
Bolivia out in thirty days, due to Bolivian dependence on Argentine food 
supplies." Within days "Under Secretary of State Stettinius told Hull 
that the Paraguayan Ambassador in Washington had warned that 'his country 
was completely under the domination of Argentina economically and that 
his Government had no choice on the question of recognition."'^ A few 
months later, in August of 1944, President Roosevelt imposed economic 
sanctions on Argentina. "Four hundred million dollars of Argentine 
assets in the United States were frozen, exports of steel and chemicals
curtailed, and Argentine ports declared off-limits for U.S. shipping.
2The blow was blunted by London's refusal to go along." England too, 
was dependent on Argentine supplies. That year, two fifths of all 
Argentine exports, principally meats, were destined for British markets.
In spite of this offsetting pressure, the United States' sanctions were 
sufficient to aggravate Argentina's serious problems in obtaining inputs 
needed for the rapid industrialization underway. In March of 1945 Argen­
tina declared war on Germany and Japan. Shortly thereafter the United 
States lifted its economic sanctions and recognized the Farrell government.
The hostile posture adopted by the United States State Department
toward the principals in the 1943 coup solidified and entrenched the posi­
tions of those among them with more overt axis sympathies. The U.S. ac-
^(Woodward to Hull, La Paz, Mar. 6, 1944, in 835.01/ 210; memo
from Stettinius to Hull, Mar. 9, 1944, in 835.01/ 271, both in DSA, NA)
in Green, p. 157.
2Kenworthy's Ph.D. dissertation, p. 198.
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tions reinforced the already strong anti-British feelings prevalent 
among nationalist circles at the time. In this context it took some 
courage on Peron1s part to declare war on Germany. Even pro-Allied 
sentiment did not approve of a declaration of war on an already defeated 
enemy. In spite of its unpopularity, Peron faced this step resolutely 
because he understood the necessity of keeping Argentina within the
/U.S. mainstream of the post-War world. To a Uruguayan journalist Peron 
declared:
Our little country is not suspended in space as our nationalists 
would like to believe, but an integral part of a world undergoing 
transformation. We must advance with the tide if we do not want 
to sink.*
Initially the United States opposed the architects of the 1943 
coup on the grounds of their Axis sympathies. However, as events unfolded 
and Peron began to implement his policies, the fundamental reason for the 
attempt.at isolating the new regime became the potentially far-reaching 
implications of social revolution for the rest of Latin America contained 
in the developing Argentine model. It was not so much that Argentina re­
presented a potential industrial competitor, although this factor undoubt­
edly played a role. Mexico and Brazil, with their more developed heavy 
industrial sectors represented a more immediate economic threat and yet 
they were not singled out as targets with the vehemence that Argentina 
was in U.S. foreign policy at the time. More important was the fact that 
in 1945 Argentina seemed to present "a clear portent of the dawning of a 
new day in Latin American political economy and socio-economic relation­
ships."^
^Cited by Luna, El 45, p. 17 (my translation). Luna also makes 
interesting observations surrounding Argentina's declaration of war around 
pp. 24 and 54-5.
2Green, p. 240.
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United States policy makers were unhappy about "the new day" 
that seemed to be taking shape in Argentina. They did not appreciate the 
international implications of Peron's "Third Position" foreign policy and 
found his aggressive pursuit of economic independence particularly irk­
some. Already in 1945 "Peron was playing off the industrial countries 
against each other as they bid for the Argentine markets." For example, 
he "was negotiating an agreement with the Swedes for purchase of agri­
cultural machinery, in direct violation of the United States-Argentine 
oilseed agreement, which contained exclusive machinery supply provisions 
scheduled to run through 1946."^
Peron's mobilization of the working class as the social base for
his regime and the potential for upheaval and disruption of ongoing social
relations must have presented an even more threatening picture for the
United States' position in Latin America. Thus, for example, statements
like Peron's. reply to a 1945 manifesto against the new regime signed by
virtually all Argentine business, industrial, and banking associations,
to which Peron responded confidently by saying "that he now had enough
forces in the regular army and 'in that other Army of labor' to put
2down any insurrection" must have caused apprehension within State Depart­
ment circles. Serious consequences for the social groups on whom the 
United States' presence in Latin America depended would result if other 
regimes like Getulio Vargas' in Brazil were also to threaten working 
class mobilization against bourgeois sectors.
However, there was disagreement within the State Department on 
just how much of a threat the Argentine model really represented and on 
whether the attempt to isolate the Peronist regime was the most effective
1 2 Green, p. 245. Ibid.
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response. Apparently, Nelson Rockefeller, then Assistant Secretary of
State for Latin American Affairs, was the chief advocate for the position
:of winning Peron over from.within rather than antagonizing him further.
For this-Rockefeller was relieved of his duties on August 25, 1944.
State Department official Carl Spaeth privately told a member 
of the U.S. Embassy staff in Buenos Aires that Rockefeller had 
been "blown through the roof" of the State Department by the pub­
lic attacks of two major newspapers... The (N.Y.) Times and the 
(Washington) Post, Spaeth said, felt that Rockefeller had aided 
the forces of Argentine fascism by his overenthusiastic support 
of the Farrell-Peron regime at the San Francisco Conference of 
the United Nations.*
In the long run however, as David Green also notes:
the tactical approach which- had been worked out in the spring 
of 1945 by Nelson Rockefeller, Senator Vandenberg, and other 
like-minded policy-makers ultimately carried the day. Peron 
was to be wooed— and won. The fly-swatter approach had not 
worked; there was nothing left but to try the flypaper.2
With this approach United States policy makers achieved their aims in a
relatively short time span.
Peronist Policies
Peronist policies delivered the final blow to the hegemony 
of British interests within the Argentine economy. The measures which 
systematically undid the foundations for the United Kingdom's domination 
included-the nationalization of the railroads and utilities, state mono­
poly over agricultural export structures, creation of the Central Bank, 
and expansion of the state merchant marine to the point that it effec-
According to a memo of a conversation, in Washington, between 
Carl Spaeth and Charles Burrows of the Buenos Aires Embassy staff (June 
24, 1946, in Messersmith MS), Green, p. 244.
2Ibid., p. 254.
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tively cut into profits realized in overseas transportation.* Seen in 
the context of a long process of decline in Britain's hegemony, these 
measures represented the definitive culmination of that process. With 
these steps the Peronist regime prevented any possibility of even a 
partial resurgence for English interests through economic policy, as had 
been the case in the thirties. The Argentine case thus presents a cri­
tical episode in the reordering of the relations defining the inter- 
2national system. It was a key component in the process of global trans­
formation from a system based on Britain's position in the international 
division of labor as "the world's workshop" to the new world order centered 
around the North American multinational corporation, a process which 
reached its climax in the post World War II era.
The policies mentioned here directly attacked the structures upon 
which British hegemony was founded. Other policies, those which promoted 
industrialization, indirectly aided the predominance of United States 
based multinationals by hastening the development of the infrastructure 
on which their presence rested. The experience of the twenties had
As a part of its campaign to isolate Argentina economically, 
the United States made a concerted effort to attack the expansion of the 
Argentine merchant marine. In a memorandum in August of 1947, the State 
Department's Division of American Republics Affairs states:
Argentina is actively attempting to build up a merchant marine through 
a system of preferences and discriminations. By virtue of its newly 
acquired position as a creditor nation, Argentina is exerting extreme 
pressure in countries requiring loans of foodstuffs to include a 
shipping clause in agreements covering such needs whereby each country 
shall take necessary measures to assure that the transportation of 
merchandise originating in that country shall take place preferably 
in vessels of the two contracting countries on an equal 
fifty-fifty tonnage basis. . . . Our policy should be to 
aggressively attack methods used by Argentina in the way we 
have been doing, and particularly watch the sales of ships to 
avoid furnishing Argentina with the means with which to 
implement this discriminatory policy.
Escude, p. 385.
Recall discussion above on pp. 292-4.
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already shown the differential effect resulting from the growth of 
manufacturing activity: it was advantageous for U.S. interests while 
it impacted adversely on the interrelationships underlying the Anglo- 
oligarchic connection. Hence, though it certainly was not their intended 
aim, Peronist policies which pushed import substituting industrialization 
based on producing consumer goods, expedited the conditions that ulti­
mately led to the hegemony of United States interests within the Argen­
tine economy.^
We saw that Peronist industrializing policies did not represent 
a fundamental departure from previous efforts and that, indeed, their 
substance represented a continuity with the industrialization sponsored 
in modifying the externally oriented growth pattern in the thirties.
Peronism departed fundamentally from its immediate past in the quantity 
of industrialization it promoted. It was a case of quantitative change 
leading to qualitative changes. The very fact that manufacturing re­
placed agriculture as the nation's predominant form of economic activity
meant a shift in Argentina's relations with external groups determining
2the direction of economic life for the next stage.
^These points summarize the conclusions of Skupch's analysis on 
the decline of the United Kingdom's hegemony over the Argentine economy.
2See pp. 231-3 above for data showing the reversal in the positions oc­
cupied by manufacturing and agriculture as the predominant forms of econ­
omic activity. Daniels (Part II), p. 11 shows that this relationship 
prevailed during the next stage.
Percentages for Sectors of Economic Activity of Gross Internal
Product at Factor Cost and 1960 Prices for Selected Years
1955 1957 1960 1962 1963 1964
Agriculture-livestock 19.9 17.4 16.8 16.4 16.8 16.8
Manufacturing 30.3 32.0 32.4 32.3 32.0 33.7
SOURCES: Based on data published in the Yearbook of Current Accounts 
for 1955 and 1957. For other years the Annual Report of the Central Bank.
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As we saw the corollary to import substituting industrialization 
based on production of consumer goods was a tremendous rise in the demand 
for capital goods. Daniels summarizes the impact on the importation of 
industrial goods: "Imports of manufactured goods fi.e., consumer goodsj 
diminished significantly (from 39.1 percent to 11.8 percent of the total 
imports between 1945 and 1952), while imported capital goods rose from 
13.3 percent to 41.5 percent of the total imports between 1945 and 1950."^ 
This increase betrayed the fact that local producers were unable to meet 
the sharply heightened demand for machinery and equipment resulting from 
the rapid growth of manufacturing. Development of the capital goods pro­
ducing sector would have required massive concentrations of capital, 
whether from foreign or domestic sources. Obtaining capital through for­
eign investments was not a realistic option as long as wartime needs con­
sumed the economies of the advanced industrial nations. Moreover, it ran 
counter to Peronism's quest for economic independence in the immediate 
post-war era,.though as we saw, this was one of the significant shifts 
that took shape with the readjustments of the SFYP. On the other hand, 
mobilization of local capital and utilization of foreign exchange reserves 
cut into the consumer goods producing sector's ability to complete the 
circuit necessary to its reproductive cycle. In other words, capital used 
for the immediate purposes of replenishing capital inputs, would instead 
have had to have been diverted for investment into developing means of 
production for producing means of production.
Though clearly insufficient to meet the demand for machinery and 
equipment, basic industries controlled by the state and private groups 
nevertheless developed under Peronism. Herein lies a fundamental difference
^"Daniels (Part II), p. 6.
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between the industrializing effects of previous regimes and Peronism1 s 
accomplishments: while the industrialization of the thirties was largely 
confined to light industry producing non-durable consumer goods, its 
further expansion' under Peronist auspices caused spill-over into the more 
rapid development of the capital goods oriented sector. This represents 
another manifestation of the dynamic of quantitative change leading to 
qualitative changes.
However, this argument should not be pushed too far because de­
spite the rapid development of the capital" goods producing sector and of 
the sector with a higher organic composition of capital generally, this 
expansion was still far from adequate to free industry from dependence on 
foreign suppliers. This dependence played a vital part in the movement 
from an indirect to a direct form of dependency. The lack of a developed 
capital goods sector is key to this analysis of Peronism as the culminat­
ing transitional stage in the process from an externally oriented growth 
pattern to a dependent industrial economy.
Tripartite Trade Pattern as the Transitional Form:
Indirect to Direct Dependency, I
The model of dependency theory applied in this analysis stresses 
shifts in the predominant combination of national and foreign interests 
as decisive in shaping the outcome of a transitional period. The favorable 
wartime conditions and the independence enjoyed by the Peronist state from 
both foreign and national economic groups highlighted one aspect and ob­
scured another of the shift taking place during this period. Peronism’s 
nationalist and anti-imperialist policies clearly dismantled the structures 
of British influence; less clear was the movement toward the ascendancy of
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North American interests. Peronist policies, especially after 1950, re­
vived the trend toward the increasingly central role of North American 
interests within the Argentine economy that had already been discernable 
in the twenties.
Before analyzing the specifically Argentine role in the transi­
tion from the hegemony of British to that of North American interests, 
it is interesting to note the United States' efforts to take advantage 
of the United Kingdom’s weakened position during the war and post-war 
period. The following memorandum from the files of the Office of Inter- 
American Affairs was indicative of the State Department's thinking on 
the subject of British holdings in Argentina:
There are some good properties in the British portfolio and we 
might well pick them up now. There is also a lot of trash which 
Britain should be allowed to keep.l
Various deals proposing to use English assets as collateral for financing 
its war effort were never actually carried out. However, one of the con­
ditions for the Lend-Lease Program was that the United Kingdom consume 
its own exportable goods and this did result in a significant reduction 
of Britain's exports to the area.
United States policy during this period was to help the United 
Kingdom in negotiations which undermined the Anglo-Argentine connection 
while adopting obstructionist tactics and sabotaging any possibilities 
that might strengthen Anglo-Argentine ties. The British were aware of 
the situation and understandibly unhappy about it, as indicated in the 
following Foreign Office memorandum:
1Hanson to Will Clayton, Nov. 2, 1940, OIAA: 30: Foreign Trade 
in Other American Republics, cited by Green, p. 140.
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The fundamental difficulty, as Sir David Kelly [the English Am­
bassador in Buenos AiresJ points out, is that the U.S. Govern­
ment are hostile not so much towards (the present Argentine gov­
ernment) as towards Argentina herself, whatever government she 
has, because, with her profitable economic links with Great 
Britain, she can afford to pursue a comparatively independent 
policy vis-a-vis the dominant influence of the United States in 
the western hemisphere. The United States are, of course, jeal­
ous of our influence and position in Argentina, and in attacking 
the Argentine Government they have a latent hope that they may at 
the same time succeed in reducing our own position in Argentina, , 
which has helped the Argentines stand up to them. From this vi­
cious circle it is difficult ... to see any escape.^
J. V. Perowne, the head of the Foreign Office's South American Department,
offered the following assessment in 1945:
One cannot escape the feeling that the "Fascism" of Colonel 
Peron is only a pretext for the present policies of Mr. Braden 
and his supporters in the State Department; their real aim is to 
humiliate the only Latin American country which has dared to 
brave their lightning. If Argentina can effectively be cowed 
and brought to patent submission, State Department control over 
the Western hemisphere (so the State Department imperialists no 
doubt think) will be established beyond a peradventure. This 
will contribute at one and the same time to mitigate the possible 
dangers of Russian and European influence in Latin America, and 
remove Argentina from what is considered to be our orbit.
It will be recalled that these favorable wartime conditions also
strengthened the hand of the nationalistically inclined regime of the 
forties in implementing its anti-imperialist policies. It was the favor­
able conjuncture of internal and external factors of the forties that 
provided the independence and room for maneuver which allowed the Peronist 
regime to be "above class forces" and to contain the contradictions inher­
ent in its class conciliation program. Hence, up to 1950 the Peronist 
state was able to provide national entrepreneurs the conditions and incen­
tives for expanded production while also achieving a redistribution of 
wealth benefiting labor, and, at the same time, it lessened the influence
1 2Escude, p. 80. Ibid., p. 241.
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of foreign interests on the Argentine economy to an all-time low.
In the favorable conjuncture of the forties, the dismantling of 
the structures on which British hegemony rested was quite clear while 
the dynamics leading to their replacement by North American multination­
als was not. Table 23 shows the shift in the influence of English and 
North American capital within Argentina's economy.
TABLE 23— Long range private foreign investments (using millions of 1950
dollars and the base year of 1945=100)
Years United Kingdom United States Other Countries Total
value index value index value index value index
1931 4,294 189 1,436 158 1,910 176 7,640 179
1934 3,481 153 1,536 169 1,903 176 6,920 162
1940 2,938 130 108 12 1,504 139 5,570 131
1945 2,271 100 907 100 1,082 100 4,260 100
1949 338 15 447 49 955 88 1,740 41
1953 357 16 494 54 1,019 94 1,870 44
1955 402 18 558 61 900 83 1,860 44
SOURCE: Esteban, p. 79.
Peronist policies clearly discouraged foreign investments until 
1952. The slight upward trend in the figures on Table 23 for the last 
years of the Peronist decade accord with the shift in policy orientation 
toward foreign capital incorporated in the SFYP.'*' Table 23 shows the most 
dramatic drop in foreign investments to be those of British origins and 
also shows that this took place during the height of Peronism's indus­
trialization between 1945 and 1949.
^Blanksten, p. 246, also perceives a 180° turn in the policies 
of economic independence around this time. He sees an about face leading 
to a sudden sympathetic orientation towards U.S. interests..
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As Juan Carlos Esteban notes, this drastic reduction in the parti­
cipation of English capital led to the proportional, though not actual, 
increase in that of U.S. capital during the Peronist decade, as Table 24 
shows.
TABLE 24.— Percentage of participation of investment capital by country 
of origin
Year United Kingdom United States Other Countries1
1945 53.3 21.3 25.4
1955 21/6 30.0 48.4
SOURCE: Esteban, p. 80.
Esteban aptly remarks that it was not at that time, a case of new U.S. 
investments displacing British capital. Rather it was a case of North 
American capital not being harmed as much by the closed market and Peron- 
ism's nationalistic industrializing policies generally. Restrictions on 
the repatriation of profits forced U.S. capital to reinvest.
The lessening influence of foreign capital was one of the most 
notable consequences of Peronist policies. Table 25 shows this trend as 
well as some other distinguishing features of the Peronist period.
The data showing the decline in the percentage of GDP comprised by 
exports indicate the increasing shift in the orientation of economic activ­
ity towards the internal market. In showing the dropping percentage of 
imported consumer goods in the total consumed, Table 25 also provides an 
indication of the growing capability of national industry to supply the 
domestic market. The tendencies expressed by these data on Table 25 are
^This category probably masks many multinationals in fact based 
in the United States through the use of subsidiary firm's with corporate 
offices in Switzerland, Luxembourg, Belgium, and elsewhere.
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generally consistent with the. movement toward an internally oriented 
growth model based on import substituting industrialization.
TABLE 25.— Relative weight of foreign capital and impact of foreign 
trade on Argentine production
Average Average Average Average
1900-13 1919-30 1931-9 1946-55
Fqreign-Capital as Percentage
of Total Capital 47.7 32.0 20.4 5.1
Imported Consumer Goods as
Percentage of Total Consumed 15.7 13.3 6.8 1.2
Exports as a Percentage of
Gross Domestic Procuct 24.6 24.3 20.0 8.1
SOURCE: Cafiero, p. 180, based on E.C.L.A. figures.
Table 26 provides additional corroboration for these points. The
data in Table 26 reflect the growing capability of national
industry to supply the domestic market. Almost all categories show the
TABLE 26.— Merchandise imports as percentage of aggregate supply, 1900-691
1900-4 1925-9 1937-9 1946-9 1950-4 1960-1 1969
Foodstuffs 6 5 5 2 2 2 2
Textiles and Apparel 55 45 44 15 5 4 5
Chemicals 45 38 40 19' 14 15 19
Metals 87 65 46 37 21 22 16
Machinery, Vehicles 
and Equipment 
(excluding electrical) 92 79 49 43 23 25 27
Electrical Machinery 
and Appliances 100 98 56 22 8 9 26
SOURCES: U.N., Yearbooks of International Trade Statistics: B .C.R.,4
Origen del producto y distribucion del ingreso. From Randall, p. 117.
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most dramatic decreases in merchandise import as a percentage of their 
aggregate supply for the Peronist years. To anticipate a point developed 
in the next chapter, it is interesting to note that the sharpest drop 
for the 1946-9 period is shown by "textiles and apparel"— a category 
representative of the light industrial sector producing non-durable con­
sumer goods— while the two categories showing the greatest declines for 
the 1950-4 period— "electrical machinery and appliances" and "machinery, 
vehicles, and equipment"— are more representative of the heavy industrial 
sector producing durable consumer and capital goods. These data support 
our hypothesis about the shift in Peronist industrializing policies 
between the forties and fifties.
The success achieved by Peronist policies in lessening the direct 
presence of foreign capital obscured the relatively growing influence of 
North American capital that was also taking place. Therefore, in order 
to clarify the dynamics involved in the process that resulted in United 
States based multinationals assuming a hegemonic position within the 
Argentine economy, it is necessary to focus the analysis on the nature of 
the industrialization taking place in the Peronist period, and particularly 
on its underlying contradictions.
At the height of their success, Peronist policies aiming to liber­
ate the Argentine economy from foreign domination went a long way in undoing 
the pattern that underlay economic life: the exchange of agro-pastoral 
commodities for manufactured, non-durable consumer goods. The traditional 
predominantly two-way flow between Argentina and the United Kingdom was 
increasingly replaced with the tripartite pattern the policies of the
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1 2 thirties had attempted to stem. As noted above, the corollary to the
type of import substituting industrialization carried out under Peronist 
auspices was the need for the importation of capital goods. Since the 
United States was the primary source for capital goods, it became necess­
ary for Argentina to realize a surplus from her agricultural exports to 
Europe in order to cover the deficit in her trade with North Anerica.
This tripartite pattern functioned even at the crest of Peronism's 
achievements, in 1947, when "The U.K. bought 30 percent and the U.S. took 
10 percent of Argentina's exports for that year; and 45 percent and 8.4 
percent, respectively, of her imports came from the United States and 
Britain."3
TABLE 27.— Argentine trade with the United States and Great Britain (aver­
age for five year periods in millions of dollars at current prices)
Imports Exports
Total U.S. G.B. G.B. U.S. Total
1946-50 1,127.2 337.0 135.8 326.6 268.4 1,340.8
1951-5 1,121.2 188.6 75.6 180.8 163.2 987.6
1956-60 1,182.6 251.6 91.8 228.4 111.2 1,000.2
1961-5 1,214.6 309.8 98.2 177.0 101.2 1,289.6
SOURCE: Compiled from Diaz Alejandro, pp. 461, 465-6, 476- 483. 
Peso/dollar conversions effected in accordance with exchange rates which 
appear upon p. 485. Adapted from Lewis in Rock, p. 121.
Table 27 shows the tripartite pattern that defined Argentina's foreign
The tripartite permutations between Argentina, the United States, 
and the United Kingdom during this period are extensively analyzed in the 
following Ph.D., theses: Carlos Andres Escude, "The Argentine Eclipse: the 
International Factor in Argentina's Post World War II Decline, Ph.D. disserta­
tion, (Yale University, 1981) and D.B. Easum, "The British-Argentine-U.S. 
Triangle," Ph.D. dissertation, (Princeton University, 1953).
^See p. 301. 3Blanksten, p. 243.
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trade during this period. The figures show a consistently greater amount 
of imports from the United States than exports to it and, conversely, a 
larger amount of exports to Great Britain than imports from it. It is 
interesting to note that from 1945 to 1960 exports to England almost ex­
actly balance the imports from North America. The figures for the six­
ties seem to indicate a shift in this pattern in that other markets dis­
placed the importance of the United Kingdom for Argentine exports. The 
data in Table 27 also exhibit an overall tendency for imports from Great 
Britain to decline, a departure from the traditional model of Argentina's 
foreign trade. The significance of the consistently diminishing value of 
exports to the United States will become apparent further on.
The most interesting figures on Table 27 for the purposes of this 
analysis of Peronism are those for the 1945-50 period. The fact that 
total exports were at their highest during those years shows that the tri­
partite pattern was at its strongest. The fact that imports from the 
United States were at their highest in turn, shows that this was a key 
point in the U.S. displacing Great Britain as Argentina's major trading 
partner. Recall also that 1945-50 was the period when Peronism achieved 
its greatest successes. Taken together, these facts support the view 
taken in this analysis that the Peronist model, one of its key features 
being the tripartite trade pattern, represents the pivotal stage in the 
transitional process from externally oriented growth to dependent indus­
trialization. In continuation, I explore this central hypothesis in more 
detail: we must look more closely inside the tripartite pattern for the 
key elements in the transitional process toward dependent industrialization.
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The tripartite trade pattern grew out of the corollary to the 
import substituting industrialization pursued by Peronism: the increased 
need to import capital goods. As we have seen, the substitution of local 
production for the importation of manufactured consumer goods benefited 
U.S.-based multinationals at the expense of British economic interests.
Thus the largest deficit in U.S.-Argentine trade for the period between 
1946 and 1952 coincided with the year in which the output of the indus­
trial sector was the highest. According to a government agency, Argentina’s 
imports from the United States in 1948 amounted to 2,296 million pesos, 
while her exports to the U.S. for that year reached 537 million pesos. 
According to the same source, the importation of machinery and vehicles 
constituted half of total imports for 1948.^
Table 29 shows how strong a by-product of Peronist industrializa­
tion the importation of machinery and equipment from the United States 
was. It is interesting to note in these figures that increased importa- 
taion of machinery and equipment was not confined to those for the indus­
trial sector alone, but also extended to agriculture. Table 28 shows 
this concern with mechanizing agriculture through the importation of 
equipment, the trend being especially pronounced for the period of 
the SFYP.
TABLE 28.— Importation of tractors
1920-3 1925-9 1930-4 1935-9 1940-4 1945-9 1950-4
Units
Imported 1,037 2,207 446* 2,035 280* 3,360 6,339
SOURCE: Cafiero, p. 233
*These lows reflect the impact of crisis in the international sys­
tem: the Great Depression in one case, and World War II in the other.
Ê1 intercambio con los Estados Unidos (Buenos Aires, 1951) and 
S:£ntesis estadistica mensual- de la Reptiblica Argentina (Buenos Aires,
July 1953), both published by the Ministerio de Asuntos Tecnicos.
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Contrary to conventional allegations that Peronism failed to pro­
mote rural productivity, it appears that there was interest in the mech­
anization of agriculture. This would conflict with the simplistic inter­
pretation that the regime’s major failure lay in its neglect of the 
agrarian sector and would be consistent with the argument that Peronism's 
problems stemmed from a complex combination of international factors, 
beyond its control, and its refusal to alter fundamental social relations 
underlaying the productive process.
TABLE 29.— Importation of capital goods from the United States (thousands 
of dollars)
1937 1939 1947 1948
Machinery and Electrical
Apparatus 4,946 3,234 35,668 32,048
Motors, Turbines and Accessories
Accessories 367 347 4,272 10,282
Machinery for Metallurgical
Industries 368 432 9,657 8,211
Machinery for Mining and
Petroleum 3,041 3,743 9,394 7,395
Textile Machiner 817 615 9.942 14,846
Miscellaneous Machinery
(refrigeration, compressors,
etc.) 2,037 1,568 19,475 16,289
Machinery and Agrigultural
Implements 11,053 6,498 20,616 14,152
SOURCE: "Recent Developments in the Foreign Trade of Argentina," 
United States Tariff Commission (Washington, D.C.: 1950). From Cafiero, 
p.59.
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Tripartite Trade Pattern as the Transitional Form:
Indirect to Direct Dependency, II
Above I examined the increased dependence on imported capital 
goods as a corollary to the type of industrialization promoted by the 
Peronist regime. I began to show the relationship of this by-product 
of Peronist industrialization to the process whereby the United States 
displaced Great Britain as the predominant influence on and in the 
Argentine economy. I noted that Peronist economic policies were a case 
of quantitative change leading to qualitative change so that what began 
as promoting internally oriented growth to salvage the traditional 
externally oriented growth model by modifying it, ended up by subordi­
nating the foreign trade infrastructure to further internal growth. I 
pointed out how this internal orientation undid the foundations upon 
which the British presence rested while not fundamentally harming 
North American interests. However, while the former tendency could be 
readily observed, the latter was not quite so visible.
In this section I continue to analyze data that allow a more 
detailed look inside the tripartite trade pattern with a particular view 
to discerning the movement from indirect to direct dependency. The trend 
from indirect to direct dependency lies at the core of the transitional 
process from externally oriented gorwth to dependent industrialization. 
Table 30 shows this trend. Though in U.S. dollars, the figures shown 
in Table 31 establish the basic continuity of the trends displayed in 
Table 30. Hence, we may surmise that the relationship developing in the 
Peronist years were not transitory and, indeed, solidified in the subse­
quent period.
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TABLE 30.— Value of merchandise imports in million paper pesos and the
Total U.S. U.K. Germany, Italy 
and France
1943 942 179 195 0
1944 1,007 172 80 0
1945 1,154 159 116 2
1946 2,332 665 308 89
1947 5,349 2,431 446 434
1948 6,190 2,287 775 692
1949 4,642 689 722 1,218
1950 4,481 787 569 1,147
1951 10,492 2,199 788 2,551
1952 8,361 1,537 509 1,487
1953 5,667 965 355 1,226
SOURCE: Annuario del comercio exterio, several issues. From Diaz
Alejandro, Statistical Appendix.
Two trends stand out clearly in Tables 30 and 31 : 1) the displace-
ment of Great.Britain by the United States as the major source of imports,
and 2) the apparent competition faced by the United States from three na­
tions that were to become a part of the European.Economic community. This
TABLE 31.— Value of imports in million current dollars, and main suppliers
Total U.S. U.K. Germany, Italy 
and France
1955 1,173 154 76 204
1960 1,249 327 113 297
1965 1,198 273 73 236
SOURCES: Comercio exterior and Boletin de estadistica, several issues. 
From Diaz Alejandro, Statistical Appendix.
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second trend raises a complex topic since the national origins behind 
the capital of many European multinationals is unclear. How widespread 
is the involvement of U.S. capital in particular European firms such as 
Olivetti or that of General Motors in Opel, for example. Nevertheless, 
considering the Argentine case illustrative of trends in the dependent 
industrial world, these data indicate that the subject of competition 
between advanced capitalist nations deserves serious study in analyzing 
the dynamics of dependency.
Tables 30 and 31 indicate the directions in which Argentina's 
external economic relations developed; Tables 32 and 33 provide data on 
the contents of those relationships.
Table 30 showed the largest increases in the total values of 
annual imports to have taken place in 1945-46, 1946-47, and 1950-51; 
in each case their value more than doubled that for the previous year.
In Table' 32 the columns for "Durable Consumer Goods," "Fuels and Lubri­
cants," "Metallic Intermediate Goods," and particularly those for "Indus­
trial Machinery and Equipment" and "Transport and Communications Equip­
ment" show dramatic rises for the years between 1947 and 1948. These 
systematic increases, making up the biggest value of imports in the 
period which corresponds to the high point of Peronist industrialization, 
bear out the hypothesis on the type of industrialization promoted by the 
FFYP: dependence on the importation of capital goods. In addition, com­
paring the figures in these categories for 1945 through 1948 with data for 
this time period on Table 30, bears out the hypothesis on the differing 
contents of British and North American trade, the latter centering on cap­
ital goods. It will be noted that the highest annual increases in the 
total value of imports corresponds with the highest annual increases of
TABLE 32.— Value of merchandise imports in paper pesos at 1950 prices, by major categories (million pesos)



















1943 2,034 596 48 82 108 75 20
1944 2,008 636 49 78 113 55 7
1945 2,205 513 190 99 171 76 17
1946 4,307 548 772 330 453 309 266
1947 7,901 1,357 735 403 809 925 1,245
1948 8,147 983 722 586 818 1,394 852
1949 5,468 584 290 475 641 865 258
1950 4,821 434 202 593 656 652 168
1951 6,123 435 608 661 925 625 233
1952 4,106 253 221 680 500 480 319
1953 3,590 266 109 654 301 403 421
SOURCE: United Nations, E.C.L.A., E.CN. 12/429/Add. 4, Mimeographed Statistical Appendix 
to El desarollo economico de Argentina, 3 vols. (Mexico, 1954), p. 109. From Diaz Alejandro, Statistical 
Appendix.
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imports from the United States. This relationship is congruent with 
the hypothesis that the Peronist model of internally oriented growth 
depended indirectly on U.S. based economic interests.
The consistent decreases in the annual values of imported non­
durable consumer goods, except for the sharp rise in 1947-48, indicates 
the success of the Peronist policies promoting import substituting indus­
trialization in this area. Bearing in mind that the rise in real wages 
from 1947 to 1948 was the highest for the entire Peronist period, the 
increased value of imported non-durable consumer goods for those years 
provides evidence for an important aspect of this analysis of Peronism 
as a transition towards dependent industrialization: the expansion of 
the domestic market outdistanced that of local production, creating a 
vacuum that could be filled either by the further development of pro­
ductive forces under local control, implying a change in the prevalent 
social relations, or by increasing dependency on external forces.
More directly germane to this interpretation of Peronism are the 
figures for the durable consumer goods category. The sharp increases in 
the annual values of imported durable consumer goods for 1946, 1947, and 
1948, in the context of the general decline in the annual values of im­
ported non-durable goods, corroborate the argument presented here. What 
was said in connection with the increased importation of non-durable goods 
from 1947 to 1948 applies all the more to durable consumer goods. Although 
strides were being made in the heavy industrial area during those years, 
this sector was relatively undeveloped compared to the light industrial 
sector producing non-durable goods. Therefore, dramatic increases in the 
purchasing power of the economically active population produced an in­
creased demand for durable consumer goods that national production was
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Incapable of filling; hence the increases in the values for those types 
of goods in the years when real wages made their largest gains. The 
inability of the heavier industrial sector 'to meet the need of 
local industry can be seen from the fact that while the annual value of 
of imported non-durable consumer goods declined by almost one-half from 
1943 to 1953, that for metallic intermediate goods almost tripled in 
the same period; this in spite of advances made in the area of steel pro­
duction and processing. The annual values of imported machinery and in­
dustrial equipment provides the most dramatic indicator for the dependence 
on foreign sources for capital goods that underlay the Peronist formulas. 
Note the sharp contrast with 1943 when the value of imported non-durable 
consumer goods surpassed that for metallic intermediate goods and that 
for the imports of industrial machinery and equipment.
Table 33 again shows the basic continuity of these trends with 
the results of post-Peronist policies. The thrust of the data accord 
with the hypothesis that the major trend after 1950 was toward the direct 
form of dependency characterized by economic control exercised by mono­
polistic multinationals producing locally. Indicative of this movement 
is the fact that the highest annual values of imports for almost all 
categories occur in 1948, and all of them, save one, had higher values 
of imports for 1948 than they had for 1964. When compared to the figures 
in Table 32, the annual values shown above reveal an important shift in 
the nature of imports. The decline in the values of imported durable 
consumer goods is more substantial than that for non-durable consumer 
goods. In general, while the annual values of imports for the two cate­
gories tended to approximate each other in the previous period, in the 
latter period a gap emerged between them, with durable goods generally
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having a lower importation value. This is congruent with the hypothesis 
that the multinational corporate presence begins in the area of capital 
goods and durable consumer goods. Their increased role within the Argen­
tine economy would enable them to provide for a greater part of national 
demand through local production, thus reducing importation of these types 
of goods. The even sharper downward trend in the annual values of imported 
industrial machinery and equipment provides additional indirect evidenct 
for this point, especially given the fact that machinery and equipment 
for modern communications and transportation is highly sophisticated and 
produced for the most part by a few multinational giants.
Conclusions
We have seen that the corollary to Peronism1s intensified indus­
trialization was the increased need for imported machinery and parts. In 
its foreign trade aspect the new model represented no more than a modifi­
cation of the traditional one in that, even though the predominantly two- 
way flow had been decisively replaced by the tripartite pattern, it still 
depended on the export of rural commodities. However, the new model 
departed fundamentally from the traditional one in that the benefits 
derived from Argentina's external links were used to promote the interests 
of groups whose economic activity was essentially contradictory to exter­
nally oriented growth. That is why I have chosed to conceptualize the 
form taken at this pivotal stage in the transitional process as indirect 
dependency. The interests promoted by the state, although dependent on 
the surplus derived from economic activity oriented to external markets, 
were nonetheless tied to productive activity oriented to the internal 
market.
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The favorable external circumstances prevailing up until 1950 
allowed Peronism both to stimulate production within capitalist relations 
and also develop the internal market through a redistribution of wealth 
benefiting labor. The populist-nationalist coalition Peronist policies 
sought to cement happened to be congruent with the positive conjuncture 
prevailing in the immediate postwar period. This favorable situation 
therefore, obscured the contradictions within Peronism1s developmental 
pattern (internally oriented growth dependent on exports) and it enabled 
the regime to contain the contradictory interests (capital and labor) in 
the class alliance it was seeking to promote. Hence, when that situation 
deteriorated after 1950, Peronism had failed to move in the one area it 
had some measure of control over— altering the social relations of produc­
tion— at a time when conditions were the most advantageous for such poli­
cies, which even then would have been rough going indeed.
Essentially, Peronism's problems flowed from the concern in its 
populist-nationalist doctrine not to directly attack the fundamental 
social relations of capitalist production. Thus, in the agrarian sector, 
while it exerted indirect pressure on the oligarchy by monopolizing trade 
structures, the regime left the material base' of its avowed enemies intact. 
To be sure, nationalizing large landed property would have created tremen­
dous, perhaps even insurmountable, difficulties for the regime; but in the 
end they might have proved less costly than the inaction which was one 
of the chief reasons for Peron's overthrow.
This chapter analyzed the regime's programmatic response to the cri­
sis of the fifties. The policies expressed in the Second Five Year Plan 
indicated that the regime had opted for the capitalistic rather than the 
socialistic side of the relations implicit in the policies of the 1943-50
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period. In comparing the Second with the First Five Year Plan, four 
shifts were found which promoted relationships among groups whose interests 
determined the post Peronist developmental pattern. Shifting the cost of 
development onto urban labor, giving priority to heavy and capital 
goods industry, aiding rural production under oligarchic ownership, and 
increasing foreign capital's role in Argentine development— all proved 
key in orienting the outcome of the transitional process towards a de­
pendent industrial economy. Since 1950 particularly, and increasingly 
since then, Argentine industry has become technologically dependent on 
U.S. corporations. It was through this more modern industrial sector that 
U.S. based multinational interests began their extensive penetration of 
the Argentine economy. It was also the bourgeoisie in this sector which 
became the backbone of the "internationalized national bourgeoisie." This 
barrier of technological inadequacy has been one of the most formidable 
problems confronted by less developed nations which have sought to 
break out of dependent relationships. As in the Argentine case, it has 
led to a restructuring of dependency rather than a radical change toward 
a developmental pattern guided by the interests of the poorest sectors of 
the population.
Related to the technological factor was the fact that developing 
and operating the sector producing means of production requires an exten­
sive accumulation of capital. Massive and rapid accumulation of capital 
meant eroding the foundation of the alliance Peronism was seeking to pro­
mote; it contradicted the commitment to provide higher profits for indus­
trialists and also a higher standard of living for the workers. The 
social relations promoted by Peronist policies were a fundamental component 
of its doctrine. Thus it was that though populist-nationalism had aided
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Peronism in its ascendancy, corresponding with the favorable conjuncture, 
it now proved to be a definite inhibiting factor preventing the regime 
from moving forcibly and consistently in one direction or the other.
The Peronist government enacted policies designed to strengthen 
the bargaining position of national groups in the process of economic 
development; it did not aim to alter the social relations of capitalist 
production. It thus neglected the internal foundations that were to re­
verse the trend toward economic independence and autonomous growth. The 
cases of the Soviet Union, China, Cuba, and others have shown the tre­
mendous difficulties of promoting a progressive growth model from an un­
developed or underdeveloped technological base. In this effort, in order 
to achieve control over the processes of the accumulation of capital and 
gain the maximum degree of maneuverability and the greatest possible resis­
tance to external influences, it was necessary to radically alter the 
social relations in the process of production. By stressing the cooperation 
of social sectors with diverging interests in the distribution of surplus 
value, Peronism facilitated the development of a dependent industrial 
economy.
Economic development was to be pursued within the framework of the 
private ownership of the means of production. The state reserved the right 
to interfere in those properties that "served a social function," but this 
potentially far-reaching formula was never applied systematically, serving 
more as an admonition to political enemies than anything else. Capital was 
supposed to "humanize itself," to see its own self-interest, with some 
prodding from a popular government; but only Evita seemed determined to 
force it in that direction. Economic privileges were decried rhetorically, 
but the class struggle was not advocated as a means to rectify injustices.
'!
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It was here that Peronism drew its clearest line of demarcation from 
Marxism: it advocated "social justice," not class struggle. The mobiliza­
tion of labor as a pressure group was actively pursued, but 
leadership of the developmental process by the working class was out of 
the question.
Attempting a program of economic recovery within the framework 
of capitalist social relations pushed the contradictions within indirect 
dependency to the direct form of dependent industrialization. The conse­
quences of depending on imported capital goods and technology intensified 
between 1950 and 1955. The pressures from the advanced capitalist suppliers, 
though still indirect, mounted. The reigme's intention to surmount economic 
difficulties at labor's expense set the conditions which led in the decade 
after Peron's overthrow to an industrial periphery economy based on the 
domination of local production by monopolistic multinational corporations.
Peron's Overthrow 
The coup of 1955 should be understood in the context of the 
policy shifts encompassed in the SFYP. It will be recalled that the latter 
was an attempt to resolve the contradictions in the alliance promoted by 
the FFYP between the industrial proletariat and bourgeoisie at the expense 
of the agro-exporting sector. The SFYP addressed those contradictions by 
promoting a new relationship revolving around the landowning oligarchy and 
the bourgeois sectors involved in the production of durable and capital 
goods, at the expense of the workers. The SFYP thus reinforced a set of 
social relations underlying a developmental pattern that was not fully 
implemented until the state was rid of the last remnants of its working 
class orientation.
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Though promoting the oligarchy's interests, the regime's policies
failed to elicit oligarchic support beyond the rhetorical level. Indeed,
not only did the large landowners retain their enmity toward Peronism,
/
they were also a key force in Peron's overthrow. Meanwhile, the Peronist 
government distanced itself from the social base that had constituted its 
most solid foundation. In retrospect, one can easily observe the intimate 
correspondence between the rise and ebb of Peronism's political fortunes, 
and the degree and intensity of the support it enjoyed from its proletarian 
wing.
In his analysis of the social forces involved, Arthur P. Whitaker 
provides the best account of the events leading up to the coup that over­
threw Peron. The surface issue involved Peronism's growing hostility 
toward the Catholic Church. In fact, all concerned understood the Church 
to symbolize the traditional ruling groups in general and the oligarchy 
in particular. By 1955 the oppositon to Peron's government found its 
most visible expression in a few of the more outspoken conservative Catho­
lic clergy. Their immediate resentment stemmed from the legalization of
divorce and prostitution and the resecularization of education; but they 
quickly served as a rallying focus for all of Peronism's opponents. The 
response by some of the Peronist rank and file in vandalizing and commiting 
arson on the churches of well-known oppositional clerics added fuel to the 
fire. As Whitaker points out, these forays were perceived by the oligarchy
as an indirect attack and caused it to fear that a real assault might be
in the making, thus precipitating its role in the coup.*
*Arthur P. Whitaker, Argentine Upheaval: Peron's Fall and the New 
Regime (New York: Praeger, 1956), p. 75. This section follows his chronology 
and interpretation of the events leading up to the September 1955 coup. How­
ever, the analysis of the reasons why the coup succeeded is not from Whitaker.




Very key to the success of the coup against Peron were his prior 
actions which discouraged active support from the movement's working class 
base. In this regard the events around the abortive coup of June 1955 
(just three months prior to the final coup), which was timed by the naval 
air force and a few armed civilian bands to commence a few hours after 
the announcement of Peron's excommunication for expelling two prelates 
from Argentina, proved to be critical. When word got out that navy 
planes had attacked Casa Rosada and other government buildings as well as 
the headquarters of the CGT, workers swarmed into the Plaza de Mayo and 
stormed the headquarters of the rebellion in the Navy Ministry where they 
were repulsed by machine guns. The army remained loyal to the regime; 
the opposition forces were isolated in the air and forced to land in Uru­
guay when their fuel ran out. Significantly, Peron sought peace with the 
Church after the revolt. He forced the two men in his inner circle who 
were most closely identified with, the anti-clerical campaign— Angel Bor- 
lenghi, Minister of Interior and Justice, reportedly the number two man 
in the regime at the time, and Eduardo Vuletich who was the Secretary- 
General of the CGT— to resign. Since these men also represented the 
descamisado wing of the movement, their resignation meant a shift toward 
the army as the regime's support base. "This view gained support from 
Peron's speeches in the week following the revolt, in which, while praising 
the descamisados for their loyalty, he gave the Army virtually all the 
credit for smashing the revolt."^ In the three month interval between 
this abortive coup and the overthrow, the army took advantage of the situa­
tion and seized the remaining small arsenal of some five thousand rifles
1Whitaker, pp. 10-1.
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and revolvers the CGT had in its possession and rejected the CGT's offer 
to turn its six million members into a civilian militia.
When the final coup came, the army did not prove to be a reliable 
base of support. The opposition forces had spread from the navy to army 
units stationed in Cordoba and the army command did not decisively move 
to crush this revolt. In retrospect, what was perhaps the most important 
factor in the success of this coup, was the fact that the workers were 
not mobilized. The revolt had been the work of only a part of the armed 
forces with practically no civilian support outside of Cordoba. At the 
point of Peron's resignation,forces loyal to him still controlled Rosario, 
the second largest city, most of the provinces, and metropolitan Buenos 
Aires which contained a quarter of the nation’s 19 million inhabitants.*
At this critical juncture, a mass mobilization undertaken by the CGT would, 
in all likelihood, have ensured Peron's stay in power.
Several factors combined to prevent the Peronist regime from 
calling for a mobilization of workers, a step which would have moved it 
closer to being organically bound to its proletarian base. There was the 
incipient disillusionment of the working class militants, not only on 
account of the recent events surrounding the abortive coup and the Standard 
Oil contract, but also going back to the shifts of the fifties that led to 
the feeling that Peron's identification with their cause in his speeches 
was a poor substitute for the active protection of their interests they had 
enjoyed in the forties. There was also Peron's abhorrence of civil war 
which was both a result of his background as a professional soldier and, 





on class conciliation and harmony. Peron identified class struggle with 
Marxism. His refusal to arm workers was quite consistent with his fear of 
the worker’s susceptibility to the influence of Marxist ideas.
When the final revolt was not crushed after four days of fighting
and it became apparent that only a class showdown would save Peron, he
resigned pith an open letter to the army and the people saying he wished
to spare the nation a civil war and Buenos Aires a naval bombardment.
This rationale expressed in Peron's resignation represented his sincerely
felt convictions and not, as has often been alleged, Peron s cowardice.
In an interview with Felix Luna almost fifteen years later, Peron made
some interesting observations on those critical days.
I could have taken repressive measures and crushed that distur­
bance: it would have been sufficient to have declared a state of 
siege and put the workers into the barracks. ... But what would 
have happened if we had taken those measures? Those things never 
end the way they start. That would have cost the country a million 
dead, like in Spain. And I was not prepared to have that happen 
to Argentina, simply on account of my presence or absence in the 
government. I thought the process would continue more or less 
unchanged, with some modifications, even without my being in 
power. Now, if I had known then what I know now, I certainly would 
have fought even though that decision cost a million dead like in 
Spain!^
It is worth noting that these declarations were made at a point when 
Peron was assuming his militant posture, being out of power and in exile 
while the movement was militantly laying the groundwork for his return to 
power.
X  ^ MFelix Luna, El 45: cronica de un ano decisivo (Buenos Aires: Jorge 
Alvarez Editor, 1969), pp. 59-60.
CHAPTER VI
/
THE DEPENDENT INDUSTRIAL ECONOMY AND PERON'S RETURN TO POWER
Introduction
The developmental pattern characterized as dependent industriali­
zation can be defined by its two essential features: 1) manufacturing con­
stitutes the predominant form of economic activity, and 2) the industrial 
sector gravitates around the presence of monopolistic multinational firms. 
The firms which become the major influence in economic life share these 
distinguishing characteristics: they are large enterprises with vast 
financial resources, utilize modern technology, are administered by bureau­
cracies responsible to a central office located overseas, and are in a 
position, either on their own or in conjunction with similar firms, to 
control the market for the goods they produce.
A dependent industrial economy requires the existence of several 
conditions, the most important of which are:
1. The centrality of the industrial sector in the economy
2. The consolidation of a viable domestic or overseas market
3. Development within the framework of the private ownership of the means 
of production and the social relations underlying it (there must also 
be a significant state sector, but it remains subordinated to the 
requirements of the private sector)
4. The general prevalence of industrial peace and a certain degree of 
political stability
Prior chapters noted how the configuration of internal-external circum-
330
stances aided Peronist policies from 1943 to 1955 in achieving these 
results.
Peronist policies of the 1943-55 period promoted the interests 
of the classes whose alliance the regime sought to forge. The material 
basis for satisfying those interests depended internally on being able 
to expand and supply the domestic market which, in turn, was related to 
the disruption of foreign sources of supply as a result of the World War 
and its aftermath. In analyzing the 1943-50 period I showed that the 
Peronist regime pushed import substituting industrialization within a 
capitalist framework based on an expanding domestic market to its limits.
In the analysis of the 1950-5 period we saw that when the favorable con­
juncture deteriorated, the contradiction posed for a capitalist model of 
accumulation by a distributionist developmental strategy could no longer 
be contained.*1 I argued that one direction for attempting to resolve this 
contradiction was taking shape during the 1950-5 period. Accumulation at 
the expense of the working class was carried out on the policy level through 
redistribution benefiting large landowners and the bourgeoisie associated 
with large-scale industry, and, in the sphere of production, through the
^Here I follow Monica Peralta Ramo's analysis in "The Economy: Lib­
eration or Dependency?," Latin American Perspectives 1 (Fall 1974): 85.
She sums up her argument noting that
the strategy necessary to extend the limits of capitalist accumu­
lation enters into open conflict with the distributionist strategy 
(the politics of full employment and redistribution of incomes) 
that characterized the Peronist period covering 1946-55. That is 
to say, the need to increase the organic composition of capital 
under conditions of technological dependency leads to an orientation 
of the productive process, of the labor market, that is the anti­
thesis of a policy aimed at a conciliation between the immediate 
interests of capital and labor.
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more intensive exploitation that results from a higher. organic 
composition of capital and its accompanying capital intensive methods.
This chapter concerns the consolidation of this process in the decade and 
a half after Peronism’s removal from power and examines some of its conse­
quences .
In following pages I show that the process associated with a higher 
organic composition of capital— greater concentration and centralization 
of capital— did indeed take place in the period after Peron's overthrow. 
This process can also be termed "the denationalization of the industrial 
economy" since foreign capital extensively penetrated those branches with 
the highest organic composition, which are also the most dynamic sectors in 
terms of productivity increases. As Laura Randall points out in her study, 
"foreign firms increased their participation in the 100 largest manufactur­
ing firms from 14 percent in 1957 to 50 percent in 1966;" and, she adds 
significantly, "these were the most rapidly growing sectors of industry."^ 
However, due to political contradictions resulting from aspects of the 
Peronist heritage, this sector was not nearly dynamic enough for a suffi­
ciently healthy performance during the ascending phase of the boom-bust 
cycle of capitalist growth.
Much of the tragedy of the Argentine crisis can be traced back to 
the fact that Argentines have endured the costs of capitalist development 
with few of its benefits. Both the national bourgeoisie and the working 
class paid a heavy price in the consolidation of the pattern of dependent
^Randall, p. 236.
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industrialization.^ On the one hand, the branches with the lowest organic 
composition of capital, the small to medium-sized firms constituting the 
backbone of nationally-owned industries suffered an increasing rate of 
bankruptcies and long-term stagnation. On the other hand, the capital 
intensive methods of the multinational sector meant a worsening in the 
unemployment/underemployment problem, an intensification of the exploita­
tion of workers within the productive process, and a general deteriora­
tion in the proportion of income allocated to the poorer sectors of the 
population. Adding to the deterioration in the position of national 
entrepreneurs producing non-durable wage goods and of working class con­
sumers is the fact that the multinational sector produces the types of 
commodities that depend on the upper income market and thus require a 
greater concentration at the higher income levels.
In this analysis of the 1955-73 period I focus on the economic and
political contradictions which ultimately led to Peron's return to power.
Due to the strength and resilience of the Peronist mystique, the economic
project based on the interests of the multinational sector and its local
allies proceeded with stops and starts as well as minor setbacks in
between. A series of civilian and military regimes succeeded each other
as they failed to come to grips with Peronism's remnants. The brief period
which saw the clearest expression of foreign monopoly capital's project in
✓
the industrial sector did not take place until a de.cade after Peron's
^This statement holds at the level of classes. In other words, 
individuals may not have been affected so adversely. This is especially 
true for those members of the national bourgeoisie who were integrated 
into the orbit of foreign capital. In many cases their individual positions 
improved considerably.
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overthrow with the 1966 coup that brought General Ongania's government 
into being. However, while this project, the Krieger Vasena Plan— named 
after the Minister of Economics under whom it was formulated— began by 
stripping away the encrustations grafted onto its predecessors' policies 
by past contradictions, it actually succeeded in aggravating these contra­
dictions further. The Ongania regime's capacity to dismantle the populist
nationalist pattern in the economic sphere was far superior to its ability 
to achieve a new form of social integration under the aegis of the multi­
national firms' interests. In the end, Peron was brought back to resolve 
the intensifying crisis.
A key theme the analysis seeks to establish is that, below the 
surface of ups and downs in the hegemonic economic project and the ongoing 
political turmoil, the pattern of dependent industrialization continued 
to be consolidated. This understanding is brought to bear in the final 
part of the chapter in order to explain why Peron's populist-nationalist 
formula, only slightly modified from its expression in the forties, was 
bound to fail in the changed conditions of the seventies. In the first
Peronist period, the principal cleavage had been that between the populist
state and the landed oligarchy as a result of Peronism's determined efforts 
to appropriate the surplus produced in the sector controlled by the oli­
garchy. In the post-Peronist period, the main contradiction was that be­
tween the mostly foreign monopoly capital and the popular classes affected 
by its expansion.
*Juan E. Corradi develops this thesis in "Argentina* Dependency 
and Political Crisis," Monthly Review 25 (Dec. 1973): 28-42.
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Denationalization 'of the Industrial Economy
Chapter 5 argued that the direction in which the contradictions 
within Peronist development were being resolved, particularly in the latter 
half of the 1945-55 decade, proved determinative in setting the subsequent 
developmental pattern. In other words, the relationships among and be­
tween national and foreign groups underlying the predominant trends of 
the post Peron era were already taking shape in the Peronist policies of 
the fifties. For example, analysis of the SFYP showed that the regime’s 
attempt to resolve contradictions in its earlier developmental program 
in the direction of the heavier and capital goods sector had an adverse 
impact on the small to medium sector constituting the backbone of the 
national industrial bourgeoisie. Here we shall see that this trend became 
much more pronounced in the years after 1955.
A key hypothesis examined in the previous analysis of the move­
ment from indirect to direct dependence'*' was that United States based 
interests were gaining a greater foothold within the manufacturing sector 
during the first Peron period. Because of the paucity of data on the 
subject, the analysis had to rely largely on inferential evidence for this 
hypothesis. Other analysts who take the position that U.S. influence became 
stronger during the populist-nationalist decade of 1945-55 such as Juan 
Carlos Esteban and Luis Sommi, present more direct but also more contro­
versial evidence. The veracity of their findings is open to question on 
the grounds of their leftist orientation. Hence, though inferential, the 
analysis in Chapter 5 served an important purpose in confirming their basic 
conclusion. By contrast with the earlier period, the data on the U.S. pre-
*See above on pp. 302-20.
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sence within the Argentine economy in the 1955-65 decade is more readily 
available and it will therefore be unnecessary to make logical extrapo­
lations .
There is no doubt that U.S. interests became the major investors
✓in the Argentine economy in the decade after Peron's overthrow. For exam­
ple, according to one survey conducted in 1966 by the Oficina de Estudios 
para la Colaboracion Economica Internacional, an organization funded by 
Fiat Concord, the United States led with 55 percent of all new foreign 
investments between 1958 and 1963. European countries combined had 39 
percent of this total, while other countries individually had less than one 
percent.*
The increased foreign, investments from the late fifties through 
the mid-sixties consolidated the external presence within manufacturing 
and led to the increasing dependence of industrial production on facilities 
owned or controlled by these foreign interests. Control of production 
translates into control of the market. The virtual take-over of the domes­
tic market proceeded with amazing rapidity. According to one analyst, 
already in 1960 "five U.S. companies accounted for 18.8 percent of Argen­
tine corporate sales in foodstuffs, beverages and tobacco; 13 U.S. companies 
accounted for 15.5 percent of sales in chemical products; eight U.S. companies 
accounted for 22 percent of sales in vehicles and machinery and seven U.S.
^"Cited by Guillermo Martorell, las inversiones extranjeras en la 
Argentina (Buenos Aires: Editorial Galerna, 1969), p. 107. On page 290 
above, I cited similar figures from Felix Herrero. It is worth noting once 
more that this type of data probably errs on the conservative side since 
what are recorded as European investments may actually be those of North 
American firms with European offices or European firms with substantial 
participation of U.S. capital. David Rock in his article on "The Survival 
of Peronism" in the book he edited, cites other sources that put the per­
centage of foreign investments coining from the United States at around 70 
percent of the total (p. 198).
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companies accounted for 19.2 percent of sales in electrical equipment."'*' 
Given that the electrical equipment producing branch had shown one of the 
highest growth rates during the Peronist period, this latter percentage 
assumes added significance as an indication of the extent of the denation­
alization of the industrial sector. The rapid take-over of the domestic 
market by the monopolistic multinational corporations thus signified the 
end of the Peronist project of promoting the interests of national 
capitalists through their ability to supply the demands of the local mar­
ket. Table 34 which rank orders total sales grouped into entities by 
adding together those of the same national origin of the majority of 
capital held in the firm, provides an even stronger indication of the 
success of foreign companies in capturing the domestic market.
The fact that the annual sales of U.S. based multinationals far
exceeded those of their Argentine counterparts in the private sector, shows
how far they had gone in cornering the domestic market. Moreover, if we
contrast these figures for 1967 with those presented above on percentages
of corporate sales controlled by U.S. firms in particular branches of pro- 
2duction in 1960, while they do not tap the same information and are not 
strictly comparable, we may nevertheless infer that U.S. companies were 
rapidly gaining increasingly larger shares of the Argentine market in the 
sixties.
Table 34 also underlines the considerable strength of European based 
multinationals in the Argentina of the sixties. In spite of the qualifica­
tion that the North American presence is to be found behind much of the
^Victor Testa, "Significacion de capital internacional en la 
industria argentina: el capital norteamericano" in Fichas 1 (July 1964); 61.
^Ibid.
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capital designated as European, it would be a mistake to underestimate the 
latter's influence on Argentine development. Nor should the importance of 
the competition between Western European and U.S. based corporations be 
underestimated. For example, according to Juan Corradi, Italian capital 
played a key part in aiding an enterprise belonging to Jose^Gelbard, 
Peron's Economic Minister, in its fight -against Kaiser Aluminum.
TABLE 34.—  Relative control of national and foreign groups of the market 
for industrial commodities in 1967
National Origins of Majority Stock . Combined Total Annual Sales 
Held in Firms
Argentine State Exceeding 396 Billion Pesos
U.S. corporations " 260 " "
Private Argentine firms " 186 " "
European companies " 344 " "
SOURCE: Special report by Julian Delgado in Primera plana 
(Buenos Aires) 6, No. 6. From Martorell, pp. 122-3.
In competing with North American interests, European capital has shown 
more flexibility and a greater disposition to enter into joint ventures 
with state and private firms, as well as a greater tolerance for political 
reforms. "These observations should not be construed, however, to imply 
that European monopoly capital offers an alternative developmental model 
or necessarily better terms of dependency for Argentina." Nevertheless, 
as Corradi goes on to note, this inter-capitalist rivalry is vital to 
understanding and "assessing the real meaning of Peron's 'anti-imperialism' 
£Ln his second regime^ which has amounted to no more than a mild defiance
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of American corporations, and a preference for European monopolies."^
Table 34 also shows how important a part the state sector played. 
The figures are however, somewhat misleading since a good portion of the 
annual intake was in the area of public services and some of them, the 
railroads for example, were run on a considerable deficit. Even so, the 
strength of the state's presence cannot be denied. The Argentine case 
thus tends to confirm those who argue that a strong interventionist role 
on the state's part becomes a necessity in a situation of dependency. The 
weakness or non-existence of a national bourgeoisie makes it imperative for 
the state to assume many of the functions traditionally associated with 
the bourgeoisie in developing and consolidating the industrial sector. 
Moreover, the political sphere becomes of strategic importance in ensuring 
policies sympathetic to the interests of non-national groups within the 
economy. We saw that the Peronist state functioned in part as a surrogate 
.for a weak national bourgeoisie. It was because of its ambiguity and con­
tradictory performance in this regard that it was overthrown. Peronism 
had to be overthrown because its populist-nationalist side had begun to 
impede the hegemony of external interests in the national economy. In 
the period after Peron's overthrow, the consistent theme echoed by those 
who occupied important economic policy-making posts, whether under civilian 
or military auspices, was that economic well-being required not only for­
eign investments but also giving foreign capital free reign within the 
economy.
The figures in Table 35 show how far manufacturing had been de­
nationalized within the decade and a half after Peron's overthrow. They
J. E. Corradi, "Argentina and Peronism: Fragments of the Puzzle" 
in Latin American Perspectives 1 (Fall 1974): 12.
339
also show the considerable strength of the state sector in the economy. 
Table 35 summarizes the conclusions drawn by the staff of the North Ameri­
can Congress on Latin America from a survey which ranked the top 120 com­
panies producing in Argentina by the volume of their sales for 1971.
TABLE 35.— Nationality and sales of top 120 corporations producing in 
Argentina in 1971
Nationality Number Percentage of 
Total Sales
Percentage of ' 
of Private
Foreign 66 48.5 67.0
United States 31 21.5 29.7
European 19 15.1 20.9
Other 16 11.9 16.4
Argentine 54 51.5 33.0
State 10 27.8 —
Mixed 2 1.0 1.4
Bunge y Born 5 3.3 4.6
Dependent Co. 13 7.8 11.0
National Co. 24 11.6 16.0
Total 120 100.0 100.0
SOURCE: Mercado 4, No. 157 (Buenos Aires, 1972). Adapted from 
N.A.C.L.A., Latin America and Empire Report 7 (Sept. 1973): 9.
Table 35 reflects one of the key components of the process leading to a 
dependent industrial economy: the concentration of industrial production 
into a diminishing number of corporate giants. The combined sales of these 
top 120 companies for 1971 amounted to 22 percent of the Argentine Gross 
Domestic Product and was 2.4 times greater than the government's entire 
budget for that year.
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According to the results of the survey shown on Table 35 , 66 
of the top 120 corporations were owned or controlled by foreign groups and 
together they generated 67 percent of the sales of privately owned firms 
in the survey. Moreover, 31 of these companies were dominated by U.S. 
groups. Of the 54 corporations in which Argentines held majority equity,
10 were state owned or managed and 2 were mixed private-state operations.
In addition, 5 of the privately owned Argentine firms formed a part of 
the complex controlled by the Bunge y Born holding company. Although 
formally a national corporation, it is part of a much wider network closely 
integrated to U.S. and European capital. Another factor diminishing the 
national character of the Argentine owned private sector arises from those 
enterprises, 13 in the above survey, which are closely linked to foreign 
interests through patent rights and licensing agreements, joint research 
ventures, international public or private financing, and/or foreign 
minority equity participation. Indeed, the process of denationalization 
in this period involved the increasing subordination of the small to 
medium size plants to the foreign monopoly sector. This took place not 
only through the payment of hefty royalties for patent rights by the 
"national'' firms, but also through technological dependence in general. 
Oftentimes, they became directly tied to the multinationals in the produc­
tive process itself by virtue of being transformed into suppliers of parts 
or components.
The small to medium size national sector did not fare well as 
manufacturing came to be increasingly centered on the activities of the 
monopolistic multinationals. The period when foreign capital was making 
its largest gains in industry was also the time when the bankruptcy rate 
of small firms rose dramatically. "Commercial and private failures, which
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numbered 800 in 1960, rose to 1300 in 1961, 1800 in 1962 and to over 
2500 in 1963."* The close correspondence between increased foreign 
investments and rising bankruptcies lends credence to the assertion that 
these failures represent the reverse side of the process of denationaliza­
tion.
Table 36 shows the extent to which multinational companies 
2monopolized production.
TABLE 36.— Foreign control of branches of production in 1972










Non-Ferrous Metals 2 85




SOURCE: Consejo tecnologico del Movimiento Nacional Peronista, 
"Bases para un programs peronista de gobierno," Economia (Buenos Aires) 
5 (Mav 1973): 14. From N.A.C.L.A., Latin American and Empire Report 7 
(Sept. 1973): 6.
*Eshag and Thorp, p. 33. Their source is The Review of the River 
Plate (Buenos Aires) for 1963.
2
This subject has been treated at various points above. See for 
example, pp. 335-6 and 339-40.
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The figures in Table 36 can be questioned because of their Peronist source. 
The general point can, however, be substantiated with other data that show 
how closely linked the increasing concentration of capital and the ever 
tighter foreign control of manufacturing was. For example, citing a 
variety of sources,* David Rock notes that in 1948 one half of all produc­
tion in the manufacturing sector was controlled by .83 percent of the 
total number of firms. By 1964 that figure had dropped to .69 percent and
of that fraction 41 percent came from firms where foreign capital had
2a majority holding. Similarly, Guillermo Martorell points out that of 
the 100 companies with the highest value in their sales for 1956, 75 of 
them were Argentine owned. Ten years later that figure was down to 50 and 
by 1970, only 39 of these companies were Argentine. At the end of 1967, 
at a time, as will be seen, when the most clearly pro-multinational indus­
trializing project was carried out, only 20 of the 50 largest companies in
3Argentina were owned domestically, and of these five were state operated.
Denationalization and Its Social Impact 
The Peronist vote was decisive in getting Arturo Frondizi elected 
to the presidency in 1958. To gain this support, Frondizi had pledged 
that the social and economic gains achieved in the Peron period would not 
be sacrificed.
^lauricio T. Arcangelo and H. Carlos Quaglio, "El imperialismo: 
el caso argentino, " Los libros 26 (May 1972): 10-4; Pedro Skupch, "Concen­
tration industrial en la Argentina," Desarrollo economico, 11 (Apr.-June 1971) 
3-15; Julian Delgado, "Industria: el desafio a la Argentina," Primera plana, 
Sept.3, 1968.
^Rock, p. 198.
3Martorell, p. 128. His source is the special report published by 
Julian Delgado in Primera plana (Buenos Aires) 6 (Sept. 3, 1968): 71-5.
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Frondizi’s real aim, enunciated in the doctrine of Integralism, 
was another class' alliance where the urban working class and unions 
would be drawn into supporting the capitalist-developmentalist 
orientation of Frondizi*s party, the Union Civica Radical Intran- 
sigente (U.C.R.I.).
To cement this relationship in the second half of 1958 Frondizi 
increased monetary wages by 60%, an amount significantly above 
the rate of increase in the retail price index. But this gesture 
was immediately undermined by the problems directly emerging from 
economic stagnation and the economic cycle. In the absence of signi­
ficant growth an inflationary spiral developed. It was accompanied 
by a major deficit in the balance of payments. Frondizi's develop­
ment objectives, and his pressing need for external financial assis­
tance to alleviate the crisis, proved more powerful commitments than 
the political calculations stemming from his links with the unions.1
The different international context did not allow Frondizi to avail him­
self of Peron's populist-nationalist formula for providing benefits to 
both workers and capitalists. Having failed in this attempt, the Frondizi 
government pinned its hopes on the IMF recommendations and eventual salu- 
tory effects that would result from the expected upturn in productivity 
and employment.
The pattern of dependent industrialization assumed particular 
intensity during the presidency of Arturo Frondizi in the context of 
"desarrollista" policies influenced by Raul Prebisch. The basic notion 
incorporated in these policies was the idea that foreign capital would 
provide a way out of the profound structural crisis by spurring on the 
development of the industrial sector. Hence foreign capital was to be 
given free reign in the economy and legal and other restrictions inherited 
from Peronism were to be removed as the primary obstacles to economic 
recovery.
This was the period, 1959 to 1963, that Eshag and Thorp designate 
as the "IMF era of orthodox economic policy" because of the closeness with
^Rock, "The Survival of Peronism" in Rock, p. 203.
which the government followed the International Monetary Fund's recom­
mendations.* The IMF "concurred in general with Prebisch's reports in 
recommending the dismantling of governmental controls and the establish­
ment of a free market. They differed, however, from the proposals of the 
Prebisch reports in containing no mention of specific development projects 
and in placing considerably greater emphasis on curbing the growth of 
demand and on use of monetary instruments." Following the IMF's recom­
mendations, the government's policies curbed consumption with restrictive 
monetary and fiscal policies and through wage restraints. It was believed 
that the operation of market forces would do the rest, that internal 
price stability and balance of payments equilibrium would be the eventual 
outcome. Thus it was hoped that after a period of adjustment, a sound and 
durable rate of growth in production and employment would be achieved.
In one sense the policies of the Frondizi period succeeded remark­
ably well. "The curtailment of consumption was such that by 1963 total 
private consumption was some 10 percent lower than it had been in 1958.
If allowance is made for the increase in population, the per capita level 
of consumption must have declined by nearly 20 percent between 1958 and 
1963." The heaviest burden from these IMF inspired policies fell upon 
the shoulders of the industrial working class. Their real wages had fallen 
some 15 percent from 1958 to 1963.^ The situation improved somewhat in
1 2Eshag and Thorp, p. 19. Ibid.
3Eshag and Thorp, p. 37.
4Ibid. According to E.C.L.A.'s Economic Development and Income 
Distribution in Argentina (New York: United Nations, 1969) urban real wages 
had already fallen by 20 percent in the decade from 1949 to 1959 (p. 10).
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1960 and 1961, when there was a recovery in income levels and a more
progressive distribution of income as a result of a better performance by
the export sector and an inflow of foreign capital. However, since the bulk
of foreign investments continued to-be funneled into the capital intensive
sectors, though there was increased productivity there was no improvement
in the unemployment situation.'*' Despite slight cyclical improvements, the
relative share of income going to the working class dropped compared to
2what it had enjoyed at the height of the Peronist period.
In another sense the policies of the Frondizi period proved to be
a dismal failure. Though they succeeded in curbing consumption and reducing
employment, "instead of ending inflation the markedly depressive impact of
these measures served to accelerate it and to induce a minor catastrophe.
In 1959 the retail price index increased by a monumental 133.5%, as against
3an increase of 31.2% in 1958." Not only did the "free market" oriented 
economic policies fail to achieve internal price stability, they also 
failed to ease the nation's balance of payments difficulties. HenCe, 
falling production and rising unemployment,̂  directly traceable to the 
orthodox economic policies of the period, could not even be justified in 
terms of curbing inflation and achieving a favorable balance of payments.
■''Rock, p. 204.
2See Portnoy, p. 10, for data showing income redistribution to the 
detriment of laborers in post 1955 period.
3Rock, p . 203.
4As we saw, the smaller nationally owned manufacturing sector 
producing wage goods for the lower income market, was particularly hard 
hit. See pp. 340-2 above.
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In addition to juridically facilitating the entry of foreign 
capital in the decade after Peron s overthrow, the state s policies 
determining income allocation provided a key component in the business 
climate multinational corporations look for. The developmental program of 
the period increasingly shifted the cost onto wage earners and lower in­
come sectors. Income reallocation took place through lower wages and 
unemployment and underemployment, which were exacerbated by increased
bankruptcies and the general decline of marginal national industries. It
became impossible under the zero-sum conditions imposed by protracted eco­
nomic stagnation to reward different class groups simultaneously as had 
been done in the prior period. Government policies became the single most
identifiable factor in the distribution of income. Hence the economic
struggle for better wages and working conditions became radicalized poli­
tically and the stage was set for the upheavals that eventually led to 
Peron’s return in 1973.
The close relationship between the policies seeking to attract 
foreign capital and the deteriorating conditions for lower income groups 
was firmly established in the minds of the working class in this period. 
Indeed, the anti-working class stance of the various regimes at this time 
was the key factor making, not just for Peronism1s survival, but for its 
resilience and growth. At best, only token gestures were made by govern­
ments in the post-1955 era to win working class support; next to nothing 
was done to promote their interests. Even the Frondizi government which 
came in on Peronist support by promising not to sacrifice the workers' so­
cial and economic gains, was nevertheless forced to undermine them and thus 
discredited what non-Peronist leadership might have emerged.
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Overall, the decade between 1955 and 1965 was marked by continual 
oscillations, beginning with draconian measures restricting the working 
class’ ability to consume, followed by short intervals of liberaliza­
tions. The stage had been set at the end of 1955 by the Aramburu govern­
ment when it attempted to freeze wages.
Collective wage contracts agreed under Peron were prorogued.
The government also dismantled the main organs of the Peronist 
state's control over the economy, in line with the demands of 
both industry and agriculture. In returning to a more laissez- 
faire system, one of Peron's more significant fringe benefits from 
the early 1950s, the state subsidy to basic foodstuffs, was abol­
ished. This brought about the first major redistribution of income 
against the working class.1
"Between 1950 and 1955 wage income accounted for an average 41.8% of
GNP. In 1956-8 this dropped to 39.6%, and in 1959-61 to 35.8%. These
figures were not representative of a permanent trend, but they illustrate
othe extent of short-term fluctuations." These were the circumstances 
that provided such fertile ground for the Peronist mystique of the "golden 
age" of the forties. Even the depression period of the early fifties could 
now be compared favorably with the present by Peronist union leaders. In 
this they took their cue from Peron himself who was able to capitalize on 
this rather convincing argument. Using official statistics, he was very 
adept at showing how much more socially just and also how much less infla­
tionary his government's economic policies had been. Writing in exile in 
the book in which he pins the label of vendepatrias on his successors, he 
states:
History cannot be refashioned with words. ... In the twenty 
months prior to the coup, the index for the cost of living increased 
21 percent, while in the following twenty months that increase had 
already reached 36 percent. Food, which is the most important item
1 2Rock, p. 201. Ibid., p. 195.
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in the popular budget, increased by 19 percent in the period prior 
to September of 1955, while beginning with that month the increase 
had reached 41 percent.
jPeron demonstrates what a critical impact rising food prices 
have particularly on living standards of workers and, by extension, 
on the economy as a wholej
People can reduce their expenditures for other things, but 
they cannot stop eating every day without harming their existence.
The purchase of a shirt can be postponed for better days, but hunger 
cannot wait. ... When the population has to spend most of its income 
to feed itself, little is left to spend on other goods which though 
they might be necessary are not essential. That is why, rapidly 
rising food prices tend to contract sales in other sectors and pro­
voke a decline in production that parallels falling consumption.
Once again, the people must bear the burden for these misguided 
economic policies since unemployment and misery are the final con­
sequences of this process of industrial and commercial paralysis.!
The attack on the working class' living standards was accompanied
by a severe repression of the Peronist movement, not only on the political
level, but on the economic too with the mass arrests of Peronist union
leaders. Along with this "came a series of clumsy attempts by anti-Peronist
union leaders, Communists and Social Democrats, to take over the unions."
These attempts and the repression against' the movement only served to
"unite the workers in a spirit of solidarity and to rehabilitate Peronism
as the focus of working class allegiance. The Communists and the rest
2came to be regarded as traitorous collaborators of a reactionary government." 
The repression of Peronism came to take on the character of an intense 
class struggle between the workers, on the one hand, and their employers 
and the state, on the other. The working class' experience during this 
period made it crystal clear that the state was the instrumentality through
Juan D. Peron, Los vendepatria: pruebas de una traicion (Buenos 
Aires: Editorial Freeland, 1972), pp. 103 and 106. My translation. It is 
worth noting that the latter part of the argument speaks not only to the 
working class, but also to those sectors of the national bourgeoisie based 
on the production of wage goods. This approach was used most effectively 
to lure these sectors back into the movement, resulting in Peronism's 
resounding electoral victory of 1973.
2Rock, p. 201.
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which their bosses sought to raise the rate of exploitation in both 
absolute (lower wages) and relative (layoffs and speed-up of production) 
terms.
In the decade after Peron's overthrow, the workers1 economic 
struggles of necessity took on a political nature and were explicitly 
linked to Peronism. Wage raises, when they were obtained, came as a re­
sult of strikes and these were almost always bitter and protracted affairs 
in which the government usually intervened directly in attempting to crush 
them through military force, often declaring them illegal and instituting 
mass arrests. For example, the metal workers' strike of 1956 lasted for 
six weeks during which time the government distributed leaflets in working 
class districts urging shopkeepers not to extend credit. Thousands were 
dismissed. Tanks and troops patrolled neighborhoods around the plants. 
Police entered bars and ejected strikers. The strike committees were forced 
to operate clandestinely and their members lived like hunted men. The 
contrast with the bygone Peron era, when the state would have been sym­
pathetic and probably have intervened positively on their side, could not 
have been starker.
As a reflection of the income redistribution toward the wealthier 
sectors, the workers’ share of gross national income consistently declined 
in the post-Peron decade whereas in the previous decade it had generally 
gone up, even during those times when their real wages went down. Signi­
ficantly, the decline in the workers' living standards in the late fifties 
and into the sixties, occurred in the context of a steady, even if slight, 
growth of the economy. The workers could see that their declining living 
standards were a direct result of the government's attack on the unions 
and of government imposed wage freezes. Again, this was in sharp contrast
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to their experience under the Peronist state.
The concurrence of the attack on workers' economic position with 
the political repression of the movement led to, and hastened, the pro­
cess weakening Peronism's populist class alliance features, while accen­
tuating those aspects that stressed class solidarity and militancy. In 
the 1955-65 period, Peronism became a doctrine of working class struggle.
As the government's role in income allocation became more central, the 
economic struggle was politicized more and more. Since the material con­
ditions making a.populist coalition possible no longer held and the gains 
of one group increasingly came at the expense of those of another, and since 
the groups controlling government had moved politically against Peronism, 
even the economistic struggle of workers for better wages was closely as­
sociated with the Peronist struggle for political power. Even the "up" 
segments of the cycle, when workers were able to reverse the diminution in 
their share of income distribution, all were achieved at the cost of bit­
ter and protracted struggle. Hence, though workers' real wages actually 
rose at several points during these years, rather than decreasing, this 
trend intensified class militancy. For the reasons just mentioned, this 
class militancy came to be expressed politically through that side of 
Peronism that tended in the direction of a socialist resolution of the 
contradictions of dependent capitalist development.
Overall, the struggle of different groups to maintain their real
incomes "spawned a Hobbesian world of strife and competition."*
The changes which occurred in the distribution of income were 
particularly felt. They meant not only changes in relative income 
positions, but also that the losing group was likely to suffer a
*Roclc, p. 195.
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decrease, often of a substantial nature, in its absolute income 
as well. The struggle for relative shares was also a struggle to 
maintain absolute positions, and in any given year there were 
always important groups which could point to a deterioration in their 
real income level. In such circumstances the conflict is likely 
to be a bitter one.*
Not only did this situation lead the workers to rally ever more firmly 
and in a united way around Peronism as their arm in this struggle, but 
also in this chaotic context of constant ups and downs, Peronism assumed 
a relative coherence and stability that disguised its intrinsically eclec­
tic nature.
With the defection of the military and the industrialists into the 
new coalition in power in the decade after Peron's overthrow, Peronism was 
stripped of its multiclass character and left as a workers' movement. At 
first, the workers represented the only significant opposition to the pro­
cess of denationalization. Thus at their plenary meeting held in Rosario 
in 1959, the grouping of Peronist unions known as the "62 Organizations," 
through their coordinating committee issued a policy document rejecting the 
Frondizi government's economic program?
. . .  we resolve to energetically oppose this economic policy which 
signifies a retreat in our country's advance... . They are trying to 
take us back to a nation exporting raw materials and importing manu­
factures which until 1944 placed us in a position of a colony. We 
reject the economic system supported by the IMF. . . since it signifies 
quite plainly the exploitation of man by man.^
Peronist doctrine, as expressed by Peron, remained a multi-class- 
oriented nationalism. However, the workers were the only class to remain
^Rock, citing E.C.L.A., Economic Development and Income Distribu­
tion in Argentina (New York: United Nations, 1969), p. 136.
Documents of the Plenario Nacional de las 62 Organizaciones 
(mimeographed).
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consistently loyal to the populist-nationalist project.^- Deserted by 
their bourgeois "allies" in the darkest hours, it is not surprising the 
Peronist workers should have interpreted the ambiguities and contradic­
tions in Peronism's populistic anti-imperialism in a socialist direction 
and that the movement should have gradually evolved towards a Marxist per­
spective. Significant elements within the industrial working class had 
moved quite far along in this direction, a fact which translated into one 
of the key contradictions upon which Peronism1s second tenure in power 
foundered. Perhaps the most combative and class conscious to emerge 
among the industrial proletariat were the automobile workers, an impor­
tant sector in the dependent industrial economy that developed after 1955. 
The following excerpts from a statement issued during the occupation of a 
Fiat factory in March of 1971 are illustrative:
The seizure of the plant is also a measure of struggle which 
reflects high combativeness, an act of recovering what is ours, 
what has been built with our sweat and sacrifice. With each occu­
pation we advance a little toward what will be the culmination of 
this struggle: the total recovery of what has been expropriated 
from us by the oligarchy and the imperialists— our labor, the 
means of labor, and its fruits. . . .
We must set forth our form of struggle for ourselves, which 
naturally does not mean confrontation before we have sufficient 
strength. We must strike where and when it hurts, where the enemy 
is weak, and little by little, along with the armed vanguards such 
as the Montoneros, the FAP, the ERP, the FAL, and the MRA,* we will 
proceed to exhaust the regime, destroying this system on all sides.
We must never lower our guard. If Lanusse** has declared the imper­
ialist and capitalist war on us, we declare revolutionary war. . . .
We must bear clearly in mind that this struggle is a long one, 
that no battle is the final one. Our struggle is not to win 
crumbs, but for final liberation through the seizure of power by
Trotskysts have pointed to this fact as justification for their 
position that the working class' interests are the only ones to truly 
coincide with the nation's interests in a dependent situation. Among 
the Peronists, Juan Pablo Franco also argues this position. See his "Notas 
para una historia del peronismo" published as a monograph by Envido:
(Buenos Aires— Revista de Politica y Ciencias Sociales, n.d.).
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"the workers' class and the exploited people in order to bring about 
a free, just, and sovereign fatherland, an Argentina with neither 
oppressors or oppressed, in other words, a national and socialist 
revolution. *■
This statement shows an important aspect of the radicalization of 
Argentine workers in this period. Expressed through strike waves and fac­
tory occupations, their demands were generally Of a political nature that 
went beyond "bread and butter" issues. As we may have seen, the militance 
and political consciousness of Argentina's workers had been evolving pro­
gressively from the late fifties on. For example, some of the components 
in the program of the Peronist unions articulated by the mesa coordinadora 
of the "62 Organizations" on August 23, 1963, included:
exchange controls and tariffs to protect Argentine industry
diversification of exports
agrarian reform to eliminate latifundios
nationalization of transport, means of communication, basic industries
and all sectors which might lead to the formation of monopolies
nationalization of bank deposits and severing ties with the IMF
repudiation of all contracts with foreign oil companies
rejection of all agreements granting privileges to foreign capital
controls on repatriation of profits
policies promoting full employment
fixing of maximum prices and limits on profits
priority for social investments in housing and education
socialization of medicine.^
^Reproduced in Urban Guerrilla Warfare in Latin America (Cambridge, 
Mass.: MIT Press, 1974) edited by James Kohl and John Litt, pp. 377-8.
*The Montoneros, FAP and MRA were Peronist guerrilla groups. The 
ERP was the armed branch of the Trotskyst Partido Revolucionario de los 
Trabajadores, while the FAL was a Marxist-Leninist guerrilla group. Another 
guerrilla group, not listed in this communique, but which was active at the 
time, was the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias (FAR). It attempted to expli­
citly synthesize the Marxist and Peronist amalgam by defining itself as 
Marxist-Leninist-Peronist, Marxism-Leninism being considered an instrument 
for social analysis and Peronism an expression of the experience of the Ar­
gentine masses.
**Alejandro Lanusse was the last general to rule before Peron's re­
turn, which he negotiated as a means to end the socio-political and economic 
turmoil threatening to spill over into socialist revolution.
2Justicialismo (October 1963).
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This type of orientation and the demands that flowed from it condemned to 
failure the attempts of the more liberally inclined regimes to co-opt 
the CGT by winning over key leaders with promises of better wages and 
benefits for their rank and file. Instead, these "leaders" found them­
selves thoroughly discredited and alienated from their consitutency. In 
this way, by resting on a working class whose adherence to the movement 
was founded on a politicized class loyalty, Peronism was strengthened.
This was the secret behind the solidity of the Justicialist^ movement in 
its years out of power and constituted the chief reason why the movement 
was not hopelessly splintered by shifting political situations and appeals 
to moderation or pragmatic compromises, often engineered by Peron himself.
The workers' militance reinforced the position of those who fa­
vored a hard line approach. Despite the severe repression however, Justi- 
cialism continued to grow and remained the major political force in Argen­
tine society. As a result, though the multinational corporate and inter­
nationalized national bourgeois sectors were dominant within the state 
apparatus and had their interests implemented in policy, they lacked a 
significant political base among the masses. This contradiction took the 
form of an unending wave of strikes, factory occupations, urban riots, and 
finally urban guerrilla warfare. These were the conditions that finally 
forced Argentina's rulers to call Peron back from exile in 1973.
^Though Peron coined the term "Justicialismo" in 1949, it did 
not gain currency until the late sixties. Then it came to stand for the 
movement’s commitment to social justice.
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Political Failure of Dependent Industrialization and the 
Reemergence of Populist-Nationalism
The disjuncture between the economic predominance of the multi­
national corporate sector and its inability to command the allegiance of 
a stable political coalition strong enough to translate economic predomi­
nance into a generally accepted, coherent developmental project, provides 
the key to unravelling the common thread underlying the chaotic events of 
the 1955-73 period.* As we saw, the Peronism of the fifties generated the
conditions that led to a new economic stage centered around multinational
/
corporate interests. In the first decade following Peron's overthrow, 
these interests successfully consolidated their economic predominance but 
failed to achieve political hegemony. On the level of controlling and 
using the state apparatus for its purposes, "the so-called 'Liberating 
Revolution' of 1955 was, perhaps, the last organic attempt on the part of 
the agrarian bourgeoisie to maintain its hegemonic role in the dominant 
bloc.* Following this failure, Frondizi's alternative appeared in 1958." 
According to Portantiero, the economic project of 1958-62 in turn, failed 
because it attempted to "simultaneously maintain levels of protection for 
national capital, . . . transfer revenue to the agrarian bourgeoisie and 
. . . guarantee high profits for monopoly capital." The Onganxa coup
*1 am paraphrasing Juan Carlos Portantiero's excellent Gramscian 
analysis of the Argentine situation between the two Peronist periods. See 
Latin American Perspectives 1 (Fall 1974 issue devoted to "Argentina: Per­
onism and Crisis"), 95-120.
*It was not to be the last attempt. After the second overthrow of 
Peronism in 1976, Argentine history once again continued on its cyclical 
path. General Videla's Economic Minister, Martinez de Hoz, rebuilt the 
economy on the interests of the agro-exporting oligarchy with the strong 
participation of the multinationals as junior partners.
2Ibid., p. 103.
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sought to salvage the situation by narrowing its economic policies to 
an unhampered pursuit of monopoly capital's interests. In this way 
"the armed forces completed in 1966 a political cycle whose first version 
had broken out in 1955 with the defeat of Peronist popular nationalism."1
The Ongania government represented the most cogent attempt to 
forcefully push aside all residual nuclei of oppositional groups. "It 
now appeared that the complex competing 'horizontal' and 'vertical' pres­
sures from the past had been finally superseded by a united and purposeful
2 / military dictatorship." The Krieger Vasena plan promulgated by Ongania's
Minister of the Economy was the clearest and most unencumbered attempt to 
implement policies favoring the interests of the multinational corporate 
sector. However, though it was economically predominant and though the 
state promoted its interests, because it lacked a significant social base, 
the multinational sector was unable to extend its economic predominance 
into political hegemony. The generals could no longer overlook this fact 
when students and auto workers protesting the government's economic poli­
cies seized control of the city of Cordoba in May of 1969. Troops had to 
be brought in, and it was only after several days of fierce fighting that 
this insurrection known as the cordobazo was finally brought under con­
trol.
The Krieger Vasena program's impact went beyond adversely affecting 
the working class' living standards. With its aggressive orientation to­
wards creating the conditions for a "competitive society" free from the 
constraints of "outmoded" economic and social structures— i.e., protection­
ism— it also hurt the position of the smaller national entrepreneurs. On
1 2 Portantiero, p. 102. Rock, p. 209.
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the political level this was coupled with an across the board attack on 
all political parties as the corrupt remnants of the old order standing in 
the way of a clean sweep. All parties were thus "placed on an equal foot­
ing in the ranks of the opposition" and, for the first time, "Radicals
and Peronists found themselves in the same camp."* In this way, economi­
cally and politically, the conditions were set for the reemergence of the 
viability of Peronism's class alliance formula.
In the years before Peron's return, these conditions reemphasized 
the ambiguous nature and the contradictory role of Peronism.. On the one 
hand, it became the expression of working class struggle against multi­
national capital which was evolving into an increasingly class conscious 
opposition to capitalism; and, on the other hand, it also reappeared as 
the residual populist-nationalist formula of class alliance between the 
national bourgeoisie and the working class and popular sectors. This was 
the internal contradiction that tore Peronism apart within less than two 
years from when Peron resumed power.
It was also in the period after the cordobazo that guerrilla war
2against the regime became a real factor. As noted above, several 
Peronist and Marxist groups were active in those years. On the Peronist 
side the most significant of these came to be the Montoneros who first 
gained national notoriety with the capture and subsequent execution of 
General Pedro Aramburu who had been the architect of the most severe 
anti-Peronist repression of the fifties. The Montoneros took their name 
from the legendary Gaucho hordes that had provided the military backbone 
for the independence war and later the many caudillos from the interior
1 2 Rock, p. 210. See p. 353 above.
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who sought to extend their authority.^ On the Marxist side the most sig­
nificant group was the Ejercito Revolucionario del Pueblo (ERP), the 
armed wing of the Trotskyst Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores.
The Peronist left of the late sixties and early seventies had 
moved in a Marxist direction to the point that they agreed with the Marxist 
left on ultimate objectives, but not enough to overcome tactical differ­
ences over how to relate to the bourgeoisie and over the role of the van­
guard. The Peronists believed in taking advantage of divisions within 
the bourgeoisie. Concerning the role of the vanguard, they believed it 
necessary to adjust to the level of consciousness reached by the masses.
To go beyond this level, would push the movement into a position where it 
would be alienated from the masses. The ERP, on the other hand, believed 
it essential to take "advanced positions" in order to educate the masses 
and thereby forge their combativeness into an effective struggle. They 
argued that there was no national bourgeoisie to speak of and that the 
sectors usually referred to under this category, were in fact mere appen­
dages of international capitalism.
Before 1973, these differences were secondary and the guerrilla 
groups actively cooperated with each other often mounting joint military 
operations. Indeed, before he returned triumphantly, Peron did not openly 
criticize the ERP, much less the self-professed Peronist guerrilla groups. 
Not only did he refuse to discourage guerrilla activity, which he termed 
merely a tactic in an overall strategy, he let it be known that such actions 
had his blessings. In exile Peron masterfully applied the same techniques
^Probably derived from the word amontonar, to pile up. That is, 
the helter-skelter gathering together in one location of these "cutthroats" 
and "brigands" who otherwise led solitary and isolated lives in the vast­
ness of the pampas.
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that had served him so well to gain power and then retain it for over a 
decade. With ambiguous statements he led diverse groups to believe that, 
deep down, he was the true champion of their interests. He appealed to 
the inclusiveness of Peronism’s populist-nationalist tradition to project 
the image that only a Justicialist regime could peacefully mediate between 
the forces tearing apart Argentina's social fabric. In forging a broad- 
based, multi-class coalition around his movement, Peron was both aided by, 
and in turn, further intensified the severe repression of the military in 
the Ongan^s period which succeeded in pushing the bourgeoise opposition 
towards the Peronist front.
With their reentry into the Peronist led coalition, the sectors 
comprising the national bourgeoisie completed the cycle that began with 
their defection from Peronism in the mid-fifties. Their tacit approval 
had been one of the factors ensuring the success of the 1955 coup. Far 
from being beneficiaries however, their interests came under almost immedi­
ate attack in the economic policies of the various anti-Peronist regimes.
The CGE which had represented the interests of the smaller producers was 
dissolved in December of 1955 while the UIA, in April of 1956, praised 
the "liberating revolution" on the grounds that it would reject "indiscrim­
inate and absolute" protectionism. ̂
Looking at the 1955 coup in class terms, the military had acted as 
the instrument of a bourgeoise-oligarchic alliance directed against Peronism 
because of its inability to definitively strip itself of its working class 
ties. Once working class interests were removed from official policy, the 
alliance fell victim to its internal contradictions. It
1Cuneo, p. 231.
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had been originally held together by the recognition on the part 
of the industrialists that to achieve further industrial growth it 
was necessary to increase agrarian production and exports, and 
thus escape the balance of payments constraints on capital goods 
imports. But during the latter 1950s and the 1960s the terms 
of trade problems showed few signs of improving significantly. At 
the same time agrarian production failed to respond adequately to 
price incentives. As a result this development strategy increasingly 
lost adherents.1
Within the industrial bourgeoisie itself, contradictions between 
its national and multinational sectors prevented it from remaining a 
secure base for anti-Peronism. Indeed, the inability to resolve these 
divisions became one of the key factors in Peron's return.- Initially, 
the post-1955 regimes were quite antagonistic toward some of the small 
business sectors, particularly those from the interior, which had consti­
tuted an important part of Peronism. By 1958 Frondizi could no longer 
ignore their interests. Responding to a campaign by regional groups from 
Northern Argentina to have their special needs recognized, he revived the 
CGE.2.
Complex and contradictory political and economic developments 
characterize the eighteen year period of Peron's exile. In the end Peron 
was brought back because the attempts to forcefully resolve the contradic­
tions between and within classes failed. The working class was brutally 
suppressed but its resistance developed into a combativeness that could 
not be contained. The multinational sectors of the bourgeoisie made tre­
mendous gains and took control of the dynamic branches of industry but the 
national bourgeoisie, far from disappearing, remained a significant part 
of the economic picture. Indeed, it may well have been their lack of suf­
ficient "economic predominance" which prevented the multinational sectors
^Rock, p. 197. ^See Cuneo, pp. 233-42.
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from achieving full "political hegemony." And, in turn, lacking sufficient 
"political hegemony," they were unable to impose the conditions needed to 
achieve full "economic predominance." Hence, when the most clear-cut, 
unemcumbered monopolistic multinational project was set in motion after 
Ongania*s coup in 1966, the groups whose interests were in contradiction 
to it, coalesced and the regime was increasingly unable to cope with their 
opposition from the cordobazo of 1969 on.
Peronism*s survival and growth, both as an expression of working 
class resistance and militance and, after 1966, as a revival of the popu­
list-nationalist alliance between the workers and the national sectors 
of the bourgeoisie, was a chief reason for the military's inability to 
transform economic predominance into political hegemony for the sectors 
of the bourgeoisie centered around the multinationals* interests. Condi­
tions just before Peron's return forced the military to invert the model 
it had been pursuing. The assumption had been that, since the interests 
of other sectors could be ignored, impressive economic results would be 
achieved through the use of the military's coercive power behind a project 
facilitating accumulation for the monopoly and multinational sector. These 
results could then be used by the multinationals as the material basis for 
cementing a new coalition under their hegemony.* Instead of achieving the 
hoped for results, the repression necessary to imposing this project in­
tensified working class militance and brought the bourgeois sectors back 
into the Peronist opposition. With repression backfiring, the military 
reversed its strategy. With General Alejandro Lanusse taking the reins of 
power in March of 1971, the thinking now was that only if political stability
*Juan Carlos Portantiero makes this point in "Dominant Classes and 
Political Crisis in Argentina Today," Latin American Perspectives 1 (Fall 1974),
p. 106.
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could be achieved, would economic development take place.* This was the
/reasoning behind the negotiations that eventually resulted in Peron's 
2triumphant return.
The return of the petite bourgeoisie, national capitalists, and 
other bourgeois sectors into the coalition grouped around Peronism was 
one of the key factors which made Peron's return possible. Promoting 
their interests, at least initially, played a very significant part in the 
policies that reformulated populist-nationalism to the new context of the 
seventies. Once again, the attempt to simultaneously promote the interests 
of the working class and the national sectors of the bourgeoisie proved to 
be an untenable venture. Again the experience of the second Peronist period 
replicated that of the first: as the contradictions in its populist-national­
ist formula intensified, the regime's policies were increasingly oriented 
toward the interests of the monopolistic multinational bourgeoisie. The 
next section explores this dynamic further.
It is important to note that though the reentry of bourgeois sec­
tors into the Peronist coalition was an important factor making Peron's 
return possible, they were not the driving force behind it. The single 
most important factor behind Peron's being brought back into power was the 
workers' militant opposition which generated such turmoil that it undermined 
industrial peace and tranquility. As a result of their militance therefore, 
the workers undermined one of the essential conditions for a dependent in­
dustrial economy: the general prevalence of industrial peace and a certain
3degree of political stability.
^Portantiero, p. 117.
2See Alejandro Lanusse, Mi testimonio (Buenos Aires: Lassere, 1977), 
Chap. 6, for his version of the Pe'ronist restoration.
3See p. 329 above.
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/Political stability and industrial peace was the promise Peron 
held out to the groups in power. Thus the stage was set for his return in 
1973 with their approval. They had not been able to achieve "normalcy." 
Their need for the displacement or reformulation of increasingly tense 
social unrest which seemed to everyone to be leading Argentina in a revolu­
tionary direction, was so great that they were willing to take a chance 
on Peron. "Peron is the only one who can quiet things down," was the state­
ment frequently heard in business circles before 1973. A few years later 
that "quiet" seemed further away than ever. Though the political context 
had shifted, it was not long before the contradictions of prior years re- 
emerged, and this time, in a more virulent form. Just as they had been the 
main force behind Peron's return, the workers and the militant struggles 
they waged provided the chief contradiction which undid the second Peron­
ist regime.
Second Peronist Period
The second Peronist regime attempted to recreate the same coalition 
of classes around itself as in the first period, only under very different 
conditions. But while Peron had been able to balance-off contradictory 
class interests to keep his regime in power for a decade, the second attempt 
was short lived, lasting less than three years. Using the dependency theory 
approach adapted from Cardoso and Faletto, what internal and external 
conditions were responsible for the disastrous failure in the seventies of 
the modified version of populist-nationalism from the forties and fifties?
The attempt to find the basis for an alliance between labor and the 
national bourgeoisie was doomed from the outset. To begin with, Peron 
faced a major contradiction with his working class base. Peron had depended
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on the ■workers' militance to bring him back to power. At key points be­
fore he regained power, his movement had been held together by becoming 
a workers’ movement based solely on working class interests. These were 
to be achieved through the militant mobilization of the class towards the 
seizure of political power. However, once in power, Peron's concern was 
to solidify an alliance between the working class and the middle sectors 
of Argentine society. He focused the Justicialist movement's politics on 
conciliation and integration. To forge this alliance with the middle sec­
tors, Peron had to be able to deliver political tranquility and labor 
peace. He had to suppress the more revolutionary inclined among his fol­
lowers who were calling for a socialist Argentina based on their interests 
and power. The fact that more than twice as many leftist militants were • 
killed in the two years that Peron was in the presidency than in the eighteen 
years that he was in exile shows the extent to which Peron repressed the 
left both within and outside of his movement.* Not only did this campaign 
fail, but in the process Peron isolated himself from the people who were 
most responsible for his regaining of power and who constituted his strong­
est base of support. This became especially apparent after Peron's death 
in July of 1974 when Isabel Peron's government was stripped of the last 
element holding Peronism together, Peron's personal charisma.
Contrary to the hopes of the Peronist left, Peron had not changed 
his opposition to fundamental changes in the social relations of production. 
Again there was an effort to gain the allegiance of the working class by con­
*According to Alvaro Luna, "Peronismo: analisis de un movimiento," 
reprinted in Denuncia (New York), July 1976, p. 9. Because of the clandes­
tine nature of the antagonists on both sides and the passionate views sur­
rounding the subject, there are no reliable figures on the casualties of 
those years. However, there is no doubt that the intensity of the struggle 
and the numbers involved far surpassed previous levels.
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trolling the centralized union leadership and providing material benefits 
for them to deliver to the rank and file. The attempt was to replicate 
the success achieved in the forties in undercutting class struggle through 
redistributive reforms. Indeed, in this respect the first measures of the 
Campora government* in May and June of 1973 bore a striking resemblance
Dr. Hector Campora, standard bearer of the Frente Justicialista 
de Liberacion (Frejuli), was elected to the presidency on March 11, 1973, 
with 49.56 percent of the popular vote. Only the Union Civica Radical 
(UCR) obtained barely over 20 percent of the vote (21.29%), all other 
parties gaining less than 15 percent. The Peronists won all the governor­
ships, 45 of 69 senatorial seats, and 142 of the 243 seats in the lower 
house.
The March 1973 elections thus represented the latest instance in 
the series of consistent electoral successes scored by Peronism when it 
was allowed to participate. Prohibited from electoral competition in 
1958 and 1963, Peronists were allowed to participate in 1962, 1965, and 
1973. Because 1962 and 1965 were congressional elections, they were allowed 
to compete since Peron would not be running. Nevertheless, the results 
were nullified by the military who removed Frondizi and Illia from office 
after the Peronists secured a plurality in those elections. In addition, 
the Peronist candidate for governor of Buenos Aires in 1962, Andres Framini, 
a former textile worker and secretary general of the CGT at the time, won 
by a large majority.
Given this record, it is difficult to see the basis in 1973 for 
the military's calculated gamble that the real possibility of a Peronist 
victory would galvanize a majority anti-Peronist coalition. Of course, 
General Lanusse was well aware that his gamble might fail. In the negotia­
tions leading to Peron's return and the dropping of outstanding charges 
against him, Peron had to agree not to run for the presidency. Instead, 
he chose Campora, a devoted and loyal Peronist on whom Peron counted to 
follow his orders. As it turned out, he was quite right in this assessment. 
When Peron asked Campora to resign shortly after his election, thus allowing 
Peron to run for president in the special elections called for September 23, 
1973, Campora willingly obliged. In the September elections, Peron received 
an overwhelming mandate, gaining 61.85 percent of the vote against Balbxn's 
(UCR) 24.34 percent.
For Peronism1s electoral appeal, see Manuel Mora y Araujo and Peter 
Smith, "Peronism and Economic Development: The 1973 Election" in Frederick 
C. Turner and Jose'*’Enrique Miguens (eds.), Juan Peron and the Reshaping of 
of Argentina (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh, 1983), pp. 171-87; 
and also Lars Schoultz, "The Socio-Economic Determinants of Popular-Author­
itarian Electoral Behavior: The Case of Peronism," American Political Sci­
ence Review 71 (1977): 1423-46.
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to those employed by Peron to consolidate himself in power in 1943 and 
1944. The prices of most essential commodities were actually rolled back 
and workers' wages were raised by twenty percent. In contrast to the 
first Peronist period, this was done at a time of the most acute spiralling 
inflation. Shch different conditions made it impossible to replicate the 
success achieved with the populist-nationalist formula in the earlier 
period.
Just before Peron's return, Peronism was perceived by the left as 
a stage in the revolutionary process of social and national liberation, 
by the national bourgeoisie as a chance to extend political space and re­
cuperate some of the ground lost to foreign monopoly capital, and by the
native and foreign monopoly establishment as a last line of defense against
1 'revolution. While favorable economic conditions allowed Peron to build
a broad social base and enabled his regime to contain and postpone the 
contradictory interests promoted by his populist-nationalist policies the 
first time around, adverse economic conditions rapidly brought out the 
contradictions in the populist-nationalist program of the seventies, despite 
the fact that this time the Justicialist regime already had a broad base 
of support.
Explicitly recreating the populist-nationalist alliance, the Justi­
cialist regime sought to base its economic and social policies on the pacto 
social signed shortly after the elections on May 30, 1973 by the Department 
of Finance, the Secretary General of the CGT, and the President of the CGE. 
The CGE, for the employers, pledged to maintain price stability, the govern­
^This compendium of perceptions of Peronism by the significant sec­
tors of Argentine society is from J. E. Corradi's introduction, "Argentina 
and Peronism: Fragments of the Puzzle," to the Latin American Perspectives
1 (Fall 1974 issue on Peronism): 14.
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ment promised long-run economic reforms, and (having obtained limited 
increases prior to signing) the CGT pledged to make no wage demands for 
two years.* With this pacto social the Justicialist regime was picking 
up where the previous populist-nationalist episode had left off with the 
"National Congress on Productivity and Social Welfare" held in early 1955.
As Alberto Ciria aptly notes, they both amounted "to the same idea of a 
social pact between labor and management under the state's tutelage." 
Interestingly, the CGE's President, Jose^Gelbard, almost immediately became 
the Minister of the Economy with responsibility for overseeing the imple­
mentation of the pacto. This was an indication of the rapidity with which 
the populist-nationalist state the second time around moved in the direc­
tion of the capitalist pole in the contradictory class alliance it sought 
to forge.
The continuity in the programmatic thrusts of the first and second
Peronist periods is clearly reflected in the contents of the Three Year Plan
/(TYP) announced by Peron in late 1973. The plan, which was to cover the 
1974-7period, set out its aims in three general areas. It emphasized the 
full realization of social justice which it defined as an equitable distri­
bution between the efforts and fruits of development. It translated this 
aim into a commitment to an accelerated redistribution of income which re-
*The pacto social can be found in the Review of the River Plate 
(Buenos Aires), June 19, 1973.
2Alberto Ciria, "Peronism Yesterday and Today" in Latin American 
Perspectives 1 (Fall 1974), 28. For Peronist economic policy of the 
second period, see Juan Carlos de Pablo, Econom^a polftica del peronismo 
(Buenos Aires: El Cid, 1980).
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suits in a growing participation of wage earners in the national product.*
Specifically, the plan proposed to raise per capita income by 35.5 per-
2cent in the three year period. The TYP also proposed establishing 
ceiling prices for key goods as a means of preventing the passing along 
of increased labor costs and thus the erosion of income gains of wage 
workers through inflation. The plan also spoke of a fundamental modifi­
cation of productive and distributive structures towards a new model of 
production and consumption. By this no more was meant than had already 
been contained in the previous Five Year Plans. The existing productive 
model was characterized as oriented to satisfying the demands of the high
and medium income markets and this would be changed to producing more and
4better quality goods for popular consumption.
Like the previous plans, the TYP did not envision any alterations 
in the social relations of production. Its proposals were based on the 
same foundation as the programmatic thrust in the earlier populist- 
nationalist formula: to simultaneously provide benefits for workers and 
national entrepreneurs. Hence the second major area in its aims emphasized 
a rapid and strong expansion of economic activity. The plan called for 
doubling the growth rate of the previous decade. This would provide the 
necessary base to achieve a high degree of well-being for all Argentines 
and the international position that would liberate the country from its 
condition of dependence, stagnation and disequilibrium.’’
1I am paraphrasing this and following highlights of the TYP as they 
are contained in a jpopularized version widely available in Argentina at 
the time: Juan Peron en la Argentina 1973 (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Sintesis, 
1974), pp. 260-1.
2Ibid., p. 253. 3Ibid., p. 258. 4Ibid., p. 268. 5Ibid., p. 261.
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The expectation that the TYP would realize the material base 
necessary for providing a high degree of well-being for all Argentines as 
well as freeing Argentina from external dependency was not quite as fan­
tastic as it appears at first sight, though it clearly was a short-lived 
hope. For a brief but critical time, the confluence of factors on the 
international scene were advantageous for Argentina. The United States' 
globally dominant position was dealt a serious blow in Vietnam and Cuba and 
there was intensified competition from Japanese and Western European 
interests for the world market in general,and within Argentina specifically, 
particularly by the Europeans. In addition, the militance of Argentina's 
working class, which in recent years had often taken the form of opposition 
to the denationalization of the industrial sector, strengthened Peron's 
hand in his attempts to gain a more prominent role for national capital, 
without even having to raise the specter of expropriations. Hence, anala- 
gous to Peron's severe attacks on the oligarchy on the level of rhetoric 
without challenging their material base during the first period, Peron was 
now able to preserve his anti-imperialist credentials without having to 
confront the interests of the multinational sector within the economy 
directly.
Peron very astutely used his "Third Position" on the level of
international relations to strengthen national capital and open up new
markets for Argentina. In his public pronouncements during his exile,
✓Peron was fond of stressing how his regime had been a precursor of the 
Third World movement. He pointed to the "Third Position" in his government's 
foreign policy which he characterized as a rejection of both Yankee imperi­
alism and Soviet communism. In this way Argentina showed the Third World 
an alternative to acquiescing to the dominance of the superpowers. Con­
370
veniently ignored was the fact that Argentina’s Third Position in world 
affairs of the fifties was largely confined to the realm of rhetoric. By 
1973, however, the Campora government applied the lessons learned by 
Third World nations in playing the cold war antagonists off against each 
other. Among its first official acts, the Campora government extended 
diplomatic recognition to socialist bloc countries which, in turn, was soon 
followed by growing trade relations.
An important component of the TYP was the attempt to open up new 
areas of the international market within the socialist bloc. Commercial 
agreements were signed with Cuba, Czechoslovakia, and North Korea and nego­
tiations were initiated with Poland, Romania,and China. It was in this 
aspect of opening up new areas of trade that the TYP showed the only sig­
nificant departure from the previous five year plans. While it was only 
a trend, Soviet bloc countries did make inroads "into Argentina's tradi­
tional trade flows with U.S. and Western European suppliers, especially in 
heavy equipment industries."* In the early fifties, though with no great 
enthusiasm, Argentina nevertheless did dutifully line up on the U.S. side 
of the Cold War. By contrast, the Soviet Union never enjoyed a closer poli­
tical and economic relationship than during the second Peronist period.
For example, in May of 1974 the U.S.S.R. granted $600 million in loans to 
allow Argentina to buy Soviet hydro-electric generating equipment.
Another example of the use of the Third Position in opening up new 
areas for the-Argentine economy were the brief but significant commercial
^Business Latin America, July 10, 1974 as quoted in NACLA, Argen­
tina in the Hour of the Furnaces (New York, 1975), p. 45.
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relations with Cuba. Cuba provided a market not only for agro-pastoral 
goods but also for industrial commodities produced by both the national 
and multinational sectors. To circumvent the U.S. embargo, the Cuban 
government had expressed an interest in purchasing cars, buses and trucks 
produced in Argentina by the subsidiaries of U.S. corporations. The 
Peronist state let it be known that any attempt by the U.S. State Depart­
ment to enforce the embargo against Cuba by restricting the deals nego­
tiated with General Motors and Chrysler subsidiaries would be construed 
as a violation of Argentine sovereignty. Thus, not only did the govern­
ment under Peron fail to confront the multinational presence within the 
Argentine industrial economy directly, but it even used its "anti-imperial­
ism11 to drum up some business.
Though the TYP represented a departure in seeking access to social­
ist bloc markets for "Argentine" goods, it did not differ from previous 
Peronist plans in its orientation towards increasing productive output 
without contemplating changes in the underlying social relations of pro­
duction. Moreover, it envisioned a continuation of the same dual indus­
trial development of the earlier period which would continue to rest on an 
export base of primarily agricultural products. The TYP’s goal was to 
double exports in order to be able to import the goods necessary for con­
tinued growth and be able to do so while maintaining a favorable balance 
of payments.'*' The TYP stressed at length that the principal emphasis in 
its policies for industrial development was to stimulate businesses with 
national capital and reverse the process of denationalization. It proposed
^ee Juan Peron en la Argentina 1973. p. 253.
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strengthening the role of small to medium size enterprises as well as the 
state's participation in basic industry.1 With respect to the latter it 
proposed to nationalize and coordinate the public sector through a Corpor­
ation of National Enterprises designed to remedy the absence of a cohesive
2policy and the dispersion of power in internal and external purchases.
At the same time, to promote the sector comprised of small to medium sized 
enterprises and assure national entrepreneurs profitability, the Corpor­
ation of Small to Medium Size Enterprises would function to make available 
the services and facilities enjoyed by large businesses such as replacing
equipment, financing, technology, vertical and horizontal integration, co-
3ordination of purchases, and outlets for exports.
In addition to the full realization of social justice and the
strong expansion of economic activity, the TYP announced its third major
area to be the achievement of growing participation by all Argentines in
the managing of the state's affairs. In this connection the plan speaks
of developing the citizenry's decision-making abilities and increasing
their capacity for participating in the process of change leading to a
4more just and independent society. While the TYP fell short of achieving 
the aims set out in its first two major areas, it failed dismally in 
carrying out the goals of this third area. Indeed as its shortcomings in 
the first two areas became apparent, the regime dropped its commitments in 
the third area all the more.
The TYP failed for the same reasons that the FFYP and SFYP had 
failed. It attempted to implement a viable model for national capitalist 
development within the framework of a basic commitment to the avoidance of
1Juan Peron en la Argentina 1973. p. 267. 2Ibid., o. 270.
3Ibid., p. 271. ^Ibid., p. 262.
class struggle. Like the earlier efforts it assumed it could find and 
nurture the means for a developmental process that would benefit both 
workers and native capitalists alike. It also assumed that indirect 
controls on the government's part would be sufficient to counter de­
pendency on external interests. The major difference with the FFYP and 
SFYP was that dependency on the international system in the seventies 
was present more directly within the Argentine economy than it had been 
in the forties and fifties. The nationalization of the railroads, crea­
tion of the Central Bank, and I.A.P.I. were an adequate response to for­
eign interests in the externally oriented growth model since these were 
largely in the transportation, finance, and commercial sectors.'*' By con­
trast, creation of a Corporation of National Enterprises and a Corpora­
tion of Small to Medium Size Enterprises seemed a weak response to the 
entrenched presence of the multinationals in the most dynamic sectors of 
the industrial economy. The automotive and farm machinery industries pro­
vide a case in point. There was significant national production in these 
areas during the first Peronist period; by 1963,97 percent of auto and 
truck manufacturing was controlled by European and U.S. companies, while 
they also controlled 88 percent of tractor production. In 1969 these in­
dustries alone employed 11 percent of Argentine industrial workers. The 
dynamism of this sector was revealed by the fact that between 1963 and 1969
its productivity grew at an annual rate of 6.7 percent while employment in-
2creased by only 0.7 percent and wages by 3 percent.
*Tt must be reemphasized however that the failure to confront the 
landowning oligarchy directly through expropriations, constituted a fatal 
flaw.
2Figures are quoted in "AIFLD Losing its Grip" in N.A.C.L.A.'s Ar­
gentina in the Hour of the Furnaces (New York, 1975), p. 69.
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According to the TYP itself, its success or failure depended on 
two key assumptions, increased exports and increased savings. Doubling 
exports would allow the national economy to obtain the imports needed for 
increased production without inducing an unfavorable balance of payments. 
Doubling of exports was assumed to be a feasible proposition in the plan 
if a) agricultural production increased considerably, b) tendencies in the 
world market for Argentine goods made for favorable prices, and c) the ex­
port of industrial goods expanded to the point of constituting a signifi­
cant component of Argentina's foreign trade. The latter two premises in­
volved factors mostly outside of the Argentine government's control, while 
it could only exercise direct control over the former if it were willing 
to alter existing relations of production. According to the second key 
assumption, the plan's success or failure would be decided by the savings 
of both wage earners and "others." The consumption of workers was expected 
to increase,but in lesser proportion than their contribution to productivity. 
The TYP reassured workers by noting that their "savings" would be compen­
sated for with increased deliveries of social services by the state.
The TYP rested on the same model of accumulation as the FFYP and 
SFYP had and therefore contained the same contradictions. It basically 
depended on a favorable international context for Argentine exports in 
order to be able to deliver the benefits promised simultaneously to wage 
earners and national entrepreneurs. Because of the state's inability to 
control the impact of the dependency dimension, when the international situ­
ation did not conform to the premises on which the first key assumption 
outlined above depended, the state was also unable to deliver the social 
services upon which the workers' savings in the second key assumption above 
were premised. Within a capitalist framework, asking workers to consume
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substantially less than they produced without any compensation in the 
form of private or state subsidized social services, meant asking workers 
to accept declining standards of living. Ergo, a repetition of the con­
tradiction involved in Peronism's demise in the fifties: a populist regime 
enforcing policies harmful to the interests of the popular sectors com­
prising its social foundation. Just as then, the alternative would have 
been the politically very difficult, and socially extremely disruptive one, 
of altering the social relations of production. That, of course, was pre­
cisely what Justicialism with its class conciliationist underpinnings, 
promised to avoid.
In essence, the Peronist policies of this second period replicated 
those of the first by recreating the same kind of balancing act between 
contradictory economic and class interests. Peronism's relations with 
the dominant external interests were based on providing a profitable situ­
ation by guaranteeing labor peace and political stability. On the other 
hand, the regime sought to enhance its bargaining position with the multi­
nationals through its control of a strong mass movement as a countervail­
ing power. In its relations with the popular sectors, in order to keep 
them within the ruling coalition and deflect the class struggle against the 
monopolistic multinational firms, Peronism depended on its ability to deliv­
er material benefits. Hence, though in a different context, by adhering 
to its populist-nationalist doctrine, Peronism once again contained the 
basic contradiction between capital and labor and its success or failure 
once again hinged on finding formulas that could provide greater profits 
and higher wages at the same time.
Given the constraints imposed by capitalist accumulation, providing 
real wage increases, and simultaneously, greater profits, depends on the
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ability to achieve cumulative expanded production. For this reason, 
Peronism's success or failure in both the first and second periods, was 
determined by the conditions which facilitated or impeded the regime's 
ability to find ways of sustaining increased productivity for the industrial 
sector. Indeed, this analysis of Peronism suggests that, as a successful 
governing formula, populism only occurs when the conditions allowing for 
a period of expanded production are present. Certainly, as the Peronist 
case clearly shows, populism can play a key part in speeding up the pro­
cess of rapid economic growth. However, this study suggests that this is 
only true in those limited situations when the confluence of external 
and internal factors is favorable. Such favorable conjunctures can only 
obscure, not overcome, the contradiction of a governing formula encompassing 
antagonistic class interests which is based on a more equitable distribu­
tion of income without altering the social relations of production. Thus, 
while the regime depends on expanded production for its reforms in the 
sphere of circulation• it remains committed not to interfere directly in 
the sphere of production.
The populist-nationalism of the forties should not be faulted for 
its class conciliationist reforms confined to the sphere of circulation. 
Under the circumstances and in the context of the times, they seemed appro­
priate and they worked. However, given that the crisis of the fifties 
brought out their underlying contradictions, it seems inexcusable for Peron 
to have based his second regime on an only slightly modified recreation of 
the formulas of the forties. This was especially true since Justicialism's 
left wing had grown on a critique of past mistakes and saw its role as the 
movement's conscience in avoiding past inadequacies. Peron missed a unique 
opportunity, seldom afforded in history, to be able to rectify past errors 
and limitations.
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In its initial phase, the Justicialist regime of the seventies 
was headed towards the socialist side in its populist-nationalist program. 
During the Campora period, when Justicialism leaned heavily on the forces 
that had brought Peronism back to power, the government relied on repre­
sentatives of the left within the movement for carrying out its policies 
and encouraged popular mobilizations as an instrument of power. Indeed, 
during this time Justicialism was largely identified with its left and 
popular sectors. So much was this the case that Hector Campora's resigna­
tion on July 13, 1973 to pave the way for Peron’s candidacy for the presi­
dency can in fact be regarded as an internal coup by the right wing of the 
movement. Though not clearly recognized at that time, Campora's replace­
ment culminated the struggle between the right and left of the movement, 
the adherents of patria peronista and patria socialists, that had come out 
with such ferocity in the shoot out at Ezeiza Airport upon Peron's would-be
triumphant arrival. Though the full implications in the rightward process
set in motion with Peron's presidency were not manifested until after his 
death, the handwriting on the wall was already unmistakable within the 
nine months that he headed the state.
Illustrative of the differences between the left Peronists espousing 
the patria socialista and the coterie grouped around Isabel Peron and Lopez 
Rega promoting the patria peronista is a short piece that appeared in Las 
Bases.* It enumerated the characteristics that set Justicialism apart from
^The article is by Domingo Rafael Ianantuoni and appeared in Las 
Bases (Buenos Aires) 2 (Mar. 29, 1973). Las Bases was the official organ 
of right wing Peronism edited by Jose Lopez Rega. Known as el bru.jo (the 
sorcerer), this self professed astrologer was Peron and Isabel's close con­
fidant and their Minister of Social Welfare. To gauge the significance of 
his official position, one need only recall that Peron used the Ministry of 
Social Welfare as his springboard to power. Lopez Rega was also generally 
held to be the guiding force behind the AAA (alianza anticomunista argentina),
the right wing death squads.
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socialism. Among these it notes that
JUSTICIALISM seeks to overcome class divisions in society, helping 
the proletarian to improve his condition and rise to the important 
rank of "SOCIAL ENTREPRENEUR." It does this through a social stock­
holder system, since it recognizes private property as inherent to 
human nature, whereas socialism, by not recognizing private property, 
maintains the worker in a state of proletarianization, even though it 
also favors a single class.1
Needless to say that the position of "social entrepreneur" did not receive
official attention, nor was a system of social stockholdership ever given
serious consideration.
As evidenced by the TYP, the political assumption underlying the
programmatic thrust of Peron's government in the seventies was his ability
to gain a truce in the class struggle and, moreover, obtain the cooperation
of the antagonists. In turn, the regime's policies were supposed to further
contain class conflict. Choosing his wife Isabel as his running mate, for
example, not only served the important symbolic purpose of assuring the
Peronist masses that Peron could now carry out even what had been denied
2to him in the past, but also played a critical function in allowing 
Peron not to side with any of the contending Peronist factions since she 
was identified with his person. For awhile Peron sought to achieve the 
kind'of delicate balancing act he had been so successful at in the past. 
Under Campora the Peronist left and youth had influence on government poli­
cy making and implementation. Under Peron they no longer had access to 
key power posts but were given hope of indirect influence through debates
^As translated by N.A.C.L.A. in their issue of Latin America and 
Empire Report 7 (Sept. 1973), devoted to "Argentina: The Protracted 
Struggle," p. 30.
2^ Recall that the military had vetoed Evita (the CGT's choice) as 
Peron's running mate in his reelection campaign of 1952.
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within the party on government policy. Peron kept them da.ngling mostly in 
order to counter the strength of the CGT bureaucracy.
Lacking a favorable international situation to provide the materi­
al basis, as had been the case in the forties, Peron's charisma alone proved 
insufficient and his attempted balancing act was short lived. Repeating 
the experience of the fifties but telescoping the duration of the process 
into less than a year, as the contradictions in the government's programs 
sharpened, the regime accelerated its drift toward the capitalist pole 
in the worker-national bourgeoisie "social pact." The central presence of 
multinational capital in the industrial economy constituted the major 
difference with the process of the fifties. Hence, conciliation and har­
mony came to mean compromise and accomodation to the interests of foreign 
capital and the Argentine monopoly bourgeoisie. Moreover, the greater weight 
of anti-imperialism and socialism among the workers' ranks made the repres­
sion of working class demands and struggles all the more severe. The 
shift in the government's economic orientation was reflected by the shift 
within the CGE. Originally representative of the interests of the national 
bourgeosie, large scale industrial companies began to join and, in 1974, 
the UIA, associated with monopoly capital, merged with the CGE.
For their part, the workers responded not with less, but with more 
militance. From the time Peron was inaugurated as president on October 12, 
1973 through mid 1974,a wave of strikes swept the nation affecting some of 
the largest foreign and national companies in the heavy industrial sector, 
such as steel. Significantly, the demands were not just economic but were 
also aimed at the labor bureaucracy's iron grip on the CGT. The left made 
important gains, particularly in heavy industry and the sectors dominated 
by multinational capital. For example, despite a vicious slander campaign
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directed against him, the 20,000 members of the auto workers-union in 
Cordoba elected a revolutionary communist, Rene*Salamanca, to lead them,and 
they also put a majority of his group on the industry's grievance committee. 
Similarly, despite the Peronist right's concerted effort to destroy the 
union, including machine gun attacks on its headquarters, Cordoba's elec­
trical workers remained loyal to their leader, a self professed Marxist by 
the name of Augustin Tosco who eventually died underground. Given that 
some of the more dynamic branches of the industrial economy were located 
around Cordoba, the crushing of this center of Peronist and non-Peronist 
left wing activity became of strategic importance. In February 1974, the 
police in Cordoba staged a coup and ousted the province's popular elected 
Governor, Ricardo Obregon-Cano who was also one of left-Peronism's most 
respected figures. Though subsequently declared illegal, the coup enjoyed 
Buenos Aires' tacit blessing and was probably organized and directed from 
there.
As the regime moved further to the right, the guerrillas stepped 
up their activities. The Trotskyst E.R.P., largest and most active of 
the non-Peronist groups, never deviated from its critique of the Peronist 
government as a bourgeois regime. Its refusal to call a truce with the gov­
ernment drove a wedge between itself and the Peronist Montoneros, thus un­
doing the alliance that had become operationally effective in the period 
just prior to 1973. The E.R.P. announced that it would continue its cam­
paign against foreign capital and domestic monopoly capital^- as well as 
its operations against the state, though it briefly promised to confine its 
attacks to the repressive apparatus (police and military). Its most
*This took the form of kidnappings of executives and sabotage of 
plant and equipment in factories owned by companies whose workers were on 
strike.
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dramatic action in this period came in January of 1974 with an attack on 
the army base at Azul, about 170 miles from Buenos Aires. As Peron moved 
against the left of his movement, the E.R.P.'s intransigence was vindi­
cated and it was not long before its alliance with the Montoneros began 
to be reestablished. The two again began to cooperate in military opera­
tions even before the Videla coup which overthrew Isabel Peron's govern­
ment in 1976.
The attitude of the largest and most active of the Peronist 
guerrilla groups towards the Peronist regime was one of critical support.
The Montoneros remained loyal to the person of Peron and maintained that, 
in spite of all the contradictions within it, the Peronist movement con­
tained the best potential for initiating the revolutionary process leading 
towards a socialist Argentina. According to their analysis at this time, 
this goal could only be achieved if the working class became hegemonic 
within the movement. Accordingly, their announced aim was to help the 
working class gain hegemony over the middle class in general, and the petit 
bourgeois and small entrepreneurial sectors in particular. The latter 
were to be kept as subordinate partners in the movement based on their 
common interests in opposition to the oligarchy and imperialism. In April 
1974 the Montoneros cautioned the regime that its weakness might lead to a 
coup. They drew an analogy of the prevailing situation with that in effect 
just prior to June-September 1955: the vacillation , of the popularly 
elected government, the bureaucratization of the movement's leadership, and 
the demobilization of the masses. In the same document, the Montoneros made 
clear how short the regime had fallen qjj the programmatic commitments en­
visioned for it by the left;
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The immediate tasks of the Popular Government were to control 
and plan the economy, expel the monopolies, reject all secret com­
promises with imperialism, expropriate the industrial and landed 
oligarchy, regulate the participation of medium sized business in 
national development and protect the small producers.
The Montoneros maintained that Peronism could not institute fundamental
changes without first turning its attention to the Armed Forces. It was
imperative to initiate "profound changes in its ranks and doctrines,
through the rise to command positions of officers clearly identified with
national goals, enemies of the monopolies and imperialism and, in the last
analysis, subordinate to the popular will."* The conclusions drawn by
the Montoneros from their analysis show how close they were to a total
break with the regime at this point:
If the diagnosis of the present situation is obvious to every 
Peronist, the future prospects are less clear. Only events will 
tell whether the deviation of the process is irreversible, whether 
the blood that has been shed is lost and whether it will be necessary 
to begin anew as in 1955, ’59, '68, and '70.
The undersigned organizations have good reason to fear that 
this is the case, but they are also ready to engage in any serious 
attempt to redirect the process and restore liberty, justice and 
power to the people.2
The widening breach between Peron and the left of his movement 
took its most visible form less than two weeks after the publication of 
the above document. In the course of his traditional May Day speech to 
a mass gathering at the Plaza de Mayo, Peron praised the right wing leader­
ship of the CGT and lambasted the Peronist Youth and Montoneros. They, 
for their part, had come prepared. One side of their placards had pro­
government slogans and, the other, critiques. As they were attacked
"A Document for Liberation, April 1974" by the Montoneros and 
Peronist Youth, translated from El Peronista 1 (Apr. 19, 1974) by N.A.C.L.A. 
in their Argentina in the Hour of the Furnaces (New York, 1975), p. 88.
2Ibid., p. 91.
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they turned their placards around and started chanting, "We voted for a 
corpse (Evita), a whore (Isabel), and a cuckold" (alluding to the alleged 
relationship between Isabel and Lopez Rega), as they inarched out of the 
plaza. They took more than half of the demonstration’s participants with 
them and left Peron on the balcony of the Casa Rosada addressing a rump 
gathering.
Exactly two months after this embarrassing fiasco, Peron died on 
July 1, 1974. This happened before the rupture between the mass base of 
his movement and the government was completed and before he was forced to 
confront the full impact of the contradictions within his populist-national­
ist program. Though considerably more scarred than the first time around, 
the mystique surrounding Peron’s person was again preserved. Even after 
the Montoneros had moved underground and declared all-out war on Isabel’s 
government in September 1974, they still avoided attacking Peron directly 
and confined their criticisms to his regime's policies, the forces behind 
them, and the personnel responsible for executing them. Distinguishing 
between Peron and Isabel, the Montoneros attributed his errors to short­
comings in Justicialist doctrine: principally that national liberation 
could be achieved through an alliance based on an equilibrium between the 
working class and the national bourgeoisie. With Isabel’s government on 
the other hand, it'was no longer a question of doctrinal insufficiencies.
Her policies were characterized as directly serving imperialist interests.
As one of the Montoneros' publications put it, "The failure of Martinez 
and her entourage of bureaucratic traitors, was the failure of an imperial­
ist strategy.’’*
*E1 Montonero, No. 11 (Apr. 24, 1976), p. 6.
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In an interview conducted during July 1976 shortly after the mili­
tary coup overthrowing Isabel Peron's government, Mario Eduardo Fxrmenich 
then Secretary General of the Partido Montonero, presented his group's 
evaluation of the second Peronist period. Responding to the critique by 
the Marxist left of Peron as a leader of the bourgeoisie,* he drew a dis­
tinction between leader of the bourgeoisie and bourgeois leader:
Peron was not a leader of the bourgeoisie because his policies 
neither guaranteed nor permitted the expansion of that class.
Was his ideology socialist? Naturally not. Curing the period of 
the military dictatorship (1966-73) we characterized Peton as a 
socialist leader. In 1973(we revised the characterization and in 
1974 we formulated a self criticism. Essentially, this characteri­
zation was erroneous: Peron was not a socialist leader. In the 
final analysis, his "third position," by not calling for socialism, 
can be reduced to bourgeois ideology. This does not mean, however, 
that he was a leader of the bourgeoisie, a conclusion which would 
deny the history of Peronist struggle.
The lesson the Montoneros drew from the second period was that Peronism
had reached its limits. The conditions of the seventies and Justicialism's
doctrine led to an impasse in the class struggle which neither permitted
the development of the productive forces nor the strengthening of the
popular camp. "It was impossible for either the working class or the
bourgeoisie to increase their power and their development within the
m2country.
In the end, rather than replacing class conflict with conciliation 
and harmony, far from even containing it, the Peronist experience of the
^This was the E.R.P.'s line.
2Reprinted in N.A.C.L.A.'s Latin America and Empire Report 11 
(Jan. 1977): 18. In this interview Fxrmenich also asserts his view that 
the Montoneros would become the political inheritors of the Peronist 
tradition of broad-based, popular and progressive, anti-imperialism. They 
will recreate Argentina's equivalent of a worker-peasant alliance; an alli­
ance between the workers and the salaried and petite bourgeoisie, but now 
with the explicit goal of achieving socialism.
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seventies actually intensified the class struggle. Given its contradic­
tions, once Peronism was in power, it transferred the class war that had 
pitted the workers and popular sectors against the multinational sector 
and the military, into the very heart of Peronism itself as the battle 
raged between the left and right wings of the movement— the former to 
lead and the latter to control the masses.*
After Peron’s timely demise, the regime’s rightward drift accel­
erated while class conflict intensified accordingly. The control exer­
cised by bureaucratic elements over the government, Justicialist Party, 
and CGT, became iron clad. Even the Economics Ministry which had been 
more responsive to the interests of the national bourgeoisie when Jose 
Gelbard occupied its top post, was affected. Its reorientation toward 
the multinational sector was completed when Celestino Rodrigo, a close 
ally of Lopez Rega's, became Minister of the Economy in June of 1975. He 
immediately introduced what he termed "economic shock treatments:" wage 
freezes, a series of price rises, and a drastic devaluation of the peso. 
Because of their dramatic impact, these measures became popularly known 
as the Rodrigazo. Though prescribed by the I.M.F. to improve the deterior­
ating balance of payments, their primary result was to speed up spiraling 
inflation, increase the decline in real wages, and strangle small to medium 
size enterprises even further. These were the same policies that had been 
attempted earlier by Krieger Vasena in Ongania's time; they produced the 
same results, and the reaction by the working class was also the same, 
only it was swifter and more massive. Celestino Rodrigo’s tenure lasted 
no more than a month. A wave of strikes and factory occupations forced him
*These points are from Juan E. Corradi's introduction to the Latin 
American Perspectives 1 (Pall 1974 issue devoted to "Argentina: Peronism 
and Crisis"): 14.
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✓to resign and then flee the country along with his mentor, Jose Lopez Rega, 
in July 1975.
With Peronism discredited and demystified, a military coup was a 
foregone conclusion. All Argentina was poised in expectation. The only 
speculation involved its timing: how long would the military allow Isabel’s 
inept regime to discredit itself further? The military was compelled to 
intervene in order to block the left, in the form of the Peronist and 
Marxist guerrilla groups, from making further inroads into the working 
class. With the end of Peronism’s ability to defuse and contain the work­
ing class, what the military feared most was that the left would continue 
to link up with the growing militance of workers on the rank and file level 
and thereby increase the viability of a socialist alternative.
Having recognized that orthodox Peronism was rendered superfluous 
by virtue of its inability to control the popular sectors or annihilate 
the left, revolutionary Peronism based its strategy on the imminence of 
a military coup. The January 1976 issue of Evita Montonera, assessing 
the year that had just ended, termed 1975 the year for "confronting the 
treason," and looking ahead to the year that had just begun, termed it the 
year for "resistance to the Videlazo"— Videla's coup did not actually take 
place until the 23rd and 24th of March. The strategy urged for the year 
ahead was the same as the one the Montoneros had followed in the year gone 
by: to confront the government of the imperialists, whether in civilian or 
military form, by 1) mobilizing working class struggles, and 2) building 
the mass base in order to have the "sea" for the guerrilla war. Indeed, 
it was the extent of mass support enjoyed by the Peronist left and its 
ideological influence in radicalizing the workers, that provided the chief 
impetus for the coup.
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The Oligarchy Makes a Comeback; The Videla Regime
In the economic realm, the coup of March 24, 1976 represented a 
rejection of the policy orientation that had predominated since 1943. As 
Martinez de Hoz, the new Economics Minister, began to unfold the regime’s 
project, it became apparent that the junta had opted to confront the con­
tradictions of dependent industrialization by turning the cycle full 
circle back to the traditional externally oriented growth model along with 
modifications dictated by the vastly changed conditions operative internally 
as well as on the international scene. Representing the traditional agro­
based oligarchy, Martinez de Hoz envisioned a return to the role Argentina 
had occupied in the international division of labor prior to the substantial 
development of its industrial sector. In a speech on April 4 of 1976 he 
said:
The world debates what has become known as the world crisis in 
energy and food. We possess the potential for food production 
that gives us extraordinary strength. This can put our country 
in a privileged position in the world due to the importance of 
food production in the near future.
Martinez de Hoz's economic program had three fundamental objectives:
promote agro-pastoral exports as the foundation of the nation’s economy,
reduce the state's deficit in order to decrease inflation, and provide a
2high rate of profit. To promote exports the regime would reverse the 
trend imposed by Peronism and turn foreign trade back towards private hands. 
Foreign exchange rates would be manipulated to benefit the exporters of
^■Quoted by Liliana De Riz, "Militares y politica en la sociedad 
argentina" in Proyectos de recambio v fuerzas internacionales en los 80 
(Mexico, D.F.: Editorial Edicol, 1980), edited by J.C'.l Portantiero, et al.
My translation.
2The analysis of the Junta's economic policies that follows is con­
tained in an evaluation of the Argentine situation by the Montoneros as it 
appeared in the Peruvian journal Marka of June 1976. See N.A.C.L.A.'s re­
print in Latin America and Empire Report 2 (January 1977): 8-9.
388
grains and beef, in addition to which, prices for these goods would be 
fixed at rates favorable to these sectors. The state's deficit would be 
reduced by drastically cutting back on the number of public employees. 
Furthermore, the public sector of the economy would be curtailed by re­
ducing the state's participation in jointly owned enterprises, turning 
many state owned firms to private enterprise and some even to foreign 
capital. Finally, the rate of profit was to be enhanced by freezing wages 
but lifting the freeze on prices.
The impact of the Junta's policies enabling employers to increase 
the rate of exploitation of labor was almost immediate. Real wages, already 
at a low point, went down even further. A month after Martinez de Hoz 
announced the Junta's economic prescriptions, the cost of living had 
increased by some 40 percent. The price of medicine, which had been fro­
zen, increased by 100 percent, cigarettes by 100 percent, rice by 198 
percent, and needles by 120 percent.* So severe were the effects of the 
Junta's policies on the sectors which had been Peronism's social base, 
that one can speak of economic warfare being waged on them on top of the 
military campaign which systematically sought to physically eliminate any 
political expression of their interests. By "1978, the basic wage was 
scarcely 36 percent of the level received in 1974 by skilled workers and 
less than 29 percent that of unskilled workers." Indeed, between 1976 
and 1983 the wage share of national income fell to its lowest level ever.
The multinationals and local monopoly capital controlling the most 
dynamic branches of production took advantage of the assault on the
*N.A.C.L.A., pp. 8-9.
2Carlos M. Vilas, "On the Crisis of Bourgeois Democracy in Argen­
tina," Latin_JjmerI^^ (Fall 1982): 20.
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Peronist unions not only to hold wages down, but also to streamline their 
operations closing down their less efficient plants and introducing even 
more capital intensive techniques requiring less workers and higher rates 
of productivity. In 1980, for example, the metal workers union complained 
that their ranks had diminished by 70,000 workers in the previous year, while 
in May of 1981, the automobile workers union (SMATA), working in a branch 
entirely controled by multinationals, estimated that the crisis in their 
industry had led to 36 percent of all of its workers being unemployed. The 
result of these massive lay-offs was a soaring unemployment rate reaching 
levels previously unknown.*
Given the general crisis it already found itself in and the Junta’s 
opposition to promoting manufacturing activity, the economic policies of 
the late seventies impacted adversely on industry as a whole. Initially 
at least, the general decline in productive output meant an overall drop 
in profits, in the absolute sense. Nevertheless, in relative terms, given 
the higher levels of productivity extracted from workers spared unemploy­
ment in the more capital intensive, dynamic branches, profit rates for this 
sector increased considerably. "The profit/wage ratio increased from 1.1 
in 1974 to 2.3 in 1977, subsequently remaining at that level. In 1978 the
2labor costs in industry were an average of 20 percent lower than in 1976."
At the same time, the assault on the working class' purchasing power 
could only reverberate negatively on the small to medium sized national 
enterprises producing wage goods. This was a period of unprecedented bank-
*From October of 1980 to April 1981, unemployment went from 10.1 
percent to 11.8 percent of the economically active population. In the 
latter date, some 1.7 million people were out of work. Ibid.
2N.A.C.L.A., pp. 8-9.
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ruptcies and business failures. Along with this sector of the national 
bourgeoisie, the petty bourgeoisie, which was also linked to the internal 
market and popular consumption, saw its position deteriorate as well.
The major beneficiaries of the Junta’s economic program were the 
large landowners producing for export and the domestic and foreign indus­
trial monopolies catering to the upper income market. The one aspect of 
the Junta's program in which it succeeded were its efforts to redirect 
economic activity to regain the preeminence of the agro-pastoral sector.
So successful were its policies benefiting the oligarchy's interests that, 
for the first time since the forties, agriculture came again to represent 
the largest proportion of the GDP. Although the regime was certainly pre­
occupied with providing attractive conditions for industrial capital, its 
major orientation represented a fundamental departure. In contrast with 
the type of economic strategy formulated by Krieger Vasena and his suc­
cessors which disputed Brazil's emerging position of industrial hegemony 
in the Southern Cone, the new regime retreated from that field and concen­
trated its efforts in rooting Argentina's future on her supremacy in agro­
pastoral production. The new approach was thus an abandonment of the com­
mitment incorporated in economic policy since the forties, to raise indus­
try to the pivotal position in the nation's economic life. This "new" 
approach was analogous to the strategy of the 1930-43 period which modified 
the externally oriented growth model: economic activity centered on agro­
exporting with strong participation of industrial production for the domes­
tic market. The difference is, of course, that industrial participation 
in Argentina's economy of the seventies was vastly stronger and of a sub­
stantially different nature. Rather than an emerging national capitalism, 
the contemporary industrial sector revolves around dynamic branches with
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high organic composition of capital, mostly controlled by multinational 
interests.
While it fundamentally reversed the orientation in the previous 
developmental model, the Junta did not throw it out altogether. Though 
it spared no extremes in the severity with which it repressed the left 
domestically, and despite its adherence to an almost obsessive anti­
communist ideology on the international scene, the military learned much 
from Peronism and practiced a "third position" in its relations with exter­
nal economic groups. It did not break relations with any socialist country 
and maintained the Soviet Union and socialist bloc nations as major trade 
partners. This is not too surprising when one considers that the Soviet 
Union was a principal purchaser of Argentine goods in the third quarter 
of 1975. More recently, in the summer of 1980, Argentina played a large 
part in circumventing the U.S. grain embargo imposed upon the Soviet Union 
after the letter’s military intervention in Afghanistan. Despite pressure 
from Washington, Argentina concluded a deal to ship 22.5 million tons of 
corn, sorghum, and soybeans over a five year period. Hence, while the 
Junta’s anti-Communist ideology made Argentina a staunch ally of the U.S., 
the return to a modified oligarchic project placed the economic interests 
of Argentina’s rulers in contradiction with those of the United States 
since the U.S. is a major exporter of identical agricultural commodities.
The decline of the project promoting dependent industrialization, 
led to other conflicts as well. For example, the Junta demonstrated an 
independence from the United States in the nuclear area. They rejected 
United States' conditions for safeguards over nuclear facilities and con­
cluded an agreement for construction of a heavy-water plant with a West 
German-Swiss group. They seemed determined to embark on nuclear develop-
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ment with a capacity for reprocessing power-station fuel with separation
of plutonium, which, in turn, could be used in manufacturing nuclear 
1weaponry.
When the Junta seized power it justified the coup by announcing 
that it alone was capable of achieving the twin objectives it deemed 
essential to rescue Argentina from chaos and guarantee its future well­
being: to liquidate subversion and improve the economic situation. In its 
campaign to eradicate subversion, the regime unleashed the most severe 
repression ever in Argentina’s historical memory which, as we have seen, 
had already experienced more than its share of brutal controls in recent 
times. While it held power, the Junta put to death between 10,000 to 20,000 
alleged opponents. By applying the most extreme methods, the Junta achieved 
the dubious success of quieting, at least for a while, its political opposi­
tion. But in the economic sphere "success" was not achieved so "easily."
Two years after the coup the Argentine economy was still in crisis. 
The year-end economic indicators for 1978 showed an inflation rate of 169.8 
percent, wholesale prices up by 147 percent, annual interest rates between
140 and 200 percent, construction costs up by 125 percent, and, most signi-
2ficantly, industrial production was down 25 percent since 1976. Ironically, 
the latter was a testament to the success of the Junta's policies. The 
regime's strategy for fighting inflation was to cut back on the working 
class' purchasing power. It succeeded in lowering real wages to about 50 
percent below those of 1977 and thereby weakened the domestic market.
*Juan de Onis dispatch in the New York Times. 17 July 1980, p. A7.
2Figures from a mimeographed report by the Argentine Information 
Service Center and the Council on Hemispheric Affairs, "Conditions in Argen­
tina—  1978-9" (Apr. 2, 1979), p. 5.
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Falling demand hurt the small to medium-sized manufacturers and merchants 
of the national hourgeosie the most. Their problems were further com­
pounded by credit restrictions and high interest rates. The bankruptcy rate 
increased by 300 percent to its highest level in Argentine history. Accord­
ing to the Economic Federation of Buenos Aires, sales in most of greater 
Buenos Aires1 neighborhoods dropped from 40 to 80 percent. Many textile 
plants virtually shut down in January and February of 1978 when they 
announced "extended vacations" for their workers. The adverse economic 
impact spilled over to the more dynamic branches of industry. Marshall, 
a producer of electrical appliances, closed down in January, laying off 
700 workers; and, in April, Petroqumica Sudamerica, a major supplier of 
polyester fibers, closed.^-
Even those industrial sectors traditionally associated with multi­
national corporations started feeling the crunch, as in the case of 
the auto and agriculture machinery industries. Subsidiaries of"
John Deere and Massey Ferguson shut down during the first months 
of 1978; G.M. auto plants in Rosario and Cordoba initially closed 
operations during February and March and were finally forced to 
close down in the second half of 1978, laying off a work force of 
34,000 employees.^
Despite such draconian reductions in the level of consumption, inflation 
was not brought under control. Far from it, by 1983 it had again leapt 
almost beyond control and was estimated at 430 percent.
Given the magnitude of the impact attendant upon the Junta's re­
ordering of the nation's economic priorities and given the degree of poli­
tical consciousness and organization prevalent among the population, extreme 
and brutal repression was an essential aspect in the Junta's ability to 
carry out its economic project. Herein lay the connection between the 
Junta's economic and political programs. Its political program consisted
1 2 Council on Hemispheric Affairs, p. 6. Ibid.
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of two stages, the first being a "military" stage which was then to be 
followed by a "political" stage proper.
In the first stage the aim was to physically annihilate the revol­
utionary organizations, the underlying objective being the elimination of 
the workers' militance. In fact the military's anti-subversion campaign 
was in large part waged at the point of production. The concept of "the 
industrial guerrilla" became part of the official lexicon. The idea was 
that since the guerrillas had taken root in the factories, the destruction 
of the Peronist guerrilla forces must mean the destruction of the Peronist 
rank and file who harbored them in the industrial centers. Given the mili­
tary's ideology and the interests it was enforcing, it really had no choice. 
The Peronist and revolutionary left had replaced the official leadership 
of the CGT with coordinadores de gremios en lucha (coordinators of unions 
in struggle). They provided the instrument through which the workers 
fought back against the attack on their living standards. These coordina­
dores mobilized the workers in La Plata, Cordoba, and the industrial zone 
of metropolitan Buenos Aires,and succeeded in paralyzing entire cities.
The war waged against Peronism and the left took a heavy toll. In 
a lucid and moving "Open Letter to the Military Junta," the noted Argentine 
journalist and author Rodolfo Walsh estimated that more than seven thousand 
habeas corpus petitions were turned down in the first year after the coup.
In many thousands of cases of others who "disappeared," writs of habeas 
corpus were never presented because the futility of the procedure was widely 
known. Moreover, it was extremely difficult to find a lawyer who would dare 
present one, since the fifty or sixty lawyers who regularly did so, in turn 
had also disappeared. Another testament to the war of extermination waged 
by the regime was the fact that, according to officially released communi­
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ques, 600 guerrillas were killed in clashes with the authorities that first 
year, while only ten to fifteen were wounded. As Walsh remarks, such a 
proportion is unknown even in the bloodiest of battles in wartime.
According to officially released figures, more than a hundred "fugitives" 
lost their lives in "escape attempts" during that time period. Rodolfo 
Walsh himself vanished shortly after he began circulating his "Open 
Letter."* In spite of the fact that the government prided itself in 
exercising total security over the nation, few of these "disappeared" were 
ever located.^
With the suppression of its opposition apparently completed, the 
Junta launched into the second stage of its political program. Inspired 
by the Brazilian model, it sought to institutionalize the new order with 
the Armed Forces' role as arbiters guaranteed within the state apparatus.
The military's plan was based on sanitizing the traditional political 
parties into a loyal opposition and on controlling a divided and atomized 
trade union structure. The military's political program was first articu­
lated by the Army in a document entitled "Bases polxticas para la reorgani- 
zacion nacional" (Political Foundations for National Reorganization). It 
begins with the extraordinary assertion that "the government which emerged 
on the 24th of March of 1976 is democratic and legitimate." Even more ex-
*Excerpts from this letter were published by Denuncia in the June 
1977 issue, p. 3. This newspaper contains much useful information on events 
inside Argentina that are unavailable elsewhere. It was produced by the 
exile community in New York and distributed there and in Spain, and through­
out Europe.
2A year later, the situation showed few signs of improving. Accord­
ing to "prominent members of the Argentine Permanent Assembly for Human 
Rights, . . .  in 1978 an average of five to ten persons disappeared daily." 
Argentine Information Service and the Council on Hemispheric Affairs, p. 1.
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traordinary, after placing itself squarely among those who understand 
that the primary task is to halt the worldwide spread of Marxism, the docu­
ment goes on to announce that the "Military Junta will not allow itself 
to be drawn into the confusion of theoretical schemes, that it is oriented 
toward the absolute respect for the human person, considering this being 
to be transcendental in its development of liberty and the full exercise 
of private property. Private property is said to be the economic founda­
tion for civil liberties and "true democracy consists in defending private 
property at those times when the West is under attack from Marxism."^
Given the regime’s policies and record, it does not seem that these senti­
ments were meant to translate into a defense of small property owners or 
even the owners of medium-sized manufacturing plants, whose positions suf­
fered drastic declines, but rather were meant to underline the Junta’s 
commitment to the interests of the narrow stratum already enjoying the 
benefits of large property ownership. For the average Argentine, far from 
enhancing her or his access to property, the regime's policies made it more 
difficult to obtain even the essentials of life.
The seven points containing the specific proposals for "national 
reorganization" are illustrative of how the military had hoped to maintain 
control:
1. Creation of a dominant political force favorable to the military 
government
2. This force must be capable of dominating from inside the party system.
For this reason it must be assured support from the state apparatus
3. The leaders will not be imposed "from above" but selected in "pilot" 
elections at the municipal level from among independent candidates who 
have publicly accepted "the doctrine and ideas behind the process of 
national reorganization"
^Excerpts and commentary on this document are contained in Denuncia's 
Feb. 15, 1979 issue, p. 1. My translation.
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4. These elected candidates will constitute themselves as a base for 
the government, but may nevertheless by deposed at any time by the 
authorities
5. These leaders allied with the government will be asked to form two
or more political parties which support the process of national reor­
ganization. In time, each of these new forces will acquire "its own 
personality "
6. When the day arrives that these parties are in existence, it will not 
matter to the government which one emerges victorious. At that time, 
the conditions will be right for holding elections on the provincial 
or national level which are not "an adventure"
7. Consultation on this project must not be sought from current politicians 
because that would amount to according them representativeness. Even 
less should it be put to the test in a referendum: "this would mean
the demagogic resurrection of the people and attributing to that 
word— which is no more than a political myth— sovereignty"!
Unfortunately for the military, its relative success in reorienting 
the foundations of the Argentine economy brought to the fore contradictions 
that revitalized that "political myth"— the people. In the end, the Junta 
had to abandon its attempt to confine the electoral process within its 
strict guidelines. The military was forced to accept the people's "sov- 
reignty" as expressed in their electing the most anti-military of the 
"politicians" running. Raul Alfonsin, candidate of the Radicals, won the 
presidency in the 1983 elections.
Though the military succeeded remarkably well in returning the 
axis of the nation's economic life back to agro-pastoral production for 
export under the policies of Martinez de Hoz in the late seventies, it was 
never able to find a political formula that would provide it with a signi­
ficant social base of support. Even its ill-fated attempt to mobilize 
patriotic fervor behind the regime for its Malvinas gamble, proved to be 
a disaster. Not only did the military fail dismally at what is its raison
Denuncia, p. 1.
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d’etre— defending national sovereignty through the force of arms'*-— but in
the process it undid what little had been achieved in the economic realm.
Important gains were made in placing Argentine rural exports on the world
market by taking advantage of Peronism1s "Third Position" in selling wheat
to the Soviet Union, thereby filling the vacuum resulting from the U.S.
2embargo after the U.S.S.R.'s military intervention in Afghanistan. These
gains were more than offset by disastrously rising debts incurred to
3obtain the latest weaponry.
The costly Malvinas campaign was however, only the icing on the 
cake. On the eve of the war the economy was already in a state of near­
collapse. The GDP fell by 6.1 percent in 1981 and continued to decline by 
about that rate for 1982. The per capita income was lower than it had 
been a decade before. Moreover, "industrial output and investment suffered 
severe reductions, falling 16 and 21 percent respectively." There were 
"massive closures of factories, a growing paralysis of economic activity,
The Army command's performance was particularly inept. Thus 
the most discredited branch was also the otie which has always wielded 
the bulk of military's political power. General Jorge Videla headed the 
Junta from 1976 to 1981. He was followed by his close associate General 
Roberto Viola, who held the post from March to December of 1981. In turn, 
he was followed by General Leopoldo Galtieri, the architect of the Malvinas 
debacle, who was forced to resign in June of 1982, to be briefly replaced 
by General Reynaldo Bignone. All of them represented the Army. Toward 
the end, the Navy and Air Force even refused to formally be a part of the 
Junta. For an analysis of relationships between the Army and Navy in 
earlier years, see Robert Potash, The Army and Politics in Argentina, 1945- 
62: Peron to Frondizi (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 
1980).
2Balance of payment difficulties were temporarily surmounted for 
the first time in years, as favorable surpluses were amassed.
3In particular the extremely costly French "Exocet" missiles.
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sharp rises in unemployment, a virtual collapse of the financial system,
(an} enormous magnitude of domestic and foreign debt, and the persistence
of one of the highest rates of inflation in the world."'*' Indeed, the
economic chaos was even more severe than at its worst point before the
ousting of the Peronist government in 1976. In the long run, the most
damaging byproduct of the Junta's economic policies was the foreign debt
which it catapulted to new heights. From 1976 to 1982 the Junta "tripled
the volume of accumulated foreign debt contracted by Argentina in its 170
2years of independence." At the beginning of 1982 it stood at 34 billion 
dollars, a real per capita average of more than $1,200.— one of the highest 
in the world. By 1984, after the humiliation of the Malvinas, Argentina's 
foreign debt reached some 44 billion dollars.
The Junta's failure in finding a significant social base of support 
for its economic program— ultimately, the reason for its collapse— was in 
a dialectical sense the outcome of its successful economic reorganization 
(which however, as noted above, did not succeed in achieving economic growth). 
Reducing the consumption levels of the popular sectors was an integral com­
ponent of the "new" economic model the military sought to implant. In this 
effort the Junta succeeded all too well, with predictable consequences.
In the first three years of its rule, the Junta had lowered real wages and
3salaries by fifty percent. The tremendous social costs of this achievement
^Miguel Teubal, "Argentina: The Crisis of Ultramonetarism," Monthly 
Review 34 (Feb. 1983): 18.
2Ibid., p. 23.
3Argentine Information Service and Council on Hemispheric Affairs, 
p. 5'. Writing in the Los Angeles Times of 25 March, 1979, Horacio 
Lofredo of The Council on Hemispheric Affairs, states that real wages had 
declined by 60 percent from their level in 1975.
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counteracted the regime's "successes" in its campaign of repression of 
the revolutionary organizations and the trade union movement.
The worsening conditions for the workers led to what the military's 
repression was fundamentally aimed against— a resurgence of class struggle. 
The Junta underestimated the workers' combative capacity, their ability to 
absorb heavy blows, regroup, and come back fighting. The Argentine work­
ing class has accumulated a wide backlog of experience in the course of 
their long history of resistance under the most diverse conditions. The 
workers' renewed militance made it difficult for the regime to move on to 
politically institutionalizing the "new order." Moreover, the adverse 
economic impact on the middle sectors resulting from the reimposition of 
an externally oriented growth model, led them to identify with the opposition 
in an increasingly open manner.
Indeed the invasion of the Malvinas on April 2, 1982 represented 
a desperate effort by the military to gain a popular base by utilizing a 
symbol close to every Argentine patriot's heart. Significantly, the inva­
sion was launched only a few days after the largest anti-government demon­
stration by trade unionists in downtown Buenos Aires since the coup. Over 
two thousand demonstrators were arrested. By mobilizing nationalist fervor 
behind the war effort in defense of Argentine sovereignty, the military 
hoped to deflect the rising tide of social unrest and political criticism 
as well as to quiet the mounting clamor for an accounting of the desapare- 
cidos. By choosing Lepoldo Galtieri to head it in December of the previous 
year, the Junta pinned its hopes on this approach. Galtieri, who had 
also been the architect of a near war with Chile over the islands at the 
mouth of the Beagle channel, advocated the classic formula of focusing on 
external threats to offset domestic criticisms. However, even before the
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ignominious defeat, it had become clear that the military's strategy for 
gaining badly needed support would not work. The thousands of Argentines 
who gathered at the Plaza de Mayo to show support for the Malvinas effort 
made it plain they endorsed the nationalist cause and not the military. 
Galtieri was consistently booed and the prevalent chants were "Malvinas 
si, militares no!"
Prospects for Alfonsin's Administration 
The collapse of the military regime in late 1983 came about more 
than anything else because of its inability to surmount the contradictions 
posed by an economic program seeking a full scale return to an agro-based 
externally oriented developmental pattern in the context of a substantially 
developed internally oriented industrial sector. The most dramatic ex­
pression of these contradictions was the burgeoning foreign debt crisis, 
and the mounting instability and turmoil resulting from the failure to 
find a political formula that would enable the regime to gain a significant 
social base of support.. With the reinstitution of civilian rule via 
democratic procedures, the AlfonsJn government temporarily solved the 
latter. However, having inherited the full brunt of the former, if the 
current government does not obtain relief from this debt crisis it will 
rapidly lose its rather tenuous and heterogeneous social base. The fact 
is that Argentina is simply incapable of meeting its international financial 
obligations the way they are currently structured. The foreign debt will 
have to be renegotiated. All depends on what new conditions the government 
is able to obtain. The more stringent these are, the more vehement the 
opposition to the "democratic interlude" will be and the more rapid the 
erosion of its support base.
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The foreign debt is however, only a part of the much larger econ­
omic dilemma that has afflicted Argentina since the fifties. If the govern­
ment fails to formulate a viable developmental policy, the same contra­
dictions that undid its military predecessors will ultimately lead to its 
demise as well. Alfonsin's government cannot afford a continuation of the 
existing developmental pattern. Even under optimal circumstances, ser­
vicing of the debt alone requires large trade surpluses. This implies 
shifting internal terms of trade in favor of agro-producers with all its 
attendant problems which even severe military repression was unable to 
cope with. It will mean minimizing imports and thus manufacturers' access 
to imported capital goods and raw materials. This, in turn, restricts 
the ability of the industrial sector to create badly needed jobs. Moreover, 
high unemployment means low levels of popular consumption. This lessening 
of demand and the restriction of the domestic market thus completes the 
cycle spelling disaster for local manufacturers.
With the loss of popular support and the mounting economic and 
political crisis, the conditions are given for the military intervening 
once again. Thus Argentine politics may well continue on their seemingly 
inexorable pendular course. The tragedy is that the Alfonsin government 
enjoyed the best opportunity to break out of this pattern since Peron 
redefined Argentina's political landscape in the forties. Moreover, it is 
extremely unlikely that this opportunity will be repeated for decades to 
come. Alfonsin was elected in 1983 largely because he was correctly per­
ceived to be a more resolute opponent of the military than his Peronist 
rival. Even Peronist voters defected to the Radicals on this issue. More­
over, with the economic chaos they precipitated topped by the Malvinas 
debacle, the military were probably at their most discredited point ever.
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Never had they been more vulnerable and never had there been a more oppor­
tune moment to move against the military as a structure. Instead, Alfonsin 
confined his attack to the very top leaders of the Juntas, even absolving 
higher and middle level officers of the crimes they committed during "the 
dirty war against subversion." Today, the entire apparatus of repression 
down to the death squads remains and is ready to derail the democratic 
experiment when the time is right. Ernesto Sabato, appointed by Alfonsin 
to head the President's Human Rights Commission, recently remarked: "We 
still get death threats. The secret services are still largely intact."*
Conclusions
This chapter examined the consolidation and eclipse of the depen­
dent capitalist industrial economy in Argentina. Manufacturing in the form 
of industrial activity gravitating around monopolistic multinational compan­
ies (mnc's) assumed a central position in the nation's economic life. The 
economic landscape came to be dominated by large enterprises with vast 
financial resources, utilizing modern technology, administered by bureau­
cracies responsible to central offices overseas, and possessing the 
ability to decisively influence the market for their goods..
The analysis showed this outcome to represent a continuity with 
the process that took shape in the latter half of the first Peronist decade. 
That is, as the favorable conjuncture deteriorated in the early fifties, 
Peronism began to resolve the contradictions between its distributionist 
developmental strategy— i.e., expanding the domestic market by raising the 
income of producers— and the capitalist model of accumulation to which it 
remained committed, by shifting its policies in the direction of promoting
*New York Times. 3/26/84, "Civilian Trials for Argentine Officers."
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the interests of the large scale agrarian and industrial bourgeoisie.
The 1955-73 period represents a consolidation of this process.
Analysis of the events characterizing this period reveals that 
the political and economic contradictions generated in this process of 
dependent capitalist industrialization eventually led to Peron s return 
to power. Government policies moved toward an increasingly clear and un­
ambiguous monopolistic-multinational capitalist developmental project, 
culminating in the Krieger Vasena program during the years of "the 
Argentine Revolution" under General Ongandfa. As government policies became 
the single most identifiable factor in income allocation away from the 
working class, the economistic struggle for better working conditions and 
wages became intensely politicized. Even the securing of economic gains, 
usually following upon bitter conflict with political authorities, served 
to heighten workers’ militance and also to intensify its political content. 
The political repression of Peronism accentuated this tendency all the more. 
Peronism became the doctrine of working class'struggle and resistance. In 
conjunction with seizing upon Peronism as their instrument for.struggle, 
the workers articulated its socialistic side in resolving the contradic­
tions of dependent capitalist development.
Peronism’s populist side receded for a while, but then regained its 
vigor as the clearcut predominance of the mnc sector in economic policy 
began to adversely affect national capital and the middle sectors generally. 
In the 1955 coup the military had acted as an instrument for a bourgeois- 
oligarchic alliance against Peronism. Once working class interests were 
removed from official policy, this alliance fell apart on its internal 
contradictions. The differences between the industrial and agrarian, and 
the national and internationalized bourgeoisie prevailed over their common
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interests. Though the mnc sector held economic predominance and had its
developmental project imposed by the state, it lacked political hegemony.
Thus, while the dominant groups had their interests enforced through
government policy, they were unable to secure sufficient support from
broad enough sectors to make their project acceptable. This basic contra-
/diction was one of the chief reasons behind Eferon's return to power.
The systematic growth of the Peronist resistance was both a result 
of and a further cause for the military's inability to transform the econ­
omic predominance of the mnc sector into political hegemony. Finally, the 
unrest and turmoil reached proportions that forced the military to reverse 
the reasoning behind their exercising power. Previously they had sought 
to place the coercive power of the armed forces behind the unencumbered 
economic project of the monopoly and internationalized sectors of the 
bourgeoisie. The assumption was that economic progress would eventually 
led to political stability. Now, however, the military's preoccupation 
became to achieve political stability first, since it was viewed as an 
essential precondition for bringing about a revival of the economy. It 
was this orientation that led to the negotiations under Lanusse's presidency 
to bring Peron back from exile.
Analysis of the second Peronist period showed that by attempting 
to recreate essentially the same coalition of classes as during the first 
period, under the different conditions of the seventies, Peronism reduced 
its longevity in power from a decade in the first period to three years in 
the second. Examination of the Three Year Plan (TYP) confirmed that the 
programmatic thrust of the second Peronist regime did not substantially 
depart from that of the first. The TYP failed because it was based on the 
same model of accumulation as the First and Second Five Year Plans (FFYP
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and SFYP). Like its predecessors, it too depended on a favorable inter­
national context for exports to provide simultaneous benefits to workers 
and capitalists. Though this approach seemed appropriate to the conditions 
of the forties, as the analysis of the FFYP in Chapter 4 pointed out, 
Peronism*s failure to learn from past errors seems unjustifiable, especially 
since the Peronist left insistently warned the regime not to repeat its 
past mistakes.
Just as in the fifties, with the inability to obtain the earning 
needed through foreign trade, the contradictions in the regime's developmen­
tal project could not be contained. Analysis of the events of the seventies 
showed how Peronism replicated its experience of the fifties. Opting to re­
main within a capitalist framework, the regime rapidly shifted towards the 
bourgeois pole in its worker-national bourgeoisie social pact. The dif­
ferent conditions telescoped the process of the fifties into less than 
one year in the seventies. Moreover, the much stronger and central presence 
of foreign capital within the industrial economy also meant a corresponding 
acceleration in the abandonment of the measures protective of national 
capital.
Another major difference with the first Peronist period noted in
this chapter, was the much stronger and more widespread anti-imperialist
and socialistic consciousness among Peronist workers. The workers'
/struggle was the main force behind Peron s return to power; working class 
actions also proved to be the chief factor undoing the second Peronist 
regime. While Peron depended on workers' militance to get back into power, 
he needed industrial peace and stability to solidify the alliance with the 
middle sectors on which his retaining of power rested. Hence the explosive­
ness of the contradiction arising from Peronism's opting to promote the
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interests of the'monopoly-nine sectors at the expense of the workers'
living standards. Peron and his entourage failed to defuse and contain
the workers' struggles and to block the Peronist and Marxist left from
making further incursions into the working class. Instead, the regime
succeeded in transferring the class war of the workers against foreign
and domestic monopoly capital into the heart of Peronism itself with
bloody battles between the right and the left. In the end, the campaign
of repression failed, even though many more militants were killed during
/the brief span Peronism held power than in the eighteen years Peron was 
in exile.
Peronism's failure to contain the militance of its rank and 
file working class base, which became even more acute after Peron's 
death, led to the military coup of 1976, thus bringing to a close the 
short lived and unique opportunity to "remake history."
Finally, the chapter briefly examined the significance of the 
Junta's economic program. The current developmental strategy is shown 
to be a return to the type of modified externally oriented growth model 
that characterized the 1930-43 period. For the first time since the 
forties, the proportion contributed to the GDP by the rural sector surpassed 
that contributed by industry.
By orienting economic policy to the interests of large landowners 
producing for export and, secondarily, domestic and foreign industrial 
monopolies catering to the high income market, the Junta's project repre­
sented an abandonment of the policy orientation that Peronism had success­
fully struggled to impose, and which was determinative in Argentine economic 
and political life from 1943 on. Ironically, the Junta's success in re­
orienting economic priorities exacerbated the contradictions that led to 
its demise.
408
Unfortunately, all indications point to Alfonsin*s failure to 
seize the unique opportunity to finally break out of the pendular pattern 
that has characterized Argentine politics for the last half century. 
Unable to find the basis for a developmental model that would benefit the 
popular sectors and having failed to dismantle the military’s repressive 
apparatus, as the contradictions intensify within the democratic experi­
ment, it seems only a matter of time before the military decides once 




Chapter 1 began with a critical review of major themes and relation­
ships found in the modernization/development literature. The early func­
tionalist approach offered little more than a teleological methodology 
which asserted truth by definition. In different ways and with slightly 
diverging foci of attention, it posited a Western=eood system typology. 
Moreover, if functionalism contained any causal analysis at all, it was 
the unilinear scheme it proposed whereby societies inexorably evolved from 
traditionality to modernity.
As world events repeatedly contradicted the optimistic projections 
of the functionalists, a body of literature took shape which attempted to 
address the earlier literature's shortcomings. One tendency, exemplified 
by Fred Riggs, moved away from theory to model building. Within the ten­
dency that sought to reformulate theory, which proved to be the more last­
ing, one current retreated to the polity as independent variable — exem­
plified by Samuel Huntington's work— and the other saw modernization and 
development as a problem of diffusing the right mix of (usually cultural) 
resources to the hinterland. However, because they proceeded from the same 
fundamental premises, the revisionists merely -succeeded in replicating pre­
vious deficiencies, albeit with a variety of models, typologies, and 
theoretical frameworks. Nevertheless, diffusionism represented an advance 
in that it abandoned the assumption that the world system was composed of 
separate and autonomous units, each traversing the path previously followed
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by the more developed units. Instead diffusionism recognized the inter­
relatedness of the international system as an integral whole with its 
central entities shaping events in the periphery.
In surveying the modernization/development literature I found 
that it performed an ideological function which was reflected in the litera­
ture's causal analysis. The various schemes offered by the literature 
all had in common their function of justifying existing power relationships: 
the posture of value-neutrality with its implicit espousal of existing 
arrangements in the distribution of power as legitimate; behavioralism 
with its focus on observed behavioral regularities abstracted from the 
socio-economic context within which they took shape; functionalism with its 
concern for existing relationships as the natural means for performing 
the function in question; the fetishism of statistics which treats its 
units of analysis as separate and distinct having no connections other than 
their numerical relationships; and the consideration of the political 
dimension as an independent variable in and of itself, not as the outcome 
of particular social processes. In justifying the relationships between 
advanced capitalist and developing areas, the modernization/development 
literature had a particularly negative impact on two major areas of inquiry. 
On the one hand, in minimizing or avoiding any analysis of dependency 
altogether, the literature neglected an integral component in the function­
ing of the international order. On the other hand, its treatment of economic 
factors was also deficient. The economic dimension is either absent from 
the analysis altogether or it tends to be "inverted." That is instead of 
analyzing material elements as a principal aspect in the determination of 
social reality, they are seen as dependent variables determined by, rather 
than determining cultural patterns, norms and values.
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While the modernization literature suffers from the lack of the 
economic dimension, the specifically economic development literature on 
the other hand, neglects the political dimension. It contains, at best, 
only a minimal analysis of the impact of social structures on the repro­
duction of some, rather than other, economic relationships. The discussion 
of the issue of control is virtually absent. It is particularly impor­
tant to establish which social groups control the productive processes and 
access to markets, because these groups are also in the position to deter­
mine who benefits from economic growth. Moreover, their connections with 
the political structures must be analyzed because they use the power avail­
able to them to solidify and reinforce the relationships beneficial to 
their interests.
In order to overcome the ideological function of the modernization/ 
development literature a methodology is needed which focuses on the inter­
relationships of economic and political factors in the production and re­
production of human life. An analysis which treats either side to the 
exclusion of the other represents an ideological procedure which leads 
either to mystification or to obfuscation. Such an analysis blinds itself 
to inner connections (interrelationships) and thus cannot get at the 
source of outward manifestations (structural forms social reality 
exhibits); in other words, it obscures causality.
Chapter 1 argued for an analysis that penetrates the exterior 
manifestations exhibited by particular social formations, for an approach 
that focuses on the process whereby socio-economic interrelationships take 
shape. The review of the modernization/development literature pointed to 
the need for a historical component in the analysis. However, in order 
to obtain the dynamic element found lacking in the mainstream literature,
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what is needed is not an historical analysis in the abstract, but a con­
crete and a dialectical one. Class structures evolve in the context of, 
and give rise to conflicts over the distribution and use of the economic 
surplus produced. Hence, the analysis of the process whereby socio-econ­
omic interrelationships take shape, should focus specifically on the strug­
gle between different socio-economic groups having diverging interests.
The scientific approach consists in analyzing concretely the ways in which 
the participants with their contradictory and conflicting interests, are 
linked to each other in the social process under investigation.
This study of Peronism applied a theoretical model that analyzes 
the relationship between economic control and political power. The local 
class structure is the expression of the relationships of the various 
groups to the structures of production and distribution. Therefore, the 
class structure contains the issues that political events respond to and 
in this way sets the parameters within which politics takes place. In 
analyzing the process whereby the Argentine class structure took shape 
historically, the theoretical model looked at the development of the 
structures of production and distribution, and particularly at the ways in 
which the relationships of the significant groups to these structures af­
fected their interests, at the orientations that flowed from these interests 
and at the relationships formed among and between these groups.
How then did the theoretical procedure proposed in this study 
address the problem of causality? In the first place, it proceeded from 
an understanding of society as composed of a variety of social groups with 
diverse and conflicting interests. These groups and their interests arise 
from the manner in which they are related to the structures involved in the 
production and distribution of material necessities and rewards. Secondly,
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this theoretical procedure defined a developmental pattern or pattern of 
dependency, conceived as a stage, by the processes through which the 
interests of the set of groups that emerges as dominant are promoted. The 
analysis focuses on how these processes reinforce the interrelationships 
among and between the dominant groups, and also on the ways in which the 
processes undermine the material basis for those relationships. In accor­
dance with the version of dependency theory formulated by Cardoso and 
Faletto, the pattern of dependency under consideration must be seen in 
its global context and the analysis must therefore specify the connections 
that link the foreign and national groups comprising the dominant set.
These connections are given by the interests of these groups which in turn 
arise from the groups' relationships to the prevalent modes of economic 
activity.
While the groups that make up the dominant set coalesce around the 
interests they have in common, they also have varying degrees of actual or 
potentially conflicting interests which drive them apart. These contra­
dictions provide the dynamic element that makes for movement and change.
The first limiting factor on the dominant set's power is given by its cohe­
sion and stability which depends on the types and intensity of the contra­
dictions it contains and on how they are resolved. The second limiting 
factor on the dominant set's ability to impose its aims is given by the 
degree whereby the excluded groups coalesce into an oppositional set. The 
oppositional set also contains contradictions which are usually, but not 
always, subordinated to the common purpose of counteracting the dominant
set's power. These contradictions can be used by the dominant set 
to its advantage. The ability of the groups controlling the system to 
counteract their opposition therefore depends on the resources available to 
them to a) either coopt segments of the opposition into the dominant set, or
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at least nullify their oppositional role by promoting their interests, 
or b) suppress key participants of the opposing set. Fundamental social 
changes, according to this perspective, can only come about through a 
process that results in a redistribution of the power relationships of 
the groups whose interests are at stake.
The particular ways in which the contradictions between the domi­
nant and oppositional sets, and those within each of them are resolved 
within each stage or pattern, set the conditions within which the new 
pattern emerges. Hence the causality contained in the theoretical frame­
work applied to Peronism is dialectical and not unilinear and determinis­
tic, as is the one put forward by positivism. The analysis of each stage 
focuses on process, on becoming rather than being. That is, in analyzing 
the process whereby the relationships defining the stage are being forged, 
the analysis examines the contradictions they contain as the basis for 
emerging patterns. Thus each set of arrangements is not examined in a 
static, but rather in a fluid and dynamic sense since it contains within 
it the patterns that may emerge dominant in the next stage. As contradic­
tions are resolved in the direction of one particular pattern, it in turn 
implies a different field of options setting the conditions for the emer­
gence of succeeding patterns. The task therefore becomes one of narrowing 
down possible outcomes. In analyzing the process whereby the links between 
groups take shape, the analysis examines the contradictions involved in 
order to ascertain, to the maximum extent feasible, which connections are 
likely to prevail and which are less likely.
A number of difficulties became apparent in applying this theoreti­
cal framework. On the theoretical level itself, there would seem to be an 
almost limitless number of possible outcomes to be considered. Each com­
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bination of groups contains within it a number of different combinations 
that could emerge, and each of these in turn, can lead to a variety of 
diverse sets. In addressing this problem, Cardoso and Faletto's category 
of the transitional period constitutes an important contribution to depen­
dency theory. It is during a transitional period that shifts in the pat­
terns of dominance become most discernible and it is during this time that 
the process of different combinations of groups vying with each other to 
impose their aims, assumes particular intensity. It is also during the 
transitional period that one of these begins to consolidate its position 
vis-a-vis the others. The transitional process is therefore a dialectical 
one involving both the dissolution of the dominant coalition and the con­
solidation of the modified or new configuration emerging as dominant.
Hence, focusing on the relative shifts in influence and power among and 
between the major foreign and local groups during the transitional 
period, provides the analytical handle for narrowing down the variety of 
developmental patterns that could result and for ascertaining the most 
likely outcomes.
Though outweighed by its benefits, the application of the concept 
of transitional period nevertheless presented some difficulties. How do 
we distinguish a transitional period from any other stage? In analyzing 
a transitional process between developmental patterns, what sets it apart? 
Where do we begin chronologically and where do we end? Within the theoreti­
cal framework adopted here there is no ultimate resolution to these prob­
lems. Since it contains within it the next stage, every stage is in a 
sense a transitional period. Moreover, a transitional process between 
patterns of dependency encompasses several stages, as this analysis of 
Peronism amply demonstrated. Perhaps, because it reconstructs reality more
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faithfully, along with simplicity in causality, a dialectical methodology 
must also pay the price of lacking elegance in being able to offer a clear- 
cut demarcation between categories representing aspects of one process. 
Nevertheless, four conditions1 extrapolated from Cardoso and Faletto's 
formulation and from the Argentine experience, though a priori, proved 
useful in specifying the important elements operative in the Argentine 
case.
These problems were more than compensated for by the results the 
analysis yielded. Though I had to cover much historical ground and a vast 
amount of detail within it, the study's theoretical framework afforded 
insights into determinative trends, as these took shape, that could not 
have been gained in any other way. The study's broad scope posed a diffi­
cult challenge, but its rewards were great. Many facets of the Peronist 
experience that appeared paradoxical and inexplicable at first, became 
clear and understandable as part of an ongoing process. Looking at the 
complex surface reality of each period separately, would never have allowed 
us to discern the underlying process tying each of them together.
The theoretical application of the concept of transitional period 
may prove useful in another sense. This analysis of Peronism provides a 
case study with which to assess the literature that interprets populism in 
Latin America as a transitional phenomenon arising out of the disintegra­
tion of externally oriented growth. A glimpse at some of this literature 
on populism reveals some striking parallels to the results of this study. 
Indeed, the interpretations of other Latin American populist episodes are 
so similar that they come close to constituting a confirmation of the con­
clusions derived from this research. For example, an article by Jose^
1See pp. 23-5 above.
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Alvaro Moises on the Brazilian case, an analysis of the Cardenas period 
in Mexico,* and Regis Andrade’s "Perspectives in the Study of Brazilian 
Populism," essentially argue that populism comes to power in a period 
of crisis, as an interregnum when the traditional order disintegrates.
Like this study, they see populism, in the sense of being a successful 
formula for state power, as a transitional phenomenon arising out of 
the disintegration of externally oriented growth. The political system 
structured around the dominance of the oligarchy based in the primary 
export sector is in disarray and populism occupies the vacuum left by the 
contradictions within the traditional ruling class.
This literature on populism also shares with this study the conclu­
sion that populism in power only remained viable in the favorable circum-
Both in the Latin American Research Unit's LARU Studies 2 (Oct. 
1977), entitled "Conflicts Within Populist Regimes, Brazil and Mexico." 
Another piece within this perspective is Rene Antonio Mayorga's "National- 
Popular State, State Capitalism and Military Dictatorship in Bolivia: 
1952-75," in Latin American Perspectives 5 (Spr. 1978). This article's 
analysis is especially close to that developed in this study. The theoreti­
cal framework applied by Mayorga is also fundamentally the same. The 
methodology is not deterministic. Mayorga perceives certain determinative 
moments in the socio-historical course of development. Responding to 
international and national economic and social forces, the elites in power—  
themselves a part of these forces— make some critical choices which set the 
parameters for subsequent development. Another article which presents ar­
guments very similar to those advanced in this study, is that by Kenneth 
Paul Erickson, "Populism and Political Control of the Working Class in 
Brazil." Erickson's analysis shows that populist politicians played an 
important role in derailing the potential for a more class conscious mili- 
tance on the part of Brazilian workers. In this way, by undercutting the 
possibility of an effective organized resistance along class lines, popu­
lism facilitated dependent capitalist development in Brazil. Erickson also 
notes that populism can move in a "radical" direction. On balance however, 
unlike the Peronist movement when populism was out of power in Argentina, 
the integrative dimension prevailed in the Brazilian case.
^A LARP Working Paper, No. 23 (Nov. 1977).
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stances of an expanding economic pie. The parallels between the Argen­
tine and Brazilian cases are remarkable in this respect, as are the dyna­
mics of the class relations involved. In both instances, populism, with 
its nationalist and industrializing impulses, was able to assert itself 
because the crisis of the thirties had weakened the oligarchy's material 
base in the primary export sectors. As dominance (at least on the level 
of policy-orientation) by industrialists began to coalesce, agrarian 
interests withdrew their support from the regime, which in turn led the 
regimes to appeal even more strongly to their working class base. Just as 
this analysis concluded for Argentina, the literature on the Brazilian 
case attributes the fall of populism from power to the contradictions in its 
capital-labor alliance which could not be contained once the favorable con­
fluence of international-national factors no longer held. *
To maintain themselves in power, populist states must be able to 
contain the fundamental contradiction underlying them. This can only be 
done when the economic conditions make it materially possible to both en­
gage in the distributive measures necessary to satisfy their popular base 
as well as meeting the requirements for internal accumulation posited by a 
capitalist industrialization model. Another major conclusion of this analy­
sis of Peronism borne out in the literature on populism is that unless the 
regime moves decisively towards the socialistic side of its contradictory 
class formula at a time when it does not appear necessary to do so; that 
is, if the populist state does not abandon promoting the interests of 
industrialists while the economic conditions are advantageous; then the
*LARU Working Paper, No 23. (Nov. 1977), pp. 50-1.
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interests of the popular sectors are invariably sacrificed once the economy 
enters its downward phase.*
Another parallel theme with this study, most starkly formulated in 
the Andrade article, interprets populism as a kind of de facto form of 
bourgeois supremacy, carrying out a program serving the interests of the 
national bourgeoisie, particularly those sectors with a base in manufactur­
ing. However, as Andrade forcefully points out, "the agents," those who 
take state power and implement the decisive economic policies, are not con­
scious of their role and do not even perceive themselves as representing 
any particular social sector.
In general, the literature examining the particularities in the
2form taken by populism in the Latin American experience confirms this 
study’s assessment of the contradictions in the attempt to promote national 
capitalism by trying to create an alliance of native capitalists and labor 
on the basis of meeting the interests of both groups simultaneously. This 
is one of the powerful insights brought to bear in Liisa North and David
Two recent articles examining Mexico's Partido Revolucionario 
Institucional and Venezuela's Accion Democratica as examples of populism, 
support this thesis. See Nora Hamilton, "State-Class Alliances and Con­
flicts: Issues and Actors in the Mexican Economic Crisis," Latin American 
Perspectives 11 (Pall 1984): 6-32 and Daniel Hellinger, "Populism and Nation­
alism in Venezuela : New Perspectives on Accion Democratica," Latin American 
Perspectives 11 (Fall 1984): 33-59. Interestingly, the authors differentiate 
these cases from the Brazilian and Argentine in that populism did not under­
go severe crisis and collapse to military dictatorships, because oil provided 
them a material foundation their southern counterparts lacked. Similarly, 
the analysis of the dynamic which led the two populist parties from, on the 
one hand, being defenders of their respective national partimonies to, on 
the other, facilitating the entry of foreign interests, also parallels this 
study of Peronism.
2This study adopts the concept of "populist-nationalism" as the most 
concise way of expressing these particularities. For a recent work offering 
differing interpretations of the populist phenomenon in the Latin American con­
text, see that edited by Michael L. Conniff, Latin American Populism in Com­
parative Perspective (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico, 1982).
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Raby's analysis of the 1934-40 Cardenas period in Mexico.'*' Their analysis 
not only concurs with the general conclusions reached in this study of 
Peronism, but comes amazingly close on some of the details as well. North 
and Raby’s analysis of c/rdenas' political orientation shows it to be 
almost identical to Peron's, particularly in the area of capital-labor
2relations and in its stance towards national and international capital.
Moreover, Cardenas' reliance on mass mobilization and the fact that the
working class constituted his most reliable base, were also very similar 
3to Peronism. In addition, just as in the 1945-55 decade in Argentina, 
Cardena's earlier pro-labor policies were later supplanted with restrictions. 
And, just as with Peronism, capital was regulated only to the extent that 
it was supposed to "serve the common good.""* Finally, Cardenas, too, ul­
timately hesitated to use his working class base at at time when it might 
have made a decisive difference.
^Liisa North and David Raby, "The Dynamic of Revolution and Counter­
revolution: Mexico Under Cardenas, 1934-40" in LARU 2 (Oct. 1977).
2Ibid., p. 27.
3On the role of mass mobilization and the working class, Cardenas
asserted:
Worker organization, the same as peasant organization, is indispensable 
for the enforcement of the country's laws. As I have said on previous 
occasions, the good will of public officials and the clauses contained 
in the legislation which binds us are not sufficient. It is necessary 
for a superior force, which can only be that of the organized workers, 
to join in overcoming the resistances which unfortunately oppose the 
economic betterment of our people. (Ibid., p. 30.)
4Ibid., p. 28. 5Ibid., p. 29.
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/North and Raby's analytical conclusions on the Cardenas variant 
of populist-nationalism are almost a carbon copy of those derived from 
this analysis of Peronism. In the first place, the authors point out 
that the Cardenas episode cannot be properly understood outside of the 
context of both the internal and external factors operating in the conjunc­
ture of the Great Depression.-^ Secondly, because of the heterogeneity of 
the social forces involved, the Cardenas period represented a fluid situa­
tion with a multiplicity of outcomes having been possible. Thirdly, the 
ultimate limits of the "socialist" direction implicit in Cardenismo were 
not fixed beforehand. In other words, the regime could conceivably have 
moved much further in this direction than it did. And fourthly, Cardenas'
project was ultimately "for the bourgeoisie" which was incapable of
2carrying it out on its own.
Before moving on to considering the contribution this study makes 
toward an understanding of the Argentine situation, some further theoreti­
cal observations need to be mentioned. A problem previously referred to 
is the length of the historical time the theoretical framework calls for 
the analysis to cover. I also noted the problem that arises from the
amount of historical detail that needs to be covered in analyzing each 
3period. How do we delineate what is "significant" from what can be 
ignored? In Chapter 1 we saw that the theory contains some guidelines 
and criteria that help to structure the analytical strategy, such as pre­
valent modes of economic activity, the structures of production and distri­
bution involved, the interests of major groups that arise from their posi­
1 2North and Raby, p. 25. Ibid., p. 26.
3On pp. 415-6 above.
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tions within these structures, and the orientations and values that flow 
from the particular interests a group seeks to promote or defend.'*' In spite 
of these guidelines and criteria, a good deal of "common sense" judgment 
is inevitable— judgments which can only be justified by the results they 
yield.
Establishing the connections between material factors— modes of 
economic activity, structures of production and distribution, the positions 
and interests of the major groups involved— and subjective variables— the 
consciousness of the major groups of their identity and the form this 
consciousness takes, the perception of their interests and of the other 
actors involved,' their actions and the relationships they forge with 
other groups— moving from the objective level to the subjective level, and 
vice versa, remains-a problem. In addressing this difficulty, an adapta­
tion of Antonio Gramsci's theoretical framework for analyzing "relations
2of force" in a given situation was found to be useful even though Gramsci's 
framework does not fundamentally resolve the problem.
Gramsci's scheme distinguishes three levels in any given reality.
The objective level is defined by the degree to which the productive 
forces are developed and by the relations of production involved. This 
objective level is ultimately manifested in the class structure which is 
the subject of investigation. The objective level leads to the subjective 
level, or the degree and type of consciousness of class. Finally, this
*"See pp. 18-9 above.
2I have paraphrased and extrapolated from the section in Antonio 
Gramsci's Selections from the Prison Notebooks (New York: International 
Publishers, 1971), edited by Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith, 
contained on pp. 175-85.
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subjective level leads to the activist level, or the political actions of 
the actors involved. Analysis of the first level establishes the type 
of society and hence the types of consciousness that can be expected 
realistically. Analysis of the subjective level in turn, establishes the 
most likely courses of action. In turn, analysis of the specific social 
relations reinforced and or undermined by political actions establishes 
the ways in which the particular actions analyzed both react back on 
the objective level as well as influencing the subjective level. The 
causality in this scheme is therefore the same as that in the theoretical 
framework applied in this study: it is both dialectical and also involves 
a process whereby the options determining a given situation, set the condi­
tions that the next set of options must contend with.
Applying Gramsci's scheme involves the not inconsiderable task of 
operationalizing these rather broad and abstract categories. Then assum­
ing a procedure is found that makes this an achievable task, and assuming 
it is successfully carried out, we are still left with the fundamental 
problem we began with: how do we move from the material to the subjective 
and vice versa, what is the exact nature of the connections between the 
three levels? The answer to this methodological dilemma can only be that 
the analysis is justified if it clarifies the relationships significant 
to a deeper understanding of the social reality under investigation. Such 
indeed, was the case with the theoretical framework applied in this study.
The theoretical framework applied enables us to organize the "signi­
ficant" facts without straining either the relationships established by 
theory or the empirical contents of the reality being analyzed. The results 
that follow from the model of the process analyzed accord with observed 
reality: the outcome that follows from the model corresponded with what
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"in fact" took place. The problem of course, is that there is a certain 
amount of teleological reasoning involved. The logic remains to a certain - 
degree circular and cannot completely free itself of the "truth by defini­
tion" stigma. It could only do so if it were able to "predict" in the 
unambiguous manner of an experiment with controls conducted in a laboratory 
setting. The problem that remains therefore, is that the methodology 
followed in this study does not allow for "prediction" in the sense that 
a positivistic, unilinear model might.
We saw that the theoretical framework applied to Peronism yielded 
an analysis that "predicted" at least two major possible outcomes based on 
the ways the contradictions within Peronism might have been resolved.
The outcome that did occur could only be "predicted" based on the direction 
Peronism leaned in resolving its contradictions.* Seen from the vantage 
point of "grand theory building" or from the optimistic expectations found 
in modernization literature's heyday of the late fifties and early sixties, 
the achievements of the methodology applied in this study may seem modest 
indeed. Yet, by the criterion of not contradicting observed reality alone, 
the analysis yielded by this study's theoretical framework represents an 
important improvement over the mainstream literature.
Ultimately, the justification for the theoretical model used to 
analyze Peronism was the "understanding" it produced. By focusing on the 
factors needed to analyze the important relationships, and by clarifying 
the contradictions within them, a deeper and more comprehensive assessment 
of the phenomena under scrutiny was gained than would have been possible




Though it cannot lead to prediction with any degree of certainty, 
this analysis of Peronism can provide an understanding of the dynamic 
elements operative below the surface of current Argentine politics. It 
will be recalled that the theoretical model this study relied on conceived 
of each stage as, in a sense, the product of the previous stage. Since 
each stage contains within itself the next, a thorough analysis of one 
stage provides the insights needed to understand its successor. For this 
reason, analyzing the basic continuities of a developmental pattern with 
its immediate predecessor and the ways in which it diverged, proved useful 
in specifying and clarifying the contradictions within one stage, and 
thereby also helped to provide an understanding of the manner in which 
these might be reformulated in the next stage.
Thus, the 1930-43 period was analyzed as a modification of the 
externally oriented growth pattern that prevailed before 1930. The basic 
continuity consisted in that the agro-exporting sector remained the founda­
tion of economic activity and social and political power. The contra­
dictions within this stage arose from the modifications (departures from 
the previous pattern) introduced to salvage externally oriented growth. 
Chapter 3 showed the conditions resulting from these contradictions which 
made Peronism a viable response. In the same way, analyzing the continuity 
and differences in the Peronist developmental model with that of the 1930- 
43 stage, served as an analytical handle in delineating the contradictions
"'‘In this respect, Jean Jordan Kirkpatrick's "Peronist Politics 
in Argentina; Composition, Expectations and Demands of the Mass Base "
Ph.D. Dissertation (Columbia University, 1968), though it contains useful 
data, falls short theoretically. Kirkpatrick's work is analytically thin 
and does not contribute to an in-depth understanding of the subject.
within it; which in turn, led to the demise of the internally oriented 
growth model and its reformulation into the pattern of dependent industri­
alization.
What then did the application of the dependency theory framework 
in this study reveal about the underlying dynamics of Argentine development 
What were the insights and understanding derived from analyzing the major 
modes of economic activity and shifts therein as these affected the 
evolving class structure and particularly the determinative relationships 
within and between national and foreign groups?
Chapter 2 began the analysis of the developing class structure in 
the context of the predominant forms of economic activity. Its basic 
point was that an oligarchy entrenched itself at the apex of the social 
structure through the ownership of vast tracts of land used for raising 
and cultivating agro-pastoral goods for export. The oligarchy used its 
economic power to control the state and, at the same time, the state played 
a key part in the consolidation of the oligarchy's economic and social po­
sition. Indeed, the state was instrumental in conferring ownership over 
thousands of acres of land to the handful of families comprising the oli­
garchy. The state was also instrumental in cementing the relationships 
between the locally dominant groups and the representatives of foreign 
capital, which provided the foundation for the externally oriented growth 
pattern. The strategic structures for the drainage of capital were estab­
lished through regulations that guaranteed monopoly conditions for foreign, 
mostly British investors over export and finance. Hence the British- 
owned railroads, meat-packing plants, port facilities, and their control 
of banking.
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In analyzing the externally oriented growth pattern, Chapter 2 
also covered the gradual shift from Great Britain to the United States as 
the dominant external pole in Argentine development. Beginning with the 
First World War and continuing into the twenties, within the traditional 
two-way flow of exchanging rural exports for industrial imports which linked 
Argentina to the United Kingdom, a three-way pattern was taking shape. 
England’s importance as a market continued, indeed increased, but the 
U.S. began displacing Great Britain as the major source for imports. 
Increasingly, Argentina came to depend on her favorable trade balances 
with England to cover her deficits with the United States.
Chapter 3 analyzed the policies of the thirties which represented 
the oligarchy's response to the shifts undermining the externally oriented 
growth pattern. Though these policies succeeded in revitalizing the Anglo- 
oligarchic relationship on a modified basis, the contradictions that these 
modifications gave rise to in turn provided the conditions that made Peron­
ism a viable response. Even though confined to a limited import substitut­
ing variety, the growth of domestic manufacturing was the key factor in 
this process. Industrial activity expanded even as it was kept in a sub­
ordinated position; the labor force increased while its demands were sup­
pressed. Thus Peron was able to build a mass movement on labor's demands 
while he held out the promise of expanded production for industrialization.
The greatly enlarged scope of action for the state that was 
needed to address the threat to the ongoing relations of production result­
ing from the crisis of the thirties, meant growth in the size and strength 
of the state apparatus. Homogeneity of the old power structure through 
which the interests of the dominant agrarian sectors and their foreign al­
lies were expressed was now swept away by the modifications required to
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maintain the equilibrium of the economic structures under stress. This 
led to greater autonomy for the state which, in turn, was further rein-' 
forced by the fact that it no longer simply translated the interests of 
the ruling class but now had to take into account those around the accumu­
lation of industrial capital. The state became more of a mediator in the 
increasingly complex power bloc . This tendency reached its high point 
in the Peronist state. State intervention and, correspondingly, growth in 
the bureaucracy increased greatly in the forties. In this sense Peronism 
represented a continuation of existing trends. The fundamental difference 
was that, ironically, the strengthened state was used against the very 
sectors responsible for its growth.
Chapters 2 and 3 examined the first two conditions for the emer­
gence of a transitional period. They analyzed 1) crises in the interna- - 
tional system and their domestic repercussions, and 2) the developing 
infrastructure for the emerging pattern, the growth of the manufacturing 
sector. Chapters 4 and 5 look at the last two conditions for a transi­
tional process to take place. They deal 3) with the mobilization of a 
political force strong enough to counter that of the traditionally domi­
nant groups, and 4) with the material conditions necessary to realize the 
new pattern.
Peronist policies represented a direct continuity with the poli­
cies developed in the thirties in as much as they promoted an import sub­
stituting industrialization within a capitalist framework, principally 
centered on industry with a lower organic composition of capital. Peronism 
departed from its predecessors in that it sought to resolve the contradic­
tions in the limited import substituting industrial development of the 
thirties through the full scale import substituting model of internally
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oriented growth of the forties. The theme in the analysis of Chapters 
4 and 5 was to show how Peronist policies transformed existing contradic­
tions through an impact that led from quantitative to qualitative change, 
and in the process created the contradictions which in turn led to the dis­
integration of the Peronist developmental model.
Chapter 4 showed that the quantitative increase in industrial 
activity under Peronism produced a developmental pattern that diverged 
qualitatively from the modified externally oriented growth of the thirties 
in several fundamental aspects:
1. Peronism reversed the traditional relationship and subordinated rural 
interests to promote industrial development
2. Directly counter to the policies of the previous period, Peronism dis­
mantled the British presence within the Argentine economy and
3. The predominant forms of economic activity shifted from supplying 
external markets to being oriented towards the internal market
Analyzing the continuity and differences in the Peronist develop­
mental pattern with that of the immediately prior period also facilitated 
an appraisal of Peronism1 s strengths and weaknesses. In that it accurately 
reflected the contradictions of the thirties, Peronism's achievements and 
limitations can be traced to the populist-nationalist doctrine it appro­
priated from the critics of the Anglo-oligarchic connection of the "infa­
mous decade." Chapter 4 showed how the inclusiveness of populist-national­
ist doctrine served Peronism well in mobilizing a broad-ranging coalition 
to counter the previously dominant interests. In addition, the simplistic 
view of industrialization as a cure-all in populist-nationalist doctrine 
provided Peronism a useful impetus since it was in tune with the transi­
torily beneficial conditions of the World War II and post-war period. 
Externally, the wartime conditions increased the demand for Argentina's 
traditional exportables thus making for an accumulation of foreign
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exchange reserves, while the lack of competition from foreign producers 
allowed Argentine manufacturers to increase production. Internally, the 
traditionally powerful socio-economic groups were in disarray, which made 
the political pressure generated from Peronism*s mass mobilization more 
effective and made possible the regime's social and sectoral redistribu­
tive policies benefiting industrial development.
This was the favorable confluence of factors that facilitated 
Peronism's achievements. The regime was able to cover the costs for the 
two interrelated areas wherein its policies showed the most dramatic suc­
cesses. In the industrial area, Peronism achieved one of the highest 
growth rates in Argentine history and, in the area of social welfare, the 
most equitable distribution of wealth ever recorded. The one was tied to 
the other in that industrialization depended on mobilization, and mobiliza­
tion depended on the material benefits derived from the regime's redistri­
butive policies.
The Peronist program, derived from its populist-nationalist doctrine, 
was an attempt to forge a multi-class coalition centered around national 
industrialists and the urban working class. The Peronist state acted as 
a substitute for a weak and non-selfconscious national bourgeoisie. By 
implementing a program serving their interests, the Peronist state 
functioned as an instrument of the national bourgeoisie. In a fundamental 
sense it was thus acting in contradiction to its social base which remained 
overwhelmingly working class. However, in the favorable conjuncture within 
which Peronism operated during the first half of its decade in power, this 
contradiction remained latent. Chapter 4 showed that despite the regime’s 
systematic efforts to promote the interests of national industrialists, as 
a class, they remained in the ranks of the opposition^ The close proximity
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of the dominant sector within the industrial bourgeoisie to the oligarchy 
may provide a partial explanation for this paradox. Such a proximity would 
also account for the espousal of a qualified industrializing program in 
the thirties.
Consistent with its populist-nationalist doctrine, Peronism 
viewed national capitalists as a progressive force and believed that the 
promotion of manufacturing activity in and of itself, without the need to 
alter relations of production, was sufficient to achieve national libera­
tion. In this sense Peronism was an essentially bourgeois doctrine. Thus, 
though its underlying contradictions contained some revolutionary strains 
calling for changes transcending the existing order, Peronism remained a 
reformist regime, an outgrowth of the socio-economic currents and accumu­
lated grievances that found fertile soil in the conditions of the forties.
A major preoccupation in Peronist policies was to prevent class struggle 
from "spilling over" from the sphere of circulation into'that of production.
yPeron often justified the social welfare measures undertaken by his regime
as means of giving the workers a stake in the system.
Confining reforms to the sphere of circulation was a source of both 
strength and weakness for Peronism. A source of strength because the re­
gime's redistributive measures coincided with the favorable conjuncture 
and Peronism was thus able to achieve the major successes that it did. 
Following a path that scrupulously sought to avoid class conflict allowed 
Peronism to make greater gains in the area of social welfare and industrial
growth than it could otherwise have achieved. As Chapters 5 and particularly
6 showed, the weakness in this approach was that once the favorable context 
no longer held, the class contradictions in the Peronist formula made it 
impossible to sustain these gains. Similarly, the inclusiveness of Peronism's
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populist orientation was the positive side that allowed it to undertake 
a broad-ranging popular mobilization, providing the regime an effective 
political tool with which to counter the power of the traditionally domin­
ant interests. This glossing over of class distinctions was also, however, 
the negative side that prevented Peronism from effectively confronting its 
contradictions at a time when the conditions were most advantageous.
The survey of Peronism's orientation towards the major social 
groups and of the attitudes of the major actors in the class structure 
towards the regime in Chapter 4 concluded that the Peronist period was 
the decisive stage in the transitional process. The fact that Peronism 
chose to use the state and popular mobilization as "pressure" to influence 
class relations indirectly, rather than restructuring state power on a 
class basis to use it in altering relations of production, played a key 
part in determining the nature of the succeeding developmental pattern. 
Chapter 5 showed that in failing to confront its underlying contradictions, 
Peronism's populist-nationalist orientation proved a hindrance in making 
the readjustments that would have given it a better chance to surmount 
the developing crisis of the fifties.
Of course to have moved explicitly to establish a socialist state 
and promote accumulation of capital outside of the framework of capitalist 
relations of production would have entailed staggering costs. The oligarchy 
and industrial bourgeoisie would most likely have precipitated a civil 
war. The one million dead Peron spoke of may be a somewhat exaggerated 
estimate, but clearly the price for a revolutionary confrontation in Argen­
tina would be high.*" Moreover, as every other attempt to achieve a social-
^See p. 328 above.
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ist transformation in the Third World context demonstrates, the internal 
upheaval combined with concerted pressure from international capitalist 
forces exacts a heavy long term toll. Like their Cuban and Nicaraguan 
counterparts, Argentine workers would have had to sacrifice higher levels 
of consumption for decades. However, given the reality of the three 
decades after Peron's overthrow, it is not at all clear that such a price 
tag would not ultimately have proven to be cheaper. In the first place, 
Argentine workers did bear the major cost for the attempt to provide a 
profitable climate for multinational capital and the agro-exporting oli­
garchy. Secondly, the campaign to repress the forces for revolutionary 
change was a costly one in human lives. Finally, the result of opting 
for development within a capitalist framework is an Argentina in chaos 
with only the bleakest prospects for the future.
In any event, to weigh the ultimate consequences of the program­
matic thrusts implicit in the policies of the 1943-50 period is beyond the
scope of this study. The methodology pursued by the analysis is less con­
cerned with speculating about hypothetical outcomes than it is to highlight . 
the dynamics underlying the actual course of events as these took shape in 
the prior stage. It is in this context that the implications of Peronism's 
opting to move toward the capitalist pole in its labor-national bourgeoisie 
alliance are evaluated.
Overall, Peronism's shortcomings were not found to lie in the steps 
the regime took to confront the external pole in Argentina's dependency.
Given the limited control it had over this area, the Peronist government
moved about as effectively as it could. Indeed, the creation of I.A.P.I.,
liquidating the foreign debt and minimizing financial dependency, eliminating 
foreign control over the internal transportation network with the nationali­
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zation of the railroads and port facilities, the building of a strong 
Argentine merchant marine, all represented major achievements in the 
quest for economic independence. Argentina has never had greater control 
over its export structures. Peronism's basic weakness lay in its neg­
lecting to alter the internal relations over which it could have wielded 
greater control. This deficiency derived from the social relations Peron­
ism' s populist-nationalist doctrine led it to promote.
Peronism delivered the final deathblow to the hegemony of British 
interests within the Argentine economy. In this respect also Peronist 
policies represented a case of quantitative change leading to qualitative 
change. The policies of the thirties represented an attempt to salvage 
externally oriented growth through its modification by promoting a certain 
degree of internally oriented growth. By intensifying this trend, Peronism 
ended up subordinating foreign trade to the exigencies of internally ori­
ented growth. While the nationalistic policies pursued by Peronism in 
the industrial area and in relation to foreign investments eroded the 
foundations of Great Britain's hegemony, they did not fundamentally harm 
U.S. interests. In contrast to the policies of the thirties, the steps 
Peronism took prevented even a partial resurgence of British interests 
within the Argentine economy. This was the visible side of Peronism's 
program for economic independence. Chapter 5 examined the less visible 
side of Peronism's import substituting industrialization and analyzed how 
it expedited the process whereby the U.S. replaced England as hegemonic 
within Argentina's economy.
The analysis showed Peronist policies to be a case of quantita­
tive change leading to qualitative change. Peronist industrialization did 
not differ in content, but its magnitude did to the extent that it changed
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the predominant form of economic activity; which in turn produced a shift in 
Argentina's relations to external economic groups. The corollary to the 
accelerated import substituting industrialization promoted by Peronism 
was an increased dependence on imported machinery and capital goods. 
Examination of the trade patterns for the Peronist decade showed that a 
tripartite pattern, whereby Argentina had to realize favorable balances in 
its European trade in order to cover the growing deficits in its trade 
with the U.S., replaced the traditional two-way flow that had been the 
basis for the Anglo-oligarchic connection. This three way pattern was 
conceptualized in this study as "indirect dependency."
In accordance with the theoretical framework which conceived 
of Peronism as the pivotal stage in the transitional process between 
externally oriented growth and dependent industrialization, the analysis 
in Chapter 5 looked inside indirect dependency for the key elements shaping 
the next developmental pattern. The data analyzed showed a discernible 
shift from indirect dependency to dependent industrialization.*- This was 
especially noticeable as the favorable conjuncture for the Argentine econ­
omy deteriorated in the fifties. European recovery from the war and the 
imposition of trade barriers, as well as competition from U.S. and Canadian 
wheat exporters, cut into Argentina's financial base for importing raw 
materials, machinery and equipment needed for continued expanded production. 
Moreover, increased local consumption of foodstuffs due to populist-national­
ist redistributive policies further complicated matters.
In addition to examining the external sources of the crisis of the 
fifties, Chapter 5 also analyzed the forms the regime's response took and
■̂ See pp. 313-20 above.
436
how its "choices" shaped subsequent developments. As conditions worsened, 
the contradictions within Peronism could no longer be contained. The 
regime had two basic programmatic directions, both of them implicit in 
the policies of the 1943-50 period, in which it could have moved. It 
could have strengthened capitalist development or it could have moved in 
a socialist direction. Both had severe socio-economic and political costs 
attached to them. Peron responded slowly and in a vacillating manner which 
was a major factor in the survival and resilience of Peronism in the post- 
1955 era. Hence workers were able to cling on to the myth of "Peron as the 
champion of labor" in their fight against regimes that were carrying out 
more clear-cut versions of policies the Peronist government of the fifties 
was already beginning to implement.
Analysis of the First Five Year Plan (1947-51) showed it to be a 
programmatic expression of the attempt to forge an alliance between the 
industrial proletariat and bourgeoisie at the expense of the agro-exporting 
sector. With the favorable conjuncture gone, this attempt no longer proved 
tenable and. the Second Five Year Plan (SFYP) expressed the regime's intended 
readjustments. The SFYP began to formalize a new relationship towards 
bourgeois sectors revolving around the land-owning oligarchy and those 
involved in the production of durable and capital goods, at the expense of 
the workers.
In applying the study's theoretical framework, the analysis found 
four determinative shifts in the policies of the fifties which revealed the 
direction of the outcome of the transitional process under scrutiny:
1. The cost of development shifted from the surplus generated by the rural 
sector to that created by urban labor
2. In addressing the dual, potentially contradictory, development of indus­
try, the nascent heavy and capital goods branches were favored over the
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light, non-durable goods producing sector
3. Agricultural output was now promoted by providing material incentives 
to the oligarchy
4. There was movement away from the pursuit of economic independence and 
toward a greater role for foreign capital
Chapter 6 showed that these trends were consolidated in the decade 
after Peron's overthrow. In the sense that the 1955-65 policies essentially 
sought to promote capital accumulation at the expense of the working class 
while also giving foreign capital a greater role in Argentine development, 
there was a basic continuity with the 1950-5 period. As the program of 
"economic orthodoxy" incorporating the I.M.F.'s prescriptions during the 
Frondizi presidency showed with particular clarity, the extent to which 
these directions were pursued in the policies of the post-Peron decade 
again made this a case of "quantitative to qualitative change." The end 
result was a developmental pattern qualitatively different from the one that 
prevailed during the Peronist years. Peronism is seen as the pivotal stage 
in the transitional process because it promoted manufacturing until it 
became the predominant form of economic activity and thus elevated the in­
dustrial sector to the center of the nation's economy. Peronism thereby 
established the infrastructure for the emerging pattern. In addition, the 
direction in the regime1s policies which sought to resolve the contradictions 
within its populist-nationalist formula, also provided the foundation upon 
which the interests of the set of relationships between national and foreign 
groups emerging as dominant in the next period rested. That is, reinforcing 
capitalist relations of production and providing a stronger role for foreign 
capital guaranteed the emergence of a dependent industrial economy.
Chapter 6 examined the economic and political contradictions in the 
process whereby monopolistic multinational firms came to occupy the pivotal
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positions within the industrial sector, contradictions which eventually 
led to Peron's return to power after eighteen years of exile. The attack 
on the workers' living standards served to radicalize them politically.
State policies became the most important immediate determinant in income 
reallocation away from the lower income sectors. Hence, even the econ- 
omistic struggle for better wages was intensely politicized. The workers 
clung to Peronist doctrine as their link with the past when their interests 
had been promoted in government policy. Severe repression backfired; it 
cemented adherence to Peronism and increased working class combativeness.
In the 1955 coup the military had acted as an instrument of a 
bourgeois-oligarchic alliance against the working class side of Peronism's 
populist-nationalism. Though united in opposition to the industrial pro­
letariat, the agrarian and industrial and the national and international­
ized sectors of the bourgeoisie also had diverging interests. Once govern­
ment policies no longer promoted working class interests, their alliance 
fell apart on its internal contradictions in the course of the sixties.
In particular, policies favoring foreign capital also hurt national entre­
preneurs and finally drove them back into coalition with the workers in 
demanding the return of Peronism.
The hear two decades between the Peronism of the fifties and the 
seventies were a period of chaos and upheaval. Though the monopoly-multi- 
national sector of the bourgeoisie had their interests implemented in econ­
omic policy, they lacked "political hegemony." Therefore the pursuit of 
their interests aroused major and, at times, seriously debilitating, opposi­
tion. The Peronist heritage was the single most important factor in this 
opposition. Concessions had to be made and the monopoly-multinational 
project suffered periodic setbacks. Finally, with General Onganxa's coup in
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1966, the military attempted to overcome the lack of political consent 
from important sectors with the coercive power of the state. The Krieger 
Vasena Plan represented the most clear-cut imposition of the monopoly-multi­
national project. It succeeded only in bringing together all adversely 
affected sectors into the opposition and thus served to politically isolate 
the monopolistic-internationalized bourgeois sectors even further. The 
military reversed its strategy as General Lanusse replaced Ongania. Pre­
viously it was thought that economic development would produce political 
stability; now the thinking was that only political stability could lead 
to economic development. The military had to confront the bitter truth: 
only with Peronism back in power was there any hope of political stability.
The second Peronist period was an attempt to recreate the same 
basic coalition of classes as in the first period. Analysis of the Three 
Year Plan (TYP) showed the basic continuity in programmatic thrusts between 
the first and second Peronist periods. TYP failed because it was based on 
the same model of capital accumulation as the First and Second Five Year 
Plans. It depended on a favorable international context (for exports) to 
provide benefits for workers and capitalsits. When sufficient surplus 
could not be obtained through foreign trade, opting to stay within a capi­
talist framework meant asking workers to accept declining standards. The 
second Peronist regime replicated the experience of the first period: as 
the contradictions in its populist-nationalist formula intensified, it 
rapidly shifted its policies towards the capitalist pole in its underlying 
worker-national bourgeoisie Social Pact. However, the changed conditions 
telescoped the process that lasted a decade in the first period, into a 
year in the seventies. Thus, the much stronger and central position of 
foreign capital within the industrial economy meant a corresponding accel­
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eration in the abandonment of the measures protective of national capital, 
and hence a much more rapid policy reorientation towards the interests of 
the monopoly-multinational sector.
The most critical difference with the first period however, involved 
the role of the workers both in returning Peronism to power and also in 
undermining the regime once it was in power. In the first period, it will 
be recalled, Peron built and cultivated his ties to labor by using the 
resources at his disposal in his capacity as Minister of Labor and Social 
Welfare. The workers played the key role in keeping Peron in power as 
the events of October 17, 1945 dramatically illustrated; but they were not 
a factor in his original ascent to power. In the second period, the 
workers’ struggle was the main force behind Peron’s return to power, and 
their militance also provided the chief contradiction undoing his regime. 
During the period of Peron's exile, the correspondence between the govern­
ment’s policies attracting foreign capital with deteriorating conditions 
for the working class, brought out the socialistic side of Peronist doc­
trine for the workers. As a result, there was a much stronger and much 
more widespread anti-imperialist and socialist consciousness, as well as 
a heightened level of combativeness, than had prevailed in the forties and 
fifties among Argentine workers. Peron was dealing with a qualitatively 
different working class when he attempted to recreate a modified version 
of populist-nationalism in the seventies.
In contrast with the first period, the Peronist regime of the 
seventies was unable to control the workers' militance. Peron had depended 
on working class militance to get back in power, but his regime’s formula 
for retaining power was an alliance with middle sectors which rested on his 
government's ability to provide industrial peace and tranquility. As the
Peronist government began to promote the interests of the monopoly­
multinational sector, resulting in declining living standards for workers, 
they responded with increased strikes. Moreover, rather than diminishing, 
the influence of the Marxist and Peronist left among rank and file workers 
reached new heights. Maintaining its ties with bourgeois sectors, meant that 
the Peronist government had to suppress the left and the more revolution­
ary inclined in its own movement. In the two years it held power, the
Peronist regime was responsible for killing more than twice as many leftist
/militants than were killed in the eighteen years of Peron s exile. Rather 
than minimizing class struggle through conciliation and harmony, as it had 
done in the first period, the regime introduced the class war into the very 
heart of the movement, with the Peronist right and left butchering each 
other mercilessly. While the campaign of repression failed to stop the 
left, it did succeed in isolating the regime from its strongest base of 
support.
Unable to stem the wave of strikes and job actions or to erode the 
growing Marxist orientation among rank and file workers, the Peronist 
regime became superfluous and the military intervened to block the left 
from making further inroads into the working class. Chapter 6 concluded 
with a brief analysis of the programmatic thrust following upon the coup 
of 1976 and its implications. In the economic realm the Junta's program 
represented a rejection of the policy orientation that Peronism introduced 
and which predominated since 1943. Representing the traditional agro-based 
oligarchy, Economics Minister Martinez de Hoz sought to return Argentina 
to the role it had occupied in the international division of labor prior 
to the substantial development of the industrial sector. It amounted to 
the reintroduction of a modified externally oriented growth pattern with
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the major beneficiaries being large landowners producing for export, and 
domestic and foreign monopolies producing manufactured goods for the high 
income market. Once again, for the first time since the forties, agricul­
ture represented the largest proportion of the Gross Domestic Product.
The Junta's policies had a devastating impact on the popular 
sectors. In a half a decade the cost of living went from one end of the
spectrum to the other; from being one of the cheapest in Latin America in
1 2 the Peronist years, to being one of the most expensive. The devastat­
ing social costs of its economic policies made all the more necessary the 
Junta's campaign aimed at the annihilation of the left and the subjugation 
of labor.
Paradoxically, the very "success" of the Junta's policies in re­
orienting the axis of the economy brought about the contradictions that 
ultimately led to its demise. Once again a developmental pattern which 
hurt the interests of the national bourgeoisie was imposed largely through 
the latter's acquiescence in the repression of the working class. This 
represented the latest episode in one of the most striking characteristics 
of Argentine politics highlighted by this analysis of Peronism: the pendu­
lar motion in the role of the national bourgeoisie.
The Argentine experience illustrates the basic flaw in the attempt 
to achieve an independent capitalist development within a global economy 
dominated by advanced capitalist nations. In order to implement policies
^The streets of downtown Buenos Aires used to be filled with 
Brazilian tourists for whom the cost of the trip was offset by the savings 
in the consumer goods they had come to shop.
2In 1980 the cost of living in Argentina was second only to 
Venezuela's, where the per capita income is considerably higher.
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contrary to the interests of foreign competitors and their local allies, 
national capitalists depend on the working class as political allies: 
that is, they require the political force of the class whose economic 
interests are in fundamental contradiction to their own. Thus, in cer­
tain conjunctures, the interests of the national bourgeoisie coincide 
politically with those of the workers, but the latter remain their econo­
mic antagonists. As we have seen, in favorable international circumstances 
this contradiction can be postponed. However, when this situation no 
longer prevails, the bourgeoisie is driven by economic considerations to 
abandon its political ties to the popular sectors. Severing these ties 
inevitably results in the increasing subordination of its interests to 
those of the international sectors and thus ’drives the national bourgeosie 
back to seek out a new populist-nationalist coalition. Hence, the cyclical 
pattern in Argentine politics.
In the last chapter we saw that the national bourgeoisie left the 
Peronist fold in 1955 and participated in the attempt to remove Peronism 
from the Argentine body politic. As their position worsened through the 
pattern of dependent industrialization in the sixties, they became an 
important component in the coalition of forces that led to Peronism's 
return to power. During the second Peronist regime the drama resulting 
from the tension of the national bourgeoisie's political need of the work­
ing class and its economic contradiction with the workers repeated itself. 
In the pursuit of its economic interests the national bourgeoisie required 
a docile working class. . At the same time however, to counter the power 
of the internationalized bourgeoisie, foreign capital, and the traditional 
oligarchy, the national bourgeoisie needed a politically active working 
class. The experience of the first Peronist period was replicated, only
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in a much more intense and rapid fashion. The workers' demands were 
greater and the threat of the working class taking over the government as 
an instrument to promote their interests was much more serious. As a 
result, there was less ambiguity and hesitation on the part of the national 
bourgeoisie in resolving its contradictory relationship to the working 
class by opting for the repression of popular mobilization and militancy.
Again, analagous to its experience under the repressive military 
regime of the sixties, after the coup of 1976 the national bourgeoisie 
found its interests even more subordinated to those of the sectors most 
closely tied to foreign capital. The dialectical cycle arising from the 
contradictory nature of populist-nationalism thus again went full circle.
The political interests of the national bourgeoisie once again coincided 
with those of the industrial working class.
For its part too, since 1976 the military traversed a cycle anala­
gous to the course it travelled in. the late sixties and early seventies.
It began with an attempt to physically liquidate its political opposition. 
This, it hoped, would produce political stability and result in economic 
development. The political opposition was frozen but not silenced; the 
Junta's success in reorienting the Argentine economy did not produce 
political stability but instead undermined it.
Argentina's foreseeable future does not look bright. If democracy 
is to survive it must build a stronger base among the popular sectors with 
which to counter its internal foes when they resort to military power. In 
addition, a strong popular base is also essential if Argentine democracy 
is to be able to withstand the pressures, from foreign capital for an ever 
greater share of whatever capital the already overburdened Argentine economy 
is capable of accumulating in the future. That is, if the democratic
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experiment is to have any chance at all, it must become more populist 
and more nationalist.
As we saw in this study of Peronism, populist-nationalism can only 
succeed during those periods when international circumstances are favorable 
for the Argentine economy. Once the advantageous conditions deteriorate, 
populist-nationalism1s central contradiction surfaces. As a formula for 
exercising state power, populist-nationalism rests on its ability to secure 
the material basis for cementing its multi-class coalition centered on the 
alliance of national capitalists and industrial workers. Once it is unable 
to find the means with which to sustain improved living conditions for the 
masses, populist-nationalism is driven by its commitment not to alter capi­
talist relations of production to policies which cut back the working • 
class’ levels of consumption. Such policies result in increased working 
class militance which undermines capitalist accumulation. This brings 
the military back to power.
The dynamics of military rule in turn, bring about the conditions 
for populism’s return to power. The military rulers' first priority 
is to guarantee the stability of capitalist relations of production. They 
unleash a brutal campaign of repression against working class militance. 
Labor peace is enforced through intimidation, torture and murder. The 
generals also use the coercive power of the armed forces to back up an 
economic project that promotes the interests of the oligarchy and domestic 
and foreign monopoly capital as the basis for recovery. This restructur­
ing of economic activity not only harms the working class and popular 
sectors in general, but also erodes the position of the bourgeois sectors 
in the production and distribution of wage goods. Thus the stage is 
set for the reemergence of the populist-nationalist formula. Improved
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economic conditions for Argentina on the international scene then provide 
the opening for some form of populist-nationalism to regain power.
So the cycle continues as does its underlying cause: Argentina's 
dependency on foreign capital. Whether through the classical model of 
agrarian exporter where control is external through forces that determine 
the international market, or through industrial production centered on 
multinational corporate giants where control is internalized in the manu­
facturing sector, Argentina's economy remains dependent on foreign capital. 
Until social forces coalesce that are capable of effectively confronting 
Argentine dependency, Argentina which possesses the resources to provide 
a decent life for all its inhabitants, will continue to be torn apart in 
the drama characterized by pendular alternations between some variant of 
populist-nationalism and an increasingly fascistic form of military dic­
tatorship .
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